JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order shall also govern the disposal of Misc. Petition No. 215/1988, Om Shanker vs. State of M. P. and another, which involves the similar questions of law for consideration of this Court. ( 2. ) THE petitioners in both writ petitions, are life convicts undergoing sentences in jail in accordance with law. Petitioners in this writ petition have been held guilty of offences under sections 302, 149 and 120-B, Indian Penal code, by the Sessions Judge, Tikamgarh in Sessions Trial No. 66/1980. It appears that they had filed a writ petition (M. P. No. 390 of 1985) complaining that they had completed five years in jail and have become entitled to be released under M. P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The respondent State did not file its return in the aforesaid case. This Court, by its order dated 7-8-1985 decided the petition without the aid of the return of the respondent State Government and directed them to consider Petitioners release under the aforesaid Act within the period of three months. It appears that in spite of the aforesaid order, the petitioners case was not considered. Their father, therefore, moved another writ petition (M. P. No. 3878/1988) and prayed for petitioners release on bail. This court by its order dated 23-4-1986, directed their release on bail. From the present petition it appears that the petitioners were released on bail in compliance, with the order of this Court. In spite of it, the petitioners case either under the Act or under Rule 359 of the Jail Manual was not considered. This has led them to file the present petition claiming release under Rule 358 or 359 (9) of the Jail Manual. The respondents/state has filed its return and submitted that in view of section 433-A of the Code of Criminal procedure as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Maru Ram vs. Union of India, air 1980 SC 2147 , the petitioners cannot be released under the aforesaid provision before they have completed fourteen years of actual imprisonment. ( 3. ) IN the other writ petition, petitioner Om Shanker has been convicted for offences under sections 302, 147, 148 and 149, Indian Penal Code and 25/27 of the arms Act, by the judgment dated 17-5-1980, passed by the Sessions Judge, Satna in S. T. No. 69 of 1979. ( 3. ) IN the other writ petition, petitioner Om Shanker has been convicted for offences under sections 302, 147, 148 and 149, Indian Penal Code and 25/27 of the arms Act, by the judgment dated 17-5-1980, passed by the Sessions Judge, Satna in S. T. No. 69 of 1979. From the petition, it appears that he has completed one year eight months and 27 days as under-trial prisoner and seven years six months and twenty days as actual sentence. He claims that, he has completed more than ten years including remissions and has become entitled to be considered for release under Rule 358 or 359 of the Jail Manual. The respondent/state admits that he has completed more than ten years of jail sentence which included remissions also. They, however, submit that in view of the section 433-A, criminal Procedure Code, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mam Rams case, he is not entitled to be released. ( 4. ) SINCE in these petitions the petitioners claim their premature release under Rules 358 and 359 of the Jail Manual, their meaning, purpose and scope may first be determined. These provisions read as under : "358 (1) When a prisoner has been sentenced to imprisonment for life whether or not he has also been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, or when he has been sentenced to a term or term of imprisonment exceeding 14 years, he shall be considered for release as soon as the term already undergone (together with any remission earned under the rules) and, such other special remission if any as have been granted by the Government in celebration of any public event amounts to fourteen years. His case shall be reported to the State Government through the inspector-General with full information regarding the character of his crime, his conduct in prison and the probability of his reverting after release to criminal habits or instigating others to commit crime, in order to enable the State Government to decide whether he should be released and if so, whether he should be subjected to police supervision or other suitable conditions. If the State Government decides that he should not be released, then after two years from the State governments order his case shall be reported again for further consideration. If the State Government decides that he should not be released, then after two years from the State governments order his case shall be reported again for further consideration. (2) The Superintendent of the Jail in which the prisoner is undergoing his sentence shall be primarily resposible for submitting the report under sub-rule (1 ). " "359. There shall be four Advisory Boards for the jails in Madhya pradesh located at Jabalpur, Raipur, Gwalior and Indore : -XXX XXX XXX (2) The Superintendents of the Central Jails of Jabalpur, Raipur, gwalior and Indore shall be Ex-officio Secretaries of the respective boards. XXX XXX XXX (8) The sentence of every casual long term prisoner who has served half his sentence, and of every habitual long term prisoner with not more than three previous convictions who has served two-thirds of his sentence shall be to reviewed. The remission earned by the prisoners conduct and diligence, excluding that granted in celebration of public events, shall be included in the period of sentence undergone. XXX XXX XXX (12) (a) The Board after a full consideration of the case shall make a recommendation to the State Government either to postpone the question of the grant of remission for a period not exceeding two years or to release the prisoner prematurely with or without conditions. Good conduct in jail shall be indispensable condition for recommendation by the Advisory Board for premature release in all cases except when the recommendation is made on urgent medical grounds. Where the members of a Board are not unanimous, its recommendations shall be in accordance with the opinions of the majority of its members. Where a board makes a recommendation which is in opposition to the opinion of the