Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. This revision application arises out of an order dated 25-4-1988 passed by the Execution Munsif, Muzaffarpur in execution Case No. 13/6 of 1988, whereby and whereunder the said learned Court directed the petitioner (decree holder in the Execution Case) to give vacate possession of the suit premises in favour of the judgment-debtor by 2-5-1988. 2. The facts of this case lie in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner who was the land-lord of the tenant opposite party, filed a suit for eviction on the sole ground of personal necessity. According to toe petitioner, he requited the suit premises for the purpose of providing accommodation to his son Manjoor Hassan to start a business. The said suit was heard in terms of the procedure laid down under Sec. 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. 4. By a judgment, dated 13th January, 1988, the aforementioned suit was decreed, whereby and where under the learned trial court held that the petitioner has a bona fide requirement in respect of a premises of suit and thereby directed the tenant-opposite party to vacate the suit premises within one month from the date of judgment failing which the plaintiff shall have right to get the suit premises vacates through the process of Court. The petitioner filed an execution case for executing the aforementioned decree in the court of Execution Munsif, Muzaffarpur on 10-3-1988. The said decree has since been executed. 5. In the meanwhile, however, the opposite party filed a civil revision application in this Court, which was registered as Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988 and listed before one of the Hon ble Judges of this Court on 7-3-1988, on which date this Court is issued notice to the petitioner in the admission matter and further directed that, meanwhile, the operation of the said judgment was remain stayed. The petitioner has asserted that the opposite party did not intimate the Execution Court about the order of interim stay passed by this Court in the aforementioned Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988, which was communicated, allegedly for the first time on 22-3-1988. But, in the meanwhile, the decree in the aforementioned suit was executed on 17-3-1988 when delivery of possession of the suit premises was effected in favor of the petitioner. But, in the meanwhile, the decree in the aforementioned suit was executed on 17-3-1988 when delivery of possession of the suit premises was effected in favor of the petitioner. Thereafter, on 22-3-1988 and 24-3-1988 the opposite party filed two applications before the Executing Court to the effect that delivery of possession effected, although an interim order of stay was passed by this Court on 7-3-1988. The petitioner filed a rejoinder to the said application on 4-1988 alleging therein that the Executing Court had passed the order of delivery of possession without having any knowledge of the order of stay passed by this Court. 6. Thereafter, the opposite party filed an application before this Court in the aforementioned Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988 praying therein restoration of possession of the suit premises and by an order, dated 14-4-1988, this Court disposed of the said application, inter alia, observing there in as follows: In the instant case, an application has been filed, it is the common ground, before the Executing Court which has fixed some date for passing appropriate orders after hearing the parties. The petitioner will be well advised to make this submission before the execution court for appropriate orders. In the case at the present stage nothing can be done in his favor. If ultimately an order adverse to him is passed by the executing court, he may challenge it in proper proceeding. When such challenge is made, the matter shall be disposed of on its own merits, The said order dated 14-41988, as contained in Annexure- to this application, the petitioner has asserted that in the meanwhile his son has already commenced business in Sukha Bidi Patta after the petitioner obtained the delivery of possession in respect of the premises. 7. By the impugned order that learned court below purportedly to have held that as the stay order had been passed by this Court but despite thereof the decree has been executed, in the interest of justice, possession of the suit premises should be delivered to the judgment-debtor. 8. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised several contentions. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned court below, in his impugned order, did not record any finding as to why possession should be restored back to the judgment-debtor in the interest of justice. 8. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised several contentions. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned court below, in his impugned order, did not record any finding as to why possession should be restored back to the judgment-debtor in the interest of justice. Learned counsel further submitted that as the impugned order has been passed pending admission in the civil revision application and in view of the fact that the delivery of possession has affected, the civil revision application itself has become in fructuous and in such a situation the Executing Court was not justified in passing the impugned order. The learned Counsel further submitted that the order of interim stay, dated 7-3-1988 passed by this Court in the Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988, having not been communicated by this Court to the Executing Court, the decree holder cannot suffer owing to fault on the part of the court in not communicating the said order in time. 9. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party submitted that this civil revision application is not maintainable, as admittedly the court has passed an order ex debito justicia. The learned Counsel submitted that the court below in passing the impugned order has not committed any jurisdictional error and in that view of the matter the question of any interference therewith by the court does not arise. Learned counsel in this connection relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Mulraj V/s. Murti Raghonathji Maharaj,. The learned Counsel further submitted that only because the delivery of possession has been affected the same does not mean that the civil revision application has become in fructuous. 