Judgment Mookherji, J. This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') for quashing the order, passed by Sri A.P. Verma, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Samastipur in Warisnagar P.S. case no. 100/85 taking cognizance of the offence, under sections 347, 384 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Penal Code') against the petitioner and others. 2. The petitioner is a class II officer of the Government of Bihar of the rank of Depute Collector and during the relevant period he was posted as Child Development Project Officer, Warisnagar in the district of Samastipur. It appears that in that capacity, the petitioner was incharge of the welfare schemes under the 20 points programme in the Block and under him there were large number of work centres to implement the programme, each having an Anganbari Sevika. The Child Development Project Officer was to provide supplementary nutrition (Khichri) and medicines to the aforesaid Sevikas for distribution among the children of the concerned area, who are in the age-group of one to six years and to pregnant and lactating mothers and also to provide for the cash money to the said Sevika, for the purchase of vegetable etc. There were some other jobs, as it appears from the petition, but in the present matter we are not concerned with them. 3. On 26th of October, 1985 opposite party no. 2 Asha Rai, wife of Kapildeo Rai, an Anganbari Sevika, Warisnagar Block and three others lodged a First Information Report against the petitioner and two others and alleged that they had gone to the office of the petitioner to take articles, when they were asked to come after the lunch period and when they appeared at that appointed time, the petitioner took them to his office, which was a part of his residential building and asked them to sign in the register and also directed his men, i.e. the other two accused to collect Rs.50/- each from them and by saying so, closed the door of the office. It is further alleged that the two sons of the landlord of the building demanded money from them and on their refusal they started misbehaving with the informant and the other ladies, and also used abusive languages. When the guardians of those Sevikas came, they were also manhandled. It is further alleged that the two sons of the landlord of the building demanded money from them and on their refusal they started misbehaving with the informant and the other ladies, and also used abusive languages. When the guardians of those Sevikas came, they were also manhandled. Out of fear they ran away, when also, the said two men threatened them with dire consequences. 4. On the basis of this complaint a case was registered and the police, after completion of the investigation, submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner and two others. At the time of taking cognizance of the offence, a prayer was made on behalf of the petitioner to discharge him, which was refused by the learned Magistrate and the order impugned was passed taking cognizance of the offences charged against the petitioner and two others. It is against this order that the petitioner has come to this Court. 5. The learned Counsel Mr. Sunil Kumar, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised two points: (a) that the allegations do not constitute any offence with which he has been charged against and (b) that the cognizance of the offence, against the petitioner is bad in law for want of sanction. 6. A preliminary objection relating to maintainability of this application under the provisions of section 482 of the Code has been raised both on behalf of the opposite party and the State of Bihar. It has been submitted that the petitioner can very well ventilate his grievance at the time of hearing of the charge matter and therefore, the inherent powers of this Court under the provisions of Section 482 of the Code cannot be exercised in regard to the matter specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. It is true that one forum is also available to the petitioner, but it is now well settled that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge sheet do not constitute any offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Absence of requisite sanction for prosecution of a Government servant may also be a ground for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers under the aforesaid section. See 1961 Supreme Court Journal, Volume 1. Absence of requisite sanction for prosecution of a Government servant may also be a ground for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers under the aforesaid section. See 1961 Supreme Court Journal, Volume 1. p. 59 (R.P. Kapoor Versus State of Bihar) and 1977 Supreme Court Reports Volume 2, P. 357 (Sharda Pd. Sinha v. State of Bihar). 7. In the circumstances, the contentions raised on behalf of the opposite party challenging the maintainability of this application under section 482 of the Code has no force. 8. The question, which now arises for consideration is whether the allegations set out in the First Information Report constitute any offence against the petitioner. The offences charged against the petitioner are under sections 347, 384, and 354 of the Penal Code. At the very outset, it may be pointed out that there is no allegation against the petitioner that he outraged or attempted to outrage the modesty of the informant or any of her companions within the meaning of section 354 of the Penal Code and hence, no question of offence under section 354 of the Penal Code could arise. The other two charges, as indicated, are under sections 347 and 384 of the Penal Code. Section 347 prescribes the punishment to be inflicted on a person, who commits the offence of wrongful confinement, extorts property or constrains to illegal act. Wrongful confinement has been defined in section 340 of the Penal Code, Which says that whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongfully to confine" that person. 