ORDER In this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner who is an Assistant Commissioner of Police has challenged the continuance of the proceeding in Criminal Case No. C/3285 of 1977 pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, Calcutta in respect of alleged offences under ss. 166, 330/34, 34B and 509 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of an occurrence alleged to have taken place in July, 1974. When this application was moved by Mr. Sen, no interim order was asked for and only Rule 'Nisi' was issued. 2. Thereafter, all application was made for interim order for stay of the proceedings before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, Calcutta. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing for Sm. Archana Guha, the complainant, did not ask for any direction for filing affidavit either in the main Rule or in the interim application. But elaborate arguments were made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. I directed repeatedly to file affidavits in view of the elaborate arguments being made on the merits of the case so that the entire matter could be disposed of without any delay. It was only before the judgment was delivered, the affidavit. In opposition was filed in the main writ application on behalf of Sm. Archana Guha. Since a copy of the affidavit was not given to the petitioner, no reply could be filed and accordingly the allegations made in the affidavit-in-opposition have not been admitted by the petitioner. 3. It may be mentioned that at the initial stage, stand of Mr. Sen appearing for the writ petitioner was that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court has virtually made up his mind and accordingly he should not hear the complaint filed by Sm Archana Guha. However, with the change of the counsel, this stand was also changed and the continuation of the said proceedings has been assailed in this writ application. 4. Before I deal with the grievances of the petitioner made in this application and contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the events leading to the presentation of this petition have to be narrated briefly. 5. On August 20, 1977, Sm. Archana Guha (hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed a petition of complaint before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta under ss. 325/331, 348 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. On August 20, 1977, Sm. Archana Guha (hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed a petition of complaint before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta under ss. 325/331, 348 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. In the said petition of complaint, the complainant, inter alia, alleged that between July 18, 1974 and July 20, 1974, the complainant was tortured at the dictates and in presence of the petitioner. On August 22, 1977, a petition was filed by the complainant praying for issue of summons to the Doctors. On October 17, 1977, summons was issued against the petitioner and four others on different charges after the statements were obtained and medical witness examined. Thereafter, the complainant was absent in the proceeding. On December 20, 1978, the case was committed to Sessions and in January 1979, the petitioner moved this Court for quashing the order of commitment. The proceedings were stayed. On May 13, 1980, the commitment order was quashed by the High Court. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate fixed the date of the proceeding on December 19, 1980, but the complainant was absent till July, 1981. No proceeding took place between November 1980 and November, 1983 as the petitioner challenged the appearance of Mr. Arun Prokash Chatterjee before the Metropolitan Magistrate. Ultimately the matter was disposed of on November 29, 1981. During this period, there was as order of stay of proceedings by the High Court. From November, 1983 to September 10, 1984, there was no effective hearing of the complaint for procedural reasons. On September 11, 1984, the hearing was adjourned upon receipt of a letter from the lawyer of the Supreme Court intimating the order of stay made by the Supreme Court. Ultimately the Special Leave Petition was disposed of on November 19, 1985. From December, 1985 till March 2, 1986, the complainant was absent. Similarly, she was also absent from April, 1986 to June, 1987. On June 9, 1987, the complainant was present and the date was fixed on July 17, 1987. On July 17, 1987 and July 22, 1987, evidence was recorded. An application for transfer was made by the petitioner before the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court which was disposed of on 3rd August, 1987. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court fixed the hearing on December 4, 1987. Between December 1987 and March, 1988, the complainant was absent. On July 17, 1987 and July 22, 1987, evidence was recorded. An application for transfer was made by the petitioner before the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court which was disposed of on 3rd August, 1987. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court fixed the hearing on December 4, 1987. Between December 1987 and March, 1988, the complainant was absent. On March 22, 1987, an application was made by the petitioner before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate which was dismissed on March 29, 1988 and thereafter on April 7, 1988, the present application was filed and Rule 'Nisi' was issued. 6. The grievance of the petitioner in this case is that any further continuation of the said criminal case would amount to violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner has mainly urged the following three grounds:–– (a) The case has been pending for more than 10 years and it relates to an alleged incident which took place more than 13 years ago. Since the speedy trial is one of the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution any further continuation of the case which is still pending at an initial stage will amount to violation of the laid Article of the Constitution. (b) It has become impossible for the petitioner to get a fair trial which is also one of the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution in any Court in West Bengal in view of the adverse and prejudicial publication and hostile campaigning which has already caused serious prejudice to the defence of the petitioner. (c) The case of the complainant prima facie is patently absurd and inherently improbable and as such, it is mala fide prosecution and for the ends of justice and in order to prevent an abuse of the process of the court the said mala fide prosecution is liable to be quashed. 7. It is contended that having regard to the cumulative effect of the aforesaid three grounds, the proceedings in this case should be quashed. On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. Arun Prokeeh Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the complainant, Sm. Archana Guha that where the delay is attributable to the accused, he cannot take the advantage of such delay and ask for quashing of the proceeding on that ground. On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. Arun Prokeeh Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the complainant, Sm. Archana Guha that where the delay is attributable to the accused, he cannot take the advantage of such delay and ask for quashing of the proceeding on that ground. He has also contended that if the accused has a fundamental right to move this Court for quashing of the proceeding, the complainant has similar right to move the Court to ensure that she gets justice and her grievances are redressed. Mr. Chatterjee has drawn my attention to the petition of complaint and the torture alleged to have been made to the complainant in the police custody. 