JUDGMENT Sengupta, J. This appeal is directed against an order dated 22nd June, 1988 passed by Pratibha Bonnerjea, J. dismissing the writ application in limine. In the writ application the petitioner asked for a Writ of Mandamus upon the respondents directing them not to pay the amount alleged to be paid as commission or kick-back or winding up charges to the Swedish Company, Bofors, A. B. sale of arms to India and to deduct the said amount from bill or bills submitted of to be submitted by the said Company to India on account of their sale or arms. An interim order was also asked for on the same terms. 2. In the stay application similar prayer has been asked for. The case of the petitioner is that as a citizen of India he has got the fundamental right to know all facts relevant to the citizens interest regarding the Bofors deal and similar other deals. He has relied on several newspapers reports to establish that payment have been made by way of alleged commission to some middlemen on account of purchase of arms from Swedish Company amounting to 30/40 million U. S. dollars equivalent to 64 crores which must be adjusted against payments to be made by the Government of India to the Swedish Company, Bofors, A B. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that the payment of commission of a huge amount which has admittedly, been paid by the Swedish Company to the middlemen as commission will be ultimately added to the company's price for arms supplied and accordingly the entire amount will necessarily be debited to India and have to be paid out from the exchequer of the Indian Government. As a citizen he is interested to see that the millions of dollars are not drained out of the Indian Exchequer, and the Indian taxpayers are not unnecessarily squeezed. 4. The learned Judge dismissed the writ application by the following order : "This application is wholly based on the Newspaper cuttings end nobody has come forward to say on oath that the news which have come out in the newspapers and which are the subject-matter of this application are true and correct. Therefore, there is no basis for this application. Moreover, the allegations in the petition are all disputed question of facts. Mr. Therefore, there is no basis for this application. Moreover, the allegations in the petition are all disputed question of facts. Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that in this application all the proper and necessary practices have not been added and therefore this application is not maintainable. In view of the fact that this application has been made on the basis of the newspaper cuttings and responsibility as to its authenticity has not been taken by anybody, this application is not maintainable. This court granted leave to Mr. Chatterjee to withdraw his application. Mr. Chatterjee, however, preferred that the Court should dismiss this application on the ground that it is not maintainable. Therefore .this application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs." 5. Before us it has been contended by Mr. A. P. Chatterjee learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that as a citizen of India the petitioner has the right to know about the facts leading to the Bofors deal. If any over payment is made that ultimately be shared by the taxpayers and no one has the right to get 'kick back'. It is also his contention that this application has been moved as a public interest litigation and accordingly this Court should intervene in this matter and ensured that the Government does not drain out the valuable foreign currency. 6. Before we deal with the contentions it may be mentioned that the writ petitioner has made Sri Rajiv Gandhi Prime Minister and Sri K.C. Pant, Minister of Defence as the party respondents being the second and third respondents respectively. We fail to appreciate how the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister could be made party respondents. It is the Cabinet which takes the decision and the Cabinet had collective responsibility. The Prime Minister or the Defence Minister and for that matter each and every Minister are accountable to the Parliament A writ may lie against the Government where the Government takes any action which violates the constitutional provision or the fundamental right of a citizen. It is the Cabinet which takes the decision and the Cabinet had collective responsibility. The Prime Minister or the Defence Minister and for that matter each and every Minister are accountable to the Parliament A writ may lie against the Government where the Government takes any action which violates the constitutional provision or the fundamental right of a citizen. If the payments as alleged had been made, that had been made by the Government of India and it is Union of India who is necessary party to this Writ application and not the Prime Minister or Defence Minister If there be any personal allegations against the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister or any other Minister, he can no doubt he impleaded as party respondent. From the writ petition or from the Stay application as filed in this court we do not find any specific allegations made by the petitioner against either the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister except to the extent indicated hereafter. Whatever the: petitioner has said are based on the newspapers reports. The correctness of those reports have not been admitted by the learned Attorney-General. Before we can direct the Government not to make any payment to the Swedish Company in respect of the arms deals, we have to assume that whetever reports had appeared in the newspapers regarding the Bofors deal are true or substantially correct. In that event we could have made the order as asked for by the writ petitioner. The Court cannot proceed solely on the basis of the newspapers reports to draw inference. 7. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that this is a public interest litigation. He has referred to Bihar Blinding Tragedy where several persons were blinded, the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis of the newspapers reports and on a letter written by the Social Welfare Organisation. As such this case may also be decided by this Court taking it to be a public interest litigation. We do not think that any analogy can be drawn with the blinding case. Firstly in Bihar Tragedy there was direct evidence of the misdeeds of the persons concerned and there could not be any denial of the reports which were published in the newspaper. It was a matter which shocked the conscience of the nation and accordingly Supreme Court intervened in the matter. Firstly in Bihar Tragedy there was direct evidence of the misdeeds of the persons concerned and there could not be any denial of the reports which were published in the newspaper. It was a matter which shocked the conscience of the nation and accordingly Supreme Court intervened in the matter. In this case there are conflicting reports. A Parliamentary Joint Committee was constituted and the Parliamentary Committee did not find anything against the Government. Further materials came out in the newspapers. An enquiry by the C.B.I. was ordered. If upon enquiry it is found that the Government bas not taken any step on the report perhaps a case could have made out for a direction upon the respondents to act on the basis of such reports. At this stage we cannot direct the Government to institute an enquiry when the matter was before the Parliament. If it is a national issue, as it contended in that event it is for the Parliament to take appropriate action in this matter. 8. On 28th July, 1987 the petitioner wrote to the Chief Justice of India to take immediate action in "the matter of such a huge amount of Indian taxpayers" money being drained out of the Indian Treasury by way of commission as "bribe" for the Bofors' arms purchase as well as West German Submarine deal through which some crooked citizens reportedly earned a fortune worth 40 Million dollars or so". 9. The Joint Registrar, Supreme Court by a letter dated 22nd August, 1987 informed the petitioner as follows :- "With reference to your petition dated 28.787 addressed to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, I am directed to inform that a petition of this nature cannot be entertained under the Public Interest Litigation on the basis of a letter petition." 10. It may be that such decision of the Chief Justice of India is purely an administrative decision but it was not entertained under the public interest litigation. The only course open to the petitioner perhaps was to move before the Supreme Court under Article 32, it he was so advised, for redressal of his grievances, if any. 11. Mr. Chatterjee bas relied on a Booklet published by the petitioner containing a, inter alia, various letters written to the Chief Justice of India. In many such letters the impartiality and fairness of judiciary had been questioned. 11. Mr. Chatterjee bas relied on a Booklet published by the petitioner containing a, inter alia, various letters written to the Chief Justice of India. In many such letters the impartiality and fairness of judiciary had been questioned. The judiciary is neither incompetent nor afraid of doing justice and to protect the interest of the citizens of India. But in a democratic set up, the Parliament Judiciary and the Executive play their defined role. What is within the province of the Parliament should not ordinarily be taken ever by the judiciary. Whether any judicial enquiry should be made on foreign arms deals or not cannot be decided by the Court. It is for the Government to decide and it is for the Parliament to highlight and to question if anything contrary to law has been done in the arms deals. 12. Mr. Chatterjee has relied on section 81 of the Evidence Act which provides that "the Court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be the London Gazette or any official Gazelle, or the Government Gazette.........or to be a newspaper or journal........and every document purporting to be a document directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such document is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody". 13. Mr. Chatterjee has relied on a decision in the case of (I) Jeremian v. Vas. 36 M & 4570: 12 IC 961 : 2 MWN 576 where it was contended that section 81 applied to public documents and not newspapers but the Court observed but it is very doubtful whether the language of the section supports it". It was observed that if punctuation may be taken to threw any light on the question, the existence of comma after the word 'Journal' is against the appellant's contention. Even otherwise, the natural import of the words of the section do not appear to favour the view that the phrase "printed by the Queen's Printer", not only qualifies the expression "Private Act of Parliament," but also "newspaper or journal". 14. He has also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) S.N. Balkrishna v. Fernandez reported in AIR 1969 SC 1201 . That was a Case under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 where the allegation was made that the successful candidate resorted to corrupt practice. 14. He has also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) S.N. Balkrishna v. Fernandez reported in AIR 1969 SC 1201 . That was a Case under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 where the allegation was made that the successful candidate resorted to corrupt practice. There the election petition was accompanied by four annexures which were extracts from newspapers on which the charge corrupt practices was based. In that context, the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "A news item without any further proof of what had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at best a second-hand secondary evidence. It is well-known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who edits the news item and then publishes it. In this process the truth might get perverted or garbled. Such news item cannot' be said to prove themselves although they may be taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence is forcible." 