ORDER K. K. Varma, J. 1. This order is about the applicant's second bail application filed in this Court on 4-8-1988 under section 439 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. The first bail application (filed in this Court on 27-4-1988 and registered as Misc. Cr. Case No. 404/1988 was dismissed as withdrawn on 23-6-1988 after the arguments had been heard. 3. On 24-10-87 one Purshottam lodged a report at P. S. Antri at 10.15 a.m. alleging that an unlawful assembly consisting of seven persons (including the applicant) beat up Mahadeo, the first-informant himself, Devendra and Ramashankar. Ramashankar died from his injuries a few hours after lodging of the report. 4. Accused Santosh and Rameshwar were arrested on 25-10-87. Accused Ramswaroop, Munshilal and Damodar were arrested on 2-11-87. Accused Brijesh and applicant Anand Kumar were arrested on 13-11-87 when they were on production before the Judicial Magistrate, Dabra ordered by him to be detained in the Central Jail, Gwalior pending further investigation and to be produced in his Court on 23-11-87. 5. Admittedly, the applicant was not produced before the Magistrate on 23-11-87 but the warrant of his commitment was produced. After recording the aforementioned facts in the order-sheet, the Magistrate recorded the fact of the applicant's absence on the warrant and signed that endorsement and an order for the production of the applicant in his Court on 7-12-87 granted the application of the police for time to file charge sheet. 6. Again, on 7-12-87 the applicant was not produced in the Court, but his Warrant was produced. The Magistrate repeated the self same procedure on 7-12-87, directing the production of the applicant in his Court ordering the filing of the charge-sheet on 15-12-87. 7. On 15-12-87 the applicant was not produced before the Magistrate instead his warrant was produced. On it the Magistrate endorsed the order for production of the applicant before him on 29-12-87. On 15-12-87 itself the charge-sheet was filed. The case was registered and serially numbered as 530/87, and copies of the charge-sheet and the connected papers were given to counsel of the accused persons in Court. 8. On 23-12-87 the Magistrate sent the record of the committal case to the Court of Session. Gwalior on the requisition No. 3223 dated 22-12-87 for disposal of Bail Application No. 3392/87 fixed for 24-12-87. 8. On 23-12-87 the Magistrate sent the record of the committal case to the Court of Session. Gwalior on the requisition No. 3223 dated 22-12-87 for disposal of Bail Application No. 3392/87 fixed for 24-12-87. (This application was disposed of by the Sessions Judge, Gwalior on 17-2-88.) 9. On 29-12-87, the applicant was not produced before Magistrate; the warrant was produced. It was noticed in the order sheet that the record of the committal case had not been received. The Magistrate endorsed an order for production of the accused in his Court on 12-1-1988. 10. On 12-1-88 the applicant was produced in Court. The order sheet recites that the record of the committal case had not been received from the Court of Session. Shri G. K. Sharma, Advocate filed his power for the applicant. The applicant was remanded to the jail custody with a direction for his production before the Court on 27-1-88. 11. On 27-1-88 the applicant was produced before the Magistrate. The order sheet recites that the record of the committal case had not been received from the Court of Session. 12. The applicant was not produced before the Court on 9-2-88. An Assistant Jailor of the Central Jail, Gwalior endorsed on the jail warrant that the applicant could not be produced in Court owing to his illness; this endorsement was supported by the sick certificate dated 9-2-88 of the jail doctor. The Magistrate made an endorsement for production of the accused before him on 23-2-88. The order sheet recites that the record of the committal case had not been received from the Court of Session. 13. On 23-2-88 the applicant was not produced. The order sheet recites that the record of the committal case had not been received from the Court of Session. On 8-3-88, 24-3-88, 7-4-88 and 27-4-88, the applicant was not produced in Court. The warrant of the applicant was received on all dates except 22-4-88. 14. On 3-5-88 the record of the committal case was again sent back to the Court of Session on its requisition dated 28-4-88 for disposal of a bail application fixed for hearing on 4-5-88. 15. The applicant was not produced before the Magistrate on 1-7-88 and 15-7-88 but his warrants were sent up and duly endorsed for his production on the next dates of hearing. 15. The applicant was not produced before the Magistrate on 1-7-88 and 15-7-88 but his warrants were sent up and duly endorsed for his production on the next dates of hearing. At this stage it was urged that the applicant's second bail application will be filed in the High Court on 4-8-1988. The absence of the applicant on the aforementioned dates were referred to at paragraph 4 of the bail application. 