8. Mr. Mukherjee has invited this Court to proceed on the assumption that the petitioner is guilty of the offences charged against him. Even after the lapse of 13 years, no prima facie case has yet been established. It is still in the primary stage. After the evidence is taken it has to be decided by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate whether any case has been made out against the petitioner for his prosecution on the offences alleged. Even after 13 years, that stage is not yet over. So long the allegations made in the petition of complaint are not proved ultimately in a properly constituted trial, the Court cannot proceed on the footing that the petitioner is guilty of the offences and accordingly the petitioner should not be allowed to assail the proceedings pending against him. It is true that in a democratic State government by rule of law, no one should be permitted to torture any accused while in the police custody. Any torture to any accused in the police custody for obtaining confession or otherwise must be viewed with utmost seriousness it deserves and any police officer found to be guilty must be punished under the law. As I said, even the preliminary stage is not yet over. But what Mr. Chatterjee wants me to hold is that the petitioner is guilty of the offences charged and accordingly the proceedings should be allowed to continue so that the accused may be punished. My attention has been drawn to some of the newspaper clippings which, it appears, proceed on the assumption that as a matter of fact the complainant Sm. Chatterjee wants me to hold is that the petitioner is guilty of the offences charged and accordingly the proceedings should be allowed to continue so that the accused may be punished. My attention has been drawn to some of the newspaper clippings which, it appears, proceed on the assumption that as a matter of fact the complainant Sm. Archana Guha was tortured in the police custody in presence of the petitioner and if the proceedings are not allowed to continue against the petitioner then a guilty person would get away from the punitive justice he deserves. This, in my view, is very unfortunate. Even assuming that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the petitioner and the learned Metropolitan Magistrate holds so, only thereafter trial would commence for prosecution of the petitioner and in that trial if ultimately, the petitioner is held guilty, he shall be with Criminal Procedure Code. But unless that stage comes, can it be said that merely because certain allegations have been made, the petitioner is guilty of such charges? In that event, there is no reason for continuance of such proceeding and on the basis of the verdict given by the newspapers which have been annexed to the petition, the petitioner could be straight way convicted in a Court of law. Fortunately, our jurisprudence does not permit any trial or conviction by newspaper. So long as a person accused of even committing a heinous crime is not found guilty of the charge by following the procedure established by law, the Court cannot hold the accused guilty, even though the counsel for the complainant or a few newspapers might hold such view. 9. An accused has got fundamental right to come before the trial court, if he has got any grievance. Even if he is convicted, he has right to come before the court for quashing the proceeding. In many cases, the verdicts of the Sessions Court holding an accused guilty of an offence, even of murder, have been set aside by the High Court. Therefore, the accused has, in every stage of the proceeding, right to move the court for redress of his grievance. Similarly, the complainant has the right to move the appropriate forum to ventilate his or her grievance against any person. The Court cannot be influenced merely by the allegations made by the complainant. Therefore, the accused has, in every stage of the proceeding, right to move the court for redress of his grievance. Similarly, the complainant has the right to move the appropriate forum to ventilate his or her grievance against any person. The Court cannot be influenced merely by the allegations made by the complainant. The Court has to judge the issue and examine the case dispassionately without being influenced by any sentiments raised and expressed in the newspapers and by the counsel for the complainant. 10. Our legal philosophy cannot alienate law from conscience and jurisprudence from justice. Law and justice must coincide. Any torture of an accused in the police custody particularly of a woman gravely violates moral sentiment or moral standards of community. Such a crime involves not only infringement or moral standards of community but also shocks its conscience. No democratic or civilized government ought to acquiesce to such crime committed by its won officer but it is only when the crime is brought home on evidence that the question of punishment would come up for innocent. Whatever there is any complaint made by the an affected person regarding torture meted out to him or her in police custody, he or she must at the earliest opportunity ventilate his or her grievance in the appropriate forum irrespective of the nature and gravity of the torture inflicted upon him or her. In this case the petitioner of complaint was filed on 20th August, 1977, in respect of the alleged torture made between July 18, 1974 and July 20, 1974. This inordinate delay in filing the petition of complaint without any explanation for such delay has to be taken into account in deciding whether such proceeding should be allowed to continue or not. 11. Even in a disciplinary proceeding, the Courts have consistently held that there should not be undue delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings and the proceedings should be initiated against the delinquent officer within a reasonable time from the date of occurrence of an offence alleged against him. The inordinate unexplained delay may by itself on the facts of a case tantamount to denial of the principles of natural justice. After 13 years of the alleged occurrence evidence either for or against an accused may not be available. The inordinate unexplained delay may by itself on the facts of a case tantamount to denial of the principles of natural justice. After 13 years of the alleged occurrence evidence either for or against an accused may not be available. In a case like this, where allegation is that a responsible police officer has directed torture to be inflicted on a woman in the police custody whatever grave might have been the charges against her and allowed such torture to continue, the complainant should not have waited until 1977 when the Left Front Government came into power. She would have filed the petition of complaint while she was produced before the Magistrate in August, 1974 or soon