JUDGMENT 1. 1. By this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ, order or direction quashing the directions issued by Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court, as communicated by the Registrar vide his letter No. 5607 dated 21st December, 1987, whereby a direction was given to the Additional Sessions Judge. Bundi to transfer sessions Cases No. 26 of 1987 and 79/87, to the designated court at Ajmer. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that on 2nd August, 1980, one Sua Rebari, resident of Rebarpura was killed and an offence under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302, Indian Penal Code was registered against several persons. including the petitioners. The petitioners were not arrested by the police and the trial of the case proceeded against the other accused persons. In Sessions Case No. 92/80, on 10th March. 1983, all accused persons other than the petitioners were convicted for the aforesaid offences, but the High Court in an appeal filed by the convicted persons, acquitted them of the charges. It was thereafter that the petitioners were arrested on different dates. Chargesheets were filed against them, but they were consolidated and the trial proceeded before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bundi. in Sessions Case No. 79/1986, State Vs Laxmi Narain and others , in which aparat from the petitioners Laxmi Narain and Hari Kishan Singh are also accused. The said trial is pending. On 29th December, 1986, an incident is alleged to have taken place in the city of Bondi, in which one Sher Ali was beaten and the offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 326 and 307. Indian Penal Code along with Sections 3/25 and 4/25 of the Arms Act was registered against several persons including the petitioners, and the case is pending before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bundi, being Sessions Case No. 26 of 1987. During the pendency of the aforesaid cases before the Additional Sessions Judge, Pundi on 21st July, 1917, the State Government in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, passed an order directing that the petitioner, Deva and Shankar, shall not be removed from the District Jail, Bundi where they were lodged. After the passing of the aforesaid order, petitioner Shankar filed a bail application before this Court under Section 439. After the passing of the aforesaid order, petitioner Shankar filed a bail application before this Court under Section 439. Cr P.C and vide order dated 23rd August, 1987, petitioner Shankar was ordered to be released on bail. In pursuance of the said order, the petitioner was released on 13th (sic, August, 1987. On 12th January, 1988 Additional Sessions Judge. Bundi informed the learned counsel for the petitioners that the cases had been orderer to be transferred as per the directions of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of this Court, as communicated by the Registrar vide letter No. 5607 dated 21st December, 1987, from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge to the designated Court at Ajmer. It was further directed that the accused persons would present themselves before the Designated Court, Ajmer on 6th February, ]988. The grievance of the petitioners is that then they made a request to the Sessions Judge to show that order of the High Court, the Additional Sessions Judge, Bundi refused to do so and advised them that the copy of the order could not be given to them but they could obtain a copy from the High Court. When they applied to the High Court for copy of the said order, the Registry refused to provide a copy to the petitioners. However the petitioner could obtain a certified copy of the order dated 12th January, 1988, by which the learned Sessions Judge Bundi had transferred the case to the Designated Court at Ajmer. A perusal of the order dated 12th January, 1988, would reveal that the aforesaid cases were ordered to be transferred in pursuance of the order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice as communicated by the Registrar vide letter No 5607 dated 21st December, 1987. The petitioners have further submitted that since the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bundi dated 12th January, 1938, makes a mention of the cases having been ordered to be transferred by the order of the High Court to the Designated Court at Ajmer, therefore they apprehended that the order of transfer must have been ordered under the provisions of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. However, it is contented by the petitioners that they have not indulged in any terrorist or disruptive activities at all and that in both the cases, No. 79/1986 and 26/1987, there are no allegations of terrorists or disruptive activities against the petitioners. However, it is contented by the petitioners that they have not indulged in any terrorist or disruptive activities at all and that in both the cases, No. 79/1986 and 26/1987, there are no allegations of terrorists or disruptive activities against the petitioners. In short, the contention of the petitioners is that the cases against them did nit fall under the Act of 1985 or under the provisions of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. 3. This Court vide order dated 21th January, 1988, issued a notice to show cause to the respondents as to why the writ petition be not admitted and disposed of. In pursuance to the notice replies have been filed on behalf of respondent No. 2. the State of Rajasthan and respondent No. 1, Rajasthan High Court. Notices were not issued to the other respondents i.e. respondents No. 3 and 4. 