A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE matrimonial proceeding under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 giving rise to this appeal, was initiated by the husband-appellant against the wife-respondent for a declaration that the marriage was a nullity because of the underage of the appellant and in the alternative, for dissolution or marriage on the grounds of adultery, cruelty and desertion on the part of the wife. The petition which was thus a composite one under Section 24 as well as Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act has, however, been dismissed which has led the husband to file this appeal. The learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Tapan Dutta, who has argued the appeal with singular ability and persistence, has, in his endeavour to assail the order, made a strenuous attempt to do so on an additional ground, namely, that the marriage between the parties having found to have been broken down irretrievably and irreparably, ought to have been dissolved by a decree of divorce on that ground also. ( 2 ) SUCH a ground for divorce because of irretrievable break-down of the marriage was, however, not specifically taken in the pleadings nor put in the issues nor has been put forward in the memorandum of appeal in this Court And even conceding that such a ground, if borne out by the materials on record can be taken into consideration without specific articulation in the pleadings or the issues or the memorandum, we are afraid that our matrimonial laws have not yet been made broad enough to warrant dissolution of marriage on the sole ground of irretrievable breakdown without more. ( 3 ) THE observation of the Supreme Court, while affirming a decree for divorce, in Saroj Rani vs. Sudarshan (A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1562 at 1566) to the effect that "this marriage has broken down and the parties can no longer live together as husband and wife; if such is the case, it is better to close the chapter", has given rise to an impression, erroneous though, that the Supreme Court has ruled irretrievable breakdown of marriage to be, by itself, a ground for dissolution. As would be evident from the provisions of Section 34 (1) of the Special Marriage Act, corresponding to Section 23 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, a Matrimonial Court has been empowered to decree reliefs under the Act only if the Court is satisfied that "any of the grounds' as specified in the Act "exists". "but not otherwise" and, therefore, no Court can add new grounds for divorce by its judicial fiat. The above observation of the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani (supra), having very often been read divorced from the context, has really been misread. That was a case where a husband Bled a petition for divorce, not on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, but on the precise statutory ground as specified in Section 13 (1a) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, namely, non-restitution of conjugal rights between the parties for one year or more in spite of a decree for restitution to that effect and the question which was being considered by the Supreme Court was as to whether a husband, who has taken no steps to comply with a decree for restitution passed against him was disentitled from invoking Section 13 (1a) (ii) and to obtain divorce thereunder on the ground that he would thereby be "taking advantage of his own wrong" within the meaning of Section 23 (1) (a ). The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative and, while affirming the decree for divorce on the ground specified in Section 13 (1a) (ii), the learned Judges have observed further that their Lordships have done so "without any mental compunction because it is evident that for whatever be the reasons, this marriage has broken down and the parties can no longer live together as husband and wife, and if such is the case, it is better to close the chapter". It is, therefore, clear that the ground on which the dissolution of the marriage was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani (supra) was a ground specified in Section 13 (1a) and not irreparable breakdown of marriage and therefore, the observation extracted above can not in any way be treated as any authority for the view that the Supreme Court has ruled that irretrievable breakdown, by itself and without more, would be a ground of dissolution of marriage. ( 4 ) THAT irretrievable breakdown of marriage, by itself is not a ground for dissolution of marriage, under the Hindu Marriage Act is irresistibly clear from the 71st Report of the Law Commission of India on "hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Irretrievable Break-down of Marriage as a Ground of Divorce", submitted in April, 1979, where the Law Commission has recommended insertion of several new provisions in the Hindu Marriage Act as Sections 13c, etc. , providing for divorce on such ground. But neither Parliament nor any State Legislature has taken up the matter in right earnest and no amendment to that effect has yet been made in the relevant enactment. The same is the position under the Special Marriage Act, whereunder also irretrievable breakdown of marriage, by itself, has not yet been made a ground for divorce. ( 5 ) EVEN before the observations of the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani (supra), extracted hereinabove, Judges in the various High Courts have almost unhesitatingly expressed their preference for the view that where the marriage has for all practical purposes become defunct de facto, the Court should be empowered to declare it to be defunct de jure. For example, in the Delhi Full Bench decision in Ram Kali vs. Gopal (I. L. R.