Pro defendant No. 2 purchased about 4 bigahs of land in the year K42 from one Badhan Ch. Lahkar and took delivery of possession. He let out about 2 kathas of land described in Schedule A to the plaint to defendant No. 1, the appellant herein at a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-. After keeping about 4 kathas of land for himself, he let out the remaining portion of the land to the plaintiff respondent for the purpose of manufacturing bricks. Thereafter in 1971 the present respondent purchased the entire land for valuable consideration but the defendant No. 1 appellant remained in the land along with one Mustt Halima Khatoon, widow of the elder brother of pro-defendant No. 2. The appellant defendant No. 2 is residing on the land described in the Schedule - A to the plaint by constructing his house along with the said Mustt Halima Khatoon as he was allowed to do so by the plaintiff-respondent. It is alleged that the plaintiff allowed the defendant No. 1 to reside in the said land on his undertaking to vacate tie same as early as possible, but he neglected to do so inspite of repeated request from the plaintiff-respondent. It is alleged that the appellant instead of vacating the land got his name mutated in the Revenue records claiming occupancy right over- one bigha of land including 2 kathas of land which was in his possession. The said order w is passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer on 20.12.71, but the Settlement Officer on an appeal being filed by the respondent set aside the said order of the Asstt. Settlement Officer vide his order dated 293.72 holding that the appellant did not acquire any occupancy right. It is further alleged that on 5.1.72. the appellant encroached upon another 1 kathas of adjacent land which has been described in the Schedule B to the plaint. A proceeding under section H5 Cr. P C. was started in respect of the said land described in Schedule B and the learned Judicial Magistrate declared possession of the land in favour of the prese it appellant. It is further alleged that the present appellant was irregular in payment of rent and he was a defaulter since January, 1972. Hence the present suit was filed after issuing 15 days notice terminating the tenancy. In the suit respondent prayed for recovery of possession of. It is further alleged that the present appellant was irregular in payment of rent and he was a defaulter since January, 1972. Hence the present suit was filed after issuing 15 days notice terminating the tenancy. In the suit respondent prayed for recovery of possession of. the land described in the Schedule - A and B and also for arrears of rent and compensation. 2. The title of the respondent was not disputed. But the appe­llant took the plea that one bigha of land on an annual rent was let out to him by the pro-defendant allowing him to use the same as agricultural land and also to construct a house thereon. It is pleaded that the said annual tenancy was for Agricultural purpose and the appellant also used the land for the said purpose. The allegation that the respondent allowed the appellant to stay on the land for some time till alternative arrangement was made has been denied. It was stated that as the appellant was occupying the land for more than 3 years as agricultural land, he acquired occupancy right under, .the law. It was submitted that tae order of Settlement Officer allowing the appeal regarding mutation of the name of the appellant in the revenue record was erroneous. According to the appellant he offered rent to respondent who refused to accept the same and as such he was not a defaulter. 3. The learned trial Court held that the tenancy was not for an Agricultural purpose and the appellant did not acquire occupancy right, that the appellant was a monthly tenant in respect of the land described in Schedule - A to the plaint and he encroached upon the land of the respondent described in Schedule - B, that a proper and valid notice was served and that the appellant was a defaulter. An abortive appeal was filed and the learned lower Appellate Court held that the order of the Settlement Officer was validly and legally passed as he was the appellate authority against the order passed by the Asstt. An abortive appeal was filed and the learned lower Appellate Court held that the order of the Settlement Officer was validly and legally passed as he was the appellate authority against the order passed by the Asstt. Settlement Officer, that the said order by which it was held that the appellant did not acquire any occupancy right is a resjudicata for the purpose of the present suit that the land in question was not for an Agricultural purpose, that the notice in question was valid and legal and that the decree of the learned trial Court was legally and validly made. 4. The first contention of Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit as framed is not maintainable inasmuch as the respondent has prayed for ejectment of the appellant from Schedule - A land on »the ground that he being a tenant was defaulter and in respect of land in Schedule - B on the ground that the appellant was a trespasser. Drawing attention to Order 2 Rule 4 C.P.C., Mr Baruah submits that the suit is bad for mis joinder' of causes of action. 5. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that as this point was not raised either at the trial stag or before the first learned appellate Court, the appellant has waive his right. Mr. Bhattacharjee further submits that in view legislative mandate as contained in Section 99-and Rule 7 Order 2 C P.C., the above submission of Mr. Baruah needs no consideration 6. Mr. Baruah has drawn my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in Kanakarathanammal vs. V. S. Loganatha Mudalior an another, A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 271. In my opinion, the law la down by their Lordships in the aforesaid case is not relevant f the present purpose as in that case the question was whether suit must fail for non-joinder of necessary parties and it was he that there can be no doubt that if necessary parties are not join the suit must fail. 7. Mr. Baruah has also placed reliance on three decisions Allahabad, Madras and FCanrnataka High Courts in support of 1 contention. In Bhondu v. Ch. Raj Singh, A. I. R. 1948, Allahabad < a suit was brought for ejectment of a tenant as well as a sub-tern and also claimed title as it was denied by the sub-tenant. 7. Mr. Baruah has also placed reliance on three decisions Allahabad, Madras and FCanrnataka High Courts in support of 1 contention. In Bhondu v. Ch. Raj Singh, A. I. R. 1948, Allahabad < a suit was brought for ejectment of a tenant as well as a sub-tern and also claimed title as it was denied by the sub-tenant. Court called upon the plaintiff to pay further court fee, but the plaintiff withdrew the suit against the sub-tenant with permission to file a fresh suit. It was held that the court instead of asking the plaintiff to pay the court fee should have asked him to exercise his option whether he wanted to proceed with the suit against both the tenant and the sub-tenant and run risk of its dismissal or proceed only against the tenant. Thus it appears from the fact that this decision is not relevant fir the present purpose. That apart the plea for mis-joinder of parties was taken at the first instance. 8. In Govindanathan v. Anjaneya Pandithan and others A. I. R. 1950 Madras 760, there was misjoinder of parties and also causes of action and it -was held that in case of misjoinder however the suit in toto cannot be said to be barred by any law and a plaintiff or plaintiffs who are found guilty of misjoinder have the right to elect which cause of action they can pursue in the suit they seek to file and that strictly the objection as regards misjoinder should have been taken after the suit was registered. Thus it appears that this decision is of no help to Mr. Baruah as in the case in hand plea of misjoinder was not taken before. 9. In Rajabibi and others, v. S. Ameeraii and another A. I. R. 1974 Karnataka 115, it was held taat co sharer being a necessary party non-impleading such a co-sharer is a fatal defect. But the present case is not regarding non joinder of parties. 1). Section 99 C. P. C., inter alia, provides that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. The said Section provides that it shall not apply to nonjoinder of a necessary party. According to Order 2 Rule 7 C. P. C. all objections regarding misjoinder of causes of action shall be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and any objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived. 11. In Mahant Ramdhan Puri and others v. Chaudhury Lachmi Narain and others, A. I R 1937 P- C. 42, it was held that the mere fact of misjoinder is not by itself sufficient to entitle the defendant to have the proceedings set aside or action dismissed and where the merits of the case have been satisfactorily disposed of by the trial Court in spite of the complication of the proceedings no objection as to misjoinder can be given effect to in appeal. 12. In Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 340, it was held that the policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 C. P. C. and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, is the same, namely, that when a case has been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, of and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction as technical and not open to consideration by an appeallate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits 13. In Virendra Singh vs. Vimal, A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 2169, which relates to an election petition, it was held that the petition could have also not been dismissed in view of Section 99 C. P. C. which clearly says that a defect which does not affect the merits of the case of jurisdiction of the Court cannot invalidate the decision. This Court had occasion to consider section 99 C. P. C. in Ramjatan Kurmi v. Dina Christian reported in Assam Law Reports 1972, Gauhati 77. This Court had occasion to consider section 99 C. P. C. in Ramjatan Kurmi v. Dina Christian reported in Assam Law Reports 1972, Gauhati 77. In that case the question arose, in respect of a suit where a person was a tenant in respect of one half and a trespasser in respect of other part of the suit land as to whether these two causes of action can be tried together and whether the suit was bad for multifariousness. This Court held that two causes of action c«n be tried together and there is no multifariousness in the suit. As on merits the Court did not find any failure of justice the decree was not set aside. The court relied upon the decisions in Mahant Ramdhan Pun (supra) and also Kiran Singh (supra). 