4. The case of the petitioner is that the order of transferring the cases from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge. Bundi to the Designated Court at Ajmer is not an administrative order and that the order w is passed without any notice to the petitioners and without affording them an opportunity of being heard as to whether the cases should be transferred or not. The contention of the petitioners is that the order passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice directing to transfer all the cases is ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction. It is submitted by the petitioners in the writ petition that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, powers of transfer are invested to the High Court under Section 407. Cr.P.C.An order under Section 407, Cr.P.C, can be passed by the High Court only on judicial side and, there is no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which empowers the Chief Justice to pass an order transferring a criminal case from one Sessions Judge to another Sessions Judge or to any other Court on administrative side Before transferring the cases, the procedure provided under Section 407, Cr. P. C. was not followed. The petitioners have also contended that even if the aforesaid order of transferring the cases is an administrative order, still, the same is void and illegal. It is violative of the right of the petitioners to know as to how the order has been passed against them and the order, thus, violates the principles of natural justice. The petitioners have also contended that even if the aforesaid order of transferring the cases is an administrative order, still, the same is void and illegal. It is violative of the right of the petitioners to know as to how the order has been passed against them and the order, thus, violates the principles of natural justice. Further the case of the petitioners is that transferring the cases from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge. Bundy to the Designated Court was without jurisdiction. The case or respondent No. 2, as disclosed in the written statement is that the activities of the petitioners were tending to disturb communal harmony and endangering their own life, as such, the State Government in exercise of its powers conferred on it under Section 269, Cr. P.C . issued an order on 31st July, 1987, for not removing the petitioners from jail keeping in view the public interest and likelihood of disturbance of public life. It is also submitted, in the reply, that the High Court was apprised of the facts and the Hon'ble High Court on its administrative side and in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, transferred the cases of the petitioners to the Additional Sessions Judge, who is also the Designated Court. The transfer was, thus effected from one sessions Court to another Sessions Court for administrative reasons and no notice was required to be given to the petitioners before transferring the cases. 5. In the reply filed by respondent No. 1, it is submitted that on the request of the State Government, Judge, Designated Court, Ajmer was conferred with the powers under Sub-section 3 of Section 9 and section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Additional Sessions Judge vide Notification dated 21st November, 1987. After issuance of the Notification the State Government sought the transfer of the cases relating to the petitioners from the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bundi to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer for reasons of security and respondent No. 1 transferred the cases to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bundi, as communicated by letter of the Registry dated 21st December, 1987. It was mentioned in the reply that the cases have not been transferred' to the Court of Designated Court, Ajmer under the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Respondent No. 1 has justified the order by stating that the order of transfer is an administrative order and is valid, Thus, the case of respondent No. 1 is that the order was administrative order and it was passed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. The impugned order is as follows:- "The Judge, Designated Court-cum-Addl. Sessions Judge, Ajmer Transfer of cases Sir, I am directed to state that the following cases are hereby transferred from the Court mentioned in Column No. 2 to the Court of the Judge, Designated Court, Ajmer as under: S.No. Case Transferred Court from Court to which transferred Court to which transferred 1 Sessions Case No. 79/86 State v. Deva Shankar Lali and Laxmi Narain Additional Sessions Judge , Bundi Judge , Designated Court , Ajmer-cum-Addl. Sessions Judge Ajmer 2 Sessions Case No. 26/87 State v. Deva , Shankar & Others. Additional Sessions Judge, Bundi -do- Yours faithfully, Sd/ REGISTRAR Dated 21.12.87 Copy to 1. The Secretary to the Govt. of Rajasthan, Law & Legal Affairs Department, Jaipur, with reference to u/s. D. O. No. F. 19(11) Home-10/87 dated 4-12-87 for information. 