Judgment D. K. Sen, CJ. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order of a learned single Judge of this Court dated the 11th december, 1987, passed in C. W. J. C. No.2348 of 1982. 2. The main point to be adjudicated in this appeal has been decided by a full Bench of this Court in Dhanji Singh V/s. State oj Bihar and other, reported in air 1979 Patna 259, and it appeared to us that this appeal could be disposed of at the stage of admission. Accordingly, we heard the learned Advocate for the appellants as also the learned Advocate for the private respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5. 3. The material facts and the proceeding, leading up to this appeal as appearing from the records, are inter alia, that one Jattu Uraon (since deceased)was prior to 1945 the owner of raiyati land in Mouza Godiyar Revenue Thana dhamdhaha measuring 1 acre 24 decimals under Khata No.94 and also other raiyati lands in Mouza Mateli Khamahand, Tola Ajh Okopa, measuring 1 acre 78 decimals under Khata No.324 as also 3 acres 9 decimals under Khata No.325. 4. Sometime in 1945 the said Jattu Uraon sold his raiyati interest in the said lands in favour of the respondent No.4, Murti Devi. 5. The case of the said Jattu Uraon was that there was an understanding between the vendor and purchaser that the vendor and his family will be the sikmidars in respect of the land sold. Though the said understanding was not recorded in the deed of sale, Jattu Uraon and his family continued to be Sikmidars in respect of the lands at all material times. 6. In the recent survey the "members of the family of Jattu Uraon have been recorded as Sikmidars in respect of the land in mouza Godiyar under Khata no.924 but such rights were not recorded in respect of lands in Mouza Mateli khamahand under Khata Nos.324 and 325. 7. Taking advantage of the aforesaid the said Murti Devi and her husband and son, Raghunath Bhagat and Mahendra Bhagat respectively, the respondents nos.3 and 5 to this appeal tried to interfere with the possession of Jattu Uraon in the said lands under Khata Nos.324 and 325. 8. 7. Taking advantage of the aforesaid the said Murti Devi and her husband and son, Raghunath Bhagat and Mahendra Bhagat respectively, the respondents nos.3 and 5 to this appeal tried to interfere with the possession of Jattu Uraon in the said lands under Khata Nos.324 and 325. 8. Being aggrieved the said Jattu Uraon applied before the Special Deputy collector Land Reforms, the respondent No.2 before us, under Sec.48-E of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), inter alia, for enquiry and adjudication of the rights of Jattu Uraon as an under-raiyat. 9. The said application was entertained by the respondent No.2 and marked as Case No.206 of 1981-82. Notice was directed to be issued to the respondent No.4 and the said Jattu Uraon filed the names of "panches" in the proceedings. 10. The said application of Jattu Uraon was disposed of by the respondent no.2 by an order passed on the 7th November, 1981. "it was recorded in the said order that the applicant Jattu Uraon was absent on tha,t date but the, respon dent No.4, the opposite party, was present and had filed Hazri. It was recorded further that the respondent No.4 had contended that the claim of Jattu Uraon was without substance and should be dismissed. The respondent No.2 considered the documents, which had been filed by the parties in the proceeding. 11. The respondent No.2 noted that the Assistant Chakbandi Officer had issued a notice on the 27 the February, 1978, under Sec.10 of the Act where name of the opposite party was recorded as permanent tenure-holder. In the said notice the land in dispute had been mentioned. 12. The respondent No.2 also considered an affidavit of the Mukhiya of ajho Kopa Gram Panchayat where it was recorded that the respondent No.4 was in exclusive possession of the land in dispute for the purpose of cultivation. 13. The respondent No.2 also considered the police report dated the 19th September, 1981, where it was stated that the respondent No.4 was in actual possession of the land in dispute and the Jattu Uraon and others had attempted to obtain forcible possession of the said land. The office-in-charge concerned had recommended to the Sub-divisional Officer that action should be taken against the said Jattu Uraon under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 14. The office-in-charge concerned had recommended to the Sub-divisional Officer that action should be taken against the said Jattu Uraon under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 14. The respondent No.2 also noted further that the respondent No.4 had filed documents of title in respect of the land in dispute in the proceeding whereas no such document had been filed on behalf of the said Jattu Uraon. 