16. Incidentally, the applicant was released on 4-6-88 by the Sessions Judge, Gwalior on a temporary bail upto 15-6-88 to allow him to appear in the obsequies in his family. He surrendered before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior who issued a warrant of commitment of the applicant and sent it to the Gwalior Jail with a direction to produce the applicant before the Judicial Magistrate First Class. Dabra on 1-7-88. 17. It appears that the applicant was not produced before the committing Magistrate on 11-8-1988 and 25-8-88. On these dates the record of the committal Court which had been sent to the Court of Session, Gwalior on 28-7-89 had not been received, at all events before the signing of the order sheet date 25-8-88 at 12.30 p m On 7-9-88 the applicant was not produced before the Court. Counsel of the accused persons was in attendance. Arguments of commitment were heard and the case was committed to the Court of Session on 7-9-1988. 18. On l-9-88 the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Gwalior submitted a report to this Court about the non-production of the applicant. It was stated therein that the jail authorities had requisitioned for the police guard from the Reserve Inspector, Gwalior and whenever no police guard had been sent to the jail, a warrant of the applicant had been sent to the Magistrate without the applicant. This report was expressed to be based on the entries in the Peshi Register of the Jail. 19. It may be mentioned that the applicant has had at no time during the hearing controverted the reasons given by the jail authorities (based on their records) for the non-production of the applicant before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dabra. 20. This report was expressed to be based on the entries in the Peshi Register of the Jail. 19. It may be mentioned that the applicant has had at no time during the hearing controverted the reasons given by the jail authorities (based on their records) for the non-production of the applicant before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dabra. 20. All this background has been set out to appreciate the contention of the applicant's learned counsel that the applicant's custody has become illegal and invalid on account of the non-production of the applicant before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dabra on several dates of hearing and that the learned Magistrate had not applied his mind to the reasons for non-production of the applicant and also whether the reason, if any, was sufficient for non-production. 21. The applicant's learned counsel bas relied on Raghabendra Singh v. State of U. P. 1976 Cr. LJ 1782 (All.) Izhar Ahmed v. State 1978 Cr. LJ 58 (All), Manohari v. State of Rajasthan 1983 Cr. LJ 1231 (Raj.) and Subhash v. State 1988 JLJ 444 = 1988 MPLJ 508 . 22. The first point for determination is whether the applicant's custody has become invalid in the fact-situation outlined above and in the light of the submissions made by the applicant's learned counsel. 23. I begin by looking up the law declared by the Supreme Court. 24. Ram Narain Singh v. The State of Delhi AIR 1953 SC 277 , the Court allowed a habeas corpus petition of four persons, arrested on the evening of 6-3-53 for an offence punishable under section 188 I.P.C. The A.D.M. Delhi allegedly passed remand order later that evening. On 9-3-53 another Magistrate, the trying Magistrate allegedly endorsed remand orders on the jail warrants, reading: "Remanded to judicial till 11-3-53". The jail warrants were handed over to the Registrar of the Supreme Court after the Court had risen for the day. The order sheet, however, merely directed the adjournment of the case till 11-3-53. The Supreme Court observed in their final order: "We cannot take notice of documents produced in such circumstances, and we are not satisfied that there was any warrant of remand committing the accused to further custody till 11th March." 25. The order sheet, however, merely directed the adjournment of the case till 11-3-53. The Supreme Court observed in their final order: "We cannot take notice of documents produced in such circumstances, and we are not satisfied that there was any warrant of remand committing the accused to further custody till 11th March." 25. Thus, the Supreme Court treated the case as one of absence of any order of remand: This was how the ruling was interpreted in 'Rajnarain v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Delhi AIR 1971 SC 178 at paragraph 6. Thus; Ram Narain Singh's case does not advance the applicant's plea. 26. It was pointed out in the ruling that it was a case where the trying Magistrate was obviously proceeding (on 9-3-53) under section 344 Cr. P. C. which required him to remand by warrant the accused, if in custody. The Supreme Court, therefore, held in effect that the provisions of section 344 Cr. P. C. were applicable and the provisions of the remand therein were not complied with by the Magistrate. In fact in Rajnarain's ease [6] it was observed that Ram Narain Singh's case [5] dealt with an adjournment under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure........ ........ 27. In 'Rajnarain v. Superintendent, Central Jail Delhi [6], Shri Rajnarain M. P. was arrested on August 20,1970 under sections 107/117 Cr. P. C. and was remanded to jail custody till August 28,1970 under warrant issued by the City Magistrate, Lucknow. A habeas corpus petition was moved in the Supreme Court. The Court ordered the production of Shri Rajnarain before itself. 28. During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding, the Superintendent, Central Jail, Delhi informed the Court at 4.00 p. m. that Shri Rajnarain's remand was to expire at mid-night and that he would not be able to detain Mr. Raj Narain after the mid-night. This was with reference to the Court order passed on 27-8-70 which runs as follows: "Shri Raj Narain's petition is not to be listed to-morrow and he is not to be produced in Court to-morrow. He may, however, be kept in Delhi." 29. The Court passed an order on 28-8-70. The order ended thus....... "... ....he (Mr. This was with reference to the Court order passed on 27-8-70 which runs as follows: "Shri Raj Narain's petition is not to be listed to-morrow and he is not to be produced in Court to-morrow. He may, however, be kept in Delhi." 29. The Court passed an order on 28-8-70. The order ended thus....... "... ....he (Mr. Raj Narain) shall be remanded back to the custody to which he belongs and that he may be taken to U. P., if so desired, to be produced before us on the next date of hearing to be fixed in this case. If the fresh remand order is not received by the Superintendent of the Jail by mid-night the petitioner shall not be detained as directed by this Court, and he shall be set at liberty at mid-night." (Emphasis supplied.) 30. On the same day, the District Magistrate, Lucknow sent a wireless message to the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Delhi, informing him that Shri Raj Narain had been remanded to further jail custody upto 1-9-70 under orders of C. M. Lucknow passed on 28-8-70, with a direction to take a note in the jail warrant and inform the prisoner accordingly. It was contended on behalf of Raj Narain that the remand order passed behind his back was illegal and he was entitled to be released. The Supreme Court repelled this contention. The Court observed at paragraph 7 as follows: "....There is nothing ill the law which required his personal presence before the Magistrate because that is a rule of caution for Magistrates before granting remands at the instance of the police. However, even if it be desirable for the Magistrates to have the prisoner produced before them, when they recommit him to further custody, a Magistrate can act only as the circumstances permit him." (Emphasis supplied.) 31. At para 8 the Court went to state the rationale of the pronouncement contained in the last sentence of the portion extracted above. "........To expect the Magistrate to do more under section 344 of the Code in such circumstances is to expect an impossibility from him and the law does not contemplate an impossibility.. ..- ........... "(Emphasis supplied.) 32. In A. Lakshmanrao v. Judl. Magistrate Parvatipuram AIR 1971 SC 186 the petitioner was arrested on 17th July 1970. "........To expect the Magistrate to do more under section 344 of the Code in such circumstances is to expect an impossibility from him and the law does not contemplate an impossibility.. ..- ........... "(Emphasis supplied.) 32. In A. Lakshmanrao v. Judl. Magistrate Parvatipuram AIR 1971 SC 186 the petitioner was arrested on 17th July 1970. He was produced before the Judicial Magistrate on 18th July 1970 on an accusation under sections 120-B.121-A 122 read with sections 302 and 395 I.P.C. Remands were extended from time to time. However, on 20th August 1970 he was not produced before the Magistrate because of want of escort and the order of remand was made in his absence. The petitioner claimed that his custody in pursuance of the order dated 20th August had become invalid because he was not produced before the Court. 33. The Court repelled this plea referring to the judgment in Shri Raj Narain's case (supra). 34, It was pointed out that the remand order dated 20th August appropriately fell in the ambit of section 344 Cr. P. C., and, that such an order could be validly passed in the absence of the accused when it was not physically possible to produce him in custody in Court. 35. In Gaurishankar v. State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 711 the law declared in Raj Narain's case (supra) was relied on. In this case also the remand orders were passed in the absence of the accused person. In Gaurishankar's case the Court observed as follows: "Those orders could be passed validly in his absence if his presence at the time could not be secured." 