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1988 DIGILAW 26 (HP)

BHAGAT RAM THAKUR v. ENAKSHI MAHAJAN

1988-07-05

V.K.MEHROTRA

body1988
JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, J.-Bhagat, Ram Thakur has approached this Court for relief under section 21 (5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, (hereinafter, "the Act") The revision is being disposed of under section 24 (5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter, "the 1987 Act") on account of the provision contained in section 34 (2) of the 1987 Act. 2. Smt. Enakshi Mahajan is the owner of the premises in the tenancy of applicant Bhagat Ram Thakur. The premises are residential in nature. Eviction from these premises was sought by Smt. Mahajan on these grounds:— That the tenant was in arrears of rent having failed to pay it for the period between September 1, 1978 and April 30, 1981, that the premises were bonafide required by her for her own occupation and for the use and occupation of her family members; and, that the tenant has built a residence of his own in Simla near fara Hall School which was lying vacant. 3. The tenant refuted the claim of Smt. Mahajan. He said that he was not in arrears of rent and that Smt. Mahajan did not accept the rent which was offered to her many a times as she wanted rent to be paid to her at exborbitantly enhanced rate. She did not have any bonafide requirement for the premises in question as she had sufficient accommodation available to her. The tenant, however, did not counter the allegations in regard to the assertion of Smt. Mahajan that he had built a residence of his own near Tara Hall School, Simla, after the enforcement of the Act. 4. The Controller, after framing necessary issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties, afforded opportunity to them to lead evidence. Smt Mahajan appeared as PW I in support of her case and also examined her husband as PW 2. The tenant examined himself as the sole witness to substantiate his case. After hearing parties, the Controller recorded his order on August 16, 1983. He held that the tenant was in arrears of rent for the period and to the extent alleged by Smt. Mahajan. Also, that Smt. Mahajan had been able to establish that she had bonafide required for being permitted to occupy the premises which was in possession of the tenant. He held that the tenant was in arrears of rent for the period and to the extent alleged by Smt. Mahajan. Also, that Smt. Mahajan had been able to establish that she had bonafide required for being permitted to occupy the premises which was in possession of the tenant. The finding further was that the tenant had constructed a residential building of his own after the commencement of the Act. On these principal findings the Controller allowed the application of Smt. Mahajan and directed eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute. 5. The tenant filed an appeal under section 21 (1) of the Act feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Controller. The Appellate Authority heard the parties. It dismissed the appeal by its order dated May 30, 1984 and, thus, affirmed the order of eviction passed against the tenant. Thereafter, the present revision was filed by the tenant in this Court on July 2 1984. 6. In this Court, one of the submissions made on behalf of the tenant was that Smt. Mahajan was not entitled to obtain an order of eviction based on the ground of her bonafide requirement for occupation of the demised premises as she had acquired the premises by transfer in the year 1978 and had made the application for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that she required it for her own occupation on May 19, 1981, that is, before expiry of a period of five years from the date when she had acquired the premises by transfer. The submission was founded upon the provision in that regard contained in section 14 (6) of the 1987 Act which was applicable to the present case as well on account of section 34 (2) of that Act. The submission was countered on behalf of the landlady. However, in view of the decision dated June 17, 1988, of this Court in Civil Revision No. 224 of 1982, Gauri Shankar v. Tilak Raj, it has to be held that the land-lady could not seek eviction of the tenant on the ground that she needed the residential premises in question bonafide for occupation by her and her other family members. To the extent that the application made by Smt. Mahajan for the eviction of the tenant-applicant is founded upon the ground that she required the residential building in question bonafide for her own occupation, it has to be held as not maintainable before the expiry of a period of five years from the date when she acquired interest in it by transfer. The submission in this respect made by the learned Counsel for the tenant deserves to be upheld. 