JUDGMENT : H.L. Agrawal, C.J. - In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution -of India, the question, which is often repeated, falling for our consideration is as to whether the State Government had the authority to grant the mining lease in question after the expiry of the period fixed by the Central Government in the remand order (Annexure-I). 2. The facts: The Petitioner had made an application on 22-3-1973 to the State Government for grant of mining lease in respect of graphite minerals in villages Hatkot and Ainlapali in the district of Bolangir over an area of 41.91 acres. The State Government having failed to pass any order on the said application within the prescribed period of 12 months under Rule 24 (1) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (for short, "the Rules"), the Petitioner filed a revision on 14-5-1974 before the Central Government u/s 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (for short, "the Act") read with Rules 54 and 55 of the Rules against the order of "demand refusal" of the State Government. The Central Government set aside the order of "demand refusal" by its order dated 10-1-1975 and remitted back the matter to the State Government to consider and pass appropriate orders in the matter by 30-4-1975 after obtaining the approval of the Central Government wherever necessary. The Petitioner was informed of the above result by letter dated 10-1-1975 of the Central Government (Annexure-I). This time also, the State Government made a default and did not dispose of the application within the time limit fixed by the Central Government, i.e., 30-4-1975, and years after sent a letter dated 15-1.1980 to the Petitioner (Annexure-2) proposing,the terms and conditions of the lease. The Petitioner, accepted the same forthwith and the official order granting lease was communicated to him on the very next day, i.e., 16-1-1980 (Annexure-3) in respect of an area of 25 acres only which was available. In the meantime opposite party No. 2 had applied on 20-11-1978 for a similar lease for an area of 43.75 acres in the same villages overlapping the area the Petitioner had applied for. 3. On the facts pleaded in the writ application and the counter affidavit of opposite party No. 1. In the meantime opposite party No. 2 had applied on 20-11-1978 for a similar lease for an area of 43.75 acres in the same villages overlapping the area the Petitioner had applied for. 3. On the facts pleaded in the writ application and the counter affidavit of opposite party No. 1. the further relevant fact brought on record is that the State Government had moved the Central Government for extension of time when it could not carry out the directions in Annexure-2 of disposing of the application by 30-4-1975 which request was disallowed. Thereafter, the State Government passed an order purporting to be under the "demand refusal" and communicated the same to the Collector, Bolangir on 14-2-1977. The Petitioner, however, has asserted that he had no knowledge or information of these movements and therefore, being ignorant of the same, could not take any steps in the matter. 4. At this stage, I may refer to some statements made in the two counter affidavits, one filed by the contesting opposite party No. 2 and the other by the State (opp. party No. 3). It is opposite party No. 2 who has brought on record the details of the intervening developments that took place in the office of opposite party No. 3 after the order of remand. I have already said that opposite party No. 2 had made an application for lease on 20-11-1978. Since the State Government did not dispose of his application within the statutory period, he filed revision before the Central Government on 11-2-1980. The Central Government by order dated 5-3-1980 (Annexure-C/2) set aside the "demand rejection" of the application of opposite party No. 2 and directed the State Government to pass final orders within a period "not exceeding 200 days of the communication of the order failing which the application will be deemed to have been refused. Opposite party No. 2 has also annexed a copy of the order of the Central Government dated 20-10-1978 (Annexure-A/2) refusing the request of the State Government for extending the time for disposal of the Petitioner's application. Similarly, a copy of the order of the State Government of "demand refusal" of the Petitioner's application which was communicated to the Collector, Bolangir, has also been filed as Annexure-B/2, which reads as follows: To The Collector, Bolangir. Similarly, a copy of the order of the State Government of "demand refusal" of the Petitioner's application which was communicated to the Collector, Bolangir, has also been filed as Annexure-B/2, which reads as follows: To The Collector, Bolangir. Sub: Application dt.22-2-1973 of Sri Pravash Chandra Agarwal for M. L. for graphite over an area of 41.91 acres in village Ainlapalli in Bolangir district. Sir, I am directed to refer to the application noted above and to say that the application of Sri P. C. Agarwal for M. L. for graphite in respect of the above noted area having been presented on 22-2-1973 is more than 12 months old and is deemed to have been refused under Rule 24 of the Mineral Concession Rules. 