36. In Gauri Shankar's case the petitioner has contended that the remand orders of the Magistrate were under section 167 and not under Section 344. This contention was repelled by the Court at paragraph 12 in the following terms: "Thus, section 167 operates at a stage when a person is arrested and either an investigation has started or is yet to start, but is such that it cannot be completed within 24 hours. Section 344, on the other hand, shows that investigation has already begun and sufficient evidence has been obtained raising a suspicion that the accused person may have committed the offence and further evidence may be obtained, to enable the police to do which a remand to jail custody is necessary. Section 344, on the other hand, shows that investigation has already begun and sufficient evidence has been obtained raising a suspicion that the accused person may have committed the offence and further evidence may be obtained, to enable the police to do which a remand to jail custody is necessary. The fact that section 344 occurs in the Chapter dealing with inquiries and trials does not mean that it does not apply to cases in which the process of investigation and collection of evidence is still going on. That is clear from the very language of sub-section (1-A) under which the magistrate has the power to postpone the commencement of the inquiry or trial. That would be the stage prior to the commencement of the inquiry or trial which would be the stage of investigation. (See A. Lakshamanrao v. Judicial Magistrate ( AIR 1971 SC 186 ). Therefore, it is not as if the stage at which the Magistrate passed the remand orders was still the stage when section 167 applied and not section 344. The decision of the Orissa High Court in Artatran v. State of Orissa AIR 1956 Orissa 129 to the effect that section 344 does not apply at the stage of investigation and can apply only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of and issued processes or warrant for the production of the accused if he is not produced before him cannot, in view of A. Lakshamanrao's case, be regarded as correct. The power under section 344 can be exercised even before the submission of the charge-sheet C.f. Chandradip v. State (1955 BLJR 323), and Ajit Singh v. State 1970 Cri LJ 1075=AIR 1970 Delhi 154, that is, at the stage when the investigation is still not over................" 37. The law declared in Raj Narain's case (supra) was also followed in M. Sambasiv Rao v. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 850 . In it, the petitioner who stood detained in committal proceedings (relating to offence of conspiracy, murder, abduction etc.) on remand orders passed by the Magistrate in his absence, had challenged the validity of his subsequent detention in the aforementioned fact-situation. 38. In S. K. Dey v. Officer-In-Charge, Sakchi P. S. AIR 1974 SC 871 the view held in Raj Narain case (supra) was folio Ned. 38. In S. K. Dey v. Officer-In-Charge, Sakchi P. S. AIR 1974 SC 871 the view held in Raj Narain case (supra) was folio Ned. In this case the accused had been transferred to another jail in connection with another case and also for reasons of security and that is why he could not be produced in the Jamshedpur Court which had passed the orders of his remand in his absence. 39. In State of U. P. v. Lakshmi Brahman [l], it was held that the proceeding before a committing Magistrate is an enquiry. Then the Court want on to say at paragraph 13 : "... if it is an inquiry, during the period, the inquiry is completed, section 309 (2) would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody.... ..." 40. The provisions of section 309 (2) Cr. P. C. 1973 are substantially the same as those in sub• section (1A) of section 344 Cr. P. C , 1898, concerning the power of a Court to remand accused in custody, while adjourning or postponing the case. 41. To draw the threads together, the petitioners in the aforementioned Supreme Court judgments did not challenge the validity of their initial committal into custody at the hands of the Magistrate but challenge was to the validity of recommitted orders passed by the Magistrates and the legality of their custody for the period subsequent thereto. Similar was the stand of applicants in the rulings relied on by his learned counsel (vide paragraph 2l supra). Similar is the gravaman of applicant Anand Kumar before me. 42. Now, Ramnarain's case (supra) was found by the Supreme Court to be a case where there had been no order of recommittal at all. So this ruling which was referred to in Subhash v. State (supra) does not help applicant Anand Kumar at all. 43. Raj Narain's case (supra), A. Lakshman Rao's case (supra) Gauri Shankar case (supra), M. Sambasiv Rao's case (supra) and S. K. Dey's case (supra) have held that recommittal orders can be validly passed by Magistrates even in the absence of the prisoners of the cases. 