thereafter. There is no explanation for this delay. Did she wait for long three years with the expectation that if the Left Front Government comes into power, she will get the officer punished even without following the established procedure of law? It may be mentioned also that the petitioner was not suspended nor any disciplinary proceeding was taken against him. Had there been any prima facie case against the petitioner, the Government must have certainly suspended him for his involvement in a heinous crime of torturing a woman in the police custody. But there was nothing adverse against him and Mr. Pulaka Ranjan Mondal, learned Advocate appearing for the Government has not disputed that he has since been promoted to the post of Assistant Police Commissioner. This fact, in my view, cannot be overlooked. If the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the petitioner in fact did what is alleged against him is accepted the other officers of the Government must be held to be guilty for abatement of crime. It may be mentioned that the complainant who was at the material time a teacher of Kolorah Giri's Junior High School, Howrah in her petition of complaint stated after narrating the alleged act of torture in the "Torture Cell" in paragraphs 23 and 24 as follows: "23. The complainant was taken to Sealdah Court on 2nd August 1974 but never produced before the Magistrate thereafter on that every day the complainant was taken to Alipore Court in a private car and after being detained there for some time was taken back to Lalbazar. The Judicial Magistrate at the Sealdah remanded her to Jail Custody till 16.8.74/ 23.8.74. The complainant was taken to Sealdah Court on 2nd August 1974 but never produced before the Magistrate thereafter on that every day the complainant was taken to Alipore Court in a private car and after being detained there for some time was taken back to Lalbazar. The Judicial Magistrate at the Sealdah remanded her to Jail Custody till 16.8.74/ 23.8.74. But the complainant was taken to Lalbazar to Police Custody. The complainant later learnt that she was implicated in another false case at Alipore and therefore taken to Alipur Court. The Police secured Police Custody for another seven days from Alipore Court. "24. On 8th August, 1974 the complainant was taken to Alipore Court at about 11.30 A.M. on that day the complainant found her elder brothers standing at a little distance from the lock-up in which they were placed. Sometime later a lawyer got a Vakalatnama executed by her. The complainant thereafter learnt that the police had again asked for police custody till 16.8.74………….." 12. She also stated in the said petition that she was brought to the Alipore Court on 13th August, 1974 and was taken to Jail Custody on that day. In paragraph 27 of the said petition of complaint she has stated that she became very weak and ultimately she was examined by Dr. B. R. Sengupta. The date has not been mentioned. It is further stated that she was admitted to S. S. K. M. Hospital on 22nd December, 1975 and she was discharged from that hospital on 24th January, 1976. It was not her case that she during her stay in the hospital could not contact her brother. She was released on parole on 17th November, 1976 and she was released from detention from 3rd May, 1977. She had the opportunity to make the complaint about the alleged torture made on her but she did not do so. Even while she was in hospital, she did not choose to make any complaint. While she was in jail custody, she could have also presented her complaint through the Superintendent of the Jail. That was not also done. In paragraph 25 of the petition the complainant has stated that "while in jail lower limbs of the petitioner became to grow weaker and weaker and it was in effect of the physical torture perpetrated on her by the accused". That was not also done. In paragraph 25 of the petition the complainant has stated that "while in jail lower limbs of the petitioner became to grow weaker and weaker and it was in effect of the physical torture perpetrated on her by the accused". If that be so it was all the more reasonable to expect that she would make a written complaint to the authorities and would be examined by the specialist between 13th August, 1974 when she was taken to jail and before she was hospitalized on 22nd December, 1975. But no whisper was made whether her weakness was caused by any torture on her by the accused is difficult to prove because of passage of time between occurrence and the complaint made. 13. It cannot be lost sight of that the delay in a criminal case tends to cause severe prejudice to the accused in conducting his defence. His witnesses may die or may become otherwise unavailable or they may forget their facts, documents may be lost or destroyed, evidence may otherwise become unavailable. There is also another aspect of the matter. Undue delay also leads to prolonged suffering and oppression of an accused person. He may be released on bail but he has to undergo the anxiety, agony and humiliation of being an accused in a criminal trial which if not properly defended may end in a conviction and consequential imprisonment which again may lead to loss of service, loss of reputation and may lead to various other adverse consequences. Although the law presumes an accused to be innocent until he is ultimately proved to be guilty, the very stigma of being an accused on trial is while the trial is pending continues to haunt a respectable man or respectable officer, day in and day out. Thus, being exposed to a protracted trial often operates as a sufficient mental punishment for any person who is made an accused in a criminal court, except in the case of habitual offender. 14. It is in the aforesaid context that it will be necessary to consider the other aspect of the matter namely, as to whether the case of the complainant suffers from such inherent weakness as would make it vulnerable, of course on a prima facie basis, to an attack from the angle of improbability and absurdity. 14. It is in the aforesaid context that it will be necessary to consider the other aspect of the matter namely, as to whether the case of the complainant suffers from such inherent weakness as would make it vulnerable, of course on a prima facie basis, to an attack from the angle of improbability and absurdity. In other words, in a case like this, the writ Court has to assess on the basis of materials before the Court as to what are the chances of an ultimate conviction. This test is to be applied in order to find out whether it is a mala fide prosecution or as to whether prosecution was initiated for an oblique purpose with ulterior motive, whether it is a lame prosecution which is expected to fail because of its inherent infirmities. This very test was applied by the Supreme Court in S. Guin & ors. v. Grindlays Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1986 SC 289 and in Rakesh Saxena v. State, reported in AIR 1987 SC 740 where the Court was concerned with the question of quashing a criminal case on the ground of delay. Even otherwise, when the delay is not a factor to be taken into consideration, this test has been applied by the Supreme Court for the purpose of quashing the criminal prosecution. In the State of Karnataka v. Muniswami reported in AIR 1977 SC 1489 and also in the recent case in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Angre reported in 1988 (1) SCC 692 , the Supreme Court proceeded on this basis. In State of Karnataka v. Muniswami's ( AIR 1977 SC 1489 ) the following observation of Chandrachud, J. at paragraph 8 of the judgment will indicate the focus of enquiry :–– "Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see whether the High Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court and in order to secure the ends of justice. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any date or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicted. We asked the State counsel time and again to point out any date or material on the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of the complainant could be predicted. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inadequate for connecting the respondents with the crime, however skillfully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole. There is no material on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict the respondents for any offence connected with the assault on the complainant" ………. "In this circumstances, it would be a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceeding to continue against the respondents. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justice the proceedings against the respondents out to be quashed." 15. In R. P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 , the Supreme Court laid down certain categories of cases in which quashing of a criminal case was permissible. But those categories are not exhaustive but only illustrative. In paragraph 9 of Muniswamy's case (supra) Chandrachud, J (as His Lordship then was) observed : "The three instances cited in the judgment was to when the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction are only illustrative and can in the very nature of things not be regarded as exhaustive. Considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by s. 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula." 16. Muniswamy's case is an authority for the proposition that a criminal proceeding can be quashed even at an initial stage to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. The expression abuse of the process of the court is generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in a bona fide and if frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. Muniswamy's case is an authority for the proposition that a criminal proceeding can be quashed even at an initial stage to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. The expression abuse of the process of the court is generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in a bona fide and if frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It was also pointed out by the Supreme Court in Muniswamy's case : "In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to law made by the legislature." The Supreme Court further pointed out that :–– "(A) Court proceeding out not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution." 17. In Nagawwa v. Veranna reported in AIR 1976 SC 1947 , certain categories of cases were specified which could be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Among these categories of cases are the following two : 1) Whether the allegation made in complaint or the statement of witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused. 2) Whether the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can over reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 18. In the recent decision of Madhav Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Angre reported in 1988(1) SCC 692 , the Supreme Court observed as follows:–– "When a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration the special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. It is also for the court to take into consideration the special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and whether in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are break and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage". 19. It should not, however, be lost light of that all the aforesaid decisions relate to the inherent power of the High Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to quash a criminal proceeding. It is settled that s. 482 of the said Code which saves the inherent power of the High Court inter alia, to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice does not confer any new power on the High Court, but only provides that the powers which the High Court already possesses inherently shall not be curtailed in any way by any provisions of the said Code. It is true that the present application under Article 226 of the Constitution has not been made in the Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, invoking the inherent power of the Court under s. 482 of the said Code. But that does not mean that the principles on which the High Court can quash a criminal case while exercising its power under s. 482 of the Code, cannot be applied by the Writ Court, while considering the question of quashing a criminal proceeding. On the other hand, it would seem that the jurisdiction of the Writ Court is wider as the Writ Court while enforcing the fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is not fettered by any documents that may be necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the other hand, it would seem that the jurisdiction of the Writ Court is wider as the Writ Court while enforcing the fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is not fettered by any documents that may be necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no procedural fetter on the powers of the Writ Court when it exercises its jurisdiction to protect a citizen from violation of his fundamental right as was held by the Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India reported in AIR 1984 SC 802 , The Supreme Court observed as follows:–– "It will be seen that the power conferred by Clause (2) of Article 32 is in the widest terms. It is not confined to issuing the high prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto, which are hedged in by strict conditions differing from one writ to another and which to quote the words spoken by Lord Atkin in United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., (1941) AC 1 in another context often "stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains". But it is much wider and includes within its matrix, power to issue any directions, orders or writs which may be appropriate for enforcement of the fundamental right in question and this is made amply clear by the inclusive clause which refers to in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is not only the high prerogative writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari which can be issued by the Supreme Court but also writ in the nature of these high prerogatives writs and therefore even if the conditions for issue of any of these high prerogative writs are not fulfilled, the Supreme Court would not be constrained to fold its hands in despair and plead its inability to help the citizen who has come before it for judicial redress, but would have power to issue any direction, order or writ including a writ in the nature of any high prerogative writ. This provision conferring on the Supreme Court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest possible terms shows the anxiety of the Constitution makers not to allow any procedural technicalities to stand in the way of enforcement of fundamental rights. This provision conferring on the Supreme Court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest possible terms shows the anxiety of the Constitution makers not to allow any procedural technicalities to stand in the way of enforcement of fundamental rights. The Constitution makers clearly intended that the Supreme Court should have the amplest power to issue whatever direction, order to writ may be appropriate in a given case for enforcement of a fundamental right." 