15. It is the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the petitioner had adduced not only the newspaper reports but also facsimile reproductions of the invoices, bank statements relating to pay-offs by Bofors. These facsimiles are not edited and obviously exact copies of the documents they represent. These facsimiles have been published in the Hindu dated June 22 and June 23, 1988 copies whereof were submitted to Court. These facsimiles are evidence of a 'forcible' nature and, in the words of the Supreme Court, news items may be taken into account along with forcible evidence. 16. He has also referred to a decision in the case (3) Hasanall v. Dara Shah reported in AIR 1949 Nagpur 282. In that case in the suit the admissibility of a catalogue was challenged on the ground that the statements in it were hearsay and that unless the sellers or the manufacturers were called the catalogue could not be admitted. The question at issue was the price of an article supplied by the manufacture hirer. In that context, the Division Bench held as follows: "As regards the catalogue, it is not, in our opinion, heresay. It is a statement put out by the sellers regarding the price at which they are prepared to sell. The question at issue was the price of an article supplied by the manufacture hirer. In that context, the Division Bench held as follows: "As regards the catalogue, it is not, in our opinion, heresay. It is a statement put out by the sellers regarding the price at which they are prepared to sell. If A walks into a shop and asks the shop-keeper the price at which he is prepared to sell a particular article his answer to A is not hearsay, and when A enters the box and tells us what the shop-keeper told him, he gives direct evidence of a relevant fact. So also, if instead of giving an oral answer the shop-keeper had replied in writing his letter would not be hearsay and it could be proved by. A who received it. Similarly when a firm broad-casts a catalogue of its prices that is only variation of a letter embodies the statement of the firm regarding the price at which it is prepared to sell its articles. Any person who receives the catalogue can prove it and thus prove the statement made by the firm regarding the price al which it is prepared to sell." 17. The point arose in the Supreme Court of the United States in (4) Cliquot v. United States, 3 Wall 114. The question at issue was the price of Cliquot's champagne. A witness entered the box and said that when he went to enquire about the prices at a certain firm in Paris he was handed a current price list, and he produced this list in evidence. Its admissibility was objected to on the same grounds as here. The Court held at p. 141 :- "We think the price-current is not liable to the objection that it was hearsay. It was prepared and used by the party who furnished it in the ordinary course of his business. It is as little liable to that objection as the entries in the books of the dealer, or his answers to the inquiries of a witness ........................ It was prepared and used by the party who furnished it in the ordinary course of his business. It is as little liable to that objection as the entries in the books of the dealer, or his answers to the inquiries of a witness ........................ It was clearly relevant what effect it should have, in connection with the other evidence adduced by the parties, was a question for the jury." The Court also said :- "While Courts, in the administration of the law of evidence, should be careful not to open the door to falsehood, they should be equally careful not to shut out truth. They should not encumber the law with rules which will involve labour and expense to the parties, and delay the progress of the remedy-itself a serious evil without giving any additional safe-guard to the interest of justice." 18. Mr. Chatterjee has also relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (5) Pratap Singh Kairon v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 , wherein tape recorded evidence was accepted, though the Court cautioned that weight to be given to such evidence will depend on the other factors which must be established in a particular case. 19 Mr. Chatterjee contends that in the instant Case Swedish Radio Broadcast has been transcribed and quoted at page 23 of the Bengali Book entitled "Bofors Kaman German Submarine Switzerland" by Murari Ghosh and DIlip Chakraborty according to which "............that an agreement exists between A.B. Bofors and................. (portion smudged............concerning the settlement of can mission subsequent to the FH 77 deal and the considerable amounts have been paid to, among others, A.B. Bofors previous agent in India". In Pratap Singh Kairon the Supreme Court accepted the tape recorded convention genuine evidence on the ground. "In the counter affidavit filed by the State there was no denial of the genuineness of the tape records, no assertion that the voices of the persons which were recorded in the tape-records were not those which they Purport to be or that any portions of the conversation which would have given a different colour to it had been cut off.” 20. Mr. Mr. chatterjee further contends that in this case the Union of India did not choose to give any affidavit-in-opposition to the petition and accordingly the Attorney-General's ipse dixit that the newspapers reports are not correct should not be given any importance 21. We are unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Chatterjee. Section 81 no doubt declares that Government Gazettes or newspapers or journals or copies of Private Acts of Parliament to be primo facie poof of their genuineness. We fail to see how does it advance the case of the petitioner. Section 81 has on application to the facts of