JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 215, Constitution of India read with Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act for taking suitable action against the two non-applicants/contemners for flagrant violation of the orders, particularly the orders dated 4-7-1988 passed by Registrar, Co-operative societies, Bilaspur. ( 2. ) (i) It is common ground that the petitioner/applicant is a member of the managing Committee of the Bilaspur Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Maryadit (for short Society ). It has 13 elected and 5 nominated members on its Managing committee. The Managing Director of the Society is also one Ex-Officio Member. The society has large membership and has built number of colonies. (ii) The Chairman of the Society viz. Shri D. P. Choubey expired on 19-6-1988. According to Rule 43 (2-A) of the Co-operative Societies Rules (for short Co-op. Soc. Rules) read with Bye-law 28 of the Bye-laws of the Society, that vacancy could be filled up by the remaining members of the Managing Committee after co-opting a person in the said vacancy of the Managing Committee. (iii) It is undisputed that N. A. No. 1 Shri S. P. Agarwal, Vice-Chairman convened the meeting of the Managing Committee by notice dated 30-6-1988 for filling the casual vacancy. The Deputy Registrar, on an application made to him by some members of the Society, passed an order dated 2-7-1988 staying the meeting to be held on 4-7-1988 till further orders. On the basis of that order, Managing director cancelled the meeting dated 4-7-1988 and sent a communication to all the members. (iv) It is further undisputed that N. A. No. 1 Shri S. P. Agarwal, Vice-Chairman, then wrote a letter to the Managing Director stating "that the Deputy Registrar has no legal authority to pass such stay order and therefore, the meeting would be held as scheduled and all the members and the Deputy Registrar be also informed accordingly". (Ann. C ). ( 3. ) AT that, the applicant Shri K. G. Ansari and one Shri Badri Prasad, also a member of Managing Committee (for short M. C.) moved Deputy Registrar, which is an application purporting to be under Section 64 of the M. P. Cooperative societies Act (for short Coop. Soc. (Ann. C ). ( 3. ) AT that, the applicant Shri K. G. Ansari and one Shri Badri Prasad, also a member of Managing Committee (for short M. C.) moved Deputy Registrar, which is an application purporting to be under Section 64 of the M. P. Cooperative societies Act (for short Coop. Soc. Act) challenging the validity of the meeting convened on 4-7-1988 said to be in violation of Rule 43 (2-A) read with Bye-law 28 and Ordinance No. 3 of 1988 besides some other allegations (Ann. D ). The Deputy registrar then passed orders dated 4-7-1988 staying conduction of the meeting scheduled on 4-7-1988 till further orders (Ann. E ). ( 4. ) BUT admittedly the meeting was held on 4-7-1988 and as per minutes (Ann. F) the subjects included co-option of a member due to sudden demise of Shri D. P. Choubey, Chairman; secondly the election of the Chairman; thirdly, discussion on the communication by the Deputy Registrar dated 2-7-1988. Apropos the subjects in this meeting, N. A. No. 2 Shri Shri Kumar Agarwal was unanimously coopted as a member; secondly he was also elected as Chairman; thirdly it was resolved that the deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to pass stay orders; that Shri B. P. Dubey expressed the contrary view; whereas one Shri Ramashankar Tiwari remained neutral. The Chairman and other members were of the opinion that the election programme was already issued and therefore, no such stay order could have been passed. ( 5. ) ACCORDING to the applicant, N. A. No. 1, in order to get his son-in-law i. e. N. A. No. 2 Shri Shri Kumar Agarwal to be co-opted and later to be elected as president, convened the meeting, which is in contravention of Rule 43 (2-A) of the coop. Soc. Rules read with Bye-law 28 of the Society; that the D. R. had passed the official order on 2-7-1988, and further stay orders dated 4-7-1988 under Section 64 of Coop. Soc. Soc. Rules read with Bye-law 28 of the Society; that the D. R. had passed the official order on 2-7-1988, and further stay orders dated 4-7-1988 under Section 64 of Coop. Soc. Act; that despite having received the certified copy of the stay order through Shri Badri Prasad Dubey, Member of the M. C. before the commencement of the meeting, all that has been stated above, was wilfully done; that the convening and conduction of the meeting by N. A. No. 1 and later by Shri Shri Kumar Agarwal, n. A. No. 2 is per se contemptuous of the orders of the D. R. passed in his judicial capacity as a Judge of a Court under the Coop. Soc. Act and this Court may take notice of the Contempt of Court of Deputy Registrar as the latter is subordinate to the High Court; that non-applicant/contemners have intentionally brought into disrepute the authority and majesty of the Court of D. R. Hence, the petition. ( 6. ) (i) The contemners were noticed. Both personally appeared before this court. According to their joint reply, the Deputy registrar/registrar are vested with the powers of the Civil Court only in procedural matters strictly restricted within the scope of Section 89 of the Coop. Soc. Act; that, they have bona fide believed that D. R. /r are not courts within the meaning of Section 90 of the Act; that in view of express provision of settlement of election dispute under Section. 