SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under sub-section (4) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Cr. P. C.) is preferred by the complaint in C. C. No. 1717/1986 for leave to appeal against the order of acquittal dated 27-6-1987 passed by the learned J. M. F. C. II court, Hubli. ( 2 ) THE petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent-accused for an offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian penal Code. The case of the petitioner was that the statement made by the respondent accused recorded under Section 313 of the cr. P. C. in Criminal Case No. 1575/1982 on the file of the J. M. F. C. II Court, Hubli, was defamatory and it amounted to defamation of the petitioner in as much as several Counsels were present in the Court and the matter was also discussed outside the Court and as a result thereof his reputation was very much affected as a Counsel and as a person having a status in the society. ( 3 ) THE learned Magistrate has acquitted the accused on two grounds that the statement falls squarely within Exception 9 to section 499 of the I. P. C. ; that it is also protected under sub- section (3) of Section 313 of the Cr. P. C. ( 4 ) THEREFORE, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the order of acquittal is justified on the aforesaid two grounds. ( 5 ) THE facts necessary for the purpose of determining the point raised for determination are not at all in dispute. The Criminal case No. 1575/1982 was lodged against the respondent -accused in this case. The complainant in this case was examined as one of the prosecution witnesses in C. C. 1575/1982. During the course of his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P. C, the respondent -accused herein was asked the following question: kss^fl a^ritta asttajandisojft ?n. The accused answered thus: It is also not in dispute that there was an order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial-Court against the petitioner- complainant and this fact appeared in one issue of 'samyuktha Karnataka' (a daily Kannada news Paper) of the year 1969. A copy of that issue of 'saroyuktha Karnataka' paper is also produced in the case. A copy of that issue of 'saroyuktha Karnataka' paper is also produced in the case. The learned trial-Judge has held that the statement made by the respondent-accused was based upon the press report and there was no evidence adduced to show that the acquittal of the petitioner-complainant by the High Court was either known to the respondent-accused or was published in a news paper. Therefore, learned trial-Judge has held that the statement was made in good faith by the respondent-accused for the protection of his interest, hence it is covered by the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the I. P. C. Accordingly, he has acquitted the respondent-accused. ( 6 ) NINTH Exception to Section 499 of the i. P. C. reads thus:"imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other's interests:- It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good". ( 7 ) THE question for consideration is, whether the statement made by the respondent-accused under Section 313 of the Cr. P. C. containing imputation against the petitioner was in good faith and was for the protection of his interest. ( 8 ) THE petitioner was examined as a prosecution witness and it was with reference to his evidence the accused made his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P. C. The statement made by the accused was in his interest because he was required to defend himself against the charge for which he was tried. ( 9 ) THE next question for consideration is as to whether the statement was made in good faith. P. C. The statement made by the accused was in his interest because he was required to defend himself against the charge for which he was tried. ( 9 ) THE next question for consideration is as to whether the statement was made in good faith. ( 10 ) WHILE dealing with the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the I. P. C. and also the degree and character of proof which the accused is required to furnish in support of his plea, the Supreme Court in HARBHAJAN singh v STATE OF PUNJAB AND another (AIR 1966 S. C. P, 97) has observed thus:"but the question which often arises and has been frequently considered by judicial decisions is whether the nature and exteqt of the onus of proof placed on an accused person who claims the benefit of an Exception is exactly the same as the nature and" extent of the onus placed on the prosecution in a criminal case; and there is consensus of judicial opinion in favour of the view that where the burden of an issue lies upon the accused, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. That, no doubt, is the test prescribed while deciding whether the prosecution has discharged its onus to prove the guilt of the accused; but that is not a test which can be applied to an accused person who seeks to prove substantially his claim that his case falls under an Exception. Where an accused person is called upon to prove that his case falls under an Exception, taw treats the onus as discharged if the accused person succeeds "in proving a preponderance of probability. " As soon as the preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus. It must be remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at all stages of the case, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. " As soon as the preponderance of probability is proved, the burden shifts to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus. It must be remembered that basically, the original