2. The Addl. Sessions Judge, Bundi, for transmission of the record. Sd/. REGISTRAR" 7. From the replies filed by respondents No. 1 and 2, it is clear that the aforesaid Sessions Cases have not been transferred under the provisions of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. It is also clear that the petitioners are not facing any case with the allegations of terrorist or disruptive activities. The stand taken by respondents No. 1 and 2 is that the cases were transferred for administrative reasons and respondent had the right to administrative side to transfer the cases from one Sessions Court to another Sessions Court by virtue of the powers under Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The difference in the stand taken by respondents No. 1 and 2 and the petitioner is that, whereas respondent No. 1 and 2 justify the order under sections 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance read with Article 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners justify the order under section 407(5), Cr. P.C. 8. The submissions of both the respondents is also that the order transferring the cases was an administrative order and no notice is required to be given in such cases. While the petitioners have contended that the order has been passed without any authority of law and in violation of the principles of natural justice and affects the rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 9. Thus, as per the submissions of the parties, the power to transfer cases from one subordinate Court to another is given to the High Court by Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, or by Section 407, Cr. P.C. 1973, or the power can be derived from Art 227 of the Constitution. 10. Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance reads as under:- "27. High Court may direct the transfer of a case from one Court to another. The High Court shall have power to direct the transfer of any criminal case of appeal from any Court to any other Court of equal or superior jurisdiction, and also to direct the preliminary investigation or trial of any criminal case by any officer or Court otherwise competent to investigate or try it though such case belongs in ordinary course to the jurisdiction of some other officer or Court." Art. 227 of the Constitution reads as under : "2.7. Power of Superintendence over all Courts by the High Court : (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may:- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may:- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein; Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces." Sec. 407, Cr.P.C., 1973 reads as under : "407. Power of High Court to transfer cases and appeals (1) Whenever it is made to appear to the High Court:- (a) that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto, or (b) that some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise, or (c) that an order under this section is required by any provision of this Code, or will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses, or is expedient for the ends of justice, it may order- (i) that any offence be inquired into or tried by any Court not qualified under sections 177 to 185 (both inclusive), but in other respects competent to inquire into or try such offence; (ii) that any particular case or appeal or class of cases or appeals, be transferred from a Criminal Court subordinate to its authority to any other such Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction; (iii) that any particular case be committed for trial to a court of Session; or (iv) that any particular case or appeal be transferred to and tried before itself. (2) The High Court may act either on the report of the lower Court or on the application of a party interested, or on its own initiative; Provided that no application shall lie to the High Court for transferring a case from one Criminal Court to another Criminal Court in the same sessions division, unless an application for such transfer has been made to the Sessions Judge and rejected by him. (3) Every application for an order under Sub-section (l) shall be made by motion, which shall, except when the applicant is the Advocate-General of the State, be supported by an affidavit or affirmation. (4) When such application is made by an accused person, the High Court may direct him to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for the payment of any compensation which the High Court may award under sub-section (7). (5) Every accused person making such application shall give to the Public Prosecutor notice in writing of the application, together with a copy of the grounds on which it is made; and no order shall be made on the merits of the application unless at least twenty-four hours have elapsed between the giving of such notice and the hearing of the application. (6) Where the application is for the transfer of a case or appeal from any subordinate court, the High Court may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice order that, pending the disposal of the application, the proceedings in the subordinate Court shall be stayed, on such terms as the High Court may think fit to impose; Provided that such stay shall not affect the subordinate Court's power of remand under Section 309. (7) Where an application for an order under Sub-section (1) is dismissed. the High Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious order the applicant to pay by way of compensation to any person who has opposed the application such sum not exceeding one thousand rupees as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case. (8) When the High Court orders under sub-section (1) that a case be transferred from any Court for trial before itself, it shall observe in such trial the same procedure which that Court would have observed if the case had not been so transferred. (8) When the High Court orders under sub-section (1) that a case be transferred from any Court for trial before itself, it shall observe in such trial the same procedure which that Court would have observed if the case had not been so transferred. (9) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any order of Government under Section 197." 