1960. An entry to this effect may be made in the standard Register. No further action is called for. Yours faithfully, Sd. Deputy Secretary to Govt. The stand of opposite party No. 2 on these facts is that the State Government having treated on 14-2-1979 the application of the Petitioner as "dead" by passing the order of "deemed refusal", the subsequent orders dated 15-1-1980 and 16-1-1980 (Annexures-2 and 3 respectively) were invalid, particularly when the Petitioner did not file any revision against the order of deemed refusal before the Central Government and allowed the matter to become final. The State Government had no jurisdiction to pass any order on the application after such a long period of about 3 years. 5. From the facts it is clear that before the revision of opposite party No. 2 could be disposed of by the State Government, the impugned orders were passed in favour of the Petitioner and thus, this opposite party No. 2 feels aggrieved. 6. The main ground of attack to the impugned order by opposite patty No. 2 is evidently the State Government's "Deemed refusal" for the second time. 7. In the counter affidavit filed by opposite party No. 3. it has been stated that the Petitioner had filed an application on 30-10-1979 before the State Government for reconsideration of his application for lease which resulted in the passing of the order dated 16-1-1980 Annexure-3. 7. In the counter affidavit filed by opposite party No. 3. it has been stated that the Petitioner had filed an application on 30-10-1979 before the State Government for reconsideration of his application for lease which resulted in the passing of the order dated 16-1-1980 Annexure-3. The stand of opposite party No. 3 is that the order in Annexure-3 in favour of the Petitioner was passed "after due consideration of his case in the light of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Caurt (W. P. No. 401/87) and that the State Government is still competent to pass the order. A similar view was reiterated by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the unreported decision in S. Lakshminatha Reddy's case which has been referred to in the counter affidavit of apposite party No. 3. I may do well to extract the relevant observations from this judgment. There, the facts and circumstances were very much similar to those in the case in hand. .... In setting aside the first order of the State Government and remanding the matter to the State Government for fresh disposal of the application, the Central Government had no doubt fixed a period of 100 days but that does not mean that after the expiry of the period of 100 days the State Government became functus officio and lost its jurisdiction to dispose of the application far grant of mining lease. The period of 100 days mentioned in the order of the Central Government dated 29-3-1976 was merely indication that it should be disposed of expeditiously. The mere fact that the order passed after the expiry of that period does not render that order once made by an authority lacking jurisdiction nor does such an order an that account became illegal. 8. Opposite party No. . 2 challenged the said grant by the State Government by filing a revision before the Central Government in which the Petitioner was also impleaded as a party-Respondent and the grant In favaur of the Petitioner was set aside by the Central Government by order dated 10-10-1980 (Annexure-5) mainly an the ground that after the expiry of the time limit laid down by the Central Government the State Government would have no jurisdiction to pass orders in the matter". 9. 9. The fallowing questions at once emerge far consideration: (1) What is the effect of the time limit fixed by the Central Government for the State Government .to dispose of the matter while passing the order of remand? (2) Whether the State Government continues to be in seisin of the matter after the expiry of the time limit fixed by the revisional authority and is thus entitled to dispose of the matter? and (3) Is there any remedy for the aggrieved party if the State Government does not dispose of the application within the time limit fixed by the revisional authority and in the event It disposes of subsequently, thereafter? 10. Rule 24 (l) of the Rules has advisedly fixed a time limit for disposal of the application considering the urgency of the matter. 11. Some High Courts, such as Patna High Court in Dey Gupta and Co. Vs. State of Bihar and Another and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the unreported decision of the year 1957 had taken the view that even after the expiry of the statutory period, the State Government does not cease to have jurisdiction over the matter "so as not to pass any order on any application after the lapse of the period from the date of the receipt of the application", The Supreme Court in the case of Nookala Setharamaiah Vs. Kotaiah Naidu and Others overruling the view of the Patna High Court in Dey Gupta's easel has held that the statutory period fixed for disposal of the application was final and not merely for the purpose of enabling the applicant to file revision without waiting for disposal of the