this case. Even if newspapers are admissible in evidence without formal proof, the paper itself is not proof of its contents. It would merely amount to an anonymous statement and cannot be treated as proof of the facts stated in the newspaper. The statement of a fact in a newspaper is merely hearsay and is inadmissible in the absence of the maker of the statement deposing to have perceived the fact reported. The Supreme Court in S.L. Balkrishna (Supra), held that news item cannot be said to prove themselves although they may be taken into account will other evidence in the other evidence is forcible. A fact bas first to be alleged and proved and than newspaper reports can be taken in support of it but not independently. In this case, as we have indicated, there are no proved facts. Furthermore, the reports have not been accepted by the Government to contain any truth. On the contrary, after we have heard this matter, news items appeared contradicting some of those reports relied on by Mr. Chatterjee. In this state of affair we cannot take into account the new, item for the purpose of deciding the issued raised. We do not far a moment suggest that this Court is powerless to Book into or take into account the newspaper reports in drawing inference. However, this will depend on the facts of case. In the instant case we cannot persuade .ourselves to draw inference solely on the newspaper reports. We could have drawn inference had the primary fact been undisputed. However, this will depend on the facts of case. In the instant case we cannot persuade .ourselves to draw inference solely on the newspaper reports. We could have drawn inference had the primary fact been undisputed. Where reports are controversial where there is divergence of opinion, where there is lot of deliberation on the truth as correctness or otherwise of the reports, where Parliamentary Joint Committee had to be constituted to find out the truth behind such reports which comes to a finding that the reports are not correct, in these circumstances the Court Cannot proceed on the basis of the newspapers reports. There is no direct evidence in support of the allegations made. The petitioner has stated that in a case like this direct evidence is not possible. but in a matter like this unless any direct evidence and some proved facts are before this Court justifying the averments made in the petition, the Court cannot solely on the basis of the reports published in the newspapers and journals direct the Government either to constitute a Committee to investigate or effect the Government not to pay the bills submitted or to be submitted by the Swedish Company. 22. The main idea behind this petition is to get an order from this Court for investigation into the allegation appearing in the newspapers which cannot he made by this Court. The court is not powerless to appoint a Committee or Commission as has been done by the Supreme Court or by this Court or by this Court, but the question is having regard to the fact that the Government appointed a Parliamentary Joint Committee who had since submitted its report, whether the court can still appoint an Enquiry Committee to investigate into the allegations made in the newspapers reports and journal. Our answer is clearly in the negative. If a Committee or Commission is constituted by the Court, it would amount to allowing the petitioner to assail the report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee indirectly which the petitioner could not do directly. We cannot loose our decision on unsubstantiated evidence and we are not prepared to draw any inference; from the reports of the newspapers which are highly controversial and are not substantiated by any evidence. A conjecture, surmise or suspicion cannot take the place of proof. We cannot loose our decision on unsubstantiated evidence and we are not prepared to draw any inference; from the reports of the newspapers which are highly controversial and are not substantiated by any evidence. A conjecture, surmise or suspicion cannot take the place of proof. In a democratic set up when Parliament has taken up the responsibility and when the said Committee appointed for investigating into the matter bad submitted a report, the validity of such report cannot be questioned in this Court. 23. Mr. Chatterjee has relied on a judgment in the case of (6) United States v. ACME Process Equipment Co. reported in United States Supreme Court Reports 17 Lawyers Edition Page 250, That case was under the Anti Kickback Act, 1946. There the court held :- "Acme argues, however, that the express provision for recovery of kickbacks is enough to protect the Government from increased costs attributable to them. But this argument Casts on two false assumptions. The first is that kickbacks can easily be detected and recovered. This is hardly the case. Kickbacks being made criminal means that they must be made, if at all, in secrecy. Though they necessarily inflate the price to the Government, this inflation is rarely detectable. This is particularly true as regards defence contracts where the products involved-are not usually found on the commercial market and where there may not be effective competition. Such contracts are generally negotiated and awarded without formal advertising and competitive bidding, and there is often no opportunity to compare going prices with the price negotiated by the Government. Kickbacks will usually not be discovered, if at all, until after the prime contract is let. The sec0nd false assumption underlying Acme's argument is that the increased cost to the Government is necessarily equal to the amount of the kickback which is recoverable of course, a sub-contractor who must pay a kickback is likely to include the amount of the kickback in his contract price. But this is not all. A subcontractor who anticipates obtaining a sub-contract by virtue of a kickback bas little incentive to stint on his cost estimates. Since he plans to 0btdin the sub-contract without regard