9. It is an essential ingredient of this offence that there should be some sort of detention, which is not permissible in law. In the instant case, at least there is no allegation against the petitioner that he had confined or detained the informant or her men within certain circumscribing limit. The allegation against the petitioner is that the informant and others were asked to come to the office side of the building, which was a part of the residential house of the petitioner where, they were asked to sign certain registers and the sons of the landlord were directed to realise Rs.50/ each from them. Thereafter, it is stated, that the petitioner went away and closed the door of the office. Thereafter, it is stated, that the petitioner went away and closed the door of the office. Nowhere there is any allegation that the petitioner, either detained or prevented the informant or any of her men from proceeding beyond certain limit or that they were confined to any particular place for the purpose of realising money or to obtain their signature. In the circumstances, it is difficult to say how the allegations contained in the complaint could be said to constitute an offence under section 347 of the Penal Code. 10. Equally, it• is difficult to accept the prosecution version that an offence under section 384 of the Penal Code has been made out against the petitioner. Section 384 provides that whoever commits extortion shall be punished. "Extortion" has been defined in section 383 of the Penal Code, which says that whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person to put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion". The F.I.R. does not allege as to which of the conditions of section 383 of the Penal Code has been committed in order to make out a charge under section 384 of the Penal Code. The only allegation against the petitioner is that he had asked the informant and others to sign a particular register and thereafter, further asked two of the co-accused to collect Rs.50/- each and then went away. It is not in dispute that the Sevikas are to ask for the articles for the welfare scheme and in evidence of receiving the same they are required to put signatures on the relevant papers of the Department. Be that as it may mere asking somebody to take signature of the victims cannot be said to be sufficient to make out an offence of "extortion" within the meaning of section 383 of the Penal Code. Something more is necessary, which is wanting in this case. The allegation contained in the F.I.R. that the petitioner had directed his men to collect Rs.50/- each may be taken as a demand for illegal gratification, but this act, even prima facie, did not constitute an offence under section 384 of the Penal Code. Something more is necessary, which is wanting in this case. The allegation contained in the F.I.R. that the petitioner had directed his men to collect Rs.50/- each may be taken as a demand for illegal gratification, but this act, even prima facie, did not constitute an offence under section 384 of the Penal Code. This is therefore, a case where the allegations contained in the F.I.R. do not constitute any offence and therefore, the learned Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance of the offence alleged. 11. The order impugned can not also be allowed to stand for want of sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner, who is admittedly a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Penal Code. It has, however, been submitted by the learned Counsel for' the opposite party that the acts committed can not be said to have been done in discharge of any official duty. I cannot subscribe to this view on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Admittedly, the petitioner was incharge of the welfare schemes and the informant and others are Sevikas attached to one of those schemes, who under the rules were required to report to the petitioner's office for the purpose of collecting articles, cash etc. to implement the scheme. On a plain reading of the F.I.R. it will appear that during the office hours the petitioner was approached by the informant and they were asked to come to the office at a particular time and when they appeared at the appointed time they were asked to go to the office side of the building, which was a part of the residential building, occupied by the petitioner. Now, the acts purported to have been done by the petitioner can be classified in two ways, partly official and partly non-official. In this connection, a reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. Page 287 (Shreekanta Ramayya Munipalli and another vs. State of Bombay) where their Lordships have laid down certain tests to see when a particular act of a public servant can be taken to be official and nonofficial acts. In this connection, a reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. Page 287 (Shreekanta Ramayya Munipalli and another vs. State of Bombay) where their Lordships have laid down certain tests to see when a particular act of a public servant can be taken to be official and nonofficial acts. In that decision it has been observed that if section 197, Criminal P.C. is construed too narrowly it can never be applied for, of course it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty which the courts have to examine so much as the fact, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The sanction has content and its language must be given meaning. The Courts have to concentrate on the word "offence" in the section. An offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. Where the elements alleged against the accused a public servant in charge of Government stores are first, that there was an "entrustment" and/or" dominion" second, that the entrustment and/or dominion Was "in his capacity as a public servant", third, that there was a "disposal" and fourth, that the disposal was "dishonest" it is evident that the entrusment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act, if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because the accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely officially permitting the disposal. If it was innocent, it was an official act, if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because the accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely officially permitting the disposal. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only" difference would lie in the intention with which it was done; in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it. Similarly, where the accused was charged with abetment of offence under section 409, in that he permitted the disposal of goods by the doing of an official act and thus “wilfully suffer” another person to use them dishonestly, the act of abetment also stands on the same footing. In both cases, the "offence" in his case would be incomplete without proving the official act. In such a case section 197, Criminal P.C. applies and sanction is necessary, and where there was none the trial is vitiated from the start. 12. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is evident that section 197 applies and as such, sanction was necessary. As there is no sanction, the order taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioner is bad in law. 13. In the result, the order of the Magistrate, dated 9.9.1986 taking cognizance of the offences and the proceedings against the present petitioner are quashed. Application allowed.