14 In View of clear and unambiguous legislative mandate contained in Section 99 C, P. C. and Order 2 Rule 7 C. P. C and also the law laid down in the above decisions, I hold that the plea of misjoinder of causes of action has to be taken al the earliest possible opportunity and at least at or before settlemen of issues and unless this is done the objection o misjoinder of cause of action shall be deemed to have been waived. An appellate Court cannot interfere with the decree nor can remand the case for trial on account of misjoinder of causes of action unless of course the Court finds any failure of justice. In the case in hand nothing has been brought to my notice to show that there was failure of just for joinder of two causes of action. For the reasons stated above, I find no merit in the contention Mr. Baruah regarding misjoinder of causes of action and according it is rejected. 15. Mr. Baruah has submitted that in respect of the land from where the respondent was dispossessed a separate suit under the provisions of Specific Relief Act, 1963 ought to hive been filed. As I have already held that the present suit is not bad for mis-joinder of causes of action, submission of Mr. Baruah needs no further consideration. 16. Mr. Baruah has urged that the suit has not been properly valued. As I have already held that the present suit is not bad for mis-joinder of causes of action, submission of Mr. Baruah needs no further consideration. 16. Mr. Baruah has urged that the suit has not been properly valued. From paragraph 11 of the plaint, it is clear that the suit has been valued for the land described in Schedule - A and B separately and as such this contention has no force, 17. Both the learned Courts below held that the appellant did not acquire the right of the occupancy tenancy in respect of the suit land and in arriving at the above decision, the learned lower Courts took into consideration the order of Settlement Officer. The Settlement Officer passed the order in question in the appeal filed by the respondent and by the aforesaid order the Settlement Officer set aside The order of the Asstt. Settlement Officer by which the Assistant Settlement Officer came to the finding that the appellant acquired occupancy right under th-3 provisions of Assam Tenancy Act, «971, for short, 'the Act'. According to Mr. Baruah the Settlement Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer under Section 59 of the Act. On the other hand Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to Section 67 of the Act and Rules 33 of the Assam ( Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Rules, 1972 and has submitted that the Settlement Officer was the competent Appellate Authority and as the order was passed by the Settlement Officer legally and validly, the said order being an order of a Court of special jurisdiction will be res judicata in respect of the present suit regarding the question of acquisition of right of an occupancy tenant by the appellant. 18. Mr. Bhattacharjee has placed reliance on the decision in Ram Sarup v. Ram Chander and others; A. I. R. 1976 Punjab and Haryanaj 246, the Court reiterated the settled law that the decision of a Court of special jurisdiction will be res judicata. in a Court of general jurisdiction provided the decision of the Court of a special jurisdiction was within the jurisdiction of that Court. This is a well settled principle. in a Court of general jurisdiction provided the decision of the Court of a special jurisdiction was within the jurisdiction of that Court. This is a well settled principle. However, if the decision rendered by a special Court such as Revenue Court is without jurisdiction, the said decision cannot be resjudicata in a subsequent suit filed in a Civil Court. So the main point for consideration is whether the order passed by the Settlement Officer was within his jurisdiction or not. 19. From the long title and the preamble to the Act, it appears that this piece of legislation was enacted to regulate the rights and liabilities of the Agricultural tenants and their landlords in temporarily settled areas of Assam. There is no dispute that the Act in question is applicable to the areas where disputed land is situated. For the present purpose, I am concerned with Chapter X of the Act which contained Sections 55 to 67 and also Chapters VI and VII of the Assam (Temporarily Settled Areas) Tenancy Rules, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Rules'. Section 55 empowers the State Government, where a settlement operation under the provisions of Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 is not being carried out, to make an order directing that a record of rights for tenants be prepared by a Settlement Officer. Sub-section (3) of slid Section provides that survey and record-of rights shall be prepared in accordance with rules made under the Act: Section 57 provides that the Settlement Officer -shall publish a draft record-of rights in the manner prescribed and shall receive and consider objections during the period of publication. It further provides that after disposal of such objections