to the economic merits of his proposals, he will be tempted to inflate that proposal by more than the amount of the kickback. But this is not all. A subcontractor who anticipates obtaining a sub-contract by virtue of a kickback bas little incentive to stint on his cost estimates. Since he plans to 0btdin the sub-contract without regard to the economic merits of his proposals, he will be tempted to inflate that proposal by more than the amount of the kickback. And even if the Government could isolate and recover the inflation attributable to the kickback, it would still be saddled with a sub-contractor who, having obtained the job other than on merit, is perhaps entirely unreliable in other ways. This unreliability in turn undermines the security of the prime contractor's performance a result which the public cannot tolerate, especially where, as here, important defence contracts are involved, In (7) United States v. Missisippi Vole) Co., 364 US 520, 563,5 L ed 2d 268, 296, 81 S Ct. 294, the Court recognized that" a statute frequently implies that a contract is not to be enforced when it arises out of circumstances that would lead enforcement to offend the essential purpose of the enactment. The Court there approved the cancellation of a Government contract for violation of the conflict-of-interest statute on the ground that" the sanction of non-enforcement is consistent with and essential to effectuating the public policy embodied in the statute. Ibid. We think the same thing Can be said about cancellation here. The court of claims in holding that the Anti-Kickback Act does not authorise government cancellation because of its violation distinguished Mississippi Valley Co. on the ground that the Anti-Kickback Act, unlike the conflict-of-interest statute provides a civil as well as a criminal remedy. But we do not deem the provision of a civil remedy in the Anti-Kickback Act decisive. Where there is a mere conflict of interest, no concrete monetary may have been received or paid which the Government can recover in a civil action. But where there is commercial in the form of a Kickback, there is something specific which the Government can recover, and hence it was quite natural for Congress to provide this express remedy. There is absolutely no indication in the legislative history of the Anti-Kickback Act that Congress, in providing a civil remedy for a more tangible evil, intended to preclude other civil sanctions necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act". 24. There is absolutely no indication in the legislative history of the Anti-Kickback Act that Congress, in providing a civil remedy for a more tangible evil, intended to preclude other civil sanctions necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act". 24. Before we part with this case we must refer to paragraph 25 of the Stay Petition which is verbatim reproduction of paragraph 25 of the Writ petition. The said paragraph is as follows:- "That your petitioner having observed the past years the style of corruption and the nature of ruling "Gandhi Family", and the way the premiers of that family had been taking bribe and trying to launder their family wealth through highly questionable sources, that were nothing hut bogus firms acting as front organisations of the notorious C. I. A. and some European States, finally decide to apprise the general public about the facts that were known to him but remained mostly unknown in India, by writing a brief but exhaustive letter to the Editor, which he did on April 29, 1988 and the "letter" appeared in The Statesman on May 7, 1988". 25. The said paragraph is verified by the petitioner true to his knowledge. It is indeed surprising that such allegations of "style of corruption and the way the premiers of that family have taken bribe" could be verified true to his knowledge. The statements made in paragraph 25 are not only reckless hut irresponsible. Had it been to the knowledge of the petitioner he could have adduced evidence in support of the allegations? We record cur grave disapproval, the manner in which the petitioner made the allegations which could not be true to the knowledge of the petitioner. If a citizen has a right to get justice from the Court he has corresponding duty to show respect to the democratic institutions. 26. In our judgment the writ application is misconceived and was rightly dismissed by the learned Judge. We shall, however observe that the learned Attorney-General his usual fairness submitted that C.B.I. has been entrusted with the investigation into the truth or otherwise of the allegations appearing in the newspaper reports after the Parliamentary Joint Committee had submitted ifs report. 26. In our judgment the writ application is misconceived and was rightly dismissed by the learned Judge. We shall, however observe that the learned Attorney-General his usual fairness submitted that C.B.I. has been entrusted with the investigation into the truth or otherwise of the allegations appearing in the newspaper reports after the Parliamentary Joint Committee had submitted ifs report. If the petitioner is so advised he will be at liberty to place materials, if any to the C.B.I and the C B I shall take into those materials into consideration in conducting the investigation as directed by the Government. 27. For the reasons aforesaid, this application fails and is dismissed. The stay application is also dismissed in view of the reckless and irresponsible allegations made in the application particularly in paragraph 25 of the petition as well as contemptuous allegations made against judiciary and Judges in the booklet, "Indira-CIA-RAJIV" we direct the petitioner to pay costs assessed at 100 Gms. to be paid to the Rural Cancer Society within a week from date. It is recorded that Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents has submitted that he has no objection to the costs being paid to the Rural Cancer Society. Let the Memorandum of Appeal be kept on record. Yusuf, J. : I agree.