10. Previously there had been a conflict in the decisions of the various High Courts as to whether an order of stay passed by the higher Court takes effect from the date on which it is passed or from the date on which it is communicated. The Supreme Court in the case of Mulrajs case (supra) resolved the said conflict and held that the order of stay passed by the superior court takes effect from the time it is communicated to the court of first instance. The Supreme Court in the case of Mulrajs case (supra) resolved the said conflict and held that the order of stay passed by the superior court takes effect from the time it is communicated to the court of first instance. The decision of the Supreme Court has been given a legislative sanction by the Parliament by inserting an Explanation to Order XLl, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104/76) which came into force with effect from 1-2-1977. The said explanation reads as follows: An order by the Appellate Court for the stay of execution of the decree shall be effective from the date of the communication of such order to the Court of first instance, but an affidavit shown by the appellant, based on his personal knowledge, stating that an order for the stay of execution of the decree has been made by the Appellate Court shall, pending the receipt from the Appellate Court of the order for the stay of execution or any order, to the contrary, be acted upon by the court of first instance. 11. The Supreme Court in the Mulrajs case (supra) laid down the law in the following terms: There is in our opinion no uncertainty by reason of the fact that the court to which the stay order is addressed must have knowledge of it before it takes affect for it can always be proved that the court to which the stay order was addressed had knowledge of it and that is not a matter which should really create any difficulty or uncertainty. Once it is clear that a stay order is in the nature of a prohibitory order, knowledge of it by the court which is prohibited is essential before the court is deprived of the power to carry on the proceedings. As was pointed out in Bassesswari Chowhurarys case (supra), the appellate court has nothing to do with the execution of the decree; the execution proceeds under the direction of the court which made the decree and it has full authority to execute it. An order of stay does not undo anything which has been done, its utmost affect is to stop further action in the direction of execution but it would only have that effect when it reached the court or person whose duty it was to obey it. An order of stay does not undo anything which has been done, its utmost affect is to stop further action in the direction of execution but it would only have that effect when it reached the court or person whose duty it was to obey it. It was further held in the aforementioned case as follows: As the stay order is addressed to the court, as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand ; if it does not do so, it acts illegally. Therefore, in the case of a stay order as opposed to an order of injunction, as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand and further proceedings are illegal, but so long as the court has no knowledge of the stay order it does not lose the jurisdiction to deal with the execution which it has under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has further held that even if an execution has been carried out without the knowledge of the order of stay passed by the superior court, the same does not mean that when the court gets knowledge of it, it is powerless to undo any possible injustice that might have been caused to the party in whose favor the stay order was passed during the period till the court has knowledge of the stay order. The Supreme Court clearly held that in such a situation the Executing Court shall have a jurisdiction under the Code of provisions of Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to set aside the proceedings taken between the time when the stay order was passed and the time when it was brought to its notices is not to be exercised automatically but the same is to be exercised "if the Executing Court is asked to do so and it considers that it is necessary in the interests of the justice that the interim proceedings should be set aside." 12 In the case before the Supreme Court had refused to interfere on the ground, inter alia, that in the case the order of stay never came to the knowledge of the Magistrate concerned till he gave the permission on October 4, 1961, and later on the District Magistrate himself dismissed the transfer petition. 13. 13. In the instant case, it appears, that the learned court below has passed the impugned order mechanically and no reason has been assigned by it, as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case it was expedient in the interest of justice to undo the alleged wrong done to the judgment-debtor by restoring over the suit premises to him. In the impugned order the learned court below has not at all considered the cases of either party but merely recorded the submissions of the parties concerned. 14. There cannot be any doubt, in view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court in Mulrajs case (supra) that the Court had the requisite power to undo the alleged terms of Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, before invoking the said power the court must take into consideration all relevant factors including that of the conduct of the appellant. It does not appear from the records that the judgment-debtor opposite-party has ever filed any application supported by an affidavit in terms of Explanation appended to Order XLl, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, although in terms, may not apply to the facts of this case but the principles analogous thereto are applicable. It is also well known that a power under Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be exercised unless exceptional hardship is alleged in the restoration application. The question as to whether opposite party could invoke the equitable jurisdiction of this Court in order to enable it to pass an order in the interest of justice in terms of Sec. 151 of the Code of the Civil Procedure will depend upon facts of each case. The question as to whether the interest of justice required restoration of possession to the judgment or not, in the instant case would be dependent upon a determination of fact on comparison of respective hardships of the parties. Reference in this connection may be made in Deep Chand V/s. Krishan Datt. 15. It is true that normally this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction does not interfere with the order passed by the Court below unless one or other the grounds enumerated in Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is satisfied. Reference in this connection may be made in Deep Chand V/s. Krishan Datt. 15. It is true that normally this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction does not interfere with the order passed by the Court below unless one or other the grounds enumerated in Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is satisfied. But it is also well known that if a discretion is exercised without taking into account the relevant considerations, the same must be held have been exercised in an illegal manner. In this connection reference may be made in State of Orissa V/s. G.C. Kanungo. Reference in this connection may be made in Anjani Prasad and Ors. V/s. Ishwardin and Ors. -- . 