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1988 DIGILAW 27 (ORI)

BRAJA KISHORE PRADHAN v. STATE OF ORISSA

1988-01-29

K.P.MOHAPATRA

body1988
K. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Keonjhar, convicting the appellant under section 376 I. P. C. and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight years and to pay one of Rs. 100/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case is that Sasmita (P. W. 1), a minor girl (hereinafter referred to as the prosecutrix), and the appellant, a student of the College at Remuli belonged to the same village Ichinda. The prosecutrix was a student of the VIIth class in a school of a neighbouring village. As usual, in the evening of 22. 2. 1986 she went near a tank called Sanabandha to answer the call of nature. When she was returning home, the appellant embraced her from behind and as out of fear she raised alarm, the appellant gagged her mouth and threatened her. Then he took her to the fear by field and forcibly committed rape on her. After she was released, she ran towards her house. The appellant followed, caught hold of her near the village school, took her inside and forcibly committed rape on her for the second time. She came back home and reported the incident to her grand mother. Her father who was serving at a different place was called and after his arrival F. I. R. (Ext. 1) was lodged at Champua Police Station at a distance of 15 kilometers from the village. Investigation was commenced and the prosecutrix was medically examined. After close of the investigation charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant for having committed an offence under section 376 I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE appellant completely denied that he had committed rape on the prosecutrix. His plea was that a proposal was initiated for the marriage of the prosecutrix with him and as they belonged to different castes and his parents disapproved of the marriage, a false case was foisted against him. ( 4 ) THE learned Assistant Sessions Judge believed the prosecution case and held that the prosecutrix was a minor girl below 16 years of age and the appellant had committed rape on her on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, he convicted and sentenced him as already referred to above. ( 5 ) MR. ( 4 ) THE learned Assistant Sessions Judge believed the prosecution case and held that the prosecutrix was a minor girl below 16 years of age and the appellant had committed rape on her on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, he convicted and sentenced him as already referred to above. ( 5 ) MR. Dhal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that there was delay in lodging the F. I. R. and the same has not been explained by the prosecution. Therefore, the prosecution case should be viewed with grave suspicion. It is true that the occurrence took place in the evening of 22. 2. 86 and the F. I. R. was lodged at Champua Police Station situated at a distance of 15 kilometers on 24. 2. 1986. The explanation for the delay has been furnished not only in the F. I. R. (Ext. 1), but also in the evidence of the prosecutrix (P. W. 1) and her father (P. W. 5 ). It was stated in the F. I. R. that P. W. 5 was serving as a Peon at Thakurani. Information about the incident was sent to him and after his arrival in the village, a meeting took place in order to patch up the matter. The facts stated in the F. I. R. have been substantially corroborated in the evidence of the prosecutrix (P. W. 1) and her father (P. W. 5 ). In a case of rape of a minor girl her reputation and that of the entire family is involved. Before making the matter public by taking recourse to law due deliberation of the members of the family is an usual feature and if for that purpose delay occurs for a day or two, it cannot be called unusual. The same thing happened in this case. The parties belonged to a remote village and the prosecutrix was on the threshold of her youth. Unexpectedly the incident came to light. Her father who was to take a decision was called from another place. On the next day a village meeting took place and obviously because nothing could be decided, F. I. R. was lodged the day after. In view of these facts, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dhal and hold that there was no unusual delay in lodging the F. I. R. and whatever delay was committed was satisfactorily explained. In view of these facts, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dhal and hold that there was no unusual delay in lodging the F. I. R. and whatever delay was committed was satisfactorily explained. ( 6 ) MR. Dhal next contended that there was no proof that the prosecutrix was a minor girl. In raising this contention, he obviously attempted to show that the prosecutrix was a major and gave consent for the sexual intercourse, if any so that no offence of rape was committed by the appellant. On the question of age of the prosecutrix no documentary evidence was adduced by the prosecution. But P. W. 5, father of the prosecutrix, stated that she was born on 6. 9. 