11. There appears to be no dispute that he High Court is invested with the powers of transferring cases from one Sessions Court to another, or from one subordinate Court to another. There is also no dispute that Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which gives powers of superintendence to the High Court upon subordinate Courts are wide enough to confer powers of transferring cases from one subordinate court to another. But, the main question is in what manner these powers are to be exercised, i e. whether the powers so conferred upon the High Court under the aforesaid provisions are judicial powers or administrative powers and, even if the powers are administrative whether a notice is required to be given to the persons who are affected by the order of transfer. Under Section 407, Cr. P. C a High Court can order transfer on any of the grounds specified in Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of that Section, viz., (a) fair and impartial inquiry not being possible: b) likelihood of unusual difficulty of a question of law; and (c) an order of transfer is required by any provision of the Code, or will tend to general inconvenience of the parties or witnesses or is expedient for the ends of justice. Section 194 of the Code empowers a Sessions Judge of the division to transfer cases to Addl. Sessions Judge or Asstt. Sessions Judge in his division for trial by general or special order, or under the orders of the High Court by its special order. 12. It may be mentioned here that the effect of the proviso to Subsection (2) of Section 407 is that an application for transferring any case from one criminal Court to another criminal Court in the same Sessions Division shall not directly lie to the High Court, as there is a mandate in the proviso that such an application has to be made to the Sessions Judge and rejected by him. Thus, unless the case is rejected by the Sessions Judge for transferring a case from one Session (sic) criminal Court to another Sessions (sic criminal) Court in the same Sessions Division, the High Court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for transfer. However, the proviso is not attracted in this case as it is not a case of transferring a case from one criminal court to another criminal Court in the same Sessions Division. The powers of Sessions Judge to transfer cases and appeals are provided under Section 408, Cr. P.C. Section 194. Cr.P.C., 1973 gives power to a Sessions Judge to transfer cases to Addl Sessions Judge, or Asstt. Sections Judge of his division Thus, Addl. Sessions Judge or Asstt Sessions Judge shall try such cases as Sessions Judge of the Division may be general or special order make over to him for trial, or as the High Court may by special order direct him to try. Section 4, 8, Cr. P.C., 1971 gives power to Sessions Judge to transfer cases from one criminal Court to another Criminal Court in Sessions Division where it is expedient for the ends of Justice to do so. Under Section 408 sessions Judge may pass an order of transfer of his own initiative or may act either on the report of the lower Court or on the application of the party interested. It is further provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 408 that provisions of sub-sections (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Section 409 shall apply in reason to an application to the Sessions Judge for an order under Sub-section (1) as they apply in relation to an application to the High Court for an order under Sub-section (1) of Sec 407. Except that, sub-section (7) of that Section shall so apply as if for the words 1030 occurring therein, the words 250 rupees were substituted. 13. In the controversy before us we are required to decide whether a High Court on administrative side has power to transfer a case from one subordinate Court to another. The respondents have contended that such powers may be derived from Section 27 of he Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. It is also suggested that the power of transfer may also be invoked under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. The respondents have contended that such powers may be derived from Section 27 of he Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. It is also suggested that the power of transfer may also be invoked under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. As regards Article 227 of the Constitution, we may state that this Article gives constitutional remedy to a citizen to approach the High Court for issuance of a direction or order. A citizen can away move the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Act or its provisions on the ground that they offend Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution or on the ground that the Act complained of offends the constitutional guarantees. In(1) Mohd. Abdul Raoof v. State of Hyderabad (FB), (AIR 1951 Hyderabad 51) , a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court considered this aspect of the matter and held that where an accused has reasonable apprehension that a fair and impartial trial or enquiry cannot be bad, or where the ends of justice make it expedient, a transfer may be ordered, by the High Court by invoking the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It may be stated here that the Hyderabad High Court considered the powers of transferring cases from one subordinate Court to another on the principle on which cases are transferred