District Magistrate of the district in which the prisoner was residing before his conviction it shall state the reasons in detail for such recommendations. (b) If the State Government decides that the prisoner should not be released, then after an interval of two years from the State governments orders, the prisoners case shall be reported again for reconsideration. XXX XXX XXX" These rules are enacted by the respondent State Government under section 59 of the Prisons Act of 1894. (b) If the State Government decides that the prisoner should not be released, then after an interval of two years from the State governments orders, the prisoners case shall be reported again for reconsideration. XXX XXX XXX" These rules are enacted by the respondent State Government under section 59 of the Prisons Act of 1894. These provisions are also relateable to section to section 432 (1) of the Code which provides that when any person has been sentenced to imprisonment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. Articles 72 and 161 of the constitution give wider powers to the President and the Governor to grant pardon, to remit or commute or suspend the sentence imposed on any person and this power can be invoked even before conviction. In Narendra vs. State, 1983 mpwn 190, these rules were held to be statutory entitling the prisoners to claim premature release. This Court also laid down that the executive would not be justified in laying down the policy that would contravene the provision of Rule 358. Rule 358 contains, what is popularly known as "14 years rule" indicating that the life sentence in actual practice, means a sentence of 14 years only. This rule indicates that while calculating the period of 14 years, remissions earned by the prisoner shall also be taken into consideration. A prisoner released under these provisions, is deemed to have served his sentence. In other words, this provision has the effect of converting life sentence into a sentence of 14 years only. That is the reason why it is called the provision for premature release. Rule 359 contains somewhat similar provision though while acting under the aforesaid para the state Government is required to act on the advice of Advisory Board. This provision is, however, wider in its ambit and scope and permits release of the prisoner prematurely with or without condition. Since we are concerned only with the premature release it is not considered necessary to dilate on all other aspects of this provision. This provision is, however, wider in its ambit and scope and permits release of the prisoner prematurely with or without condition. Since we are concerned only with the premature release it is not considered necessary to dilate on all other aspects of this provision. In Narendra vs. State of M. P. (supra) as Naina Ram vs. State of M. P. , 1987 MPLJ 687, these provisions have been interpreted as containing powers of premature release. It is, therefore, plain that these provisions entitle a life convict to claim release from prison on completing 14 years of sentence including remissions. In other words, the benefit of these provisions has the effect of substituting life sentence to the sentence of 14 years including remissions. ( 5. ) SECTION 433-A, Criminal Procedure Code, however, disentitles a life convict to be released from prison unless he has served at least, 14 years of imprisonment. This provision did not exist in the Code as originally framed but was inserted by Act 45 of 1978, with effect from 18-12-1978 and reads as under: "433-A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment. " Constitutional validity of this provision, including its ambit and scope was examined by the Supreme Court in Maru Ram vs. Union of India (supra ). The question for consideration of Supreme Court was : whether after coming into force of this provision it was open to the State Governments to reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on a person convicted of a capital offence to any period they liked on the basis of remission-rules framed by the state Governments which were traceable to section 432, Criminal Procedure code, or Acts which authorised the State Government to modify the sentence of imprisonment of life imposed by courts. The Court, on a consideration of the matter in detail held that in view of the non-obstante clause used in section 433-A, criminal Procedure Code, which included the operation of section 432, Criminal procedure Code, remission rules could not prevail over section 433-A. The Court clearly and equivocally held that section 433-A of the Code applies in preference to any special or local law to the contrary and will prevail over them. The conclusions of the Court are formulated in fourteen broad propositions of which relevant ones for purpose of this case are as under : "72. We conclude by formulating our findings. (1) We repulse all the thrusts on the vires of section 433-A. May be penologically the prolonged term prescribed by the section in supeerrogative. If we had our druthers we would have negatived the need for a fourteen year gestation for reformation. But ours is the construe, not construct, to decode, not to make a code. (2) We affirm the current supremacy of section 433-A over the remission Rules and short-sentencing statutes made by the various states. (3) We uphold all remissions and short-sentencing passed under articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution but release will follow, in life sentence cases, only on Government making an order en masse or individually, in that behalf. (4) We hold that section 432 and section 433 are not a manifestation of articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution but a separate, though similar, power, and section 433-A, by nullifying wholly or partially these prior provisions does not violate or detract from the full operation of the constitutional power to pardon, commute and the like. XXX XXX XXX (6) We follow Godsex case, AIR 1961 SC 600 to hold that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath, and whatever the length of remissions earned, the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Government. (7) We declare that section 433-A, in both its limbs (i. e. both types of life imprisonment specified in it), is prospective