15. The respondent No.2 came to the conclusion that on consideration of the documents filed on behalf of the respondent No.4 it was clear that the dispute sought to be raised by the said Jattu Uraon was not bonafide. He ordered that the application of Jattu Uraon be dismissed as lacking in bonafide. 16. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid, on the 14th June, 1982, the said jattu Uraon filed a writ petition, marked C. W. J. C. No.2348 of 1982, in this court. He contended, inter alia, that having initiated the proceeding under section 48-E of the Act the respondent No! 2 was not entitled to decide the matter himself finally without remanding the same to Board to be constituted under Sec.48-E of the Act. In any event, the respondent No.2 did not give any opportunity to him to adduce evidence in the matter and that he did not know that the proceedings would by disposed of finally on the 7th November, 1981. 17. It was contended further that the evidence adduced on behalf of Jattu uraon that he and his family continued to be the Sikmidars in respect of the lands under Khata No.924 in Mouza Codiyar, which had been sold along with the lands in dispute under Khata Nos.324 and 325 in Mouza Mateli Khama-hand was not considered by the respondent No.2, and that the respondent No.2 had no jurisdiction to decide the case himself finally without remanding the same to the Board to be constituted under Sec.48-E of the Act. 18. The said writ petition was contested on behalf of the respondent nos.3, 4 and 5. The respondent No.5 affirmed a counter affidavit on the 24th january, 1986, which was filed in opposition to the writ petition. 19. Jattu Uraon, the original writ petitioner, died on the 17th April, 1986, during the pendency of the writ application. 18. The said writ petition was contested on behalf of the respondent nos.3, 4 and 5. The respondent No.5 affirmed a counter affidavit on the 24th january, 1986, which was filed in opposition to the writ petition. 19. Jattu Uraon, the original writ petitioner, died on the 17th April, 1986, during the pendency of the writ application. By an order passed on the 7th august, 1986, Bhaddo Uraon and 12 others, the heirs and legal representatives of Jattu Uraon, wepe substituted in place and stead of the said Jattu Uraon, whose death was recorded and whose name was expunged from the pleadings. 20. The said writ petition was disposed of by the said judgment and order dated the 11th December, 1987, under appeal. 21. Following the said decision of the Full Bench in the case of Dhanji singh (supra), as also another decision of the Division Bench of this Court in kapildeo Singh and other V/s. Chatu Rai reported in 1978 B. B. C. J.131, it was held that the respondent No.2 was justified in adjudicating whether the dispute raised by the said writ petitioner was bona fide or not and that having come to the conclusion on the materials on record that a dispute was sought to be raised was not bona fide, the respondent No.2 was justified in holding that the conditions for initiating a proceeding under Sec.48-E of the Act had not been fulfilled and concluding the proceeding on that basis. 22. 22. It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of section 48-E of the Act which reads as follows :- Section 48-E (1)- "if an under-raiyat is threatened with unlawful ejectment from his tenancy or any portion thereof by his landlord or if there is a dispute between them over the possession of land, crop or produce thereof, either on the ground of non-existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between them "or otherwise or if an under-raiyat is or has been ejected from his tenancy or any portion thereof within twelve years before the commencement of proceedings under this section in contravention of the provisions of Sec.89, the Collector may, of his own motion or an application made in this behalf by the under-raiyat, initiate a proceeding for preventing the landlord from ejecting the under-raiyat or for settlement of the said dispute or for restoration to possession under-raiyat unlawfully ejected from his tenancy or portion thereof. " Sec.48 (3)- "when a proceeding is initiated under sub-section (1) the collector may refer the matter (hereinafter referred to as dispute)to a Board to be appointed by him, for promoting the settlement of the dispute between the under-raiyat and the landlord. " Sec.48-E (7)- "where a Board does not succeed in bringing about an amicable settlement of the dispute, it shall make enquiry into the same, receive such evidence as it considers necessary, record its findings on the dispute and transmit the entire record of the proceeding forthwith to the Collector who may dispose of the proceeding in accordance with