64 of the Act, the Deputy Registrar could not issue any order of injunction restraining convening of the meeting of co-option by the Managing Committee dated 4-7-1988, since he had no jurisdiction to pass such orders in view of specific bar in Order 39, Civil procedure Code as amended in M. P. ; that the Managing Committee has statutory right to convene meeting and fill up the casual vacancies and the D. R. had no powers to restrain such election meeting; that D. R. was highly under the political pressure and was asked to see that the co-option meeting dated 4-7-1988 is not convened for the simple reason that the politicians including the petitioner were interested to set up their own candidate. (ii) They have further stated that N. As. Nos. (ii) They have further stated that N. As. Nos. 1 and 6 other Directors have already filed a writ petition under Article 226, Constitution of India, M. P. No. 2525/88, alleging inter alia that the D. R. had no authority to interfere in internal management of the Society by restraining the above meeting; that the said Writ petition was admitted on 28-7-1988 restraining the Deputy Registrar from passing any order of the supersession of the Committee, that Section 67 of the Coop. Soc. Act prescribes the D. R. to follow procedure as provided under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code and temporary injunction could not issue without affording the Directors and Society an opportunity of being heard; that the election process once started could not be stayed; that the stay orders dated 4-7-1988 were void; that furthermore, the D. R. subsequently annulled the Resolutions passed on 4-7-1988 vide his orders dated 14-7-1988 which were again passed without hearing, which is in violation of Section 49 of the Act; and furthermore, the D. R. initiated proceedings of suspension of the Managing Committee and did suspend the committee vide his order dated 23-7-1988 under Section 53 (10) of the Act and started other proceedings of supersession; that passing of such supersession order has been stayed by the High Court vide orders dated 28-7-1988; that the entire proceedings taken by D. R. are in excess of his powers, not in conformity with law and are in clear violation of the mandatory provisions and have been exercised due to political pressure. (iii) It is further stated that N. A. No. 1 bona fide believed that the election process could not be stayed by the D. R. in view of the numerous decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court; that N. A. 2 was not present when the Committee took a decision of the rejection of the proposal of Shri B. P. Dubey not to convene the meeting because he joined the meeting subsequently only after being co-opted; that the decision was of the Committee as a whole which is a statutory body. The non-applicants never intended to disrespect any order; that Section 51 of the Act validates the act of the Committee if subsequently found to be invalid; that there were no proceedings pending on 2-7-1988 under Section 64 of the Act and D. R. could not issue any order on that date restraining to convene the meeting; that for aforesaid reasons, N. As. have not committed any contempt of Court, nor they had any intention to commit any contempt of Court. Lastly they tendered apology for the fault found, if any. ( 7. ) THE learned counsel Shri Vivek Tankha for the applicant and the learned counsel Shri D. M. Dharmadhikari for the non-applicants, heard. Their arguments relate to the contentions which have already been referred earlier in this order. Since N. A. No. 1 and other Directors have already filed a writ petition M. P. No. 2525/88 on allegations referred in Para 6 (ii) (supra), we propose to crib and confine ourselves only to the short question "whether there was non-compliance of the orders of the Dy. Registrar?" Therefore, the controversy before us veers around the following points : (i) Whether the Dy. Registrar constitutes a Court within the meaning of contempt of Courts Act ? (ii) Even if it was a Court, is it subordinate to the High Court? (iii) Whether in the circumstances, the non-compliance of the orders passed by the Dy. Registrar, dated 4-7-1988 amounts to Contempt of court? ( 8. ) (I) Points Nos. (i) and (ii) :-The learned counsel for the applicant, Shri Tankha strongly placed reliance on thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha vs. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. , air 1967 S. C. 1494. Therein, in an appeal against the order of Asstt. registrar, there were allegations of mala fide in the grounds of appeal. Their Lordships of the supreme Court held that Asstt. Registrar, Cooperative Societies was a "court" within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act; secondly that it was a court subordinate to the Patna High Court; thirdly that the words used by the appellant in one of his grounds of the appeal to the Joint Registrar which formed the basis of the complaint, amounted to Contempt of Court; and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. In paras 9, 10 and 11, the various provisions of Bihar and Orissa cooperative Societies Act, 1935 were considered. In paras 9, 10 and 11, the various provisions of Bihar and Orissa cooperative Societies Act, 1935 were considered. It was then observed that the registrar was exercising powers which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue Courts. The Registrar has not merely the trappings of a Court but in many respects he is conferred the same powers as are given to the ordinary civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of the documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts and for those reasons, there is no difficulty in holding that in adjudicating upon a dispute, the Registrar is to all intents and purposes, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do; (ii) on analogy, it was urged before us that similar provisions which are considered as a criteria in the above decision exist in the M. P. Cooperative Societies Act. To mention a few amongst others, Sections 56, 57, 57-A and 58 confer on the Registrar the power "to enforce performance of obligation", "to seize records, etc. " and the powers of "audit, Inquiry, Inspection and supervision" which may be called administrative powers. But Section 64 relates to the disputes and Section 67 provides for the "procedure for settlement of disputes and the powers of the Registrar and his nominee" which includes power to make interlocutory orders including grant of temporary injunction, of course, after following the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, Section 68 confers the powers of "attachment before award". Section 77 relates to "appeals and revision". Section 77-A states that "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act,. . . in certain matters, no appeal, revision or review shall lie. Section 80 refers to the power of transfer of cases to and from subordinates". Section 80 refers to "transfer or withdrawal of cases". Section 81 relates to "recovery of sums due to Government;" Section 82 enjoins that "save as provided in this Act, no civil or revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of certain matters stated therein. Section 80 refers to the power of transfer of cases to and from subordinates". Section 80 refers to "transfer or withdrawal of cases". Section 81 relates to "recovery of sums due to Government;" Section 82 enjoins that "save as provided in this Act, no civil or revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of certain matters stated therein. " Section 89 confers the powers of Civil Court on the registrar, his nominee or the board of nominees or any other person deciding a dispute and the Liquidator of society, in respect of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, discovery and production of any document; and issuing commissions for examination of witness etc. Section 90 states that "registrar or any person empowered by him" shall be a Civil Court for many purposes, stated therein. ( 9. ) LEARNED counsel Shri Tankha urged that the decision by Their. Lordships of the Supreme Court is based on the scheme of Bihar and Orissa Cooperative societies Act, 1935; but we find that the provisions in M. P. Cooperative Societies act are parimateria except that the power of Review is not there. But absence of this provision does not mean that the Registrar or his nominee or Addl. Registrar or dy. Registrar, as the case may be, is not a "court". Therefore, in our view, the Dy. Registrar in exercise of his powers under Section 64 of the Act, is a "court", and obviously, it is subordinate to this High Court. ( 10. ) POINT No. (iii) (Whether non-compliance amounted to Contempt?) (a) The learned counsel Shri Tankha referred to Mottur Hajee Abdul Rahman and Co. vs. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Vaniyambadi, AIR 1969 Mad. 232 , in which the contemner, in contravention of the interim order of stay, proceeded with assessment proceedings. ( 10. ) POINT No. (iii) (Whether non-compliance amounted to Contempt?) (a) The learned counsel Shri Tankha referred to Mottur Hajee Abdul Rahman and Co. vs. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Vaniyambadi, AIR 1969 Mad. 232 , in which the contemner, in contravention of the interim order of stay, proceeded with assessment proceedings. This is a decision by S. B. and in Para 5, it was observed : "i emphasise and it is worth emphasising that no officer of the government, however high or exalted he may be, can take upon himself the responsibility of judging the correctness or validity of an order of any court and if he honestly and bona fide in the discharge of his functions feels that the order is erroneous or requires any modification, the only remedy open to him is to approach that Court by way of review of modification or a higher Court by way of appeal or otherwise. Apart from that, it is not open to him to take upon himself the responsibility of judging the order and take any action contrary to or inconsistent with the same on the basis of his own judgment. If once an officer is permitted or allowed to do any such thing, that will mean the end of the very principle of rule of law on the basis of which the entire fabric of our democratic society has been constructed. " (b) Kruthiventi Kutumba Rao vs. Muthi Vankata Subba Rao and others, AIR 1969 A. P. 47, was also referred. It was observed that "whether order is valid or irregular, unless it is vacated, it has got to be obeyed". (c) Vishwanath Khanna vs. M/s Ramswaroop Rastogi and Sons, 1980 Cr. L. J. N. O. C. 109, was also referred besides In Re : District Magistrate, Rajnandgaon, 1975 M. P. L. J. 706, in which the above observations of the Madras decision (supra)were referred. That was a case of habeas corpus and the District Magistrate, instead of producing the detenu detained under MISA. stated his inability to produce the detenu in view of Governments general Order, and sent message to the A. G. and copy to Registrar, High Court. Their Lordships further considered the apology "belated and not bona fide. That was a case of habeas corpus and the District Magistrate, instead of producing the detenu detained under MISA. stated his inability to produce the detenu in view of Governments general Order, and sent message to the A. G. and copy to Registrar, High Court. Their Lordships further considered the apology "belated and not bona fide. " The learned counsel Shri Tankha urged that there has been an appeal to Supreme Court but certain observations in the above decision have not been set aside. Therefore, the main contention is that the non-applicants should have chosen the legal remedy of appeal provided in the Act instead of arrogating upon themselves the process of adjudication viz. "whether those orders passed by the Dy. Registrar in his judicial capacity were in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise". (d) On the other hand, the learned counsel Shri Dharmadhikaris thrust of the arguments is that the order was transparently void; without jurisdiction, and therefore, there was no question of contempt. Some decisions were cited. (e) In Eric Camp vs. Christ Church Council, Morar, 1981 M. P. L. J. 340, held that if the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter involved, its injunction will be treated as null and void. "a void judgment or order is in legal effect no judgment or order. " (f) In Mohd. Murtiza Khan vs. State of M. P. , 1966 M. P. L. J. 933, it was held "that the order being without jurisdiction, it was not necessary to set it aside". That decision largely relates to Limitation Act. The order of the Collector having beep made in non-compliance with the provisions of Section 34 of the Bhopal and revenue Act, it was without jurisdiction and it was held that there was no necessity to get it set aside and the suit will be governed by Art. 142 and not by Art. 14, limitation Act. (g) In Smt. Kaushalya Devi vs. K. L. Bonsal, AIR 1970 S. C. 838, an ejectment suit was compromised and a decree was drawn executable after a certain date. The compromise did not indicate any of the statutory grounds mentioned in the relevant section for eviction. Quoting an earlier decision, the ratio is that the Court was forbidden to pass the decree. The decree is a nullity and cannot be enforced in execution. The compromise did not indicate any of the statutory grounds mentioned in the relevant section for eviction. Quoting an earlier decision, the ratio is that the Court was forbidden to pass the decree. The decree is a nullity and cannot be enforced in execution. (h) In Nawabkhan Abbaskhan vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1471 , externment order was passed by the Police Commissioner under the Bombay Police action 5th September, 1967. On contravention of that order, he was prosecuted under Section 147 of the said Act. Its contravention allegedly took place on 17th september. But the trial Court acquitted the accused. The State appeal with success for the High Court held that the accused had re-entered the forbidden area during the currency of the order. The externment order was then quashed by the high Court under Art. 226, Constitution of India on 16th July, 1968 during the pendency of the Criminal trial. The question posed was "when has a citizen the discretion to disobey the order ?" Honble Shri Krishna Iyer, J. , who delivered the judgment of the Court, considered