JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by one of the Trade Unions, representing the workers employed with the respondent, a limited Company, constituted under the Companies Act, 1956, for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus declaring the Standing Order No. 53 as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as well as to quash the order Annexure a passed by the respondent terminating the services of M. V. Bargath under the aforesaid Standing Order. ( 2. ) ONE M. V. Bargath was employed as an Artisan Grade III, in the respondent Company. According to the petitioner, there was an agitation by the employees of the respondent Company in respect of the revision of pay scales etc. , and the employees had gone on strike from 10th April, 1983 to 13th April 1983. M. V. Bargath who was Artisan Grade III, was an active union worker as well as Office-Bearer of the petitioner Union. In order to victimise M. V. Bargath, for taking active part in the union, his services were terminated by the impugned order dated April, 1983 (Annexure-A) by the Senior Manager of the respondent Company in exercise of the powers conferred under Standing Order No. 53 without any notice or holding any enquiry. It has been averred in the petition that since the Standing Order 53 confers unbridled and unguided powers on the management to dismiss an employee without giving any opportunity to the workman of hearing or to question his termination, it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it deprives a workman of the fundamental right of opportunity of being heard and violates the principle of natural justice. ( 3. ) THE respondent Company has opposed the petition and tried to sustain the Standing Order No. 53 and the order of termination of services of Bargath in pursuance thereto by invoking its powers under certified Standing Order No. 53. It has been stated by the respondent Company in the return that the employees of the Company are governed by the certified Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standng Orders) Act, 1946 (for short hereinafter referred to as the Act), and not by Article 311 of the Constitution. It has been stated by the respondent Company in the return that the employees of the Company are governed by the certified Standing Orders under the Industrial Employment (Standng Orders) Act, 1946 (for short hereinafter referred to as the Act), and not by Article 311 of the Constitution. It has been averred that the respondent Company had proposed draft Standing Orders under Section 3 of the Act and the certifying officer (Regional Labour Commissioner, Central) after notifying the same to the Trade Unions and workers as required by Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act, certified the same under sub-section 3 of Section 5 of the Act, after affording opportunity of being heard to the Trade Unions as the representative of workmen, and consequently adopted by the respondent Company. It has, therefore, been stated that since the said Standing Orders were adopted by the respondent Company after the same were certified by the certifying officer after affording the Trade Unions and workmen, an opportunity of being heard, neither the Trade Union nor the workmen have any legitimate right to challenge the Standing Order. ( 4. ) THE respondent Company has further pleaded in its return that since the workman M. V. Bargath was found guilty of disorderly and riotous behaviour and assault on Senior Officers of the Company, the General Manager considering that it was not expedient or in the interest of the security to follow the procedure laid down in the Standing Orders terminated the service of M. V. Bargath in exercise of the powers vested under Standing Order No. 53 ( 5. ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner relying on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. 1985-I-LLJ-267 contended that the Standing Order No. 53 cannot be sustained and deserves to be declared as arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it takes away the fundamental right of the workman and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it confers unguided powers upon the management to dispense with the services of any employee without affording him an opportunity of being heard and even without assigning any reasons for dispensing with his services. ( 6. ( 6. ) IT may be pointed out here that Standing Order No. 51 relates to the punishment for misconduct, removal and dismissal from the service being one of the penalties prescribed for the said misconduct. Standing Order No. 52 prescribes the procedure for dealing with cases of misconduct. It contemplates issuance of a charge sheet requiring the explanation of the employee against whom certain misconduct is alleged, holding of an enquiry, if the charges are denied and affording a reasonable opportunity of explaining and defending the alleged misconduct and if on the conclusion of the enquiry the employee is found guilty of the charges framed against him, to award punishment. The Standing Order No. 53, the validity of which has been challenged in this petition, prescribes a special procedure in certain cases to impose penalty on an employee on the ground of misconduct and reads as under: 53 SPECIAL PROCEDURE IN CERTAIN CASES. Notwithstanding anything contained in Standing Order No. 52 where a penalty is to be imposed on an employee on the ground of misconduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or where the Managing Director/resident Director/general Manager is satisfied, for reasons to be, recorded in writing, that it is not expedient or in the interest of security to follow the procedure laid down in that Standing Order, he may consider the circumstances of the case and pass orders thereon as he deems fit. ( 7. ) A bare reading of the aforesaid Standing Order No. 53 will go to show that it confers power on the Managing Director/resident Director/ General Manager to impose the penalty on an employee only when he is satisfied, after reasons to be recorded in writing, that on considering the circumstances of the case, it is not expedient or in the interest of the security to follow the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 52. In order to invoke powers under Standing Order No. 53, the prerequisite condition contemplated by the said order is that on consideration of the circumstances of the case, the authority mentioned therein must be satisfied that it is not expedient or in the interest of the security to follow the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 52 to impose the penalty on the employee and the reasons for such satisfaction should have been recorded in writing by the authority. Thus for the invocation of the