under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The main trust of the proposition laid down by the Hyderabad High Court was on the ground that the Court was of the opinion that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. It was further observed that it is not any and every apprehension in the mind of the accused that can he a ground for transfer but it should be a reasonable apprehension, i. e. an apprehension which the High Court considers it reasonable for the accused as a reasonable person to entertain in the circumstances of the case. We to not dispute the proposition of law laid down in the said case. As a matter of fact, the main dispute, as we have already stated is whether a High Court has any authority on administrative side to transfer a case from one subordinate Court to another. We to not dispute the proposition of law laid down in the said case. As a matter of fact, the main dispute, as we have already stated is whether a High Court has any authority on administrative side to transfer a case from one subordinate Court to another. Article 227 gives judicial powers to the High Court and such powers can be exercised for the ends of justice to give constitutional protection to a citizen, where he apprehends his rights to be in peril. 15. As regards Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, we may say that it undoubtedly gives power to the High Court to direct the transfer of any criminal case or appeal from one Court to another Court of equal or superior jurisdiction or also to direct a preliminary investigation or trial of any criminal case by any officer or court otherwise competent to investigate or try it though such case belongs in ordinary course to the jurisdiction of some other officer or Court Section 27 of the said Ordinance comes under the head of criminal jurisdiction, which is suggestive of the fact that it deals with the judicial powers of the High Court, rather than executive powers. Though no grounds have been laid down in Section 27 of he Ordinance on the fulfilment of which condition the High Court is empowered to direct the transfer of cases from the one Court to another it is well settled that an administrative body clothed with powers is free to devise its pragmatic flexible and functionally viable processes of tracting business, but it should be subject to the basics of natural justice. fair play in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous consideration as held by the Supreme Court in (2) J.P. Kulshrestha v. Chancellor, Allahabad University 1980 (3) SCC 418 ) . 16. Thus, the analysis of various provisions and different statutes which empowers a High Court the direct the, transfer of any criminal case to another Court, reveals that the High Court is clothed with powers to transfer the cases from one subordinate Court to another. But, it does not resolve the dispute which is involved in the case. We are therefore required to examine whether the powers under Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance or Section 407, Cr.P.C. are administrative in nature or are judicial one. But, it does not resolve the dispute which is involved in the case. We are therefore required to examine whether the powers under Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance or Section 407, Cr.P.C. are administrative in nature or are judicial one. Further, even if the said powers may be said to be of administrative character, whether such powers can be exercised without giving any notice to the persons whose rights are affected in one way or the other by transferring a case from one Court to another. In order to examine this question, we shall have to make out a distinction whether a dispute is administrative one or judicial one, or quasi-judicial. In (3) State of Andhra Pradesh v. Parasurama ( 1973 (2) SCC 232 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the distinction between administrative; action and quasi-judicial decision. The Court observed that essentially there are three tests which are as follows : (1) That there must be a is between the two parties:- (2) The opinion should be formed on the objective satisfaction and should not depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the tribunal ; and (3) there must be a duty to act judicially. 17. While laying down the aforesaid tests, the Supreme Court considered this aspect of the matter that an executive authority is also required to decide something, but it would not make the decision judicial. and further stated that it is the manner in which the decision has to he arrived at which makes the difference, and the real test is : Is there any duty to decide judicially? In (4) Province of Bombay v. K.S. Advani and others, ( AIR 1950 SC 222 ) , which was considered by the Supreme Court in the said case Das, J. made following observations : " ..............the two kinds of acts have may common features. Thus a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do both have to act in good faith. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do both have to act in good faith. A good and valid administrative or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes a liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is frequently made dependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which may never the less be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority as was done in the several Ordinances, regulations and enactments considered and construed in the several cases referred to above. The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is. ..............the duty to act judicial) ..." 