JUDGMENT B.L. YADAV, J. 1. BY the present petition the petitioner who was a Head Clerk in Sri Tika Ram Girls Inter College, Aligarh has prayed for a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate him on the post of Head Clerk and for the payment of his up to date salary with effect from 21-5-75 the date of suspension. On account of some criminal charges, petitioner was suspended on 21-5-75, but lateron he was exonerated from all the criminal charges levelled against him. The petitioner furnished order of acquittal dated 2-2-82 to the Manager and prayed that he should be reinstated with past salary (vide Annexure 2 to the writ petition). BY letter dated 31-8-82 he requested the Manager to be allowed to join and sent a copy of the same to the District Inspector of Schools Aligarh and Regional Inspectress of Girls School Agra, who directed the Manager for the reinstatement of the petitioner (vide Annexure 8) and thereafter made an enquiry from the Manager by letter dated 27-10-83 (Annexure 9) but the Manager neither gave any reply nor took any action to reinstate the petitioner who never resigned. The case of the petitioner was, that for the first time, in para 4 of the counter affidavit filed by one O. P. Gupta on behalf of respondent no. 3, it was averred that the petitioner has voluntarily tendered resignation on 7th October, 1975 which was approved by the Committee of Management on 27-1-76. This resignation was, however, in pursuance of Regulation 29 framed under Chapter 3 (Conditions of Service) applicable to the employees of the Institution. The case of the Committee of Management was that the petitioner has resigned as a Head Clerk and the same has been accepted. 2. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that petitioner never tendered any resignation nor any such allegation was in his notice prior to the date when a copy of the counter affidavit was served on his counsel who informed him. In Regulation 29 under Chapter 3 (Conditions of Service) of the Intermediate Education Act (for short Act) with the approval of the State Government on 10th March, 1975 an Amendment was made in the Act and Regulations to the effect that the provisions of Regulation 29 were applicable to the clerks and librarians also. Earlier it was applicable only to the teachers. Earlier it was applicable only to the teachers. The regulation 29 may be read with Regulation 26. The legal effect of resignation is that the service stands terminated, therefore it must strictly comply with the Regulation 29 read with Regulation 26. As such a permanent employee, while tendering resignation must give 3 months notice or 3 months pay in lieu thereof. In the instant case neither any such notice was alleged to have been given nor the Management, while accepting the resignation, condoned the period of notice as is clear from Annexure C.A. 5, hence it was no resignation in the eye of law. Reliance was placed on Shiv Raj Singh v. Shri Dev Ji Mal Asba Ram Paliwal, 1982 Ed Cases 151 and Km. Rama Chauhan v. Committee of Management, 1981 UP LB EC 721. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents urged that the resignation was valid even without 3 months prior notice and that under Regulation 100 applicable to the librarians etc., Regulation 29 was not mentioned, therefore the conditions for resignation applicable to the teachers could not be made applicable to the cases of clerks. 3. HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties point for consideration is whether the petitioner resigned, if so, was it in accordance with the Regulation 29 read with Regulation 26. 4. AS regards first part of the question it appears that the letter of resignation, even though a copy of the same (Annexure 4 to the counter affidavit of O. P. Gupta) has been filed, does not appear to have been sent to either D.I.O.S. or the R.I.G.S. nor the approval of the authority concerned appears to have been obtained, we proceed to determine as to whether the resignation can be made without complying with the provisions of Regulations 26 and 29 framed under Chapter 3 (Conditions of Service), under U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. It has to be noticed that U. P. Intermediate Education Act was passed prior to coming into force of the Constitution of India. Under the Act amendments have been made from time to time and the Regulations have been framed thereunder. It has to be noticed that U. P. Intermediate Education Act was passed prior to coming into force of the Constitution of India. Under the Act amendments have been made from time to time and the Regulations have been framed thereunder. With a view to provide more protection to the teachers and employees of the institutions State Government approved an Amendment on 10th March, 1975 to the effect that the provisions applicable to the teachers regarding resignation would be applicable to the clerks and librarians also. The object of the amendment was to safeguard the interest of librarians etc. from the unfair clutches of Management as it used to fabricate resignations on behalf of the clerks and other employees just to employ its own henchman. To avoid all this the provision was made that a teacher, clerk or librarian can resign only by giving 3 months notice or paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof. This obviously means that a teacher or employee has to remain conscious while submitting resignation, by giving notice of 3 months or paying salary of 3 months in lieu thereof, in case he was a permanent employee. This was a salutary check to ascertain the bonafides of the letter of resignation. It was in consonance with the objects of the amendment brought in the provision. In our opinion the possible textual and contextual interpretation of Regulation 29 read with Regulation 26 under Chapter 3, would be that unless a head clerk submits his resignation giving 3 months notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof, the resignation cannot be deemed to be valid. From the record it appears that in the instant case the resignation was not communicated even to the relevant authorities including Regional Inspectress of Girls School etc. Had the resignation actually been submitted, relevant authority including respondents 1 and 2 would have itself commented about the validity of the resignation or otherwise. 