16. The Supreme Court in Shri Vinod Kumur Arora V/s. Smt. Surjit Kaur reported in 1987 Vol. 2 On reported Judgment SC p. 734 has held that if the trial court does not take into consideration a relevant and vital document it commits a jurisdictional error and in such an event it would be permissible for a revisional court to interfere therewith Reference in this connection may be made in Ajantha Transporters V/s. T.V.K. Transports,. 17. As mentioned hereinbefore the learned court below did not assign any reason whatsoever as to why he exercised his jurisdiction purported to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is now well known that assigning of reason is now a part of principles of natural justice. The duty to assign reasons while passing a judicial or quasi-judicial order is mandatory and in my opinion, once the said rule is violated this Court may interfere with such order either in exercise of its power under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this connection may be made in Dwarika Prasad Kejriwal V/s. Rajendra Prasad Sao, reported in 1980 PWR 146. However, in the instant case all these questions might have been held to be academic had this Court itself exercised its power under Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Civil Revision No. 319 of 198 S thereon mentioned hereinbefore by an order dated 14-4-1988 this Court directed the petitioner to press Ms application for restoration of possession before the court below. 18. 18. Unfortunately, the attention of the Humble Judge was not drawn to the distinctive feature of this case that this Court in the aforementioned civil revision application by an order dated 7-3-1988 stayed the operation of the order. In such a situation, in my opinion, this Court alone could have exercised its jurisdiction in undoing the wrong allegedly meted out to the opposite party by evicting him from tenanted premises purported to be in execution the decree passed against him although as stated hereinbefore this Court stayed the operation of the judgment itself. 19. Such order of interim stay having been passed, the Executing Court could not have proceeded with the execution case at all as the operation of the judgment itself has been stayed and not further proceeding thereof was stayed. However, this aspect of the matter, need not detain us any further. In view of the order dated 14-4-19881 passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988, in my opinion, the judgment-debtor opposite party was bound by that order and as such has rightly moved the Court below for restoration of possession in pursuance thereof. 20. There cannot be any doubt that normally if delivery of possession is effected inspite of the order of stay passed by this Court, interest of justice may demand that status quo ante as obtaining on the date of passing of the stay order should be restored but in the instant case one cannot over look the fact that the civil revision application has not yet been admitted. It is just possible that the said revision application may be dismissed summarily. It may further be taken note of that the suit was filed by the petitioner on the ground of personal necessity. The petitioner has asserted that pursuant to the delivery of possession effected in respect of the suit premises, the son of the petitioner has already started his business. On the other hand, the opposite party has also been deprived of his right to carry on business inspire of an order of stay granted by this Court. 21. In such a situation, in my opinion, the interest of justice would be sub served if the parties are asked to pray for an appropriate relief at the stage of admission of the civil revision application itself. 21. In such a situation, in my opinion, the interest of justice would be sub served if the parties are asked to pray for an appropriate relief at the stage of admission of the civil revision application itself. If this Court, while hearing the civil revision application for admission considers that the same is fit to be heard it may, at that stage further direct restoration of possession or may ask the parties to await the result thereof. As a matter of fact, I proposed to the counsel of the parties as to whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the civil revision application should be directed to be heard by the same Bench which may pass an order in the aforementioned Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988 at the time of admission. Learned counsel appearing on the behalf of the opposite party, however, insisted that I should pass a judgment in this civil revision application. 22. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is hereby set aside. The learned court below, is, therefore, directed to consider the materials on the records afresh and pass a speaking order in accordance with law. However, I may observe that in spite of pendency of this application filed by the opposite party for restoration of possession it would be open to the opposite party to approach this Court in the aforementioned Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988 for an appropriate direction if he so chooses. 23. However, before parting with this case I may indicate that I do not agree with the submission of the learned course for the petitioner that the said Civil Revision No. 319 of 1988 has become in fructuous. As the civil revision jurisdiction is an appellate jurisdiction as appeal includes revision. Seo Shankar Ram Chandra Abhayankar V/s. Krishanji Dattaram. This Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction in terms of Sec. 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction,) Control Act, 1982 can vary or modify the decree and in such an event an application for institution in terms of Sec. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure would lie. Seo Shankar Ram Chandra Abhayankar V/s. Krishanji Dattaram. This Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction in terms of Sec. 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction,) Control Act, 1982 can vary or modify the decree and in such an event an application for institution in terms of Sec. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure would lie. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that only became the delivery of possession has been effected pursuant to the decree passed by the learned trial court the civil revision application which has been preferred against the said decree, has become anfractuous. 24. In the result, this civil revision application is allowed subject to the observations made hereinbefore. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.