-1 Delhi 6), Khanna, C. J. , (as he then was), observed that "it would not be practical and realistic, indeed it would be unreasonable and inhuman, to compel the parties to keep up the facade of marriage even though the rift between them is complete and there are no prospects of their ever living together as husband and wife". This Delhi Full Bench decision in Ram Kali (supra) has been approved by the Supreme Court in Dharmendra vs. Usha (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 2218 ). But what is to be noted is that, notwithstanding all these observations, the decree for divorce in both the decisions was made, not on the ground of any irreparable breakdown simpliciter, but on the ground specified in Section 13 (1a) (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, namely, non-resumption of cohabitation for the requisite period after passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights between the parties. To take another example, in Akkamma vs. Jaganandhan (A. I. R. 1981 Andhra Pradesh 269), a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that a marriage which has irretrievably broken down should not be allowed to continue and that a marriage buried in fact should also be buried in law; but there again the decree for divorce was granted not on the ground of such breakdown, but on the ground of adultery which might have brought about such breakdown. ( 6 ) BUT one thing, however, deserves to be noted. Even though irretrievable breakdown simpliciter has not precisely been made a ground of dissolution of marriage as yet under the Special Marriage Act or the Hindu Marriage Act, the concept thereof has nevertheless entered in the divorce jurisdiction under those enactments. For, even where the ground put forward is adultery, cruelty, desertion or the like and the Court is satisfied as to the existence of any of those grounds, the Court, before granting any relief on such grounds, is, both under Section 34 (2) of the Special Marriage Act and Section 23 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, under a mandatory obligation to "make", wherever possible, "every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties" and to grant relief only when such reconciliation is not possible. In other words, the existence of any such ground alone would not justify a decree of divorce unless the Court is further satisfied that the ground has wrecked the marriage beyond reconciliation or repair. But even then, the ground for dissolution is not the "irreparable breakdown", but one or more of the grounds specified in the relevant enactment which might have resulted in such a breakdown. ( 7 ) THEN again, Section 27 (2) of the Special Marriage Act and Section 13 (1a) of the Hindu Marriage Act providing for divorce on the ground of non-resumption of cohabitation for a period of one year or more after the passing of a decree for judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights, have, in a sense recognised the concept of breakdown of marriage, the rationale behind those provisions being the presumption that non-resumption of cohabitation for the requisite period demonstrates breakdown of the marriage beyond repair. But there again, the ground for dissolution is not breakdown simpliciter, but the post-decree non-resumption of marital relation for the requisite period. But there again, the ground for dissolution is not breakdown simpliciter, but the post-decree non-resumption of marital relation for the requisite period. It is true that both Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act and Section 13b of the Hindu Marriage Act provide for divorce by mutual consent where the parties have been living separately for at least one year and that they have not been able to live together. This again without doubt has brought in the concept of break-down of marriage is a ground for divorce. But there again, the breakdown, by itself, has not been made a ground of dissolution, but what would warrant such a dissolution are the parties failing to live together and living separately for one year and their mutual consent to dissolve the marriage. We must, therefore, conclude, as we cannot but, that mere breakdown of the marriage, however, irretrievable, is not, by itself and without more, any ground for dissolution of the marriage as yet under our matrimonial law. ( 8 ) THE ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Reynold Rajamoni (A. I. R. 198? S. C. 1261) would clearly support the view that we are taking. It has been ruled there (at 1263) with reference to the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, that "when a legislative provision specifies the grounds on which divorce may be granted, they constitute the only conditions on which the Court has jurisdiction to grant divorce" and that "if grounds need to be added to those already specifically set forth in the legislation, that is the business of the Legislature and not of the Courts" and accordingly the prayer for a decree of divorce on the ground of "mutual consent" was rejected, as the Divorce Act of 1869, unlike Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act of 1954 or Section 13b of the Hindu Marriage Act, does not specify "mutual consent" as a ground of divorce. The Divorce Act no doubt specifies the grounds of divorce, but unlike Section 34 (1) (f) of the Special Marriage Act or Section 23 (1) (e) of the Hindu Marriage Act, does not specifically provide that decrees can be granted on those grounds only "but not otherwise", and if in spite of the absence of such negative prohibition, the ratio in Reynold Rajamani (supra) is that no divorce can be granted except on grounds expressly specified, the ratio will a fortiori apply to divorces under the Special Marriage Act or the Hindu Marriage Act where such negative provisions stare at the face. ( 9 ) AS to the contention that a marriage is null and void as the appellant-husband was under the age of 21 years at the date of the marriage, it must be noted that not only Section 4 (c) of the Special Marriage Act prescribes as one of the essential conditions for a valid marriage that "the husband has completed the age of twenty one years", Section 24 (1) clearly provides that "any marriage solemnized under this Act shall be null and void and may on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by decree of nullity, if any of the conditions specified in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 4 has not been fulfilled. Under-age of the parties to the marriage, therefore, under Special Marriage Act is a vitiating factor and would render the marriage null and void, unlike the Hindu Marriage Act, whereunder under-age of any of the spouses does not affect the validity of the marriage. ( 10 ) THE appellant having married the respondent in 1955 on his own representation that he had the qualifying age, we would not have allowed him to raise this plea as to nullify of the marriage in 1979 on the ground of under-age, if we could do so on the ground of estoppel or otherwise. But estoppels of all kind are subject to one general rule, namely, they cannot override the law of the land and cannot be invoked to defeat the clear provisions of the statute. Since under Section 4 (c) read with Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act, under-age renders the marriage null and void, no amount of estoppel against the appellant for his false representation as to age, would render it valid. Since under Section 4 (c) read with Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act, under-age renders the marriage null and void, no amount of estoppel against the appellant for his false representation as to age, would render it valid. Under Section 4 read with Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act, a marriage with a person having a spouse living, or that one within the prohibited decree is null and void, and even ii the person concerned made a representation that he or she had no spouse living or was not within the prohibited degree, no estoppel can be allowed to operate to validate such marriage for that would defeat the clear provisions of the statute and would allow persons to legalise, by mere false representations, marriages, which are null and void under the law. ( 11 ) WE also wanted to ascertain that since under Section 34 (e), "unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding" disentitles a person from obtaining relief under the Special Marriage Act, whether this delay of about 24 years would so disentitle the appellant-husband. But we are afraid that whatever might be the effect of delay on a proceeding for divorce or other matrimonial reliefs under Section 34 (e), no amount of delay would stand in the way for obtaining declaration as to the nullity of a marriage which is null and void under the law. As pointed out in Halsbury (4th Edition, Vol. 13, page 266, para 541), "in case of void marriages, neither delay nor conduct constitutes a bar to a decree". In Kuppu Damayanti vs. C. Rama Rao (A. I. R. 1969 Andhra Pradesh 62), a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court refused a decree of nullity because of about seven year's delay to a husband seeking such a declaration on the ground that he was under the age of 21 years on the date of the marriage and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of his guardian as required under Section 2 (3) of the preceding Special Marriage Act of 1872. But as pointed out therein, under the Special Marriage Act of1872, a marriage of a man below 21 years of age without the consent of the father or the guardian, was not void, but only voidable and under Section 17 of' the said Act, a Court was given a discretion to grant a decree of nullity in respect of such voidable marriage and delay