5. UNDER the circumstances we are of the opinion that a permanent head clerk can resign only by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof. Giving of notice or paying three months salary is a condition precedent. In the instant case there is no evidence on the record to show that petitioner resigned by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof. Giving of notice or paying three months salary is a condition precedent. In the instant case there is no evidence on the record to show that petitioner resigned by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof. In the counter affidavit nothing has been pointed out to establish that petitioner submitted resignation by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof or the Committee of Management while accepting the resignation condoned the notice. Therefore, the said resignation (Annexure 4 to C. A.) if any, cannot be said to have been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Regulation 29 read with Regulation 26 and same cannot be treated to be resignation in the eye of law. The view which we are taking also find support from a Division Bench Case Shivraj Singh v. Shri Devji Mal Asha Ram Paliwal, 1982 Ed. Cases 151, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was held in para 9 that under U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Regulations were framed. Those Regulations control both the management as well as the teachers' rights to terminate or resign from service. Regulation 26 is in positive terms. Giving of the three months notice or pay in lieu thereof is a condition precedent for the management to exercise its right to terminate the services of an employee. Similarly in Km. Rama Chauhan v. Committee of Management, 1981 UP LB EC 721, it was held that a resignation without following the procedure prescribed under Regulations 26 and 29 framed under Chapter 3, cannot be treated to be a letter of resignation at all. 6. REVERTING to the question as to whether under Regulation 100, Regulation 29 was mentioned and if not its effect. In fact under Regulation 29 the State Government approved an amendment on 10th March, 1975 to the effect that the provisions of Regulation 29 so far applicable to the teachers would be applicable to the clerks and librarians also. This was done just with a view to safeguard the interest of librarians and clerks from the evil designs of the management to comply its own henchmen and relations and to get resignations from the helpless librarians and clerks etc. who have no strong following in the management. This was done just with a view to safeguard the interest of librarians and clerks from the evil designs of the management to comply its own henchmen and relations and to get resignations from the helpless librarians and clerks etc. who have no strong following in the management. The elementary rule of interpretation is that a particular provision of Statute has to be interpreted keeping in view the object behind the enactment of that provision. The interpretation has to be placed in such a way so that it may achieve the prospects and objects for which the legislation was made. As the Statutes or Regulations framed are manmade and they are framed or made sometime in past but are made applicable for the times to come in future, there is bound to be 'causus omissi' which means that a measure of discretion is imported into every decision as to whether the provision applies to the case in hand or not and there may be some bonafide omission on the part of Legislature also. The Court has certainly, in appropriate cases, power to iron out the creases keeping in view the objects sought to be attained by particular piece of legislation. In Latimer v. A. E. C. Ltd., 1953 A.C. 643 at page 658 it was held as follows: "It appears to me desirable in these days when there are in existence so many statutes, statutory Regulations, that the Court should be vigilant in the matter of interpretation."In the present case as the amendment approved on 10th March, 1975 was obviously to apply Regulation 29 on the relevant date, to the librarians but when Regulation 100 was framed making some provision applicable to the librarians and clerks also how it could be that Regulation 29 was not mentioned there. If it was really so, we are of the opinion that it could have been only on account of some bonafide mistake or 'causus omissi' or by sheer omission. Even if Regulation 29 was not mentioned in Regulation 100 it does not lead to the inference that the object of the amendment brought about by the Legislature on 10th March, 1975 would be obliterated. In the instant case solemn duty of the Court is to interpret Regulations 26, 29 and 100 together with a view to avoid absurdity and manifest injustice. In the instant case solemn duty of the Court is to interpret Regulations 26, 29 and 100 together with a view to avoid absurdity and manifest injustice. It is better to refer what was said in Land Revenue Commissioner v. Hinchy, 1960 A.C. 748 to the effect, "What we must look for is the intention of the Parliament and I also find it difficult to believe that Parliament really intended the consequences which flow from the appellant's contention" (i. e. in the instant case from the submissions made on behalf of respondents). Reading relevant provisions of U. P. Intermediate Education Act, Regulation 26, Regulation 29, amendment referred to above approved by the State Government on 10th March, 1975 it comes out that the provisions of Regulation 29 would be applicable to the cases of clerks and librarians as well. When this amendment was made it appears to be a sheer omission that the Regulation 29 was not mentioned under Regulation 100 where the provisions were made applicable to the cases of the clerks and librarians. Regulation 100 has to be read subject to the Regulation 26 read with Regulation 29 and the aforesaid amendment approved by the State Government on 10th March, 1975. We are accordingly unable to find any merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents. The petitioner has made a number of representations to the respondents 1, 2 and 3 about the payment of salary but a lame excuse appears to have been taken by the Committee of Management that the petitioner has tendered resignation. In view of the premises aforesaid, we are of the opinion that said letter of resignation was totally void. The only inescapable conclusion is that the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner. 7. IN the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner and to pay entire back pay and other emoluments within 3 months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before them and to go on paying the salary and other emoluments to which he is entitled including increments etc. according to law. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.