powers under Standing Order No. 53, a reasonable safeguard has been provided to the effect that special procedure prescribed therein can be exercised only when the authority invested with that power, on considering the circumstances of the case, is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not expedient or in the interest of the security to follow the normal procedure prescribed for dealing with the cases of misconduct as contemplated by Standing Order No. 52. In the present case as is clear from Annexure R-5, the General Manager of the respondent Company had passed the impugned order terminating the service of M. V. Bargath by invoking the powers under Regulation 53 for the reasons that the said employee Bargath was found a violent and dangerous type of person by reason of which the officers/workers, who faced riotous and violent action of the dismissed employee Bargath and his followers, were hesitating to come forward to give evidence due to the fear to their life and property. It was in these facts and circumstances that the General Manager found it inexpedient to hold the normal departmental enquiry and dispense with services of the employee Bargath by invoking the powers under Standing Order No. 53. From these facts, it can very well be said that the power to dispense with services under Standing Order 53 is circumscribed with certain limitations inasmuch as the condition of setting down reason in writing as to why that power has been exercised while dispensing with the normal procedure. On reading the reasons given by the General Manager in Annexure, R-5,\for dispensing with the normal procedure, it can clearly be spelled out that the enquiry, if held, it would have been counter-productive for the reasons mentioned by the General Manager. For these reasons Standing Order No. 53 cannot be held as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 8. ) FROM the above discussion, it necessarily follows that the reasons must be germane to the issue and such reasons would be subject to a limited judicial review. For these reasons Standing Order No. 53 cannot be held as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 8. ) FROM the above discussion, it necessarily follows that the reasons must be germane to the issue and such reasons would be subject to a limited judicial review. But if the reasons exfacie are not germane to the issue, that is to say, dispensing with the normal enquiry, the Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can always examine such reasons exfacie and if they are not germane to the issue, record a finding that prerequisite for exercise of the powers regarding special procedure under Standing Order 53 having been not satisfied, the exercise of powers would be bad and without jurisdiction. In the present case, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the General Manager without making any enquiry in that behalf wrongly assumed that the dismissed employee Bargath is a violent and dangerous type of person and for that reason if the normal enquiry was held the witnesses would not come forward to give evidence against him due to fear. It may be pointed out that the correctness or otherwise of these facts being disputed could not be gone into, in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. If, in fact, the petitioner seriously disputed this situation and these facts, he should have challenged the same before the Labour Court under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. ( 9. ) NOW turning to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Hindustan Steel Limited (supra), we find that the said decision stands on a different footing and does not advance the case of the petitioner. In that case scope and interpretation of Standing Order No. 32 framed under the Act, by the employer of that case, Hindustan Steel Ltd. , came up for consideration of their Lordships, which read as under:- 32. Special Procedure in certain cases. Where a workman has been convicted for a criminal offence in a Court of Law or where the General Manager is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is inexpedient or against the interest of security to continue to employ the workman, the workman may be removed or dismissed from service without following the procedure laid down in Standing Order 31. On comparison of the Standing Order No. 53 which is in question before us in this petition and the Standing Order No. 32 in the Supreme Court case (supra), we find that both are totally different and distinct from each other. Under Standing Order No. 53, the authority may dispense with the normal procedure on being satisfied after consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not expedient or in the interest of security to follow the normal procedure, while the Standing Order No. 32 did not confer upon the authority to dispense with the normal procedure but it confers the power on the General Manager to remove or dismiss from service the workman, without following the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 31 in that case. It was for this reason that their Lordships took the view that reason for dispensing with the enquiry and reasons for not continuing to employ the workman stand wholly apart from each other and it was for this reason that their Lordships held that Standing Order which conferred powers to remove or dismiss the workman from service by not giving reasons and merely stating that it is inexpedient or against security to continue to employ the workman, are violative of natural justice, while in the present case no such power is vested in the employer under Standing Order No. 53. On the contrary their Lordships observed in the end of paragraph 4 of the report that "one can appreciate that in a given situation, an enquiry into misconduct may be counterproductive. Constitution itself contemplates such a situation when it enumerates situations in which a punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank can be imposed without holding a disciplinary enquiry". The Standing Order No. 53 contemplates exactly the same situation as contemplated under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. In the present case, we are satisfied that reasons ex facie are such which could have prompted the concerned authority to record a finding that it was not reasonably possible to hold the normal enquiry and, therefore, the impugned order, Annexure A, cannot be said to be bad in law. ( 10. ) FOR the reasons stated above, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. We, therefore, make no order as to costs. ( 10. ) FOR the reasons stated above, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. We, therefore, make no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. ?