in effect. To put the position beyond doubt, we direct that the mandatory minimum of 14 years actual imprisonment will not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th December, 1978 when section 433-A came into force. To put the position beyond doubt, we direct that the mandatory minimum of 14 years actual imprisonment will not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th December, 1978 when section 433-A came into force. All lifers whose conviction by the court of first instance was entered prior to that date are entitled to consideration by Government for release on the strength or earned remissions although a release can take place only if Government makes an order to that effect. To this extent the battle of the tenses is won by the prisoners. It follows, by the same logic, that short sentencing legislations, if any, will entitle a prisoner to claim release thereunder if his conviction by the Court of first instance was before section 433-A was brought into effect. XXX XXX XXX (10) Although the remission rules are short sentencing provisions proprio vigore may not apply as against section 433-A they will override section 433-A, if the Government, Central or State guides itself by the self-same rules or schemes in the exercise of its constitutional power. We regard it as fair that until fresh rules are made in keeping with experience gathered, current social conditions and accepted penological thinking - a desirable step, in our view - the present remission and release schemes may usefully be taken as guidelines under Articles 72/161 and orders for release passed. We cannot fault the Government if in some intractably savage delinquents. Section 433-A is itself treated as a guideline for exercise of Articles 72/161. These observations of ours are recommendatory to avoid a hiatus, but it is for Government, Central or State, to decide whether and why the current Remission Rules should not survive until replaced by a more wholesome scheme. XXX XXX XXX (14) Section 433-A does not forbid parole or other release within the 14 years span. So to interepret the section as to intensify inner tension and intermissions of freedom it to do violence to language and liberty. " A bare reading of these propositions indicates that though remissions and short-sentences are within the powers of the State, they have to operate within framework of section 433-A, Criminal Procedure Code, and not against it. So to interepret the section as to intensify inner tension and intermissions of freedom it to do violence to language and liberty. " A bare reading of these propositions indicates that though remissions and short-sentences are within the powers of the State, they have to operate within framework of section 433-A, Criminal Procedure Code, and not against it. Under the circumstances, though parole or other release within 14 years span are permitted, no life convict can claim his premature release by claiming advantage of remission other substitute forms of punishment before 14 years of actual imprisonment. It is, therefore, plain that in spite of remission a lifer must complete 14 years of actual sentence and though his release on parole or on other consideration for short-period can be considered he cannot be set free before he has completed 14 years of actual imprisonment. ( 6. ) IN Shidagouda Ningappa Ghandavar vs. State of Kamataka, AIR 1981 sc 764 , the Court seems to have emphasised the importance of fourteen years rule under this provision by observing as under : "we do hope that even if the validity of section 433-A of the Criminal procedure Code is upheld by this Court, the Government will not, save for weighty reason, reduce or commute the sentence of the appellant to less than fourteen years, since, unquestionably, he has committed a very serious crime." This is also the meaning assigned to Mara Rams case in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Vallabhapuram Ravi, AIR 1985 SC 870 , where the Court considered the effect of section 433-A of the Code vis-a-vis Borstals Act and gave benefit of the said act to the prisoners only by interpreting that a person, kept in Borstal School was not a prisoner. In view of these clear holdings there is no scope for the submission that a life convict can be set at liberty before he has completed or undergone actual 14 years imprisonment. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that 14 years for the purpose of section 433-A of the Code should include remissions. Indeed, this Court would think that there is no scope for such an argument, in view of the decision in Mara Rams case. No decided case has been brought to our notice taking any contrary view of the matter. Indeed, this Court would think that there is no scope for such an argument, in view of the decision in Mara Rams case. No decided case has been brought to our notice taking any contrary view of the matter. It should, therefore, be accepted as well settled that in spite of the provisions under Rules 358 and 359 of the Jail Manual, the petitioners who are life convicts cannot claim their premature release before they have undergone a least 14 years of actual imprisonment. Admittedly, they have not completed 14 years of actual imprisonment and, therefore, they cannot claim advantage of premature release either under Rule 358 or Rule 359 of the Jail Manual. ( 7. ) IT is true that in M. P. No. 3878 of 1985 and M. P. No 390 of of 1985, thi court had directed consideration of the case of the petitioners Rejendra Sharm and Prem Sharma but a perusal of the order dated 7-8-1985, indicates that the court had directed consideration not under these paras but under M. P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954 with which we are not concerned in the present writ petition. In any case, the aforesaid order does not go contrary to this order, and, therefore, cannot give any benefit to the petitioners. ( 8. ) IN view of the discussions aforesaid, the petition fails and is dismissed. Even while dismissing the petition, this Court would expect the respondents State to adopt a benevolent approach in the matter and consider the petitioners case under M. P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1954 in accordance with law. The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.