20. The High Court also under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise such power for ends of justice. 21. At the same time it should be noted that the question whether the prosecution case in the instant matter is patently absurd or inherently improbable is an issue which has to be considered in the context of the petitioner's fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, the Writ Court will not entertain a prayer for quashing a criminal proceeding when the petitioner has an alternative remedy in Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction and that remedy cannot be said to be any less efficacious under ordinary circumstances. But when the question of enforcement of fundamental right comes up before the Writ Court the existence of an alternative remedy is not a matter to be taken into consideration and the Writ Court will proceed to consider the question of violation of fundamental right on the basis of material before the Court. In doing so, if the Court is required to consider the question as to what is the chances of ultimate conviction, in order to judge as to whether any useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing the prosecution to continue the Writ Court may have to go into the question of patent absurdity and/or inherent improbability of the prosecution case. In the light of the incontrovertible documents and other materials placed before it. It has, however, been contended by Mr. A. P. Chatterjee that this question as regards the prima facie merit of the prosecution case has already been considered by a Division Bench consisting of Barooah and Maitra, JJ in Criminal Revision Case No. 449 of 1979 when the writ petitioner had moved against the order of commitment of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. In this connection, Mr. A. P. Chatterjee that this question as regards the prima facie merit of the prosecution case has already been considered by a Division Bench consisting of Barooah and Maitra, JJ in Criminal Revision Case No. 449 of 1979 when the writ petitioner had moved against the order of commitment of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. In this connection, Mr. Chatterjee relied on the judgment of the Division Bench to show that such contention made by the accused was rejected by the Division Bench. 22. It was held in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Mohan Singh reported in AIR 1975 SC 1002 that the fact that a similar application for quashing a proceeding on a former occasion had been rejected by the High Court could be no bar to the quashing a proceeding at a later stage on a similar application. From the observations in paragraph 2 of the judgment it would appear that in that case the accused had made an earlier application for quashing the proceeding invoking the inherent power of the High Court. The High Court rejected it on the ground that the evidence was yet to be led and it was not desirable to interfere with the proceeding at that stage. Thereafter, the case was dragged on for a period of about one and a half years without any progress at all and a fresh application was made by the accused for quashing the proceedings invoking the inherent power of the High Court. It was also observed in that decision : "…………..Section 561A (of the Old Code) preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deem fit to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the facts and circumstances entitled to entertain a subsequent application of the respondent No. 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceedings against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing is necessary to secure the ends of justice. The High Court was in the facts and circumstances entitled to entertain a subsequent application of the respondent No. 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceedings against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing is necessary to secure the ends of justice. The facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application of the first respondent because despite the rejection of the earlier application of the first respondent, the prosecution had failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as in 1965 and the criminal case rested where it was "…………" for a period of over one and half years it was for this reason that, despite the earlier order dated 12th December, 1968 the High Court proceeded to consider the subsequent application of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 for the purpose of deciding whether it should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under s. 561A (of the Old Code). This, the High Court was perfectly entitled to do "………… we find that the order of the High Court was justified as no prima facie case appears to have been made out against the respondent nos. 1 and 2." 23. From the observations of the Supreme Court it would appear that in a situation closely similar to the one which we find in the present case, the Supreme Court approved of the order of quashing although on an earlier occasion the High Court had rejected such an application. The Supreme Court also considered the time lag between the first order and the second order which was one and half years only and upheld the order of the High Court quashing the proceeding on the ground that no prima facie case had been made out. In view of this decision it cannot be contended that there is any absolute bar to the reconsideration of the said issue. While in the case before the Supreme Court the reconsideration was by the High Court in the Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, in exercise of its inherent powers, in this case, the reconsideration is sought to be made in the writ jurisdiction. While in the case before the Supreme Court the reconsideration was by the High Court in the Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction, in exercise of its inherent powers, in this case, the reconsideration is sought to be made in the writ jurisdiction. For this purpose the jurisdiction of the Writ Court is certainly wider and the scope of enquiry is not fettered by any rules of technicality. 24. It is now necessary to advert to the decision of the Division Bench in the said Criminal Revision Case No. 449 of 1979. 