according to rules the Settlement Officer shall finally frame the record and cause it to be published in the prescribed manner. Section 58, inter alia, provides that every entry in a record of rights finally published shall be conclusive evidence of the matter referred to in such entry of record-of-rights and shall be presumed to be correct until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect. Section 58, inter alia, provides that every entry in a record of rights finally published shall be conclusive evidence of the matter referred to in such entry of record-of-rights and shall be presumed to be correct until it is proved by evidence to be incorrect. Section 59 of the Act, inter alia, provides for appeal and revision - an appeal against the order of Settlement Officer prior to finally publication of record of rights on any objection shall lie to the Director of Land Records or any other officer or officers authored by the State Government in this behalf. Sub-section (2) of Section 59, inter alia, provides that the State Government on application or of its own motion, direct the revision of any record-of-rights It may be worthwhil to mention that under section 66 (c) of the Act preparation of record of rights under the aforesaid Chapter X has been exempted from cognizance of Civil Court. Section 70 (a) of the Act empowers the State Government to invest any Revenue Officer or Asstt. Settlement Officer with all or any of the powers of the Deputy Commissioner or the Settlement Officer. Rules 23 to 27 under Chapter VI of the Rules lay down the general power of officers making survey, preparation of record-of -rights and the procedure of publication of notification issued under Section 55 of the Act. Chapter VII which contains rules 28 to 39 lays d >own the procedure for the preparation of record-of-rights. According to rule 32, the Assistant Settlement Officer after correction of records in course of attestation shall prepare the draft record-of-rights for an area or a village and shall cause it to be published at a convenient place. Rule 33 (1) provides for filing of objections and disposal of such objection by the Asstt. Settlement Officer. It, interalia, provides that after hearing the parties and all interested persons on the date and place fixed for such hearing of the objection, the Assistant Settlement Officer shall dispose of objections filed in respect of draft record-of rights. Sub-rule (2) of the said Rule 33 "provides that an appeal against the order of the Asstt. Settlement Officer shall lie to the Settlement Officer. Rule 34. inter alia, provides that after disposal of all objections by the Asstt. Sub-rule (2) of the said Rule 33 "provides that an appeal against the order of the Asstt. Settlement Officer shall lie to the Settlement Officer. Rule 34. inter alia, provides that after disposal of all objections by the Asstt. Settle­ment Officer or by the Settlement Officer in appeal the Settlement Officer shall proceed to frame the final record-of-rights It also provides, that such final record-of-right shall be liable to de corrected in the light of order passed in appeal under section 59 of the Act. Rule 38 pr »vides the mode of disposal of an appeal filed under section 59 (1) of the Act and rule 39 provides for manner of disposal of a revision by the State Government under section 59 (2) of the Act. Thus from the provisions contained in Chapter X of the Act and Chapter VI and VII of the Rules, it is clear that a person aggrieved in respect of any entry made and published in a draft-record-of-rights can file an objection before the Asstt. Settlement Officer and against the order of the Asstt. Settlement Officer, an appeal shall lie to the Settlement Officer. Against the order of the Settlement Officer, an appeal shall he to the Director of Land Records or any other person authorised in this behalf by the State Government as provided in Section 59 (1) of the Act. State Govern­ment has been invested with revisional jurisdiction in respect of any entry made in the record of rights prepared under the Act. Presumably provisions for 2 (two) appeals and also revision have made in respect of preparation of record-of-rights by the legislature as under section 66 of the Act this matter has been exempted from the cognizance of Civil Court. 20. In the present appeal, the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer is not available on record. Exhibit 14 is the order dated 29. 3. 72 passed by the Settlement Officer in Revenue Appeal Case No. 25 of 1971-72. On perusal of the said appeal, it appears that the appeal was filed against the order dated 20. 12. 71 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer in Tenancy Objection No. 127 of 1971-72. By the aforesaid order the Assistant Settlement Officer declared the appellant herein as occupancy tenant in respect of suit land. On perusal of the said appeal, it appears that the appeal was filed against the order dated 20. 12. 71 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer in Tenancy Objection No. 127 of 1971-72. By the aforesaid order the Assistant Settlement Officer declared the appellant herein as occupancy tenant in respect of suit land. As the aforesaid order was passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer in respect of objection, it was an order passed under rule 33(1) of the Rules. Under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 33 of the Rules an appeal against such an order passed by the Asstt. Settlemem Officer shall lie to the Settlement Officer and as such the order dated 29. 