V. GOPALASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) ORDER :- This revision is preferred against the judgement of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ganjam-Boudh, in Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1982-G (15/80-GOC) dated 24-6-1982, confirming the order of the Judicial Magistrate. First Class, Digapahandi, in G. R. Case No. 407 of 1976, convicting the petitioner under Ss. 304-A and 279, I. P. C. and sentencing him there under to undergo R. I. for six months and three months respectively, with a direction that the sentences should run concurrently. ( 2 ) THE gist of the prosecution case is that on 7-6-1976, near Madanmohanpur, as the petitioner, driving the minibus ORG 4544, in high speed tired to pass by the code of a truck parked on the road, and the course of such by-passing the minibus dashed against a telephone pole starting by the side of the road and ran over and killed a blind man named Debraj sitting near the telephone pole, and then it turned upside, down, and thus he was found driving the, minibus rashly and negligently rendering himself liable under Ss. 279 and 304-A. I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE accused pleaded that he was driving the minibus at normal speed but due to fresh earth put on the side of the road, the wheels of the bus slipped and the accident took place. No witness was examined on behalf of the defence. ( 4 ) THE prosecution has examined in all eleven witnesses to prove its case. P. W. 1 is the informant. P. W. 4 is the father of deceased Debraj. P. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 are post-occurrence witnesses. P. Ws. 5, 6 and 10 are examined as eye-witness to the occurrence. P. W. 7 is a witness to the seizure of same documents. P. W. 8 is the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination over the body of the deceased. P. W. 9 is the I. O. P. W. 11 is the Motor Vehicles Inspector. ( 5 ) P. W. 6 was one of the passengers in the minibus ORG 4544 on the relevant day. P. W. 8 is the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination over the body of the deceased. P. W. 9 is the I. O. P. W. 11 is the Motor Vehicles Inspector. ( 5 ) P. W. 6 was one of the passengers in the minibus ORG 4544 on the relevant day. His evidence shows that while the accused was driving the minibus near Madanmohanpur at normal speed there was a truck parked ahead on the road and as the accursed tried to by pass the truck, by going on its right side, as there was fresh earth put on the road, the bus dragged to the right and dashed against a telephone pole by the side of the road and ran over a blind man sitting near the telephone pole P. Ws. 5 and 10 were also the passengers to the same minibus on the relevant occasion and they too deposed that while the accused was driving the minibus and attempted to pass by the side of a truck parked on the road by going on its right side, the bus stopped and dashed against a telephone pole on the side of the road and ran over a blind than sitting nearby. There is nothing in the evidence of P. Ws. 5, 6 and 10 to disbelieve their version regarding the to which the occurrence had taken place. From their evidence it is seen that the minibus had run over the blind man sitting near the telephone pole as a result of which he died instantaneously. The evidence of the doctor P. W. 8, who conducted the post-mortem examination over the deceased, shows that, according to him, the death of the deceased must have been instantaneous and the antemortem injuries found on the deceased might have been caused by a vehicle running over him. So the evidence of P. Ws. 5, 6 and 10 that the death of deceased Debraj was due to the minibus running over him is also corroborated by the medical evidence in the case. So the evidence of P. Ws. 5, 6 and 10 that the death of deceased Debraj was due to the minibus running over him is also corroborated by the medical evidence in the case. ( 6 ) THE prosecution has satisfactorily proved that the petitioner was the driver of the minibus at the relevant time and that as he was driving the bus near village Madanmohanpur and was trying to pass by the side of a truck parked on the road the minibus swerved to its right and slipped and dashed against the telephone pole and ran over the deceased and killed him. So what remains to be considered is whether the running over of the minibus on the deceased, which resulted in his instantaneous death, was on account of the rash and negligent driving of the minibus by the accused at the relevant time. ( 7 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. 5, 6 and 10 discloses that as the accused was trying up pass by the side of the truck, he was driving the bus at normal speed. The relationship between speed and rashness or negligence depends upon the place, time, condition of the road, nature of the traffic and such other like circumstances. A motor vehicle is meant to be driven in speed. It is not always that one who drives his vehicle at a slow speed is a safe driver. So the speed with which a vehicle is driven is not always the deciding factor for coming to a finding whether he is driving rashly or negligently. The evidence of P. Ws. 5. 