application. Under Rule 26 of the Rules inasmuch as after the deemed refusal, the State Government is rendered incompetent to deal with the application any more. 12. The question before us, however, possess a slightly different situation as to the right of the Central Government to fix a time limit for the State Government to dispose of the matter acting as the revisional authority and the effect of the fixation of the time limit. Obviously, it cannot be disputed that the fixation of a time limit unless it is in the mandatory form e. g., where it prescribes a default clause, must be held only to be directly. Obviously, it cannot be disputed that the fixation of a time limit unless it is in the mandatory form e. g., where it prescribes a default clause, must be held only to be directly. I myself have taken this view sitting in a Division Bench in a recent case in Dr. S. Pradhan v. State of Orissa and Anr. 63 (1987) C.L.T. 316. by holding that: Fixation of any time limit by the Central Government for carrying out its direction is only directory in nature and on expiry of the said period, the direction does not lose its force and effect and the State Government cannot be absolved of its responsibility of carrying out the direction of the Central Government under the pretext that the time for compliance of the direction had expired. Such a view is based upon a high public policy as otherwise an unwilling State Government could frustrate all such directions by simply allowing the time to expire fixed by the Central Government for compliance of its direction. I also find that a similar view had been taken by R. N. Misra, C.J. (as he then was) in the case of Jajati Mineral Traders v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1963 Ori 179 : 55 (1983) C.L.T. 193. I also find support for this view in Harish Tara Refactories Private Ltd., Ranchi Vs. State of Bihar and Others. In this case also, the matter was remanded to the State Government with a direction to dispose of the Petitioner's application on merits within 100 days. No order was, however, passed by the State Government within that time and thereafter the Petitioner was informed that on account of the expiry of the period, no order could be passed and that the application for lease stood dismissed. On revision, the Central Government took the same view that the Petitioner's application had stood automatically dismissed. The High Court held that the dismissal of the revision by the Central Government was illegal as the period of 100 days specified in the remand order of the Central Government could not be regarded as the statutory period like that specified in Rule 24 (1) and therefore the application of the Petitioner for grant of lease could not be deemed to have been refused by the State Government. The Central Government was directed to dispose of the revisional application on merits. 13. The Central Government was directed to dispose of the revisional application on merits. 13. A learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kalki Subbarami Reddy Vs. Government of India and Another a decision strongly relied upon by Mr. Das. counsel for the Petitioner, had also an occasion to consider a somewhat similar question. There also, the Central Government directed the State Government to dispose of the application within 100 days treating the failure of the State Government to dispose of the application as amounting to second deemed rejection. But the State Government once again refused to carry out the order of Central Government and therefore, the Petitioner came to the High Court for a direction to the State Government to implement the order passed by the Central Government by executing a lease in his favour. The High Court took the view that the provisions of the law providing for the' fiction of rejection cannot be extended ad infinitum. Taking this view, the learned Judge held that the second revision application was itself incompetent and thus incapable of being mandamused by the High Court, and on the view that the matter was still deemed to be pending before the State Government directed the State Government for disposing of the Petitioner's application. The learned Judge took the said view obviously for the reasons that the revision itself being incompetent, the direction was unenforceable. Otherwise, the Supreme Court has already settled this question in the case of Dharam Chand Jain Vs. The State of Bihar. by stating that the State Government cannot refuse to implement the direction given to it by the Central Government for grant of mining leases. The Andhra Pradesh case was also referred to with approval in Jajati Mineral Traders' case. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has further held that inasmuch as the statute has not contemplated a second deemed rejection, and,has deliberately failed to provide for a revision in such a situation, the Petitioner's second revision and the orders passed by the Central Government were, therefore, null and void. I find myself in respectful agreement with this view. In other words, the State Government will have to pass an order in such a case under Rule 26 of the Rules against which a revision could be tiled before the Central Government. 