3. 72 passed by the Settlement Officer was within hi; jurisdiction. The appellant did not avail of the opportunity of the second appeal or filed a revision petition as provided under Section 59 of the Act. 21. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the order passed by the Settlement Officer declaring that appellant did not acquire any occupancy tenancy in respect of the suit land was legally and validly passed and that he had jurisdiction to pass the aforesaid order As the Settlement Officer is a Court of special jurisdiction, the said order regarding acquisition of tenancy right in respect of the suit land will be a res-judicata in the present civil suit, I, therefore hold that the learned lower appellate court rightly decided that the question of acquiring occupancy right by the appellant in respect of the suit land is barred by Section 11 of the C. P. C. The contention of Mr. Baruah is rejected. 22. Mr. Bhattacharjee- learned counsel for the respondent has taken up an alternative plea. According to Mr. no order under section 55 of the Act was made- by the State Government and as no settlement operation under the provision of Assam Land and Revenue Regulations, 1886 was being carry out. Chapter X of the Act which includes provision for appeal in Section 59 is not applicable to the instant case and as such Section 67 which provides for appeals in respect of other provisions the Act will be attracted. Chapter X of the Act which includes provision for appeal in Section 59 is not applicable to the instant case and as such Section 67 which provides for appeals in respect of other provisions the Act will be attracted. This plea was not taken up either before the trial Court or before the learned lower appellate Court and opportunity was provided to the parties to produce particulars regarding application of Chapter X of the Act to the present dispute and as such at this stage this point cannot be decided. It appears that trial of this dispute proceeded on the basis that Chapter X of the Act is applicable. I have already held that under Chapter X and the relevant rules made under the Act, the Settlement Officer had jurisdiction to pass the order, exhibit 14 and that the said on is a res-judicata in the present suit regarding the question of acquisition of occupancy tenancy by the appellant and as such content of Mr. Bhattacharjee needs no consideration. 23. The question whether the appellant is an occupancy tenant in respect of the suit land is a question of fact and this has been decided by both the learned lower Courts on the basis of evidence on records and this cannot be re-opened in this second appeal unless it is shown that the said decision was perverse and illegal. The only point regarding res judicata vis-a-vis the provisions of the Act is a substantial question of law which has been decided against the appellant. The apart, Mr. Bhattacharjee has also drawn my attention to the revenue record, namely, Jamabandi, Exhibit - 3, wherein the land in question has been classified us 'Takalabari'. Mr. Bhattacharjee has drawn my attention to the definition 'Takalabari' which is available at page - XXVIII in the introduction to the Assam Land Revenue Manual, Vol. I 1965 edition and according to the said definition, the term 'Takalabari' means 'Bare house sites'. In other words the land classified as 'Takalabari' is not a land used for Agricultural purpose, but home stead land. This fact was also considered duly by the learned lower appellate Court. 1 do not find any material to disturb the finding of the learned lower appellate Court that the appellant did not acquire the right of an occupancy tenant in respect of the suit land. 24. Last contention of Mr. This fact was also considered duly by the learned lower appellate Court. 1 do not find any material to disturb the finding of the learned lower appellate Court that the appellant did not acquire the right of an occupancy tenant in respect of the suit land. 24. Last contention of Mr. Baruah is that notice to quit and vacate was bad as there was no finding that the tenancy was not according to English calendar month. Form the judgment of the learned trial Court, I find that a specific issue was framed regarding service and validity of the said notice vide issue No. 8. and the learned trial Court after discussing the material on record decided the issue in favour of the respondent. The notice was also considered by the learned lower appellate Court and the learned Court held that 'considering the entire evidence on record, I am constrained to hold that notice is valid and sufficient in law and it has properly been served upon the defendant No. 1. As both the Courts below came to the finding that a valid notice was served, this point, being a question of fact cannot be reagitated in this second appeal. 25. From what has been stated above, I hold that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed, which I hereby do. 26. In the result, appeal is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Interim stay order, if any, stands vacated.