44. 43. Raj Narain's case (supra), A. Lakshman Rao's case (supra) Gauri Shankar case (supra), M. Sambasiv Rao's case (supra) and S. K. Dey's case (supra) have held that recommittal orders can be validly passed by Magistrates even in the absence of the prisoners of the cases. 44. Lakshmi Brahman's case AIR 1983 SC 439 is an authority for the proposition that the committal proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in a case on a police report is an inquiry and that on committing the case of an accused to the Court of Session, the Committing Magistrates may commit or recommit the accused to custody during and till the end of the trial and for doing this the Magistrate has the requisite powers under section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 45. "Now to the rulings cited by the applicant's learned counsel". 46. In Raghvendra Singh v. State of U.P. 1976 Cr. LJ 1782 (All) also referred to in Subhash v. State (supra) the Magistrate did not issue any fresh order of remand at all after the expiry of the period of the original remand order validly given had expired. Thus, Raghvendra Singh's case falls in the category of Ram Narayan Singh's case(supra), and is, therefore, of no aid and comfort to the applicant's plea. 47. In Manohari v. State of Rajasthan (supra) it was held-following the law laid down in Raj Narain's case (supra) that the period of the initial valid order of remand could be validly extended in the absence of the accused where it was not possible to produce him before the Magistrate owing to circumstances beyond the control of the jail authorities. Thus, this dictum in this ruling, answering questions referred to a Division Bench, actually does no 1 support the main submission of the applicant's learned counsel. However, the other proposition made in the reference is that in cases of grant of bail if there was illegality in the earlier orders of remand, it cannot be validated by a subsequent order of remand This proposition will be considered in the event of any remand order is found to be invalid. The latter proposition has been referred to in Subhash v. State (supra). 49. The latter proposition has been referred to in Subhash v. State (supra). 49. In Izhar Ahmad v. State (supra), the learned Single Judge was dealing with a case where the accused were produced before a Magistrate and remanded by him to jail custody from where they were not produced before him on 14-5-77, 21-5-77, 2-6-77, and 16-6-77, the last three dates being the dates to which the earlier period of remand had been extended by passing orders in the absence of the accused. 49. The learned Single Judge cited the Supreme Court decisions beginning with Rajnarain's case (supra) and ending with S K. Dey's case (supra), the decisions set out at paragraph 27 to 38 (supra). The learned Single Judge then said that the decisions "remarked that it would be desirable for the Magistrate to have the prisoner produced before him when he commits him to custody." The learned Judge continued as follows : "It appears that because of the observations made by the Supreme Court in above cases, that a provision for the production of the accused before the Magistrate at the time of the passing of the remand order was made in the new Code. Proviso (b) to sub-clause (sub-section?) (2) of S. 167 Cr. P. C. of the new Code says "No Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him." In view of this provision it has become mandatory for the Magistrate to have the prisoner produced before him when he commits him to custody. Therefore, as it is, there can be no doubt about the fact that the detention of the applicants in jail at the stage of S. 167 Cr. P. C. was illegal because they had not been produced before the Magistrate on 14-5-77, 21-5-77, 2-6-77 and 16-6-77 when the orders of remands were passed against them." (Emphasis supplied.) 50. Now, the learned Judge's observations underlined by me were not fortified by any reference either to the Statement of Objects and Reasons or to any statement or clarifications made by the Government the debates in the Central Legislature. In fact, when a submission was made by the applicant's learned counsel on the same lines. I had asked him to show me anything to establish his assumption. In fact, when a submission was made by the applicant's learned counsel on the same lines. I had asked him to show me anything to establish his assumption. The learned counsel said that he would look up the subject, but he did not bring up anything though many hearings had taken place between that day and the date on which argument had closed. 