14. I find myself in respectful agreement with this view. In other words, the State Government will have to pass an order in such a case under Rule 26 of the Rules against which a revision could be tiled before the Central Government. 14. On a circumspection of the provisions of the law and the authorities in the foregoing paragraphs, it must be held that the State Government as well as the Central Government were working under an erroneous impression that the time limit fixed in this case was peremptory in nature and, therefore, by its efflux, the State Government became functus officio. Once this view is taken, and there does not appear any scope for taking any other view, then it must follow as a matter of course that the request of the State Government to the Central Government for extending the time and the purported refusal of the Central Government to extend the said period and then the further acts of the State Government in informing the Collector, Bolangir for treating the application to have been refused were in complete ignorance of the correct position of law and therefore are of no consequence and would not destroy the right of the Petitioner of getting his application considered by the State Government on merits in accordance with law after it was remanded by the Central Government by Annexure-I. In other words, I would lay down that in the remand order (unless it is In peremptory terms), the direction for 'disposal within a limited period was only directory in nature thereby intending that the State Government' shall pass orders on the application expeditiously and not that the orders passed by it beyond the time limit would be without jurisdiction or null and void. It may well be that in case of delay, on being informed, the Central Government may withdraw the case to itself for its disposal, or the Petitioner may move the High Court in writ jurisdiction for directing the State Government to dispose of the matter within a reasonable time or itself fixing a time. It may well be that in case of delay, on being informed, the Central Government may withdraw the case to itself for its disposal, or the Petitioner may move the High Court in writ jurisdiction for directing the State Government to dispose of the matter within a reasonable time or itself fixing a time. In that view of the matter, the State Government was not required to apply for extension of the period fixed in Annexure-I, nor the refusal by the Central Government in Annexure C/2 was of any consequence because the tenor of the remand order passed in the Petitioner's case was not in the same terms as those in the remand older passed in opposite party No. 2's case (Annexure-C/2) and therefore the State Government remained in full seisin of the case. In that view of the matter, the impugned order in Annexure-5 passed by the Central Government setting aside the order granting the lease in favour of the Petitioner being entirely misconceived cannot be sustained in law. 15. The answers to the three questions posed by me therefore would be as follows: (1) The time limit fixed by the Central Government for the State Government to dispose of the Petitioner's application is only directory and not mandatory in nature. In other words the State Government does not become functus officio or lose its jurisdiction to dispose of the application. (2) By fixing a time limit it is only intended that the matter should be disposed of by the State Government expeditiously. But where the remand order imposes any condition, such as the order passed in the case of opposite party No. 2, the above principle would not be applicable and the consequence contemplated in the remand order would become effective giving the aggrieved party a right to move the appropriate authority. (3) If the State Government fails to dispose of the application within the time hmit fixed by the Central Government the latter being the higher authority having revisional powers may recall the matter itself. 16. We have seen that neither in the original order of remand (Annexure-1) nor the subsequent order refusing to extend the limit, the Central Government had imposed any rigorous condition or indicated any consequence for noncompliance and therefore the State Government continued to have jurisdiction as the statutory principle of "deemed refusal" is not attracted at this stage. 16. We have seen that neither in the original order of remand (Annexure-1) nor the subsequent order refusing to extend the limit, the Central Government had imposed any rigorous condition or indicated any consequence for noncompliance and therefore the State Government continued to have jurisdiction as the statutory principle of "deemed refusal" is not attracted at this stage. Since the impugned order of the Central Government (Annexure-5) had been passed on the sole ground that the State Government had become functus officio and no other point was raised before us, the writ application must be allowed. 17. In the result, the writ application succeeds and it is hereby allowed. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, I shall not award any costs to the Petitioner. P.C. Misra, J. 18. I agree. Final Result : Allowed