the terms of the findings. . ," Sec.48-1. . ," Sec.48-1. (8)- "in case of disagreement with the report or the findings of the Board, the Collector shall, after recording his reasons for such disagreement and after giving the parties concerned a reason able opportunity of being heard, make such enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary and on being satisfied that- (i) the person threatened with ejectment is an under-raiyat, the collector shall declare the threatened ejectment illegal and direct that the landlord shall not interfere with the possession of the undet-raiyat in his tenancy or any portion thereof ; (ii) the land under dispute is in the tenancy of the uader-raiyat the collector shall declare possession of the under-raiyat and order the crop or produce, or the sale proceeds thereof, as the case may be, to be divided between the under-raiyat and his landlord in accordance with the provisions of Sections 69 to 71 of the act ; (iii) the person alleged to have been ejected was an uader-raiyat of of the disputed land on the date of ejectment and was ejected within twelve years before the commencement of proceeding under this section in contravention of Sec.89, the Collector shall order that the landlord, or, where any other person is in possession of the land comprised in the under-raiyats tenancy or portion thereof under any claim derived from the landlord, such person shall restore the under-raiyat to possession of the tenancy or portion from which he was so ejected. " Sec.48-E (10)- "if the Board fails to record its findings or transmit the record as required under sub-section (7), within a period of six months from the date of its appointment, the Collector may withdraw the proceeding from the Board and decide the dispute himself accord-ing to the provisions of this section. " 23. Relying on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Dhanji singh (supra) learned Advocate for the appellants contended that the respondent no.2 after having initiated a proceeding under Sec.48-E of the Act of 1885 had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute itself finally without reference to the board under Sec.48-E and, therefore, the impugned order of the respondent no.2, dated 7th November, 1981, was without jurisdiction, void and had to be set aside. He contended further that in the judgment and order dated the 11th december, 1987, under appeal it has been erroneously held that the respondent no.2 had only adjudicated that the dispute raised by the said Jattu Uraon was not bona fide and that the respondent No.2 was justified in adjudicating on the preliminary question about the bona fide of the dispute raised and disposing of the application under Sec.48-E of the said Act of 1885 accordingly. 24. Learned Advocate for the private respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 contended to the contrary and submitted, also relying on Dhanji Singh (supra), that by the impugned order dated the 7th November, 1981, the respondent No.2, merely refused to initiate proceeding under Sec.48-E of the said Act of 1885 on the application of the said Jattu Uraon, as he decided that the conditions for initiating a proceeding under Sec.48-E were not in existence. It was not the case that by his impugned order the respondent No.2 had adjudicated upon and decided the dispute raised before him finally. 25. I have considered the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in dhanji Singh (supra ).1 note that in the judgment of N. P. Singh, J. , it was held specifically, following an earlier decision of this Court in Lakshmi Prasad Bhagat v. State of Bihar reported in 1978 B. B. C. J. (H. C.) 750 that once a proceeding is initiated under sub-section (1) of Sec.48-E of the said Act, t e dispute has to be referred to the Board to be constituted by the Collector. The expression "may" in sub-section (3) of the said Sec.48-E was construed and it was held that the same should be read imperatively. It was held further and specifically that after initiating a proceeding under Sec.48-E (l) the Collector had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute himself without reference to the Board. 26. It was, however, observed in the said judgment that the Collector had to apply his judicial mind to ascertain whether the requisite conditions for initiating a proceeding under Sec.48-E existed or not, before any proceeding could be initiated. 27. It was stated in the judgment of B. P. Sinha, J. in the same case, viz. 26. It was, however, observed in the said judgment that the Collector had to apply his judicial mind to ascertain whether the requisite conditions for initiating a proceeding under Sec.48-E existed or not, before any proceeding could be initiated. 