in that case was accordingly held to be a ground on which such decree could be refused. ( 12 ) BUT, as already noted, under Section 4 read with Section 24 of the present Special Marriage Act of 1954 such a marriage without the qualifying age has been rendered, not merely voidable, but absolutely null and void. The marriage would be a nullity ipso jure and ab inito and would continue to be so, whether or not a decree to that effect is passed and would not, as in the case of voidable marriage, become a nullity only on the passing of a decree to that effect. If the marriage is null and void under Section 4 read with Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act on the ground of a person being under-age, or having another spouse living or the parties being within prohibited degree, no amount of delay mould make that person of qualifying age, or without a spouse, or outside the prohibited degree on the date of the marriage and, therefore, delay, however long, can be of no relevance in respect of such marriages which are null and void. Since no relief in the shape of a decree of nullity or otherwise is legally necessary to render such marriage null and void, Section 24 of the Special Marriage Act, which would apply only when a decree is legally required for the enforcement of any matrimonial relief, would not proprio vigore apply to such a case. The decision of Dr. Lushington in Duins vs. Donovan (1830-162 ER 1165), referred to in Kuppu Damayanti (supra) may he referred to where under the then prevailing enactment, known as Lord Hardwick's Act, the marriage in question was an absolute nullity and it was held that in such a case "lapse of time" would he no bar. The decision of Dr. Lushington in Duins vs. Donovan (1830-162 ER 1165), referred to in Kuppu Damayanti (supra) may he referred to where under the then prevailing enactment, known as Lord Hardwick's Act, the marriage in question was an absolute nullity and it was held that in such a case "lapse of time" would he no bar. In Aina Devi vs. Buchan Singh (A. I. R. 1980 Delhi 174), which was a case under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, whereunder certain marriages are declared to be null and void, it has been held by a learned Single Judge that "the grounds on which a petition for declaring a marriage to be null and void may be filed under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act are such that no amount of delay could be said to be sufficient to disentitle a petitioner to relief thereunder in spite of the generality of the provisions of Clause (d) of Section 23 (1) of the Act". Section 28 (1) (d) of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 34 (1) (e) of the Social Marriage Act are in pari materia, both providing generally that delay may otherwise be a bar to relief under the Act. . For the reasons stated hereinbefore in some details, we would agree with the observations made in the Delhi decision. ( 13 ) THAT being the position in law, we have tried to ascertain as to whether there are reliable materials on record to show that the appellant-husband was below 21 years of age on the date of the marriage in December, 1955. Mr. Dutta has mainly relied on the appellant's Passport - Ext. 4 - from Bangladesh and his Certificate of Registration as Indian Citizen - Ext. 3 (a ). In Ext. 4, the appellant's date of birth is recorded as 5. 4. 1935. To the same effect is Ext. 3 (a), dated 8. 12. 61 where his age is recorded as 26 years 8 months on that date. All these are no doubt relevant pieces as evidence, but, as fairly conceded by Mr. Dutta, the date of birth and the age in these documents were obviously recorded as per the appellant's own statements. To the same effect is Ext. 3 (a), dated 8. 12. 61 where his age is recorded as 26 years 8 months on that date. All these are no doubt relevant pieces as evidence, but, as fairly conceded by Mr. Dutta, the date of birth and the age in these documents were obviously recorded as per the appellant's own statements. But as we would presently show, the manner in which the appellant has made statements about his date of birth or age at various stages can inspire no confidence and, more so, when admittedly according to his own case, he did not hesitate to make a false statements as to his having the qualifying age before the Marriage Registrar, though, according to the case now sought to be made out in the petition, he had none. In his deposition before the Trial Court recorded on 10. 5. 83 he has categorically stated that "i am now aged 47 years" and that "i was 19 years when I married". If his date of birth was 5. 4. 35 as recorded in Ext. 4, then at the time of his marriage in December, 1955, he was 20 years and 8 months and not 19 years and on the date of deposition on 10. 5. 83 he was more than 48 years and not 47 years. Then again, in the Affidavit filed by him in this Court in support of his application for taking additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and sworn on 19. 1. 87, he has affirmed his age to be 49 years, while it ought to have been more than 51 years, if, as now stated by him and as recorded in Ext. 4, his date of birth was 5. 