25. In Criminal Revision Case No. 449 of 1979 (Ranjit Guha Neogi v. Smt. Archana Guha) which was disposed of by Borooah and Maitra, JJ the validity of the order dated December 20, 1978 passed by the then Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta in Case. No. C3285 of 1977 committing the accused persons to the City Sessions Court was challenged and a prayer was made for setting aside that order and for quashing the proceeding in respect of offence under ss. 166, 330/34, 331/34, 348/34 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears from the judgment of the said Division Bench that on the basis of the evidence of two doctors the Court came to the finding that there was no prima facie case under s. 331 of the Indian Penal Code which offence was the basis of the order of commitment and accordingly, the order of commitment dated December 20, 1978 was set aside. Thereafter, the Division Bench considered the following question : "………….Whether the case made out by the complainant and her witnesses is so patently absurd and/or inherently improbable that we should quash the entire proceeding ?" 26. The Division Bench relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagawwa v. Veranna, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1947 . In the light of the said decision of the Supreme Court the Division Bench observed as follows:– "………In order to decide whether the instant proceeding can be quashed on the aforesaid ground, we have to confine ourselves to the petition of complaint, the decision of the complainant and her witnesses and the documents exhibited on her behalf. We cannot look into any material which has been produced before us on behalf of the petitioner and which was not before the learned Magistrate, because till the stage of commitment an accused does not come into the picture." 27. We cannot look into any material which has been produced before us on behalf of the petitioner and which was not before the learned Magistrate, because till the stage of commitment an accused does not come into the picture." 27. It would thus appear that the Division Bench had to proceed on the basis of the materials which were before the learned Magistrate till the stage of commitment of the accused and could not take into consideration any other documents. On the basis of the said materials the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the allegations of the complainant on the basis of the said documents, as were before the learned Magistrate, at that stage could not be said to be ex facie absurd. It should also be noted that the Division Bench while remanding the matter to the learned Magistrate to proceed with the trial in accordance with law made it clear that the accused persons would be at liberty to urge the points raised before the Division Bench or such other points as may be available to them at an appropriate stage. 28. It now appears from the petition which was moved on behalf of Ranjit Guha Neogi before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, Calcutta on 22nd March, 1988 praying that the proceedings be dropped and for the discharge of the accused from the bail bond, that pursuant to the aforesaid liberty given by the Division Bench the contentions which had earlier been urged before the said Division Bench were raised before the learned Magistrate. Reference may be made to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the said petition which has been made Annexure 'N' to the writ petition. The allegation made in the said paragraphs are as follows:– "9. That this delay is defeating a speedy trial has not been occasioned by the absconding of the accused persons or by other obstructive and delaying tactics adopted by them by resorting to untenable proceedings. To come to the conclusion, the prosecution case and the contention of the defence about its patent absurdity and inherent improbability are stated below besides the other merits of the cause in favour of the defence:– On August 20, 1977, the complainant opposite party Sm. To come to the conclusion, the prosecution case and the contention of the defence about its patent absurdity and inherent improbability are stated below besides the other merits of the cause in favour of the defence:– On August 20, 1977, the complainant opposite party Sm. Archana Guha filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta against the petitioner Ranjit Guha Neogi alias Runu Guha Neogi and four others alleging the commission of offences under ss. 325, 331, 348 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate after perusing the complaint took cognizance. He thereafter examined the complainant and nine of her witnesses and by an order dated October 17, 1977 directed the issue of summons against the petitioner, who was named as accused no.1, under ss. 166, 330/34, 348/34 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. He also directed the issue of summons against the four other accused persons under more or less similar sections of the Indian Penal Code. By another order dated December 20, 1978 the learned Magistrate committed the petitioner and the other accused persons to the City Sessions Court, Calcutta for trial under ss. 166, 330/34, 331/34, 348/34 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. "10. That the allegations made in the petitioner of complaint filed by the opposite party against the petitioner and the other accused persons are briefly as follows:– "11. That the complainant resided at 7, Jawpur Road, Dum Dum along with her brother's wife Mrs. Latika Guha, her mother and the other family members and one Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee who was like a member of the family. On July 18, 1974 at about 01.30 hrs., her house was raided by a number of Police Officers, who said that they had come from Lal Bazar. The Police ransacked her entire room and carried out a search without calling any independent witnesses. Thereafter the complainant along with Mrs. Latika Guha and Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee were brought to Cossipore Police Station and in the morning of July 18, 1974, they were taken to the Special D. D. Cell at Lal Bazar whereby they were questioned. At about 10 a.m. on that day, the complainant along with Mrs. Latika Guha and Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee were taken to the room of the petitioner. The room led to the torture chamber Mrs. At about 10 a.m. on that day, the complainant along with Mrs. Latika Guha and Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee were taken to the room of the petitioner. The room led to the torture chamber Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee was first taken inside the said chamber and the complainant was taken a little while thereafter in order to show her how Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee was being tortured. The complainant was thereafter tortured. The petitioner burnt the soles of her feet and elbows with lighted cigarette ends after she was hung up on a pole with head downwards and feet upwards. At about 2/3 p.m. on the same day the complainant was removed to the Central Lock up at Lal Bazar and at about 4 p.m. she was again taken to the torture chamber and subjected to further torture by the petitioner and the other accused persons. On July 19, 1974 at about 11-30 a.m. they were all taken to Sealdah Court and made to sit in the chamber of one Mr. Sanyal, a Court Babu, for some time, but were not produced before the learned Magistrate. Thereafter, they were again brought back to Lal Bazar and the complainant was threatened and abused by the accused persons and thereafter all three of them were only acted to