18. The observations in Advani's case (Supra) were quoted with approval by Das, C.J. in (5) Shri Radheyshyam Khare and Another V. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, ( AIR 1959 SC 107 ) . S.K. Das, J., who in general agreed with the learned Chief Justice in that case observed : "To get to the bottom of the distinction, we must go a little deeper into the content of the expression, `duty to act judicially'. As has been repeated so often, the question may arise in widely differing circumstances and a precise, clear-cut or exhaustive definition of the expression is not possible. But in decisions dealing with the question several tests have been laid down; for example : (i) whether there is a lis inter parties; (ii ) whether there is a claim (or proposition) and an opposition; (iii) whether the decision is to be founded on the taking of evidence or on affidavits; (iv) whether the decision is actuated in whole or in part by question of policy or expediency, and if so, whether in arriving at the decision the statutory body has to consider proposal and objections and evidence; and (v) whether in arriving at its decision, the statutory body has only to consider policy and expediency and at no stage has before it any form of lis." 19. Again, coming to Section 407, Cr.P.C. we may observe that procedure is provided under the said section enumerating the various circumstances when a direction for transferring the case from one Court to another may be passed by the High Court In the light of the tests discussed above, which make a distinction between an administrative order and judicial order, it would be evident that the powers embodied in Section 407, Cr. P.C. are judicial one. Similar is the position with regard to Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance and, as already discussed. the same would be the position with regard to Article 227 of Constitution of India. Thus, the powers may be exercised when circumstances as are enumerated under Section 407, Cr.P.C are required to be considered by the High Court and the circumstances are that fair and impartial enquiry is not possible, or there is likelihood of unusual difficulty on a question of law arising in the case, the general inconvenience of the parties and witnesses, or expediency of the transfer for the ends of justice 20. On 16th March, 1988, the case was fixed for final disposal No body appeared on behalf of the petitioners. On behalf of respondent No. 1. Shri J.P. Sharma, Officer-in-charge of the case appeared and argued the case. On behalf of the State none appeared. After bearing the arguments of Shirt J.P. Sharma and perusing the entire record, the judgment was reserved. On 20th April, 1988, Shri M.I. Khan, learned Addl. Advocate General, appeared and submitted to cite certain authorities to substantiate the contentions raised in the written statement. For the ends of justice, we allowed him to argue the case. 21. The main submission of Shri Khan, learned Addl. Advocate General, is that the order of transfer was passed by the Rajasthan High Court for administrative reasons and no notice was required to be given in such matters. Shri Khan has placed reliance on 6) Bhanwari Lal v. State, (1966 RLW 546) . The submission of Shri Khan is that Bbanwarilal's case (Supra) is a direct authority of this Court which lays down that if a case is transferred for administrative reasons, notice to the parties is not necessary. In Bhanwarilal's case (Supra). Shri Khan has placed reliance on 6) Bhanwari Lal v. State, (1966 RLW 546) . The submission of Shri Khan is that Bbanwarilal's case (Supra) is a direct authority of this Court which lays down that if a case is transferred for administrative reasons, notice to the parties is not necessary. In Bhanwarilal's case (Supra). the grievance of the petitioner was that before ordering the transfer of the cases, the District Magistrate did not hear them and, it was argued that the order of transfer passed by the District Magistrate was vitiated. In that case, two cases were pending before the Sub-divisional Magistrate and the District Magistrate has transferred them from the Court of Sub-divisional Magistrate, Abu to the Court of Sub-divisional Magistrate, Sirohi. A learned Single Judge of this Court while deciding the case observed that powers given to the District Magistrate have been designatedly kept far wide and the Legislature has not thought fit to lay down in so many words the notice be given to the parties before ordering transfer of cases on account of the reasons that many a time a District Magistrate may have to transfer cases from one Court to another by way of adjustment of work in the courts subordinate to him. The District Magistrate being the head of the Magistracy in the District, he has to distribute criminal business in the district whenever necessary and, thus, where he transfers cases on account of administrative exigency, notice to the parties may not be necessary. It was also observed by the learned jingle Judge that if the notices were to be necessitated even for making adjustment of work in the courts subordinate to the District Magistrate then perhaps the very object of having cases transferred will result into Prolonging the life of cases and the business of transfer itself may be delayed for a considerable time. Therefore, when cases are transferred from one Court to another by the District Magistrate for administrative reasons giving of a notice to the parties concerned would not be necessary. However, the learned Single Judge further observed that when a particular case or