JUDGMENT A.N. VARMA, J. 1. THE petitioner is a professor in the Department of Psychology in the Aligarh Muslim University and was, at the relevant time, the Chairman of the Department. By means of this petition he has assailed the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Authority, Sri M. K. Vasudevan, the respondent no. 4, to hold and proceed with the enquiry which has been initiated against him. THE relief claimed is that the order dated 12-6-86 passed by the Vice Chancellor of the respondent University appointing Sri M. K. Vasudevan, formerly Commissioner for the Department of Enquiries, Central Vigilence Commission, as the Enquiry Authority to enquire into the charges framed against the petitioner be quashed. 2. THE sole ground of challenge to the impugned order dated 12-6-86 is that the power to appoint the Enquiry Authority vests exclusively under Statute 40 (3) (c) in the Executive Council and not in the Vice Chancellor and, consequently, the impugned order is a complete nullity. In order to appreciate the submissions made at the Bar, it will be necessary to set out the essential facts. On 13-5-86 the Vice Chancellor communicated to the petitioner his letter dated 12/13-5-86 enclosing therewith the substance of imputations of misconduct in respect of which an enquiry was proposed against the petitioner, a statement of imputations of misconduct in support of the article of charges as well as a list of witnesses and documents with the help of which the article of charges was proposed to be sustained. The letter stated that an enquiry was proposed against the petitioner under Statute 40 (3) (c) of the Statutes of the University. In response to this the petitioner by his letter dated 15 - 5-86 sought arbitration of the dispute under section 36 (2) of the Aligarh Muslim University Act. The petitioner also replied to the charges by his letter dated 15-5-86. On 16-5-86 the petitioner sent representation to the Prime Minister with a copy thereof to the Vice Chancellor. Thereupon the Vice Chancellor by his order dated 17-5 -86 suspended the petitioner under Statute 40 (3) (c) of the Statutes. Then followed the impugned order dated 12-6-86 passed by the Vice Chancellor appointing Sri M. K. Vasudevan as Enquiry Authority to enquire into the charges against the petitioner mentioned in the memorandum dated 13-5-86. Thereupon the Vice Chancellor by his order dated 17-5 -86 suspended the petitioner under Statute 40 (3) (c) of the Statutes. Then followed the impugned order dated 12-6-86 passed by the Vice Chancellor appointing Sri M. K. Vasudevan as Enquiry Authority to enquire into the charges against the petitioner mentioned in the memorandum dated 13-5-86. Sri Vasudevan acting on this letter fixed certain dates in July, August and September, 1986 for holding the enquiry. The petitioner applied for and was granted adjournment of the proceedings and while the same were pending, presented this petition on 25-9-86. An interim order was granted the same day to the effect that the enquiry proceedings initiated against the petitioner shall go on but the petitioner's services shall not be terminated till further orders of this Court. 3. IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the University the various allegations of malafide made by the petitioner against the Vice Chancellor have been emphatically denied as completely false and baseless. Briefly, the stand taken by the University is that the facts and circumstances of the case were such as warranted immediately action against the petitioner. Consequently, the Vice Chancellor invoked the emergency powers vested in him under section 19 (3) of the aforesaid Act and in the very first meeting of the Executive Council held after the Vice Chancellor's order dated 12-6-86 the matter was placed before the Executive Council which approved the action taken by the Vice Chancellor. The action taken against the petitioner, it is asserted, is in consonance with the Statute 40 (3) (c). 4. WE begin with section 19 (3) of the Act and Statute 40 (3) (c) of the Statutes of the University around which the submissions at the Bar were centered. The same are extracted here:- "19(3). The action taken against the petitioner, it is asserted, is in consonance with the Statute 40 (3) (c). 4. WE begin with section 19 (3) of the Act and Statute 40 (3) (c) of the Statutes of the University around which the submissions at the Bar were centered. The same are extracted here:- "19(3). The Vice Chancellor may, if he is of opinion that immediate action is necessary on any matter, exercise any power conferred on any authority of the University by or under this Act and shall report to such authority the action taken by him on such matter, Provided that if the authority concerned is of opinion that such action ought not to have been taken, it may refer the matter to the visitor whose decision thereon shall be final, Provided further that any person in the service of the University who is aggrieved by the action taken by the Vice Chancellor under this sub section shall have the right to appeal against such action to the Executive Council within three months from the date on which decision on such action is communicated to him and thereupon the Executive Council may confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by the Vice Chancellor." "40 (3) (c). The Vice Chancellor may suspend a teacher against whom any misconduct is alleged and shall report the case to the next meeting of the Executive Council, but before any orders for dismissal are passed, the teacher shall be informed of the