1972. When the occurrence took place she was between 14 to 15 years of age. P. W. 4, the Radiologist of the District Headquarters Hospital, Keonjhar, also examined the prosecutrix to determine her age. He took X-ray photographs of different parts of her body, held ossification test and came to the conclusion as per his report (Ext 5) that the prosecutrix was aged between 14 to 15 years. P. W. 3, the Assistant Surgeon of the same hospital also examined her and took into consideration the report of P. W. 4 and opined that the prosecutrix was more than 14 years and less than 15 years of age the evidence of P. W. 5 cannot be lightly brushed aside because, parents have the instinct and are naturally aware of the age of their children even though they do not make reference to document. Added to his evidence, is the evidence of two experts (P. Ws. 3 and 4) who scientifically examined the prosecutrix for determination of her age. In view of the aforesaid evidence, it is not possible to hold that the prosecutrix was a major on the date of occurrence. On the other hand, accepting the evidence of P. W. 5 and the medical officers (P. Ws. 3 and 4) I hold that she was aged between 14 to 15 years at the time of commission of the rape. ( 7 ) IN this connection reference was made to Jayamala v. Home Secretary, where it was held:. . . However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side. ( 7 ) IN this connection reference was made to Jayamala v. Home Secretary, where it was held:. . . However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either side. Relying upon the aforesaid observation Mr. Dhal urged that in any case even accepting the evidence of the medical officers (P Ws. 3 and 4) it cannot be said that the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of occurrence. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayamala (supra) came for discussion in a case Dutta Pradhan and others v. The State of Orissa. This Court held that if invariably in all cases it is accepted as a general proposition that the margin of error is two years, then cases in which the victims of kidnapping and rape are around 15 years or between 15 and 16 years shall end in acquittal, thereby causing miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the judicial approach with regard to the age of the victim girl should be that each case must have to be decided in relation to its own facts established by the prosecution. In following the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Dutta Pradhan (supra) and on examination of the evidence on record as already referred to above, I am satisfied that no other conclusion than already arrived at can be reached with regard to the minority of the prosecutrix. The contention of Mr. Dhal in this regard is therefore untenable. ( 8 ) MR. Dhal contended that rape was not committed on the prosecutrix and even if it is found that she was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, it was with her consent. In making this contention he placed reliance on the evidence of another medical officer (P. W. 2), absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix and the circumstance that even though she was subjected to sexual intercourse for the second time inside the school very close to the village, she did not raise hue and cry. It is necessary to examine the evidence of P. W. 2 in detail on these aspects. P. W. 2 was the Assistant Surgeon of the Sub-Divisional Hospital, Champua, He examined the prosecutrix on police requisition on 24/2/1986 and submitted his report (Ext. 3 ). It is necessary to examine the evidence of P. W. 2 in detail on these aspects. P. W. 2 was the Assistant Surgeon of the Sub-Divisional Hospital, Champua, He examined the prosecutrix on police requisition on 24/2/1986 and submitted his report (Ext. 3 ). On examination he found that there were no marks of violence on her body except two bruises, one on her nose and the other on her left knee. On examination of her private parts he found that there was no bleeding from the vagina. The hymen was ruptured. Vaginal swab was taken and was examined by microscope, but there were no dead or alive spermatozoa. He accordingly came to the conclusion that there was no sign of recent sexual intercourse. In cross-examination he stated that the rupture of the hymen was an old one. If there was violent sexual intercourse against the will of the victim there would be injury marks on her private part. The evidence and the report of this medical officer show that the examination of the prosecutrix was not a detailed one, but was of superficial nature. Manifestly, the investigating officer was not satisfied with such examination and sent the prosecutrix for further examination to the District Headquarters Hospital, Keonjhar where she was examined in detail by P. W. 3 on 25/2/1986. He found that there was a tear in the hymen which was 72 to 90 hours old. He opined that the prosecutrix had been subjected to violent sexual intercourse and so rape could not be ruled out. His report (Ext. 4) shows that the examination was in de fail and the tearing site of the hymen bled on touch. ( 9 ) THE evidence of both the medical officers (P. Ws. 2 and 3) will thus show that some one had committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, as a result of which her hymen had ruptured. According to P. W. 2, she had also two other injuries. The points of difference between them were as follows:p. W. 2 There was no sign of recent sexual intercourse. The teat in the hymen was an old one. There was no bleeding. P. W. 3 There was violent sexual intercourse indicating rape. The tear in the hymen was 72 to 90 hours old. On touch, the ruptured hymen bled. The points of difference between them were as follows:p. W. 2 There was no sign of recent sexual intercourse. The teat in the hymen was an old one. There was no