JUDGEMENT Dr. Couto, J. : - On 23rd July, 1985, the Excise Inspector Afonso conducted a raid on the house No. 597 situate at Badem, Assagao and recovered from a room of that house 47.50 kgs. of charas. A criminal case under S.30(a) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Excise Duty Act, 1964 was thereafter filed against the present respondent and two others in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mapusa. 2. The three accused had been enlarged on bail, but the original accused 1 and 2 absconded during the trial and, therefore, the case proceeded under S.299 Cr. P.C. against them. Finally, the trial ended and by judgement dt. 25th Sept. 1987, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mapusa, acquitted the respondent herein giving him the benefit of doubt. It is against this judgement of acquittal that this appeal was filed with the leave of the Court. 3. Mr. Bhobe, the learned Public Prosecutor, contends that the impugned judgement is not sustainable and is bound to be set aside as not only against the evidence on record, but also as contradictory in terms. He submitted that the impugned judgement is, therefore, perverse and this Court should interfere with it and convict the respondent for an offence punishable under S.30(a) 1 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Excise Duty Act, 1964. According to the learned Prosecutor, there are glaring errors in the impugned judgement, for the learned Magistrate has started to proceed on the wrong footing that the Excise Inspector has acted with undue haste in breaking open the room from where the charas had been recovered, because the raiding party broke open the door of the room although the respondent had stated that the said room was in possession of the owner of the house, P.W. 1 Rosy Dias. The learned Magistrate observed that in view of the said statement made by the respondent, it was incumbent upon the Excise Inspector to secure the presence of P.W. 1 in order to ascertain whether or not the room had been rented to the respondent and whether the keys of the said room were with him. The learned Magistrate observed that in view of the said statement made by the respondent, it was incumbent upon the Excise Inspector to secure the presence of P.W. 1 in order to ascertain whether or not the room had been rented to the respondent and whether the keys of the said room were with him. These observations of the learned Magistrate however, are not justified, according to the learned Prosecutor, because the evidence of P.W. 4 clearly shows that he had made an attempt to secure the presence of the said witness, but had not succeeded in locating her. Secondly, according to the learned Prosecutor, the learned Magistrate recorded a clear finding in para 14 of the impugned judgement that the respondent was in possession of the house, but he added that he was not in possession of the charas. This finding of the learned Judge is entirely unreasonable and unjustified, for once the possession of the house by the respondent was established, it necessarily followed that the Charas which were found inside the same house were also in his possession. Thirdly, the learned Magistrate assumed in the evidence, facts which are not at all brought on record and wrongly applied the rulings of the Supreme Court cited by him. For all these reasons, according to the learned Prosecutor, a case exists for the interference by this Court with the impugned judgement. He contended that the evidence on record clearly establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that the whole house had been leased by P.W. 1, to the respondent; that he was staying in the house along with the other two accused and that 47.50 kgs. of charas had been recovered from the said room by the raiding party. The defence of the respondent throughout the trial has not been that there was no lease agreement but that it was with one of the accused with the difference that the lease instead of being with the respondent was with the accused 2. Further, the defence was that the charas had not been recovered from the room but from some bushes existing outside the house. The evidence clearly established that the charas had been recovered from the said room and further the evidence of P.W. 1 which stood the test of cross-examination clearly showed that the whole house had been leased to the respondent. 4. It was, however, contended by Mr. The evidence clearly established that the charas had been recovered from the said room and further the evidence of P.W. 1 which stood the test of cross-examination clearly showed that the whole house had been leased to the respondent. 4. It was, however, contended by Mr. Dessai the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, that there was no reason for interference, since the view taken by the learned Magistrate is one of the views possible while assessing the evidence adduced by the prosecution. He submitted that as rightly pointed out by the learned Magistrate, the absence of documentary evidence to prove the lease was creating a doubt about the said lease and the benefit of this doubt had necessarily to be given to the respondent. The documentary evidence was necessary in view of the circumstance that the respondent has denied his entry in the lease agreement with P.W. 1 and further, he had stated that the room from where the charas had been recovered was in possession of P.W. 1. In these circumstances, the learned counsel placing reliance on 'Dharamdeo Singh v. State of Bihar' AIR 1976 SC 832 : (1976 Cri LJ 638), 'Bhagirath Singh v. State of Bihar' AIR 1976 SC 924 Muluwa Binda v. State of Madhya Pradesh' ' AIR 1976 SC 989 : (1976 Cri LJ 717), 'Ram Jag v. State of U.P.' AIR 1974 SC 606 : (1974 Cri LJ 479) and in 'Awadesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh' AIR 1988 SC 1158 : (1988 Cri LJ 1134), submitted that there is no reason for interference with the impugned judgement. 