allegations made against him and shall be given a "reasonable opportunity to make such representation to the Executive Council or to any Committee thereof appointed for the purpose, as be may desire to make ; and further, he shall be entitled to claim the benefit of due enquiry, with full opportunity to inspect evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and offer his own evidence and witnesses, before the Executive Council or before a person or persons appointed by it to conduct the enquiry." The main contention raised by Sri Murli Dhar, learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Vice Chancellor clearly acted in excess of his jurisdiction in invoking the emergency powers under section 19 (3) inasmuch as, according to the petitioner, there did not exist any such emergency as to justify recourse to that provision. 5. THE submission is devoid of any merit. 5. THE submission is devoid of any merit. Let us examine the background in which the impugned order dated 12-6-86 came to be passed. THE petitioner had been placed under suspension by the Vice Chancellor on 17-5-86. This order was preceded by a charge sheet which had been served on the petitioner on 13-5-86. In the charge sheet it was specifically stated that a regular enquiry would be held if the article of charge was not admitted. However, in his reply/representation dated 15-5-86 the petitioner denied the various charges framed against him, thereby leaving the authorities free to go ahead with the regular enquiry contemplated under the latter part of Statute 40 (3) (c). THE first step towards the progress of enquiry was the appointment of the Enquiry Authority. As it happened, however, in June when the impugned order was passed, the University was closed on account of summer vacation and, according to the version put forward in the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents, the correctness of which we have no reason to doubt, the meeting of the Executive Council could not in view of the intervening summer vacation be convened before the end of August 1986. Having placed the Professor and Head of the Department under suspension on 17-5-86 and there being no prospects of the Executive Council meeting before the end of August 1986 the Vice Chancellor passed the impugned order appointing the enquiry Authority in order to avoid delay. 6. THESE facts, to our mind, indisputably furnished a legitimate occasion for invoking the emergency powers under Section 19 (3). The suspension of a senior Professor and Head of the Department was a serious matter and if disciplinary proceedings had to follow in the circumstances narrated above, it was but proper and desirable that the first step necessary for setting the disciplinary proceedings in motion should have been taken without any delay. Ordinarily, where a teacher who happens to be a senior Professor and Head of the Department is placed under suspension, we not only see no objection to the enquiry being expedited but we think that unless there are exceptional circumstances necessitating postponement of the enquiry, the Enquiry Authority should be appointed without any delay. The Vice Chancellor therefore, rightly took the action in appointing the Enquiry Authority by his order dated 12-6-86. The Vice Chancellor therefore, rightly took the action in appointing the Enquiry Authority by his order dated 12-6-86. That the action taken by the Vice Chancellor in appointing the Enquiry Authority was in the facts and circumstances justified, is further fortified by the fact that the Executive Council at its very first meeting held after 12-6-86 on 30-8-86 endorsed the action of the Vice Chancellor by approving the appointment of the Enquiry Authority at its meetings held on 30-8-86 and 27/28-9-86. We, therefore, overruling the petitioner's contention hold that the Vice Chancellor had not acted in excess of the authority vested in him under Section 19 (3). The second contention of the learned counsel was more or less an extension of the first submission The argument was that the very fact that the Vice Chancellor proceeded to appoint an Enquiry Authority in the exercise of his emergency powers under Section 19 (3) betrays a biased attitude as, according to the submission of the learned counsel, there was no such emergency as to warrant the exercise of that power. We have already commented upon the submission regarding the existence or otherwise of the circumstances in which powers under Section 19 (3) could be invoked. It is hence unnecessary to dilate on this contention further. We think that from the mere fact that the Vice Chancellor had appointed Sri M. K. Vasudevan as the Enquiry Authority in the exercise of his emergency powers, no malafide could be inferred. Sri M K. Vasudevan, as mentioned above, was a retired Commissioner of Vigilence, Government of India, and, had acted as the Enquiry Authority in a large number of cases. It is significant that the counsel for the petitioner had made no imputations against Sri Vasudevan personally nor against the capability or otherwise of Sri Vasudevan to act as the Enquiry Authority. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention also. 7. WE are, however, refraining from entering into the larger issue of malafides sought to be raised in the petition against the Vice Chancellor as our enquiry is confined only to the legality or propriety of the appointment of the Enquiry Authority by the Vice Chancellor. The petitioner himself has confined the challenge only to the issue of jurisdiction of Sri Vasudevan to act as the Enquiry Authority. The petitioner himself has confined the challenge only to the issue of jurisdiction of Sri Vasudevan to act as the Enquiry Authority. In paragraph 5 of the petition, the petitioner has expressly averred that he does not desire any decision on various other controversies sought to be raised with regard to the charges levelled against him. 8. BE that as it may in so far as the appointment of Sri Vasudevan as the Enquiry Authority is concerned, we find that the petitioner has totally failed to substantiate any of the grounds raised in the petition, whether those relating to the jurisdiction of the Vice Chancellor or even the charge of malafides alleged against him. This brings us to a subsidiary point raised by Sri Murli Dhar in regard to the scope of Statute 40 (3) (c). It was urged that under that statute the occasion for appointment of the Enquiry Authority had not yet arisen when the Vice Chancellor passed the impugned order on 12-6-86. Relying on the latter part of clause (c) beginning with and further he shall be entitled to claim the benefit of due enquiry.........learned counsel contended that it is only after the teacher being proceeded against asks for a full enquiry that the Executive Council is expected to appoint a person to conduct the enquiry. In the present case, it was urged, the petitioner had not asked for the fuller enquiry contemplated under the latter part of clause (c). 9. WE are unable to agree. The petitioner had in his reply dated 15-5-86 denied the charges framed against him. After that denial he had clearly become entitled to a regular enquiry with full opportunity to inspect evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, offer his own evidence and witnesses before the person appointed to conduct the enquiry as contemplated under clause (c). No form has been prescribed in which the teacher proceeded against has to indicate that he wants a regular enquiry to be conducted. Consequently, the Vice Chancellor rightly concluded that a regular enquiry has to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the latter part of clause (c). The occasion for appointing the Enquiry Authority had thus clearly arisen and the Vice Chancellor rightly appointed Sri Vasudevan to conduct the enquiry. 10. THAT takes us finally to the last submission. Consequently, the Vice Chancellor rightly concluded that a regular enquiry has to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the latter part of clause (c). The occasion for appointing the Enquiry Authority had thus clearly arisen and the Vice Chancellor rightly appointed Sri Vasudevan to conduct the enquiry. 10. THAT takes us finally to the last submission. The argument of Shri Murli Dhar was that the power of appointment of Enquiry Authority contemplated under Statute 40 (3) is by its very nature incapable of being exercised by the Vice Chancellor acting individually under Section 19 (3). In support, learned counsel placed particular reliance on clause (b) of Regulation 40 (3) which requires a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Executive Council present and voting. It was urged that where an action requires the majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting, it is something personal to the members and hence such an action cannot be taken by the Vice Chancellor acting singly. The submission is easily disposed of. Under Section 19 (3), the Vice Chancellor is authorised to exercise, subject to the conditions mentioned thereunder, all such powers as may be exercised by the Executive Council or other authorities constituted under the Act. And, where a resolution is passed by the Executive Council, it is the act of the Executive Council, whether the resolution is required to be passed by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting or a simple majority and not of the members personally voting in favour of the resolution only. It follows, therefore, as a necessary corollary that in emergency the Vice Chancellor can exercise all such powers as are exercisable by the Executive Council including those requiring two-thirds majority of the members present and voting subject, of course, to the conditions laid down under Section 19 (3). There is hence no substance in the argument. 11. BEFORE concluding, we may point out that on the request of the petitioner we permitted him to argue in person and add to the submissions already advanced on his behalf by Sri Murlidhar. However, his submissions were mainly confined to demonstrating that the charges framed against him are the outcome of a systematic campaign of vilification and victimization launched against him by the succeeding Vice Chancellor including the present incumbent because of his (petitioner's) secular views, etc. etc. However, his submissions were mainly confined to demonstrating that the charges framed against him are the outcome of a systematic campaign of vilification and victimization launched against him by the succeeding Vice Chancellor including the present incumbent because of his (petitioner's) secular views, etc. etc. We repeat what we told the petitioner that having regard to the limited scope of the controversy involved in the petition, namely, the competence or otherwise of the appointment of Enquiry Authority by the Vice Chancellor we do not propose to enter into the merits of the charges against the petitioner, particularly when the same have been enquired into and are pending decision before the respondents. 12. IN the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. The interim orders passed by this Court are discharged. Petition dismissed.