the question whether the demolition of the externment Order took effect rotroactively ? However, Para 12 at page 1476 points out the problems if a person takes upon himself to judge the validity of an order. That is now it was said : "illegal acts of authorities if can be defied on self-determined voidness, startling consequence will follow as the High Court apprehends. A detenu will beat back, a builder will put his well on the forbidden line, a court officer will meet with physical resistance, all because the order is, on the view of the affected party, a nullity and is later proved so before a Court. Not every action by a Government agency carries with it the force of law and naturally what should he do if he concludes that the action is invalid ? should he disobey, face penal proceedings and get his violation legitimated by Court ? Is there no alternative to breaking the law or order to expose the lawlessness of the law or order ?" this extract was highlighted by Shri Tankha. On the other hand, Shri dharmadhikari focussed on the extract : "obviously. . . one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Shri dharmadhikari focussed on the extract : "obviously. . . one cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of an officer if that command is itself violative of the Constitution. The policemans order was treated like a statute : obedience to an unconstitutional order of an official is not required, even though the order has not yet been ruled invalid by a court. The citizen is at liberty to make his own judgment of the orders validity and to act accordingly. If he turns out to be wrong, of course, he is answerable. But if he turns out to be right, he is not answerable in any way not for disobey the order, since the order was invalid, and not for undertaking himself to decide in advance that the order was invalid, since he was at liberty to make that decision. " ( 11. ) IN our view, the controversy is problematic and that is why at the end of para 12 of Nawabkhans case (supra) it was observed : "the law in this area is full of alarming conundrums hardly resolved by academic writing or judicial dicta. " and lastly in Para 20, it was stated : "we express no final opinion on the many wide-ranging problems in public law of illegal orders and violations thereof by citizens, grave though some of them may be. But we do hold that an order which is void may be directly or collaterally challenged in legal proceedings. An order is null and void if the statute clothing the Administrative Tribunal with power conditions it with the obligation to hear, expressly or by implication. Beyond doubt, an order which infringes a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule is a nullity. When a competent court holds such official act or order invalid, or sets it aside, it operates from nativity, i. e. the impugned act or order was never valid. " ( 12. ) THE case before us turns on facts of its own. This is a case where, as in the decision of the Supreme Court in an ejectment suit above, there has been amendment in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code. ( 13. " ( 12. ) THE case before us turns on facts of its own. This is a case where, as in the decision of the Supreme Court in an ejectment suit above, there has been amendment in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code. ( 13. ) IT was further emphasised that both the non-applicants are senior counsel of long standing and they, bona fide in view of the amended provisions, were of the view that the order passed by Dy. Registrar was "patently illegal" and there was "no doubt" about it because it was "forbidden by law and decisions of the Court". The amended provision, so far Madhya Pradesh State is concerned, is as under :- "order 39, Rule", STATE AMENDMENTS madhya Pradesh. "in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh in Order 39, in R. 2 in sub-rule (2) insert the following proviso :-"provided that no such injunction shall be granted - (a) X X X (b) X X X (c)XXX (d) to restrain any election; or (e)XXX" (ii) Now the Managing Committee was seized of the election of co-opting the member. Notices were issued for the scheduled meeting to the members. The election process had started. There is a catena of decisions of Supreme Court and this Court that once election process has begun, there should be no interference. Moreover, there is a legislative mandate not to issue any injunction to restrain any election. The non-applicants who are senior lawyers, bona fide believed that the orders passed by the Dy. Registrar were "transparently void", "without jurisdiction" and in other words, "non est. " Therefore, in the circumstances of this case, we are of the view, that no case for contempt has been made out. The non-applicants have also tendered apology in case they are found at fault. ( 14. ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the rule issued against the non-applicants, is discharged. Order accordingly.