onus never shifts and the prosecution has, at all stages of the case, to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As Phipson has observed, when the burden of an issue is upon the accused, he is not, in general, called on to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict of guilty; it is sufficient if he succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability, for then the burden is shifted to the prosecution which has still to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i. e. that of establishing, on the whole case, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This principle of common law is a part of the criminal law in this Country. That is not to say that if an Exception is pleaded by an accused person, he is not required to justify his plea; but the degree and character of proof which the accused is expected to furnish in support of his plea, cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof expected from the prosecution which is required to prove its case". (emphasis supplied) again, in the very same case, while dealing with the question as to what the requirement of good faith means, it has been held thus:"good faith is defined by Section 52 of the Code. Nothing says Section 52, is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention. It will be recalled that under the General Clauses Act, "a thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not. " The element of honesty which is introduced by the definition prescribed by the General clauses Act is not introduced by the definition of the Code; and we are governed by the definition prescribed by section 52 of the Code. So, in considering the question as to whether the appellant acted in good faith in publishing his impugned statement, we have to enquire whether he acted with due care and attention. So, in considering the question as to whether the appellant acted in good faith in publishing his impugned statement, we have to enquire whether he acted with due care and attention. There is no doubt that the mere plea that the accused believed that what he stated was true by itself, will not sustain his case of good faith under the Ninth exception. Simple belief or actual belief by itself is not enough. The appellant must show that the belief in his impugned statement had a rational basis and was not just a blind simple belief. That is where the element of due care and attention plays an important role". ( 11 ) IN the instant case, the respondent-accused has acted in good faith in as much as his statement containing the imputation against the petitioner-complainant as to conviction and sentence of him in a criminal case was on the basis of the report that appeared in a news paper, to which a reference has already been made. A copy of the news paper was also produced in the case. The petitioner complainant was examined as a witness in the case. The statement of the respondent-accused was not voluntary. It was made with reference to the question put to him by the Court under Section 313 of the cr. P. C. as to "whether he had anything more to say. " The respondent accused was required to defend himself against the charge in support of which the petitioner - complainant was examined as a witness and he deposed against the accused. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any evidence to show that the subsequent acquittal of the petitioner - complainant by the High court was either known to the respondent-accused or it appeared in the press, it is not possible to hold that the statement made by the respondent - accused was not in good faith and it was made without due care and attention and that it was not for the protection of his interest. We accordingly hold that the statement of the respondent-accused was covered by the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the I. P. C. ( 12 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, we are also of the view that the statement in question of the respondent-accused is also protected under sub-section (3) of section 313 of the Cr. We accordingly hold that the statement of the respondent-accused was covered by the Ninth Exception to Section 499 of the I. P. C. ( 12 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, we are also of the view that the statement in question of the respondent-accused is also protected under sub-section (3) of section 313 of the Cr. P. C. , which provides that:"the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them". ( 13 ) IN the instant case, as already pointed out, the statement was made by the respondent-accused in answer to the question put to him under Section 313 of the Cr. P. C. It was based upon a report made in the press. ( 14 ) IN PAYINI CHELLAYA [ (1909) 9th criminal Law Journal P. 276] a Division bench of the High Court of Madras opined that statements of a defamatory character made by the accused person in the course of the statement, which he is invited to make under Section 342 of the old Code of criminal Procedure must be considered privileged. Similarly, in MURL1 PATHAK v king EMPEROR (A. I. R. 1927 Allahabad p. 707) it was held that when according to clause (2) of Section 342 of the old Code of criminal Procedure the accused could not be punished for making a false statement in answer to question put to him by the Court. It must be presumed that he had an absolute privilege under Section 342 (2) of the Old code of Criminal Procedure. We agree with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions. ( 15 ) IN the result, we do not find any ground to grant leave. The petition is accordingly rejected. --- *** --- .