4 35. In that application under Order 41 Rule 27, the appellant has prayed that a certificate annexed therewith, alleged to have been issued by the Secretary, Bakerganj Baptist Union, he admitted in evidence as proof of his date oil birth. We are afraid that even assuming that there are justifiable grounds to admit additional evidence, the document sought to be produced is clearly inadmissible. The document appearing on the Letter-Head of "barishal Baptist Sammilani" (and not "bakerganj Baptist Union") purports "to certify that the date of birth of Mr. We are afraid that even assuming that there are justifiable grounds to admit additional evidence, the document sought to be produced is clearly inadmissible. The document appearing on the Letter-Head of "barishal Baptist Sammilani" (and not "bakerganj Baptist Union") purports "to certify that the date of birth of Mr. Harendra Nath Baroi (Burman), son of late Madhusudan Baroi (Burman), of former Village Dhandoba, P. S. Gournadi, District Bakerganj is 8th April, 1935, according to the Birth Register of Dhandoba Parish Church". Assuming that the entry in the Birth Register of that Parish Church, even though not maintained under any statute, can go in evidence, what can go in the relevant entry or, at least, a true copy of such entry and not a certificate purported to have beer prepared by some one in 1984 on the basis of the alleged entry in the Birth Register. And what is more, even that certificate shows the date of birth to be 8. 4. 35 and not 5. 4. 35 as now alleged by the appellant and as is recorded in Ext. 4. That being the state of the evidence on record as to the age of the appellant, demonstrating what scanty regard the appellant has for truth, we have no doubt that we would be committing the gravest error in annulling the marriage on the ground as alleged that on the date of the marriage the appellant did not attain the qualifying age, notwithstanding his representation to the contrary before the Marriage Registrar. ( 14 ) WE are aware that the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" may not always be a safe rule to be rigidly applied in appreciating evidence. But the appellant having himself sought for a decree of nullity on the ground of his under-age on the date of marriage obviously knew about the great importance of the evidence as to his age and if he still could go on prevaricating and making divergent statements as to his age from time to time, the evidence on the other aspects of the case would also require a very close scrutiny. And on such scrutiny of his evidence as to the alleged adultery of his wife, we are in agreement with the learned Trial Judge that the alleged adultery has not been satisfactorily approved. And on such scrutiny of his evidence as to the alleged adultery of his wife, we are in agreement with the learned Trial Judge that the alleged adultery has not been satisfactorily approved. It appears, and this we say with respect, that the law laid down by the Supreme Court as to the standard of proof of the ground for dissolution of marriage is not quite uniform. In Dastane v. Dastane (A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1584 at 1540) a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while referring to Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act which empowers the Court to pass a decree, "if the Court is satisfied" as to the existence of any ground for granting relief has ruled that the "word 'satisfied' must mean 'satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities' and not 'satisfied' beyond reasonable doubt' " and that the Civil and not the Criminal standard of proof applies to matrimonial causes. Since Section 34 of the Social Marriage Act also uses the same expression, namely "if the Court is satisfied", the expression 'satisfied' there must also on the authority of Dastane v. Dastane (supra) mean " 'satisfied' on a preponderance of probabilities" not "satisfied beyond reasonable doubt ". But even though Section 14 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, used the similar expression, namely, "in ewe the Court is satisfied" an earlier three-Juries Bench of the Supreme Court in White vs. White (A. T. R. 1958 S. C. 441 at 444 has held that "section 14 makes it plain that when the Court is to be satisfied on the evidence in respect of the Matrimonial Offences, the guilt. must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. ". In Dastane vs. Dastane (supra), the three-Judge Bench has not even noticed the earlier decision in White vs. White (supra) emanating from a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction nor another yet earlier decision of another co-equal Bench in Bipinchandra vs. Prabhavati (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 176 at 184) where also a three-Judge Bench has ruled that "it' is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce, the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like any other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt". ( 15 ) AS has been pointed in a recent Special Bench decision of this Court in Bholanath Karmakar (A. I. R. 1988 Calcutta 1 at 6-7), while confronted with conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by Benches of equal strength, the High Courts would have to prefer one to the other and is not necessarily obliged as a matter of course to follow either the former or the later in point of time, but must follow that one which, according to it, is better in point of law. Needless to say that it would be quite embarrassing for a High Court to declare one out of two or more decisions of the Supreme Court to be more reasonable or better in point of law, implying thereby that the other or the others is or are less reasonable. But if such a task falls upon the High Court because of irreconcilable contrary decisions of the Supreme Court emanating from Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the task, however, unpleasant or uncomfortable, has to be performed. In the case at hand, however, we are relieved of such an exercise because we are satisfied that even if we go by the standard of proof laid down in Dastane vs. Dastane (supra) and hold that the egression "satisfied" in Section 34 (1) of the Special Marriage Act could mean satisfied, not unnecessarily beyond reasonable doubts, but on a preponderance of probabilities, we would have to hold that the allegation of adultery in the case at hand has not been proved to our satisfaction. We must, however, note that notwithstanding the strenuous and forceful arguments against the impugned judgment, Mr. Dutta at a later stage of his argument has conceded with extraordinary fairness that the allegation of adultery against the wife-respondent, as understood in the divorce jurisdiction, has not been satisfactorily proved. This aspect of the case, therefore; need not detain us any longer. ( 16 ) THE Trial Judge has decided the issue relating to desertion also against the petitioner-husband and we are inclined to agree, though on somewhat different reasons. That the wife-respondent has left the matrimonial home is undisputed. But while the husband has stated that she did so in January, 1977 without specifying any date, the wife has asserted that she did so on 2. 9. 77 after lodging a diary to that effect in the Police Station on that date. That the wife-respondent has left the matrimonial home is undisputed. But while the husband has stated that she did so in January, 1977 without specifying any date, the wife has asserted that she did so on 2. 9. 77 after lodging a diary to that effect in the Police Station on that date. The G. D. entry has been duly produced and proved and is marked Ext. A and, as has been rightly held by the Trial Judge, the contents of that contemporaneous document fully support the wife's version. Apart from the fact that we have already noted what scanty regard for truth the husband has demonstrated while making statements about his age and date of birth, the G. D. Entry Ext. A lends such assurance to the version of the wife that we have felt that her statement on the point that she left on 2. 9. 77 should be accepted, more particularly when there was no serious challenge to this statement during her cross-examination. And once we do so, then even assuming, though not deciding, that the wife did so with all the requisite animus deserndi and also animus revertendi, the case of the husband must still fail as on the date of the initiation of the proceeding on 16. 6. 79, there could not have been any desertion for a continuous period of not less than two years from 2. 9. 77 to make out a ground of divorce under Section 27 (1) (b) of the Special Marriage Act. It should be noted that while by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act of 1976, the length of the requisite period of desertion has been reduced to "one year" from "two years" in Section 13 (1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the requisite period under Section 27 (1) (b) of Special Marriage Act, which governs us here, has been reduced only to "two years" from "three years". ( 17 ) THE Trial Judge has also held the allegation of cruelty against the wife-respondent not to have been satisfactorily proved; but we are afraid that there the Trial Judge is not correct and has not determined the issue with proper advertence to the materials on record. ( 17 ) THE Trial Judge has also held the allegation of cruelty against the wife-respondent not to have been satisfactorily proved; but we are afraid that there the Trial Judge is not correct and has not determined the issue with proper advertence to the materials on record. In paragraph 10 of the petition the petitioner-husband has categorically alleged that in an earlier application filed by the wife-respondent, under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, she has asserted that "the petitioner had an illegal and illicit connection with one Shipra Burman, who is the sister's daughter of the respondent herself whom she brought from Bangladesh to her residence". The wife-respondent far from denying the same in paragraph 11 of her written statement has, on the contrary, reiterated that allegation in paragraph 12 (ii) and (xiii) of the written statement and has asserted such allegation made in her earlier application to be true. In her deposition in cross-examination at the