JUDGMENT R. N. Prasad, J. These two appeals have been heard together at the instance of the parties as common questions of fact and law are involved in both the appeals. Both the appeals were filed by the complainant i.e. The Food Inspector of Kishanganj Municipality under section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order acquitting the respondents in respect of an offence punishable under section 16 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 2. In both these cases the respondents were prosecuted for keeping adulterated mustard oil for sale. It is said that the Food Inspector had inspected their shops situated within the jurisdiction of Kishanganj municipality and found the said mustard oil stored for sale. He took sample of the mustard oil after observing legal formalities and sent the same to Public Analyst who reported that the mustard oil in both the cases was adulterated. On receipt of the reports of the Public Analyst separate complaint was filed against these respondents before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kishanganj, for their prosecution under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act after obtaining the necessary sanction. The learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and transferred the case to another Judicial Magistrate of the First Class for trial. Eventually, the case was transferred to the Court of Sri B. K. Kashyap, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Kishanganj, who, tried he respondents and acquitted all the respondents on the ground that the prosecution had ailed to establish that the mustard oil was adulterated to the extent required by law to make the respondents liable for punishment. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the complainant-appellant has contended that the finding of the learned Magistrate in both the cases hat the adulteration could not be established as erroneous and is not based on the correct appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents however, contended that it would not be necessary to go into the facts of his case as the entire trial of the respondents was bad for want of jurisdiction in the learned Magistrate to try these cases. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents however, contended that it would not be necessary to go into the facts of his case as the entire trial of the respondents was bad for want of jurisdiction in the learned Magistrate to try these cases. It was contended hat after the insertion of Section 16-A in the .ct by Act 34 or 1976 all the offences under sub-section (1) of Section 16 are to be tried summarily by a Judicial Magistrate of First Class specially empowered in this behalf by the state Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate. It has been submitted that Sri B. K. P. Kashyap, the learned Judicial Magistrate, who tried these cases was not empowered under section 16-A of the Act by the State Government I1d, as such he had no jurisdiction to try these respondents in the two cases in question. 4. In view of the jurisdictional question raised which may cut at the root of the matter, I propose to decide this question first. 5. Section 16-A of the Act is as follows ;-- "16-A. Power of court to try cases summarily.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (2 of 1974), all the offences under subsection (1) of section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government of by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of section 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial : Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year : Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case i5 such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason. undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall, after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code." 6. A bare reading of this section shows that :- (i) all the offences under section 16 (1) of the Act have to be tried summarily. (ii) the trial has to be conducted by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate, and (iii) the provisions of Section 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to such trial as far as possible. So, after the incorporation of this section in the Act, all the offences under section 16 (1) have to be tried summarily and secondly, the trial has to be conducted by Judicial Magistrate of the First Class who has been specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by Metropolitan Magistrate. In the present case the trials have of course been conducted by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class but the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has failed to show that the learned Judicial Magistrate, namely, Sri B. K. Kashyap, was - specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government. He took many adjournments for producing such an authorization but, ultimately, - he conceded that he was unable to procedure - such an authorization. On the other hand, it was emphatically contended by the learned counsel - for the respondents that the State Government has not empowered the said Judicial Magistrate in this behalf and there is no such notification in existence. If the learned Magistrate was not specially empowered by the State Government to try such offences, he could have no jurisdiction to try the respondents and further trials conducted by him in respect of these respondents would be invalid for want of jurisdiction in the learned Magistrate. If the learned Magistrate was not specially empowered by the State Government to try such offences, he could have no jurisdiction to try the respondents and further trials conducted by him in respect of these respondents would be invalid for want of jurisdiction in the learned Magistrate. If the learned counsel f0r appellants failed to produce any notification under section 16- A of the Act issued by the State Government authorising Shri B.K.P. Kashyap, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Kishanganj, to try offences under section 16 (1) summarily, I have no option but to accept tile contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that 'no such authorization has been made by the State Government. 