K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS order shall dispose of the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act') filed by the applicants. ( 2 ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to the application are these. The Non-applicants instituted Civil Suit No. 3-A/82 against the applicants and one Nandibai (since deceased) for separate possession of property and mesne profits and in the alternative for partition, possession and mesne profits. The learned Ist Additional Judge to the District Judge, Ratlam, Camp Jaora, in the said suit, passed a preliminary decree dt. 21-3-86 for partition. ( 3 ) THE applicants on 19-6-86, after excluding time as provided under S. 12 of the Act, within 70 days of the decree, filed an application under O. 44, R. 1, C. P. C. accompanied by the memorandum of appeal for permission to appeal against the decree as indigent persons. The office note is to the effect that the proposed appeal is barred by 9 days as the period prescribed for an application for leave to appeal as indigent person is 60 days as provided by Art. 130 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE applicants have later on 19-2-88 filed an application under S. 5 of the Act for. condonation of delay stating that acting under the advice of their counsel in the trial Court, they preferred the appeal within 90 days as provided by Art. 116 of the Act and in the circumstances the delay deserves to be condoned. ( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicants is that advice by a counsel which is contrary to the express provision of law cannot be urged as constituting sufficient cause for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Act. ( 6 ) THE point for consideration is whether the application under S. 5 of the Act deserves to be allowed. ( 7 ) SECTION 5 of the Act together with its explanation is in these terms : -"any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. "it may be noted that the provision makes no reference to any suit. ( 8 ) UNDER the provision extracted above the question essentially is one of satisfaction of the Court that the applicants had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. As pointed out in the decision in State of W. B. v. Hawrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal interpretation so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. ( 9 ) THE Legislature has left undefined the expression 'sufficient cause' so that the court is free to determine the sufficiency of the cause in the context of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It may be noted that there is a difference between the two expressions 'good cause' and 'sufficient cause. ' ( 10 ) IT is true that a party is entitled to wait till the last date of limitation for filing appeal but when limitation expires, he has to establish sufficient cause as required by S. 5 of the Act for not filing it before the limitation expired. That cause is certainly something mere than that sufficient according to the express provisions of the Act for if any case fell within the express provisions it would be covered by them as in the case of suits and there would be no scope for the application of the section. Delay which could be avoided by due care and attention cannot constitute sufficient cause. ( 11 ) WHEN the prescribed time lapses, a very valuable right accrues in favour of the successful party and before he may be deprived of that right, the Court must be satisfied of the justness of the ground on which condonation of delay is sought. In this connection the decision in Hiralal's case, 1986 MPLJ 149 is pertinent. Sufficient cause must relate to the period of limitation and delay of each day thereafter has to be explained. In this connection the decision in Hiralal's case, 1986 MPLJ 149 is pertinent. Sufficient cause must relate to the period of limitation and delay of each day thereafter has to be explained. ( 12 ) IN the decision in Matadin v. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 with reference to S. 5 of the Act it has been pointed out that mistake of counsel will not in every case, by itself, be sufficient ground to condone delay but where the delay in filing appeal is due to filing of earlier appeal in wrong forum on mistaken advice and there is nothing in the case to show that the error of the counsel was tainted by any mala fide motive, court would be justified in extending time. In paragraph 6 the Apex Court has delivered itself thus on the subject : -"the law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely advice (devise-Ed) to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an underhand way. The High Court unfortunately never considered the matter from this angle. If it had, it would have seen quite clear that there was no attempt to avoid the Limitation Act but rather to follow it albeit on a wrong reading of the situation. ''the decision in Comm. of I. T. v. Khemraj, 1979 Jab LJ 17 is also pertinent. ( 13 ) LAWS of procedue are devised for advancing justice and not impeding the same. In the decision in Ram Sumiram's case, AIR 1985 SC 606 the provision in O. 22, R. 9, C. P. C. which also embodies the requirement of sufficient cause was interpreted leniently in favour of a rural litigant who 6 years after the death of the respondent 5 applied for setting aside abatement. According to one of the respondents, the appellants knew about the death of the deceased respondent. According to one of the respondents, the appellants knew about the death of the deceased respondent. The Supreme Court observed thus : -"but merely because no application was made by the appellants for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record we do not think that in the circumstances of the present case that would be a valid ground for refusing to grant the application of the appellants for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent 5 on record because the appellants are admittedly from the rural area and in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, it would not be fair to presume that everyone knows that on death of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time. The ends of justice require that the application for bringing the legal representative of the deceased respondent 5 should have been granted. ''the decision in Sital Prasad's case. AIR 1985 SC 1 which too pertains to O. 22. Rr. 3 and 9 C. P. C. is also pertinent on the question of Court's approach in matters of condonation of delay. The decision in Jashodabai's case (1984 MP LJ Note No. 60 Page 35) may also be usefully perused. ( 14 ) THE Supreme Court decision in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Smt. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 : (1987) 2 MPWN 118 makes an illuminating reading on S. 5 of the Limitation Act. The decision points out that the doctrine of equality before law entitles the State to be treated like any other litigant and that due to impersonal machinery delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The following observation from the decision may profitably be reproduced (Para 3) : -"the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of the matter on merits. The expression sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. The expression sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principles as it is realized that : - "1. Ordinarily a litigant does stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary, is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. '' ( 15 ) IN the instant case there is no counter-affidavits to the affidavits filed by the applicants. ( 16 ) ON a perusal of the application under S. 5 of the Act and the affidavits including that of the applicants' Advocate in the trial court, it appears that it was on being asked merely regarding limitation for filing an appeal in the High Court that Advocate stated that the prescribed period for appeal to the High Court is 90 days. It does not appear that he was informed that it was intended to file appeal as indigent persons. In the light of Ram Sumiran's case ( AIR 1985 SC 606 ) (supra) the applicants cannot be very much blamed for the ignorance of the distinction between the different appeals and in the circumstances the advice by the Advocate cannot be said to be lacking in 'good faith' as defined in the Limitation Act. The decision in Anjani Prasad's case, 1983 Jab LJ 602 relates to delay due to bona fide advice by a counsel and may usefully be perused. ( 17 ) IT is true that the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed much later but this delay by itself cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be made a ground to reject it. Courts exist for dispensing justice and should do nothing which would amount to dispensing with it. The trend, as indicated by the decisions referred to in paragraphs 8, 12 and 13 of this order, is that in determining the sufficiency of cause for ther delay the court's approach should be a broad based one and where there is nothing to show that the party may be ascribed any ulterior motive. the prayer for condonation of delay should be allowed so as to subserve the cause of justice. ( 18 ) IN the ultimate analysis I find that the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act deserves to be allowed and is, consequently, allowed. .