bleeding. P. W. 3 There was violent sexual intercourse indicating rape. The tear in the hymen was 72 to 90 hours old. On touch, the ruptured hymen bled. According to rules of evidence, if two views are possible evidence in support of the accused is to be accepted. If the evidence of P. W. 2 is accepted in toto, even then it would not suggest that the prosecutrix was not subjected to sexual intercourse in view of the statement that the hymen of the prosecutrix had ruptured, although it was not very recent. Therefore, the medical evidence has to be considered along with the evidence of the prosecutrix in order to find out the truth of the incident. I leave the medical evidence with the conclusion that there were traces to indicate that the prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse. When and under what circumstances would appear from her evidence. ( 10 ) THE prosecutrix (P. W. 1) stated that she was first attacked by the appellant near the village pond caned Sanabandha and was raped there in the evening. When she was coming to her house, she was again attacked by the appellant near the village school and was taken inside. She was raped for the second time successively in the same evening. Although she complained of the rape to one Tail Gouda near the village school, the said person was not examined as a witness. He grandmother to whom she complained after reaching home was also not examined by the prosecution in natural course, after the first occurrence of rape she would have cried aloud to attract the attention of other villagers, but she did not do so. There was no reason why she came towards the village school situated near the appellants house instead of straight making for home. She did not also shout for help when she was attacked for the second time near the village school, because her shouts could have attracted the attention of some villagers who were performing Kirtan in a nearby place of worship. So, the conduct displayed by her evidence was not consistent with the usual reaction of an innocent victim of rape. She did not also shout for help when she was attacked for the second time near the village school, because her shouts could have attracted the attention of some villagers who were performing Kirtan in a nearby place of worship. So, the conduct displayed by her evidence was not consistent with the usual reaction of an innocent victim of rape. On the other hand, when her evidence is considered along with the medical evidence, an impression can be formed that she was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse. Most likely, the prosecutrix and the appellant were in love and on account of the physical attraction, were drawn towards each another culminating in incident which for some inexplicable reason took the form of rape for being subsequently brought before the Court. ( 11 ) EVEN though the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse with the appellant, yet she was a minor girl below the age of sixteen years and technically the appellant was guilty of rape. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that the conviction of the appellant for the offence of rape under section 376 I. P. C. was correct. ( 12 ) THE appellant was a college student when the F. I. R. was lodged against him for the offence. It was staled at the Bar that he had already passed Higher Secondary Examination and had taken admission in the three years degree course. His academic career has been interrupted on account of the conviction. An attempt was made for reconciliation by getting the appellant married to the prosecutrix so that she could be rehabilitated in the society. But neither the appellant nor the prosecutrix and not even their parents consented to the marriage because of caste barrier. Anyway, the prosecutrix, now a young girl will be left at lurch on account of the stigma. She has suffered on account of the rape, as well as the publicity that the case must have received in the locality. In ordinary Course, prospects for her marriage appears to be bleak. But in the present day society there is every possibility of the prosecutrix being rehabilitated if she gets some financial assistance. This objective can be easily achieved if sentence of imprisonment of the appellant is reduced and he is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. In ordinary Course, prospects for her marriage appears to be bleak. But in the present day society there is every possibility of the prosecutrix being rehabilitated if she gets some financial assistance. This objective can be easily achieved if sentence of imprisonment of the appellant is reduced and he is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- (rupees three thousand), which on realisation should be paid personally by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge by summoning the prosecutrix and on proper identification. In the facts and circumstances of the case, reduced sentence will serve the ends of justice. ( 13 ) IN the result the appeal is dismissed and the order of conviction of the appellant is affirmed, but the sentence is modified. Instead of sentence of rigorous imprisonment for eight years the appellant is sentenced to imprisonment already undergone and is further sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 3000/- (rupees three thousand), in default of which he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. On realisation of the fine, the same shall be paid to the prosecutrix as compensation. .