7. The conclusion aforesaid, it is argued does not mean that the tenant is entitled to relief in the present revision. The reason is that one of the grounds upon which his eviction had been sought was that he had built a residential building of his own. This ground for seeking eviction of the tenant was claimed by Smt. Mahajan on account of the provision contained in section 14 (3) (f) of the Act which said that "the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a residence," 8. By the retrospective amendment dating back to November 17, 1971, brought into force under the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, this ground has been provided for in section 14 (3) (iv) which says that:— "(iv) the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted, a residence reasonably sufficient for his requirements." 9. The submission of Miss Kamlesh Sharma, appearing for the tenant in this Court, has been that the fact that the residence built by the tenant was reasonably sufficient for his requirements" was neither pleaded nor established by Smt. Mahajan. As such, the order of eviction passed against the tenant could not be upheld on this ground as well. 10. The above ground for eviction of the tenant was the subject-matter of issue No. 5-A framed by the Controllor. The Controller noticed in his order, while considering issue no. 5-A, the fact that the tenant had not given any reply to the assertion made on behalf of Mrs. Mahajan that he had built a residence of his own in Simla near Tara Hall School in his written reply- He has also said that this fact stood established by the evidence led on behalf of the land-lady. 5-A, the fact that the tenant had not given any reply to the assertion made on behalf of Mrs. Mahajan that he had built a residence of his own in Simla near Tara Hall School in his written reply- He has also said that this fact stood established by the evidence led on behalf of the land-lady. The finding of the Controller under Issue No, 5-A was challenged in the memorandum of appeal by the tenant on the ground that there was no evidence on record to come to that conclusion. When, however, the matter was argued before the Appellate Authority, the tenant did not assail the finding. The only point which was stressed on his behalf related to issue No. 2 framed by the Controller, namely, whether the premises in dispute were bonafide required by the land-lady, as alleged by her. The Appellate Authority dealt with the submission at some length, but found against the tenant. It then mentioned (in paragraph 13 of its order) that no other point had been stressed. In these circumstances, the submission on behalf of the land-lady has been that the tenant cannot be permitted now to say that the order of eviction against him be set-aside on the ground that the residence built by him was not alleged to have been reasonably sufficient for his requirements. 11. Under section 1 (3) of the 1987 Act, the provisions of that Act are to be deemed to have come into force on November 17, 1971. Subsection (2) of section 34 says that notwithstanding the repeal of 1971 Act the proceedings pending, inter alia, before a revisional authority are to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of 1987 Act as if, the provisions contained therein were in force at the relevant time. Obviously, the requirement of section 14 (3) (iv) of the 1987 Act shall have to be treated to be the requirement also of clause (f) of section 14 (3) of the 1971 Act in its entirety. Therefore, before a landlord could claim eviction of a tenant on the ground that the tenant had built a residence for himself it must also be established by him that such residence was reasonably sufficient for the requirements of the tenant. Therefore, before a landlord could claim eviction of a tenant on the ground that the tenant had built a residence for himself it must also be established by him that such residence was reasonably sufficient for the requirements of the tenant. Even if the finding of the Controller on issue No. 5-A is accepted to be sacrosacnt and accepted in its entirety, the order of eviction of the tenant cannot be upheld on its basis for it falls short of the ground which the landlord must establish before he can seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground that the tenant had built a residence for himself. 12. An inquiry is to be made about the fact whether the residence built by the tenant was reasonably sufficient for his requirements or not by the Controller. It is only after he finds that it is so that an order of eviction can be passed against the tenant. In the present case, admittedly, neither any such inquiry has been made by the Controller nor has any finding been recorded by him that the residence which has been built by the tenant was reasonably sufficient for his requirements. Consequently, the order of eviction of the tenant cannot be founded on this ground as well. 13. In conclusion it must be held that the order of eviction passed against the applicant cannot be upheld on the two grounds on which it was sought to be supported by Smt. Mahajan in this Court. The revision succeeds and is allowed. The order of eviction of applicant Bhagat Ram Thakur is set-aside. 14. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this Court. Revision allowed.