various forms of torture. This torture continued till July 20, 1974. As a result of the torture and the beating which the complainant received at the hands of the petitioner and the other accused persons, her lower limbs began to grow gradually weaker. This defect was observed by the complainant while she was confined in the jail and she was examined by the Jail Doctors, who accordingly, treated her. After her discharge from the criminal cases the complainant was detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act till May 3, 1979. Since November, 1976 the complainant had to take recourse to various types of treatment but the consistent medical opinion is that there will not be a complete recovery of the power of her lower limbs and there is no likelihood of her becoming normal and active and she has been crippled for life due to intense torture on her by the petitioner and the other accused persons. Though it now transpires that the complainant is leading a normal conjugal life with perfect condition of health in a foreign country and the opinions so given by the experts have been falsified." "Against the order of commitment, the matter was moved in the Hon'ble High Court and by an order dated 13.5.80 the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court Calcutta directed the Trial to be proceeded before the learned Magistrate excluding s. 331/34 of the Indian Penal Code." "12. That in support of the defence case it is submitted that the prosecution case as made out in the petition of complaint and through the witnesses is on the face of it false and is so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no reliance can be attributed on the prosecution charges pending against the petitioner. It is further submitted that the seizure list prepared after the search of the complainant's house on 18.7.74 shows that the search took place between 10.00 hrs. and 11.45 hrs. and various articles were seized in the presence of three independent witnesses. The said seizure list was also signed by the complainant Mrs. Latika Guha and Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee and the date 18.7.74 appeared under their signature. This according to the petitioner completely falsifies the case made out by the complainant that at about 01.30 hrs. on July 18, 1974 her house was raided and she along with Latika and Gouri Chatterjee were asked to accompany the police and they were taken to Cossipore Police Station and then to the Special D. D. Cell at Lal Bazar. In view of the aforesaid seizure list it must be clear that the complainant and her two associates could not have been taken to Lal Bazar or Cossipore Police Station before midday of July 18, 1974 and they could not have been subjected to the alleged torture from 10.00 a.m." "13. That it is further submitted that if the allegation of torture and the burning of the soles of the complainant's feet and the elbows be true, they would have produced visible marks which could have been easily noticed by the Magistrate before whom the complainant and her two companions were produced. That it is further submitted that if the allegation of torture and the burning of the soles of the complainant's feet and the elbows be true, they would have produced visible marks which could have been easily noticed by the Magistrate before whom the complainant and her two companions were produced. In this connection order sheet of the learned Police Magistrate at Sealdah dated 19.7.74 in connection with Ultadanga P. S. Case No. 108 dated 31.5.74 is quoted here which read as follows:– "Seen Police report Accused 3 to 5 (viz. Sm. Latika Mukherjee @ Guha, Sm. Archana Guha and Sm. Gouri Chatterjee) are produced in custody. I.O. prays for P. C. till 2.8.74. Allowed" "14. That it is submitted before the Learned Court that it would appear from the Magistrate's order sheets as well as from other relevant papers, including the applications for bail, which were moved on behalf of the complainant that there was no allegation of torture on her by the petitioner or the other accused persons. Although there was allegation of mere less torture and assault by a number of Police Officers on different dates there was no visible external injury on Archana Guha or her companions nor was any complaint made by them to their lawyers or even to the learned Magistrate before whom they were produced. No complaint was lodged by the complainant or by anybody else before the Advisory Board or in application before the Hon'ble High Court or in any other place from the Presidency Jail during her detention. "15. That for the first time in the month of September, 1975 Archana Guha complained about the weakness of her lower limbs i.e. after about 14 months from the date of alleged incidents and complained about torture in Presidency Jail (and not in Police Custody) in February 1976 i.e. after about 19 months from the dates of alleged incidents and the case was filed after about 3 years from the said dates. "16. That in view of the facts and circumstances stated above there is virtually no chance and/or probability to convict the accused persons recording the statements of the complainant and her witnesses after about 14 years from the date of alleged incident." 29. "16. That in view of the facts and circumstances stated above there is virtually no chance and/or probability to convict the accused persons recording the statements of the complainant and her witnesses after about 14 years from the date of alleged incident." 29. It further appears that the learned Magistrate in his order dated 29th March, 1988 which has been made Annexure 'O' to the writ petition did not take into consideration the said contentions of the writ petitioner as to the patent absurdity and inherent improbability of the case of the prosecution. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate recorded as follows:– "Record is put up for order. It appears that the accused no.1 by filing a petition on 22.3.88 has prayed for an order dropping the proceeding and discharge of the accused on the following grounds, namely, (1) the accused has a right to speedy public trial according to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and the instant case is pending for about 10 years 7 months which is beyond the outer space limit of 7 years fixed by Hon'ble High Court of Patna in several decisions. (2) Till this day examination in chief of the complainant has not been concluded and in view of the various judgments of Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court the instant case cannot be allowed to proceed for a day and further continuance of the case will tantamount to miscarriage of justice. (3) In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record and in view of the defence case pleaded in the petition filed on 22.3.88 there is virtually no chance or probability to convict the accused person and recording the statement of the complainant and other witnesses after about 14 years form the date of alleged incident will also tantamount to miscarriage of justice. (4) The delay in the trial has not been occasioned by the absconding of the accused persons or by other obstructive and delaying tactics adopted by them resorting to untenable proceedings." 30. (4) The delay in the trial has not been occasioned by the absconding of the accused persons or by other obstructive and delaying tactics adopted by them resorting to untenable proceedings." 