51. I have before me the Statement of Object and Reasons, (printed at pages 2 to 4 of Princep's Code of Criminal Procedure Diamond Jubilee Edition) which do not contain any reference to the Supreme Court decisions or to the provisions proposed to be enacted in paragraph (b) in the proviso below sub-section (2) of section 167 Cr. P. C. 52. In fact. the applicant's learned counsel had said several times during the arguments before me that be was not canvassing a proposition that 'the mere absence of the accused at the time of passing of orders of extension of the period of his custody. However, he cited the ruling in the context of the subject of the afore mentioned orders, I had to discuss the ruling as to its observations on the subject. 53. Besides, the judgment of the learned Single Judge did Dot examine the Supreme Court judgment at all and made no reference to the rationale behind their pronouncements. Hence, with utmost respect to the learned Judge I find no persuasive value in his enunciation of the law in the ruling in face of the Jaw declared by the Supreme Court. (para 27 to 38, supra). 54. In 'Subhash Babu Rao v. State (supra), the learned Single Judge was dealing with a bail application under section 439 (1) Cr. P. C., 1973. The fact-situation, gleaned from the judgment was as follows. The accused was initially remanded by a Warrant to custody on 27-10-1987. He was not produced before the Magistrate from 10-11-87 and the subsequent dates, on one of which i.e. 20-1-88 the charge-sheet was filed before the Magistrate. On those dates his warrant of production was being produced before the Magistrate along with loose papers, bearing a rubber stamp seal impression indicating non-production of prisoner for want of police guard and just below the endorsement the learned Magistrate at different dates and places had noted "produced... ....", and also the next date of production. On those dates his warrant of production was being produced before the Magistrate along with loose papers, bearing a rubber stamp seal impression indicating non-production of prisoner for want of police guard and just below the endorsement the learned Magistrate at different dates and places had noted "produced... ....", and also the next date of production. Corresponding order-sheets indicate that no order committing the petitioner to judicial custody was passed. 55. The learned Single Judge had, however, earlier (at para 5) said: "Ordinarily a Magistrate is expected to write in the order sheet that the accused is remanded to judicial custody for a certain period. It is not mere a form. An omission to mention the same in the order sheet may not amount to illegal detention when there is an authorisation on the warrant itself, but a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has observed that a remand by merely filling the column on the reverse of the warrant form already signed on the front side on an earlier date, cannot be said to be substantial compliance with the requirements of remanding the accused by warrant under sub-section (2) of section 309, Criminal Procedure Code, See Urroj Abbas v. State of U. P. 1973 Cr. L. J. 1458 (FB) (Emphasis supplied.)" 56. Then after narrating the fact-situation referred to at the end of paragraph 54 (supra), the learned Judge proceeded as follows: "6 Whether such continued extension on detention without production of the petitioner when he was directed to be produced, would amount to illegal detention? A detention without valid order of remand has been held to be illegal by the Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi AIR 1953 SC 277 . It has been held by the Allahabad High Court in Raghabendrasingh's case 1976 Cr. L. J. 1782 that under section 309, Criminal Procedure Code' custody of the accused in jail can be maintained and continued only by a warrant issued by a Magistrate and when there is no such valid warrant, his confinement is illegal. 7. As has been noted above, only next date of production has been noted by the Magistrate on the so called jail warrant, bearing the rubber seal impression. 7. As has been noted above, only next date of production has been noted by the Magistrate on the so called jail warrant, bearing the rubber seal impression. Once an order of remand is not passed merely, noting the next date of production on the jail warrant without there being anything in the order sheet, committing or further continuing such custody, the detention becomes illegal which cannot be cured by a subsequent order of remand for subsequent period. See Manmohan's case, 1983 Cr. L. J 1231 wherein the Rajasthan High Court in similar circumstances held that the accused are entitled to be released on bail." 57. At para 8 the learned Judge granted bail to the applicant. 