5. There is no doubt whatsoever that in an appeal against an acquittal, the High Court will be slow in interfering and only when the judgement of the trial Court is perverse, or unreasonable, such interference will be justified. It is now well settled that in appeals against acquittal the Court has to bear in mind that the presumption of innocence which always militates against an accused person is fortified by the judgement of acquittal. Therefore, the standards of proof required to set aside an acquittal are much higher and, therefore, only when the evidence does not justify at all the findings of the trial Court, the Appellate Court can interfere. Therefore, the standards of proof required to set aside an acquittal are much higher and, therefore, only when the evidence does not justify at all the findings of the trial Court, the Appellate Court can interfere. Thus, if two views are possible, one of them being the view taken by the trial Court, the Appellate Court will not interfere, even when in its assessment the other view was to be adopted. This, in short, is the law laid down in the several authorities cited at the Bar by Mr. Desai. 6. Bearing in mind the law as above, we have no doubt whatsoever that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the interference by this Court is entirely justified. We say so because the impugned judgement suffers of glaring infirmities. In the first place, the learned Magistrate gave contradictory findings as regards the material and relevant fact of possession of the house by the respondent, and secondly, the judgement proceeds on presumptions and is against the findings on record. 7. The learned Judge has given the benefit of doubt to the respondent, basically, for the following reasons : (a) the prosecution has failed to bring documentary evidence in order to prove the lease of the house by the respondent (b) although a reference is made to some clothes and personal belongings of the accused as found in the room from where the charas were seized, the said clothes had not been attached and identified as belonging to the respondent; (c) the panchanama of the search and attachment of charas was not recorded at the site, but in the office of the Excise Officer; and (d) P.W. 4 had acted with undue haste in breaking open the lock of the room from where the charas had been recovered and had not secured the presence of P.W. 1 before opening the room. 8. Now, a careful analysis of the evidence is sufficient to show that the learned Magistrate failed to appreciate the evidence on record. 8. Now, a careful analysis of the evidence is sufficient to show that the learned Magistrate failed to appreciate the evidence on record. In the first place and as regards the need of documentary evidence in respect of the lease of the house, the learned Magistrate did not appreciate the fact that admittedly, the respondent and two other accused were sitting in the house and that the whole case of the respondent was that the lease agreement had been entered into with P.W. 1 by the accused No. 2 and not by him. It was further his case that the room from where the charas were recovered had not been let out to him. In other words, there is a clear admission that a lease agreement had been entered into by one of the accused persons with P.W. 1 and, therefore there was no need at all of a documentary evidence to prove this fact. Secondly, the evidence of P.W. 1 is clear and proves beyond doubt that the house was given on lease to the respondent. She indeed deposed that she gave on lease the whole house to the respondent on a rent of Rs. 450/- for six months. She was emphatic in saying that the entire house had been rented to the respondent and that except for some chairs and tables no other personal belonging of her was kept in the house. In cross-examination, she denied that she gave on lease the house to the original accused No. 2 and that she kept in her possession the room from where the charas had been recovered. Finally, in reply to a question put to her by the Court, she stated that on the date of the raid, the house was in possession of the respondent. This evidence had not been at all shaken in the cross-examination and gets independent corroboration in some evidence, as we will presently show. 9. In fact, it is clear from the evidence that when the raiding party entered the house, accused 1 and 2 were found sitting at a table in the kitchen and that on the top of that table, there was a piece of charas weighing 50 gms. When the room from where the charas was recovered was opened, 47 packets of charas were found on a cot. Each of these packets except one, was weighing 1 Kg. When the room from where the charas was recovered was opened, 47 packets of charas were found on a cot. Each of these packets except one, was weighing 1 Kg. and the one which was not weighing 1 Kg. had a small portion missing. Now, it has come in the evidence that the piece of charas found on the table of the kitchen was matching with the portion missing in the said packet weighing less than 1 kg. This fact clearly establishes a link between the charas found inside the room and the piece found on the table, and as the accused 1 and 2 were sitting at that table, a link between the accused and the charas found inside the room. This further necessarily implicates that the accused persons had access to the said room and if they were not in possession of that room, one fails to understand how they were able to remove the portion of the charas from one packet and bring it to the kitchen, specially when admittedly, P.W. 1 was not present. It is true that it has come in the evidence of P.W. 4 himself that the keys of the room were not found either in possession of the respondent or in the house, but this fact in no manner destroys what was observed above. The keys most probably were hidden in some place and the Excise Inspector did not succeed in getting them at the time of the search. 