7. It was, however; pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has issued a notification bearing No. 80 dated 28th March, 198.0 which has been published in Bihar Gazette dated the 24th December, 1980 by which the High Court has authorised the Sub-divisional' Judicial Magistrate of Kishanganj and- some other places to try the offences under section 16 (1) (a) of the Act in a summary manner. A perusal of this notification shows that this authorization was made under the powers vested in the High Court under section 260 (1)(C) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is that of course, the High court could authorise a Magistrate try a case summarily under section 260 (l).(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure but no authorization in respect of an offence under section 16 (1) of the Act can be made by the High Court as the Food Adulteration Act is a special Act arid is complaint in itself and provides its own procedure in respect of the trial., Indeed, Section 16-A clearly states thus the mandate given by the legislature in this Section shall override the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it begins with the expression "-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure Code"- and so any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure Code which is contrary to the 'provisions of this section shall have no' legal' effect and provisions of this section shall prevail not with standing any provision .to the contrary in the Code of Criminal Procedure. As said above, Section 16-A of the Act specifically lays down that only the State Government can authorise a Judicial Magistrate of the First' Class to try an offence under section 16 (1) Of 'the Act besides the Metropolitan Magistrate with whom we are not concerned in this case. Evidently, the legislature did not vest in the High Court the authority to empower any Magistrate to try 'such offences summarily and that being so, the High Court cannot authorize any Judicial Magistrate to try an officer under section 16 (1) of the Act summarily and such authorization, if any; made by the High Court would be beyond the powers of the High. Court. So the 'notification No.80 dated 28th March, 1980 issued by the High Court cannot have any legal effect as any authorization made by the High Court cannot vest jurisdiction in the Magistrate to try the case summarily, under section 16-A of the Act as such an authorization could be made only by the State Government and not by the High Court. It is needless to say that the authorization mad; by the High Court cannot be co-terminus with the authorization made by the State Government as required under section 16-A of the Act and' in absence of any authorization made by the State Government authorising the Judicial Magistrate in question to try such offences he could have no jurisdiction to try the respondents in these cases and the entire trial conducted by the learned Judicial Magistrate in this case must be held to be bad for want of jurisdiction in him to try these cases. . 8. Similar question had arisen before Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Chandra Vs. State reported in 1979 Allahabad Law Journal 952 and the following observation was made by P.N. Bakshi, J, in almost identical circumstances. X, X X X X “The section, no doubt, empowers. the Judicial Magistrate to try an offence summarily under the Prevention of Food' Adulteration Act, subject to the restriction of sentences directed therein, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but it is to be noticed that in order to exercise' the summary powers, Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, must be specially empowered in this respect by the State Government. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the Judicial Magistrate concerned in the instant case was empowered by the State Government to exercise summary powers. The authorization by the High Court, which I have referred to above, cannot be taken as an authorization by the State Government by any stretch of imagination. In this view of the matter, the Judicial Magistrate, Harriya concerned had no jurisdiction to try the applicant in a summary manner. The whole proceedings before him are, therefore, without jurisdiction and void ab-initio." 9. It may also be incidentally mentioned that by notification No.80 dated 28th March, 1980, the High Court had authorised only the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate of Kishanganj to try the offences ,under section 16 (1) of the Act in a summary ,manner and no such authorization was made by the High Court in favour of Sri B.K.P. Kashyap who was only a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and not the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate of Kishanganj 'When be conducted these trials So, in any view of the matter Shree B.K.P. Kashyap had no jurisdiction to try these cases against the respondents. 10. From the discussions made 'above, it is evident that both the trials in which the respondents have been acquitted were void ab-initio for want of jurisdiction• in the learned Magistrate and, as such, it would not be worthwhile to go into the merits of these appeals as these appeals have to be dismissed as both the trials were bad for want of jurisdiction in the learned Judicial Magistrate. In the result, both the appeals are' "'dismissed. 11. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Registrar of this High Court for placing the same before the Hon 'ble the Chief Justice for the needful. Appeals dismissed.