JUDGMENT K.K. BIRLA, J. 1. THIS is a petition under section 482 Cr PC for quashing the order dated 25-10-83 whereby the Magistrate had taken cognizance against Triveni Prasad and four others. 2. IN brief Salig Ram filed FIR on 1-11-82 against Amar Nath Dubey and Subhash Dubey and petitioners Triveni Prasad, Murli Yadav, Ram Raj Yadav, Ram Rup Singh and Deo Nath Dubey for the offences under sections 323/324/325 and 307 IPC. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted against Amar Nath Dubey and Subhash Dubey. Salik Ram filed a protest petition on 17-9-83 for taking cognizance against Triveni Prasad and 4 others (hereinafter referred as 'the petitioners'). After perusal of the case diary and considering the statements recorded under section 161 Cr PC by a discussed order the Magistrate took cognizance under section 190 Cr PC against these petitioners as well for these offences by its order dated 25-10-83. A revision preferred against that order was also dismissed by the Revisional Court by its order dated 11-1-84. The petitioners being aggrieved have preferred this petition. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the cognizance of the offence had already been taken by the Magistrate on the submission of the charge-sheet against two persons and by the impugned order he has again taken cognizance against the petitioners, that under law Magistrate cannot take cognizance twice and, therefore, the order is bad. Secondly it is contended that the Magistrate had taken cognizance on the basis of the protest petition; the protest petition is in the nature of a complaint and before taking cognizance on the basis of the protest petition the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under section 200 Cr PC and thereby taking some statements, and he has erred under law by taking cognizance against the petitioners after perusal of the case diary alone. These contentions have been repelled on behalf of Salig Ram and the State of U. P. 3. I have heard the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. These contentions have been repelled on behalf of Salig Ram and the State of U. P. 3. I have heard the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. THE short points for consideration in the petition are firstly whether the summoning of the petitioners amounts to the taking of the cognizance twice; and secondly whether after submission of the charge-sheet against some of the persons named in the FIR, the Magistrate is competent to summon the other persons as accused on the protest petition being filed after perusing the case diary and without undergoing the procedure provided for a complaint under section 200 Cr PC and onwards. As regards the first contention, in my opinion summoning of the accused in this manner does not amount to the taking of cognizance twice. It is the offence of which the cognizance is taken and the cognizance is not taken of the offenders The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the case of Shriyans Prasad Jain v. Shanti Prasad Jain, 1977 Cr LJ 1270 in which it has been held that "the word 'cognizance' is used to indicate the point of time when the Magistrate or Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is not a continuous process." It is quite established and also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hare Ram Satpathy v. Tika Ram Agarwala, 1978 ACC 356, that from section 190 Cr PC the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence made cut in the police report or in the complaint and there is nothing like taking cognizance of the offenders at that stage. As who actually the offenders involved in the case might have been, has to be decided by the Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence". 5. THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the cognizance of the offence cannot be taken twice as it is not continuous process may have force. But it is clear that issuing summons or warrants to some other persons in a case of which cognizance has already been taken will amount to start the proceedings against those persons and will not amount to the taking of the cognizance of the case afresh or for that matter twice. Therefore, this contention raised on behalf of the petitioners has no force in my opinion. 6. Therefore, this contention raised on behalf of the petitioners has no force in my opinion. 6. THE other point for consideration is whether after a protest petition is filed, whether the Magistrate is bound to adopt the procedure provided for filing of the complaint, namely, under section 200 Cr PC and onwards or the Magistrate can start proceedings for taking the cognizance against some other accused without following that procedure. In my opinion the answer to this question will be that the Magistrate has power to take the cognizance even though the procedure provided under section 200 Cr PC and onwards is not taken. The learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has relied on the case of Ram Adhar v. State, 1981 ACRR 288 and Vijai Pal Singh v. State of U. P., 1987 LuckDow Criminal Reports 116. In these cases it has been held that Magistrate is not bound to accept the final report submitted by the police after investigation, he may not accept the final report and can take cognizance of the offence and summon the accused. There is no dispute about the proposition and the same has not been disputed by Sri Tapan Gosh learned counsel for the petitioners. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners where charge- sheet has been submitted against some of the persons and final report has been submitted against others, the different considerations will arise and in such a case the Magistrate will not be entitled to take cognizance without following the procedure prescribed mentioned above. In my opinion this contention cannot be accepted. In the case of Ashok Kumar v. Shyam Lal, 1986 Allahabad Criminal Rulings t03 relied on by Sri Hari Har Prasad Tripathi A.G.A. on similar facts a Single Judge of this High Court has taken the view that a Magistrate can take cognizance and issue summons and he is not bound by the conclusion of the police report. In that case the Magistrate summoned the charge-sheeted accused first. On the request of the first informant the Magistrate perused the case diary and summoned the other accused. It has been held that nothing illegal was done by the Magistrate. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that in absence of the procedure being followed by the Magistrate as is provided for a complaint case, the view taken in this case is not correct. It has been held that nothing illegal was done by the Magistrate. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that in absence of the procedure being followed by the Magistrate as is provided for a complaint case, the view taken in this case is not correct. In my opinion this contention is without force. Rather the matter stands concluded by the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hare Ram Satpathy v. Tika Ram Agarwala (supra). In that case a FIR was lodged with the police against several persons. On investigation the police submitted the charge-sheet against 6 persons and submitted a final report against 13 persons saying that from the investigation carried on by it no offence appeared against them. A complaint was filed by the informant appellant reiterating the allegations made by him against the aforesaid 13 persons. After going through the statements made under section 161 Cr PC and finding a prima facie case under section 302 IPC made out against the respondents, the Magistrate directed the issue of non-bailable warrants against them. In this case no procedure as prescribed under section 200 Cr PC was followed by the Magistrate as in the case before me. It has been held in the case of Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar, 1967 (2) SCR 423 that "once cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he comes to the conclusion that apart from the persons sent up by the police some other persons are involved, and it is his duty to proceed against these persons. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceedings initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence". It has further been held in the case of Hare Ram Satpathy (supra) that after submission of the final report by the police saying therein that there was no sufficient evidence to justify the forwarding of the respondents to him, it was open to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to add the respondents as accused in the case and issue process against them. Therefore, in view of the principles laid down in this case it is clear that even after charge-sheet has been submitted against some of the persons named in the FIR on a protest petition being filed and the Magistrate being satisfied about the prima facie case against the other persons, the Magistrate is fully competent to issue summon or warrants as the case may be to those persons and start proceedings against them as well even without recording the statements under section 200 Cr PC or enquiry under section 202, Cr PC. 7. IT was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proper thing for the Magistrate to do was that if after evidence he found from the evidence that these persons had committed any offence, he could have proceeded against them under section 319 Cr PC. Reliance was placed on the case of Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1979 ACRR 438. In my opinion this contention too is devoid of any force. The scope of section 319 Cr PC is quite distinct and it will not mean that the cognizance against the petitioners would have not been taken earlier. The Magistrate has given proper reason for summoning the petitioners 8. IN view of the above discussions the petition has no force. In the result the petition is hereby dismissed. The interim order staying the proceedings is hereby discharged. Petition dismissed.