JUDGMENT Bellie, J. 1. In a suit for eviction the defendant tenant Shanmugham has filed the Second Appeal. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court, but the Appellate Court decreed the suit. 2. The facts: The plaintiff Municipality constructed houses for its employees. There were surplus houses and those houses were let out to non-employees also. The defendant is one such person who was allotted the suit house. On a subsequent direction from the Government the non-employees were required to vacate the houses. According to the plaintiff-Municipality the defendant's tenancy was terminated and he was asked to vacate but he did not vacate and therefore the Municipality had to file the suit. 3. As against this the defendant contended that he was entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and therefore the suit is not maintainable. He also contented that the lease has not been validly terminated and hence the suit is incompetent. 4. The trial Court held that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Real Control) Act is not applicable to the suit house and therefore the defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the said Act. However, it held that there is no valid notice of termination of tenancy ad therefore the suit is not; maintainable. Accordingly, as stated above, it dismissed the suit. 5. In the appeal by the plaintiff-Municipality the appellate Court viz., the learned Subordinate Judge. Erode, concurred with the finding of the trial court that the defendant is not entitled to the benefits under the Rent Control Act, but as regards the termination of tenancy it held that there is proper and valid notice of termination and the finding of the trial Court is not correct. In the result, therefore, the appellate Court decreed the suit as prayed for. 6. Now, in the second appeal the learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant raises the same points taken before the Courts below viz., (1) the defendant is entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and (2) there is no valid notice of termination. As regards the first point, the Courts below have referred to a Notification G.O.Ms. As regards the first point, the Courts below have referred to a Notification G.O.Ms. No. 3741, Development Department dated 30.9.1946 a copy of which has been marked as ExA-3 under which the Governor has exempted all the buildings owned by Municipal Council or local board or Corporation of Madras from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and held that the suit building belonging to the plaintiff Municipality is not within the purview of the said Act and hence the defendant will not be entitled to any benefits thereunder. But the learned Counsel now argues that the Notification has been issued under Section 13 of the Rent Control Act 1946, but in the subsequent Act of 1949 under Section 22 thereof, the said notification has become ineffective and the plaintiff Municipality cannot take advantage of that Act. But a reading of Section 18 of 1949 Act makes it clear that the notification shall be deemed to have been commenced or taken under the corresponding provisions of 1949 Act and be continued subject to the provisions thereof. So there is no substance in the argument of the learned Counsel. The learned Counsel has not touched upon 1960 Act i.e., Tamil Nadu Act, 18 of 1960 the provisions of which were in force at the time of filing of the suit. In Section 35 in the 1960 Act it is clearly provided that notifications deemed to have been issued under 1949 Act shall be deemed to have been issued under the corresponding provisions of 1960 Act and shall have effect accordingly. It is manifest therefore that the said notification in G.O.Ms. No. 3741 Development Department exempting the buildings belonging to the Municipalities among others was in effect when the suit was filed. Therefore, it is clear that the defendant is not entitled to any benefits under the Rent Control Act. 7. As regards the second point, according to the plaintiff, as seen from the plaint paragraph 8 relating to cause of action, for the suit, two notices issued by the Municipality on 12.11.1976 and 5.4.1977 are said to be notices of termination of tenancy. There can be only one notice of termination of tenancy on which the plaintiff must rely on. Now the notice dated 12.11.1976 is marked as Ex.A.6 and the notice dated 5.4.1977 is marked as ExA-9. There can be only one notice of termination of tenancy on which the plaintiff must rely on. Now the notice dated 12.11.1976 is marked as Ex.A.6 and the notice dated 5.4.1977 is marked as ExA-9. ExA.6 is in fact a letter sent in reply to a notice issued by the Advocate of the defendant dated 21.10.1976 which in turn was sent in reply to a notice of the Municipality dated 14.10.1976. In this notice or letter Ex.A-6, the Municipality has replied to many contentions raised in the notice issued by the defendants advocate. Under Ex.A-6, the Advocate of the defendant has been requested to advise his client to vacate the premises by the first of December, 1976. This can by no means be held to be a notice determining the lease issued to the defendant. 7a. Ex.A9 is a notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant wherein it is written once again after repudiating the defendant's contentions that "the lease has also been terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act". Then it is stated that the defendant is required to hand over vacant possession to the Municipality on or before 1.5.1977. From this it is seen that this notice only states that the lease has been already terminated i.e., the lease is not terminated in this notice. Then there is nothing to the effect that the lease is terminated by the end of any month. In this notice at the top a notice dated 14.10.1976 has been described as one of the three items of references, the said notice dated 14.10.1976 has been marked as Ex.A4. In this notice it has been stated that the defendant is required to vacate the house within 15 days of receipt of the notice (Ex.A4). It appears to me that when it is stated in Ex.A-9 that the tenancy has also been terminated the Municipality referred to only ExA4 notice. But this notice has not been stated in the plaint as a notice of termination by the plaintiff. Further in this notice (Ex.A-4)it is simply stated as aforesaid that the defendant is required to vacate the premises within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice and it is not stated about termination of tenancy by the end of any tenancy month. Therefore ExA-4 also is not a proper notice of termination. Further in this notice (Ex.A-4)it is simply stated as aforesaid that the defendant is required to vacate the premises within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice and it is not stated about termination of tenancy by the end of any tenancy month. Therefore ExA-4 also is not a proper notice of termination. A reading of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly shows that a month to month tenancy is terminable by 15 days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. This means the plaintiff must say in the notice by the end of which tenancy month the tenancy is terminated and there shall be 15 days clear notice. Certainly ExA-9 does not satisfy these requirements. The same is the case with ExA6 and further, as already seen, it is sent to the advocate of the defendant and not to the defendant or to any of his family members or his servant or affixed on any conspicuous part of the house in question as laid down in the second part of Section 106. As already seen above, even Ex.A-4 also is not a proper notice of termination because it is not at all stated that the tenancy is terminated by the end of any particular month. True, as argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff-Municipality, notice of termination shall be liberally construed. But when any of the fundamental requirements of law is not satisfied, the plaintiff cannot be helped. Therefore, I hold that there is no proper and valid notice of termination. For this defect the suit suffers. 8. In the result, therefore, I set aside the decree of the first appellate Court and restore the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit. Accordingly the appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances of the case no cost.