6 and 10 shows that when the truck was seen parked on the road from a considerable distance, the accused was driving the minibus at normal speed and that even while he attempted to pass by the side of the truck he continual to drive at the very same speed. That a truck was parked on the road it not in dispute and that fresh earth was laid on the road is also not in dispute. There is no reason to disbelieve the correctness of the opinion of the Motor Vehicles Inspector that when loose earth covers the road. the vehicle is liable to be dragged to a side if it is driven at a speed of over K. Ms. per hour. As earlier stated the evidence of P. Ws. There is no reason to disbelieve the correctness of the opinion of the Motor Vehicles Inspector that when loose earth covers the road. the vehicle is liable to be dragged to a side if it is driven at a speed of over K. Ms. per hour. As earlier stated the evidence of P. Ws. 5, 6 and 10 also reveals that even while attempting to pass by the side of the truck the accused was driving the minibus at the same speed at which he was driving it earlier before reaching the spot where it slipped. ( 8 ) THE driver must have seen the truck parked on the road from a considerable distance and so when he tried to by-pass the truck on its right side, he should have slow down his vehicle as soon as he approached near the truck. Further as there was now and fresh earth spread on the road it should have drawn the attention of the driver to slow down the vehicle. When the road is fresh and the road condition is perfect, the accused is justified in driving his minibus at normal speed. But wen when the road is blocked by the truck and the road condition is bad as fresh earth was spread on the road side, if the accused-driver still drives his vehicle at normal speed without slowing it down, it is evident, that such driving is rash and negligent act on his part. The opinion of the M. V. I. that the mechanical condition of the vehicle was alright can be safely relied on. Even though the mechanical condition of the vehicle is perfect, yet if it slips down the road and dashes against a wayside telephone pole and runs over the deceased, sitting near the telephone pole, the only reasonable inference is that there is something wrong with the driver. On a proper consideration of the evidence, both the Courts below have come to a finding that the rash and negligent driving of the accused was the proximate and sufficient cause for the instantaneous death of the deceased at the spot. ( 9 ) IN this case there is reliable evidence to show that the minibus in question was found in a topsy-turvy state at the spot of occurrence. ( 9 ) IN this case there is reliable evidence to show that the minibus in question was found in a topsy-turvy state at the spot of occurrence. Relying on this evidence, the learned Standing Counsel submitted that the very fact that the vehicle turned upside down, is a telling circumstance regarding the rash and negligent driving of the accused. In this context he relied on the decision Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 719 wherein it was observed thus :". . . . . . IN our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A. I. P. C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy duty vehicles and of speeding menaces. This viewed, it is fair to apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur, of course, with care. . . . . . . . " ( 10 ) IN Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka. 1980 SCC (Cri) 59 while considering the scope of the applicability of the maxim of res ipsa loquitur in criminal cases, the Supreme Court observed that in criminal cases, because of the rules of burden of proof, presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt, res ipsa loquitur can only be an aid in the evaluation of evidence. It was held that the maxim was only a means of the estimating logical probability from the circumstances of the accident and so it could be used only as a convenient ratiocinative aid and assessment of evidence, in drawing permissive inference under S. 114 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case the very fact that after the occurrence, the vehicle was found in a topsy-turvy condition by the road side is a circumstance, which lends further support to the other reliable prosecution evidence, that the accused was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently on the relevant occasion. ( 11 ) HENCE on it careful scrutiny of the material placed on record, as discussed above. I find that both the Courts have correctly come to the finding that the prosecution could successfully bring home to the petitioner the charges under Ss. 279 and 304-A, I. P. C. ( 12 ) IN the result. I find no merit in the revision petition and the same is, therefore dismissed. Revision dismissed. .