10. We may also mention that the learned Magistrate has drawn an adverse inference from the fact that he opened the room without securing the presence of the owner of the house first. This adverse inference was not at all justified. Specially when it is clear from the evidence that P.W. 4 made an attempt to secure the presence of P.W. 1 by sending one Assistant Guard by name Atmaram Shivji. The said Atmaram did not succeed in finding the house of P.W. 1 and, therefore, her presence could not be secured. 11. Coming now to the panchanama, it is pertinent to note that the panchanama is not the material evidence. It is only a recording of what happened, the substantial material evidence being the evidence of the Panch himself. The said Atmaram did not succeed in finding the house of P.W. 1 and, therefore, her presence could not be secured. 11. Coming now to the panchanama, it is pertinent to note that the panchanama is not the material evidence. It is only a recording of what happened, the substantial material evidence being the evidence of the Panch himself. Now, P.W. 2 gave a clear-cut account of the search and the recovery of the charas and further stated that although the panchanama had been written in the office of the Excise Inspector, the fact remains that some notes had been taken on a paper at the site and that the panchanama was read over to him and was according to his say. In other words, P.W. 2 stated that the contents of the panchanama were entirely correct. This evidence has not been in any manner shaken and, therefore, the mere fact that the panchanama was recorded in the office of P.W. 4 does not affect the prosecution case. 12. As regards the attachment of the clothes, it is no doubt true that it would have been advisable for the prosecution to have the clothes and other belongings found inside the room duly attached. However, the omission in doing so is in no manner fatal to the prosecution case, for P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 stated in the course of their examination-in-chief that some clothes like pants and shirts and other belongings of the accused were also found in the room from where the charas were recovered. This statement of the said witnesses went unchallenged and, therefore, one has to take that statement as correct and, therefore, that also clothes and other belongings of the respondent were inside that room. 13. We already mentioned that the learned Judge has contradicted himself in the judgement itself and that he has given findings against the evidence on record. In fact, in para 9 of the impugned judgement the learned Judge discussed the evidence as regards the possession, giving the impression that he was of the view that possession of the house by the respondent had not been established. However, in para 14 of the impugned judgement he expressly recorded a finding that the house was in possession of the respondent, although actual possession of charas had not been established. However, in para 14 of the impugned judgement he expressly recorded a finding that the house was in possession of the respondent, although actual possession of charas had not been established. We find this finding of the learned Magistrate rather curious and we are fully in agreement with the learned Prosecutor when he submitted that once the possession of the house had been established, the learned Magistrate has necessarily to hold that possession of the charas was also proved, since admittedly, the charas had been recovered from the house. We may also note that the learned Magistrate has in several parts come out with a strange reasoning which is not only extraneous, but shows that he has not appreciated properly the case. As an illustration we may only refer to what the learned judge stated in para 14 of the impugned judgement to the effect that accused 1 and 2 have already jumped bail and are absconding and that the accused No. 3 (respondent herein) who is also a foreigner is facing trial from the beginning and if he was not innocent he would have certainly also jumped bail and avoided to face trial. This reason is obviously no reason at all to justify the acquittal of the respondent. 14. In view of the above, we are of the firm view that this is a fit case for interference with the acquittal. Therefore, we heard the respondent on the point of the sentence. He stated that he is innocent. He has come down to Goa three days before the search, but in any event he prays for leniency. 15. The result, therefore, is that the impugned judgement dt. 25th Sept. 1987 is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent is convicted for an offence punishable under S.30(a) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Excise Duty Act, 1964 and sentenced to undergo six months of rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo a further period of three months of rigorous imprisonment. The detention undergone by the respondent if any, to be set off against the sentence. 16. Mr. Desai orally prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and for the stay of the judgement just delivered for one month. The learned Public Prosecutor opposes the application, Leave and stay rejected. Appeal allowed.