Judgment :- 1. Five workmen represented by petitioner, were dismissed after a domestic enquiry by second respondent. An industrial dispute was raised and Ext. P1 is the reference order. In the proceedings a preliminary issue was raised, and by Ext.P4 dated 9-2-1983, the Labour Court (1st respondent) found that "workmen were not given sufficient opportunity to establish their innocence. Enquiry to that extent is vitiated". 2. Thereafter, additional evidence was taken, and three witnesses (WW. 2 to 4) were examined for the workmen. One of the workmen and Enquiry Officer were examined respectively, as WW.1 and MW. 1, as seen from Ext. P6 order (paragraph 5). Thereafter, first respondent considered the matter and found that charges 1 and 3 were established. Punishment of discharge from service was imposed. 3. Ext. P6 order is challenged on three grounds. It is contended that, first respondent should not have acted on evidence recorded at the domestic enquiry. It was also contended that the findings are unsupported by evidence, and that the punishment imposed is unduly harsh. 4. Petitioner would contend that, since the domestic enquiry was found to be improper, the evidence recorded therein could not be relied on. According to counsel, if the domestic enquiry is illegal, all that took place during the enquiry is wiped out. I am unable to accept this submission on principle or precedent. S.11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that the Labour Court shall rely only on the material on record. What is material on record came up for consideration in the workmen of Fire stone Tyre and Rubber Company v. Management (1973(1) LLJ 278). In the said decision (paragraph 46), the court observed that material on record takes in: (i) evidence taken by the management at the enquiry and proceedings of the enquiry; (ii) that evidence and in addition any further evidence let in before the Tribunal; and (iii) evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time in support of the action taken by an employer as well as the evidence adduced by the workmen to the contra; Category (i) refers to evidence taken by the management at the enquiry. This is clear indication that evidence at the domestic enquiry is "material on record". The fact that the domestic enquiry was found to be vitiated, will not have the effect of obliterating whatever was done in the course of the enquiry. This is clear indication that evidence at the domestic enquiry is "material on record". The fact that the domestic enquiry was found to be vitiated, will not have the effect of obliterating whatever was done in the course of the enquiry. The language of S.11A, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, leaves no room for doubt that evidence already recorded at the domestic enquiry is material on record that could be and should be considered. 5. There are no roles of evidence or procedure governing this area. In the absence of rules, there is no warrant to think that such evidence should be excluded from consideration. The "exclusionary rule" does not come into play. "Exclusionary rule", wherever it is found, must be based on a legal provision, or constitutional mandate, like Art.20 (3) of the Constitution of India or 4th or 14th amendment in the United States. In Pur an Mal v. State (AIR 1974 SC 348) and Wolf v. Colorado (338 U.S 25), I find support for this view. Petitioner placed reliance on the decision in Radio & Electricals Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal and others (1978 (2) LLJ 131), to contend that evidence recorded at the domestic enquiry must be excluded. Even in that case it was found that, in the absence of an objection raised before the Tribunal against admitting evidence, such a contention cannot succeed. In the instant case, no objection was raised before first respondent regarding the admissibility of the evidence recorded at the domestic enquiry. Besides, the decision of Supreme Court aforesaid, clearly is to the effect that, such evidence can be considered. 6. The next contention is that, the conclusion reached by first respondent is not supported by evidence. I have been taken through Ext. P6. First respondent has relied on the evidence of Chandran and corroborating circumstances. id proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution, this court will not sit in appeal on findings of facts. I am not inclined to think that the findings are not based on evidence, or that they are vitiated by any errors apparent on the face of the record. The contention roust fail. It was then urged that the punishment imposed is not merited. This court will not consider the question of punishment, as a Court of appeal would, unless the punishment is 'unduly harsh'. The contention roust fail. It was then urged that the punishment imposed is not merited. This court will not consider the question of punishment, as a Court of appeal would, unless the punishment is 'unduly harsh'. Having regard to the nature of the charges found, I do not think that the punishment is unduly harsh. Considerations of discipline, and other relevant factors must govern this area, and the appropriate authority has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. I am not inclined to think that the finding calls for interference. In the result, writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.