Trial, she has also stated that she found "both at them lying on the same bed" "in a naked condition on the bed in night". She has also asserted that on protest being made by her on the following morning she was assaulted and that she also in her turn assaulted Sipra. But strangely enough, no such case was put to the petitioner-husband while he deposed in this case. From the wife's own admission that she never told anybody about this, from the total absence of any corroborative evidence, direct or indirect, and in particular, from the series of letters - Ext. 1 series - written by Sipra to the petitioner and also the respondent and also letters written by Sipra's husband to the petitioner, we are satisfied that this allegation made by the wife about her husband's adulterous relation with Sipra is unfounded and baseless. And once we hold so, we must then hold further that the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty by hurling those ugly allegations in the earlier application for maintenance and then again in the written statement and then again in her deposition. There is no doubt that unfounded or baseless allegation of adultery by one spouse against the other constitutes mental cruelty of the gravest character to warrant divorce. There is no doubt that unfounded or baseless allegation of adultery by one spouse against the other constitutes mental cruelty of the gravest character to warrant divorce. In this case, such allegation was admittedly made by the wife prior to this proceeding in her application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But even if there was no such allegation made prior to the initiation of this proceeding, such allegations made in the written statement itself and in the deposition can and should be taken note of in matrimonial proceedings without driving the petitioner to another proceeding on the ground of such cruelty. While ordinarily a lis is to be determined on the cause of action accruing on the date of the initiation of the lis, it is nevertheless well-settled that it is open to a Court, including a Court of appeal, to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties where it is necessary to do in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. If any Authority is needed in support of this proposition, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sikherchand vs. Digambar Jain (A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1178 at 1182), where the leading decision of this Court on the point of Sir Ashutosh in Rai Charan vs. Biswanath (A. I. R. 1915 Calcutta 183) has been referred to with approval. It should be so done all the more in matrimonial proceedings where multiplicity of proceedings should always be discouraged and the dispute should be disposed of as early as possible in the interest of the parties as well as in the interest of the society at large. In fact such courses appear to have been adopted in a series of decisions to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Dutta and reference inter alia may be made to the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Savitri vs Mulchand (A. I. R 1987 Delhi 52), in Ashok vs. Santosh (A. I. R. 1987 Delhi 68) and in a Bombay decision in Jaishree vs. Mohan (A. I. R. 1987 Bombay 220 ). Dutta and reference inter alia may be made to the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Savitri vs Mulchand (A. I. R 1987 Delhi 52), in Ashok vs. Santosh (A. I. R. 1987 Delhi 68) and in a Bombay decision in Jaishree vs. Mohan (A. I. R. 1987 Bombay 220 ). ( 18 ) AS we cannot but note, scurrilous, vituperative and scandalous allegations have been freely made by both the spouses against each other and since we have found them to have been made by the parties without any justifiable foundation, we would have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and irreparably beyond all prospects of resuscitation or restoration. But as pointed out hereinbefore, however desirable it may be, irretrievable breakdown by itself and without more, has not, as yet been made a ground of divorce and the Court must find out one or more of the grounds as specified in Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, unless the parties choose to proceed for divorce by mutual consent under Section 28 of the Act. Since we have found out such a ground; namely, cruelty by the wife-respondent, we would decree divorce and (borrowing from the Supreme Court decision in Saroj Rani (supra) we would say that we do so without any "mental compunction", as we have also found the marriage to have been wrecked beyond repair. ( 19 ) WE would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment and decree of the Court below and decree the petition of divorce filed by the appellant-husband with the result that the marriage between the parties shall stand dissolved. We would however, make no order as to costs. It is obvious, but we would still like to make it clear that nothing herein would prevent the wife from making any application under Section 37 of the Special Marriage Act for such permanent alimony and maintenance to which she would be found entitled to. Appeal allowed. Baboo Lal Jain, J. I agree.