K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application dt. 2-9-88 under S. 482, Cr. P. C. 1973 (for short 'the Code') for quashing the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 182 of 1981 under Ss. 147 and 323. IPC pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class Indore. ( 2 ) THE application has been made on the ground that the aforesaid criminal case was filed in the year 1978 and during all these years not a single witness for the prosecution has been examined though the learned trial Court had been issuing warnings and instructions for production of evidence. ( 3 ) THE submission of the petitioner's learned counsel is that the pendency of a criminal case against a person involves curtailment of his liberty and delay in the trial of the case unless it is occasioned due to the fault of the accused or due to exceptional reasons, has to be characterised as violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India which guarantees speedy trial. It is contended that in the circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice that the same is dropped. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the State has opposed the application. ( 5 ) THE point for consideration is whether the application deserves to be allowed. ( 6 ) IN relation to Art. 21 of the Constitution on which the learned counsel for the petitioner relies this is what has been observed in Hussainara's case. AIR 1979 SC 1360 . "a procedure prescribed by law for depriving a persons of his liberty cannot be reasonable, fair or must unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial, can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Art. 21. There can therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Act. 21. There can therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Act. 21. "in the decision in Maneka Gandhi's, AIR 1978 SC 597 with reference to Art. 21 of the Constitution, it has been held that the 'procedure prescribed by law' contemplated therein has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred in a given situation and must ex-hypothesi, it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14 which guaranteed equality therefore law. It has been pointed out that principle of reasonableness which is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Art. 14 and the procedure contemplated under Art. 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Art. 14 Reference has also been made to the principle of Audi Alteram Partem which mandates that on one shall be condemned unheard, and is a part of the rules of natural justice. In this very connection the decision in Sheikh Salim's, 1985 Jab LJ 28 may also be profitably perused. What may be termed a reasonable period may no doubt vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 7 ) IN the decision in Sheela Barse's case, 1986 Cur Cri J 249 (SC) it has been held that right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Art. 21 of the Constitution and the consequence of its violation would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in branch of the fundamental right. The case relates to delinquent child and six months' period or inquiry under the Bal Adhiniyam 1970 was held proper. Therein it has also been observed that total inadequacy of strength of the Presiding Officers of Courts is one of the primary reasons why trials of criminal case are delayed. In the decision in Suk Das's case, 1986 Cur Cri J 165 it has been held that in certain circumstances right to free legal assistance at State cost is the fundamental right under the Article and that the Magistrate or the Judge is under obligation to inform the accused about the same. In the decision in Suk Das's case, 1986 Cur Cri J 165 it has been held that in certain circumstances right to free legal assistance at State cost is the fundamental right under the Article and that the Magistrate or the Judge is under obligation to inform the accused about the same. In the circumstances of the case it was also held that it was in the interact of justice that no fresh trial should be held. ( 8 ) IN this very connection reference to the decision in F. B. decision in Madheshwar Dharis case, AIR 1986 Pat 324 is pertinent. It also makes an illuminating reading on the right of speedy trial. The following observations are apposite :-"laying down of an outer time limit to concretise the right to speedy public trial is envisioned both by principle and precedent. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violated the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Art. 21. Unless the fundamental right to speedy trial is to be whittled down into a mere pious wish, its enforceability in court at least be indicated by an outer limit which in investigation and the trial in a criminal prosecution may ordinarily extend. Holding otherwise should be merely paying tip twice to a precious right whilst denuding it of the benefits of the actual enforceability. "reference may also be usefully made to the decisions in Herald Stephen's case, 1988 0 Crlr 147 and Gajraj Singh's, 1988 0 Jablj 483. ( 9 ) I am aware that in the decision in V. K. Agarwal's, AIR 1988 SC 1106 which relates to the Customs Act and Gold (Control) Act it has been observed thus on the question of delay in the trial :-"the fact that 20 years have elapsed since the date of the seizure of gold under Customs Act 1962 and Gold (Control) Act 1968 (Nov. 15, 1968) would be no ground for not proceeding further with the matter inasmuch as the offence in question was a serious economic offence which undermines the entire economy of the Nation. 15, 1968) would be no ground for not proceeding further with the matter inasmuch as the offence in question was a serious economic offence which undermines the entire economy of the Nation. The delay occasioned in the working of the judicial system by the ever increasing work load cannot be the ground for justifying the delay. "it may be stated that observations have been made in the circumstances of that particular case and the same cannot be urged as covering cases of the present sort. ( 10 ) IN the decision in Mohd. Hanifs case, 1986 (ii) MPWN 65 it has been pointed out that though justice has got to be administered according to law, the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law and the amplitude of the inherent powers under S. 482 of the Code as the words nothing in the Code used in the Section disclose, is not affected even by S. 397 ibid regarding bar of revision. In any of the three situations contemplated in S. 482 of the Code the inherent powers these under designed to achieve a salutary public purpose may be invoiced irrespective of the label of the petition. ( 11 ) ON a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the delay in the trial which cannot be traced to any fault on the part of the petitioner or to any exceptional reason has to be held as violative of the petitioner's fundamental right implicit in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. ( 12 ) IN the result, the application for the foregoing reasons succeeds and is allowed. The proceedings in the aforesaid criminal case are quashed. Application allowed. .