58. Now, Subhash Babu Rao's case (supra), does not contain any reference to Raj Narain's case (supra). A. Lakshmanrao's case (supra), Gaurishankar's case (Supra), S. Sambasiv Rao's case (supra), S. K. Day's Case (supra). So the law declared by the Supreme Court, which is binding on all Courts in India under Article 141 of the Constitution, was not placed before the learned Single Judge. The law so declared was that if an accused validly committed by a Magistrate to custody for a fixed period and with a direction to produce him before him on a specified date, but the authorities in keeping the accused in custody were prevented by circumstances beyond their control to convey the accused in custody before the Magistrate, the Magistrate could validly extend the expiring period of remand by passing an order in the absence of the accused and by conveying the order to the jail authorities. The rationale was expressed in Raj Narain's case (supra). It was that a Magistrate can act only as circumstances permit him If the keepers of an accused in custody were unable to produce the accused before the Magistrate on the due date and brought to the notice of the Magistrate the facts and circumstances which prevented the production of the accused before him, the Magistrate could do no more than extend the period of original remand in the absence of the accused to do more under section 344 was to expect an impossibility from him and the law does not contemplate an impossibility. 59. In A. Lakshman Rao's case, (supra) the accused could not be produced before the Magistrate for want of escort. 59. In A. Lakshman Rao's case, (supra) the accused could not be produced before the Magistrate for want of escort. In the circumstance the Court followed the law declared in Raj Narain's case. 60. In Subhash Babu Rao's case (supra), the facts were same to the situation in A. Lakshman Rao's case in particular and of comparable situations in the remaining SC's rulings. A Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court [I] which was relied on in Subhash Babu Rao's case (supra). The latter case was decided without referring to the Supreme Court judgments referred to at paragraphs 25 to 38 (supra). The law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on every Court in India under Article 141 That law on being applied to the facts of the case in Sub hash Babu Rao's case would have governed to the facts to the same law as clearly applicable to the facts of the present case, as set out at paragraphs 4 to 19 (supra). The warrant of commitment issued by the Magistrate in the present case contains self-contained duly signed orders of extension of the custody of the applicant. The warrant is not at all of the mutilated one-half piece of the warrant which contained entries which made no meaning, and which was the reasons in Urooj Abbas's case 1973 Cr. LJ 1458 in holding the warrant as one not in accordance with law. 61. Thus, following the law laid down in the Supreme Court decisions vide paragraphs 25 to 38 (supra), I hold that the orders extending the periods of remand in the present case were valid notwithstanding the absence of applicant Anand Kumar on 23-11-87 & 7-12-87. The same law would govern and stamp the orders during the committal inquiry whenever the applicant could not be produced before the Magistrate. In this connection Lakshmi Brahman's case (supra), also comes into lay as mentioned at paragraph 39 (supra). 62. The applicant's learned counsel submitted that the order of committal was passed on a day when applicant Anand Kumar was not in Court. The order sheet dated 7-9-1988 further shows that Anand Kumar was represented by his counsel who had also addressed his arguments on the point of commitment. What is more, it was a clear cut case of dispensing with the personal presence of the applicant under sub-section (1) of section 317 of the Cr. The order sheet dated 7-9-1988 further shows that Anand Kumar was represented by his counsel who had also addressed his arguments on the point of commitment. What is more, it was a clear cut case of dispensing with the personal presence of the applicant under sub-section (1) of section 317 of the Cr. P. C. At all events, the remand continued to be governed by the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 309 of the Cr. P. C. as held in Lakshmi Brahman's case (supra). Thus, the remands granted at commitment was also in order. 63. In the result, I find that the orders extending the period of detention in the absence of applicant Anand Kumar were lawful and valid. 64. Coming to the merits of the bail application, it is sufficient to say that Anand Kumar was one of the assailants of deceased Ramashankar. Plea about the time taken up to the committal of the accused, it has also to be borne in mind that the applicant had been ill for some time and had been on temporary bail and the record of the committal case had been for months in the Court of Session in connection with some bail applications filed by the applicant himself and some bail applications filed by the remaining co-accused persons. Hence, I do not think that there is much to commend the applicant's plea on this score. 65. I, therefore, dismiss the bail application of Anand Kumar.