cases are transferred on an application made by one of the parties to the case or cases then in such a contingency it will be necessary for the District Magistrate to hear the other affected party. However, the learned Single Judge further observed that when a particular case or cases are transferred on an application made by one of the parties to the case or cases then in such a contingency it will be necessary for the District Magistrate to hear the other affected party. In our opinion, this case in no way supports Shri Khan. It is true that Section 194, Cr. P. C. gives power to the Sessions Judge to transfer cases from his Court to subordinate court competent to try such cases and as observed above powers under Section 194, Cr. P.C may he said to be administrative powers where for administrative exigency Sessions-Judge is empowered to transfer cases. But, the circumstances of the present case are quite different. Here, the cases have been transferred from one sessions division to another sessions division on the application moved by the State. But no such administrative power is conferred upon the High Court under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Section 407. Cr. P.C. prescribes judicial power of the High Court in regard to transfer of cases from one Sessions Division to another Sessions Division. This seems to be the reason why the respondents have not placed any reliance on Section 407, Cr. P. C. in substantiation of their case. 22. It is a tribute to the Apex Court that it has been playing a dynamic and creative role in developing administrative law. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away and we have been liberated from the psittacine incantation of administrative action. The rule laid down by the Apex Court is that an administrative order which involves civil consequences. i.e. which affects a citizen in his civic life, must be made consistently with the rule of natural justice. An executive power must not be exercised arbitrarily or mala fide and must obey the guidelines made in conformity with constitutional mandates and manifest purpose of the power. The forces of progress and change are now armed with two formidable weapons namely principles, of natural justice' and 'ultra vires' against arbitrary action. The Apex Court has gone to the extent that even if the party is unable to prove prejudice, it has been held that it is prejudice to any action to be denied justice that is to say, to be denied a hearing. The Apex Court has gone to the extent that even if the party is unable to prove prejudice, it has been held that it is prejudice to any action to be denied justice that is to say, to be denied a hearing. Any administrative action affecting a party on irrelevant grounds or without taking relevant grounds into consideration or for reasons which are mala fide may now be questioned in a court on the ground of ultra vires. Arbitrary action will suffer a lethal blow under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has evolved the above referred whole jurisprudence round the principles of 'natural justice' and 'ultra vires' in the case of (7) A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India ( 1969(2) SCC 262 ) . In the case of (8) Mohindra Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner (1978(1) SCC 105) (9) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ( 1978 (1) SCC 248 ) and (10) S.L. Kipur Vs Jag Mohan, (1980)(4) SCC 379) , the Supreme Court has expanded the norizons of natural justice. In the above referred cases, the Supreme Court observed that where valuable rights or individuals are affected, the administrative authorities act judicially as if the basic norms of judicial action is applicable by implication In (11) State of M.P. v. Bharat Singh ( AIR 1967 SC 1170 ) , the Supreme Court laid down that executive action must not be exercised arbitrarily but must have the authority of law to support it. Article 21 after the land-mark case in Maneka Gandhi (Supra) followed in (12) Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration, ( 1978 (4) SCC 494 ) , is the sanctuary of human values prescribing fair procedure. The law as it stands today is that even acting reasonably in the matter of executive action is the mandate of the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution, which permeates all State action either statutory or executive. 23. In (13) Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India & Ors., ( AIR 1956 SC 479 ) , the Supreme Court bad the occasion to consider an omnibus whole-sale order of transfer of cases under the provisions of the income-tax Act, 1922. Sub-section (7A) of Section 5 in terms makes provision for transfer of cases. In that case, cases were transferred from one Income-tax Officer of one place to the Income Tax Officer of another place. Sub-section (7A) of Section 5 in terms makes provision for transfer of cases. In that case, cases were transferred from one Income-tax Officer of one place to the Income Tax Officer of another place. The order of transfer was expressed in general terms without any reference to any particular case and without any limitation as to time. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court observed that an order of transfer denies to the assessee, as compared with other merchants who are similarly situate, equality before law or the equal protection of the laws, the assessee can legitimately complain of an infraction of his fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court further observed that in a democracy functioning under the Rule of Law it is not enough to do justice or to do the right thing; justice must be seen to be done and a satisfaction and sense of security engendered in the minds of the people at large in place of a vague uneasiness that Star Chambers are arising in this land. Further, the Supreme Court male the following weighty observations which are relevant for deciding the controversy raised in this case : "In my opinion, the power of transfer can only be conferred if it is hedged round with reasonable restrictions, the absence or existence of which can in the last instance be determined by the Courts; and the exercise of the power must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice, that is to say, the parties affected must be heard when that is reasonably possible, and the reasons for the order must be reduced, however, briefly, to writing so that men may know that the powers conferred on these quasi-judicial bodies are being justly and properly exercised." 24. The case of Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India (Supra) was further considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (14) M/s. Panna Lal Binjraj v. Union of India, ( AIR 1957 SC 397 ) . It was also a case under the provisions of the Income-tax Act relating to the transfer of cases. The case of Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India (Supra) was further considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (14) M/s. Panna Lal Binjraj v. Union of India, ( AIR 1957 SC 397 ) . It was also a case under the provisions of the Income-tax Act relating to the transfer of cases. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court remarked that it would be prudent if the principles of natural justice are followed, where circumstances permit, before any order of transfer under Section 5 (7-A) of the Act is, made by the Commissioner of Income tax or the Central Board of Revenue, as the case may be, and notice is given to the party affected and he is afforded a reasonable opportunity of representing his view on the question and the reasons of the order are reduced however briefly to writing. 25. It is true that no party is allowed to choose the Judge who will try his case. But when a criminal case is transferred from one place to another without assigning any reason and without affording an opportunity to make representation against it, such an order would deny to an accused as compared to other accused, who are similarly situate, equality before law or equal protection of law and is likely to result in adverse civil consequences affecting an accused in his civic life. In the instant case, the grievance of the petitioners is that looking to the fact that the complainant party had fired with revolver at the petitioners on 26-1-1987, when they were being brought before the Addl. Sessions Judge, Bundi they have every reason to believe that their lives are in danger, apart from the financial repercussions and inconveniences caused to them in travelling from Bundi to Ajmer. 26. From the analysis of administrative law and the distinction between an administrative action and the judicial action, it is clear that the powers which are given to the High Court under Section 7 of the High Court Ordinance, 1949 or under Sec 407, Cr. P. C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are judicial powers and the powers are to be exercised within the para-meters and limits as discussed above. P. C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are judicial powers and the powers are to be exercised within the para-meters and limits as discussed above. It requires consideration of the relevant circumstances, as stated above, and a notice to the other party that is likely to be affected by transfer of case from one sessions division to another sessions division. Even if it is an administrative action as is suggested by Mr. Khan. learned Additional Advocate General, still the principles of natural justice are to be observed and notice is required to be served for hearing the other side, likely to be affected by the order. 27. Thus, in our opinion, the order of the High Court transferring the cases from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge. Bundi to the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Ajmer cannot be sustained, as the order was passed without assigning any reason, without giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners and without complying with the provisions of Section 407, Cr. P. C. As discussed above, the impugned order also cannot be sub-stained under Section 27 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The upshot of the discussion is that the impugned order of the High Court dated 21st December, 1987 ordering the transfer of the cases from the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, to the Judge. Designated Court, Ajmer-cum-Additional Sessions Judge, Ajmer is without any authority of law and in violation of principles of natural justice and offends constitutional guarantees prescribed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 28. In the premises aforesaid, we allow the writ petition and set aside the order passed by the High Court, as communicated by the Registrar vide letter No. 5607 dated 21st December, 1987, transferring Sessions cases No. 79/1986 and 26/1987, pending before the Addl. Sessions Judge. Bundi to the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Ajmer. However, this will not come in the way of the State if it chooses to file an application for transfer of the cases in accordance with law. 29. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******