27. It was stated in the judgment of B. P. Sinha, J. in the same case, viz. Dhanji Singh (supra) that the Collector had to find out whether a prima facie case existed, for initiation rof a proceeding under the said Sec.48-E and as such the collector could not prevent the opposite party from appearing before him to establish that such a prima facie case did not exist in favour of the applicant. 28. It was observed in the judgment of P. S. Sahay, J. , also in the same case, that it should not be held that the opposite party had a right to appear before the Collector in all cases as a matter of right, though no hard and fast rule could be laid down in this regard. It was observed further that at the initiation stage all that the Collector had to see was whether the three requisite conditions enumerated in sub-section (1) of Sec.48-E had been satisfied or not. 29. Construing the observations in the three judgments of the learned judges in the said Full Bench decision it appears to me that the Collector at the stage of initiating a proceeding under Sec.48-E is only required to be satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out by the applicant. In the absence of a prima facie case no proceeding under Sec.48-E should be initiated even if the opposite party did not appear. The examples given in the judgment of N. P. Singh, J, in the said case may be noted. If it was the allegation of the under-raiyat that he had been dispossessed by the landlord 12 years prior to the date of the filing of the application or that the under-rayat had been dispossessed by a third party, obviously his application under Sec.48-E would not be maintainable ex facie and no proceeding should be initiated. 30. In the instant case from the application of the undet-raiyat itself-which was filed before the Collector, it could not be said that the under-raiyat did not make out a prima facie case. It was his allegation that he was the original owner of the land in dispute. 30. In the instant case from the application of the undet-raiyat itself-which was filed before the Collector, it could not be said that the under-raiyat did not make out a prima facie case. It was his allegation that he was the original owner of the land in dispute. After the said lands were sold to the respondent No.4, there was an understanding between the parties that the under raiyat would continue to have Sikmidari rights over the said lands. At least in the land covered by Khata No.924 Sikmidari right of the under-raiyat appears in the record of rights. It is the further allegation of the under-raiyat that he had been cultivating the other plots of land where such Sikmidari rights had not been recorded for a long time since 1945. This was obviously disputed by the private respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 it appears from the impugned order dated the 7th November, 1981, that the respondent No.2 had adjudicated on the issue whether the said Jattu Uraon was under-raiyat or not. 31. Under sub-section (3) of Sec.103-B of the said Act of 1885 an entry in the record of rights published is an evidence of the matter referred to in such an entry and will be presumed to be correct till proved by further evidence to be incorrect. The presumption, which arises from the entries in the record of right is a rebuttable presumption and could have been rebutted by further evidence. Similarly, the affidavit of the village Mukhiya and the report of the local police are all pieces of evidence to be considered while deciding the matter finally. 32. The respondent No.2 in the instant case went far beyond ascertaining whether the said Jattu Uraon had a prima facie case for initiation of a proceeding under Sec.48-E. He gave notice to the landlord and allowed the landlord to file documents, considered the same in detail and thereafter came to the conclusion that the claim of the said Jattu Uraon was not bonafide. In our view, this amounted to a final decision of the dispute sought to be raised by the said Jattu uraon on adjudication of a prima facie case but on merits. 33. For the reasons above we are unable to agree with the judgment and order dated the 11th December, 1987, under appeal and I set aside the same. In our view, this amounted to a final decision of the dispute sought to be raised by the said Jattu uraon on adjudication of a prima facie case but on merits. 33. For the reasons above we are unable to agree with the judgment and order dated the 11th December, 1987, under appeal and I set aside the same. Let an appropriate writ issue quashing the said order of the respondent No.2 dated the 7th November, 1981. I direct further that the matter be remanded to the respondent No.2 for being disposed of in accordance with law. 34. The appeal is, accordingly, but without costs. Appeal allowed.