30. The learned Magistrate however only considered the question of delay and came to the conclusions that "although there has been an inordinate delay in disposing of the case the complainant could not be held responsible for the same and as the accused also played a vital part in causing such delay, though not by absconding and may be in certain stages in assertion of his legal right, yet the accused could not claim for dropping the proceeding and for an order of discharge on that ground.". 31. It is clear from the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench that the Division Bench could not refer to or rely upon any document other than those which had been placed before the learned Magistrate by the complainant. At that stage there was no scope for the accused to place any document before the learned Magistrate. At Their Lordships of the Division Bench in exercise of the Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction were considering the legality and propriety of the order of the learned Magistrate, Their Lordships had confined their attention only to the record of the learned Magistrate and whatever was not on record of the learned Magistrate was not taken into consideration by the Division Bench. But the Writ Court in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution is not concerned with the legality or propriety of the order of the learned Magistrate. The writ petitioner has challenged the continuation of the proceeding mainly on the ground that to allow the proceeding to continue any further would constitute violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 32. The contention is based on the following three main grounds : (a) That in view of the adverse publicity and hostile publication, demonstration etc it is not possible for the accused to get a fair trial. (b) The trial has been pending for about 11 years in respect of alleged incidents of July, 1974. The prosecution is still at an initial stage and it may take many more years in future for the trial to reach its conclusion. This is contrary to the principles of fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (b) The trial has been pending for about 11 years in respect of alleged incidents of July, 1974. The prosecution is still at an initial stage and it may take many more years in future for the trial to reach its conclusion. This is contrary to the principles of fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (c) The allegations in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable as would be evident from the documents annexed to the writ petition are in the nature of public documents and which can be translated into relevant and admissible evidence. It is contended in paragraph 42 of the writ petition that on a cumulative effect of the aforesaid three facts the case should be quashed. 33. In support of the contention the allegations are patently absurd and inherently improbable certain documents have been annexed to the writ petition. These documents were also sought to be relied upon before the Division Bench, but the Division Bench ignored the said documents for reasons as already stated above. 34. It is first of all necessary to decide as to whether it is open to the writ Court to look into the said documents. As already stated above, the writ Court in an application for enforcement of fundamental right is not really concerned with the legality or propriety of the order of the leaned Magistrate. There is no procedural embargo on the writ Court which would confine the attention of the Court only to the records of the criminal case which is sought to be quashed. When a citizen approaches the Writ Court for enforcement of the fundamental right and one of the contention before the writ Court is that on the basis of incontrovertible documents the case of the complainant is patently absurd and inherently improbable the writ Court is certainly entitled to consider the said documents and, if necessary, the writ Court can also call for the relevant records when such records are in the custody of the public authorities. In the case the respondents did not leek to dispute the documents annexed to the writ petition. These documents, which appear to be beyond dispute, can certainly be taken into consideration by the writ Court. In the case the respondents did not leek to dispute the documents annexed to the writ petition. These documents, which appear to be beyond dispute, can certainly be taken into consideration by the writ Court. 35 The position of complaint of the complainant on the basis of which the criminal case was initiated has been made annexure 'A' to the writ petition. The salient features of the said complaint are as follows:– (a) The complainant on the night of 17th July, 1974 was in deep sleep in her bed room at her Dum Dum residence at about 1.30 a.m. on 18th July, 1974 her residence was raided by a number of police officers who ransacked the entire room and asked the complainant and others to accompany the police. She was taken in the morning of 18th July, 1974 to Cossipore Police Station and from there to Lalbazar at about 10 a.m. the complainant along with Mrs. Latika Guha and Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee were taken to the room of the writ petitioner. That room laid to the torture Chamber. In the tortured chamber all three of them were severely tortured by being hung upon on poll upside down with intermittent beating on her sole by a club by the police officers at the instance of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner frequently burnt the soles and elbows of the complainant with cigarette ends and also burnt the nails of her fingers. This continued up to 2/3 p.m. and was again resumed at about 4 p.m. (b) On 19th July, 1974 she was taken to the Sealdah Court at about 11.30 a.m. but was made to seat in the room of the Court Babu, being made an accused implicated in case no. 108 dated 31.5.74. She was never produced before any Magistrate. She was again tortured in similar manner after her return from Court which continued till 21st July, 1974. She was again taken to Court on 2nd August, 1974 but was not produced before any Magistrate. However, on 8th August, 1974 when she was taken to Court she found her elder brother and also a lawyer who appeared on her behalf. The learned Magistrate on that date allowed her to be sent to Jail custody. But she was not sent to Jail custody till 13th August, 1974. However, on 8th August, 1974 when she was taken to Court she found her elder brother and also a lawyer who appeared on her behalf. The learned Magistrate on that date allowed her to be sent to Jail custody. But she was not sent to Jail custody till 13th August, 1974. (c) While in jail her lower limbs began to grow weaker and weaker as a result of physical torture perpetrated on her by the writ petitioner. She was examined by Doctor B. R. Sengupta and she was admitted to S. S. K. M. Hospital on 22nd December, 1975. She was discharged from the said Hospital on 24th January, 1976. She was again admitted to Emergency Department of the Medical College Hospital, Calcutta on 9th February, 1976 and was released after 17th November, 1976. Thereafter she was released on parole. She was released from MISA detention on 3rd May, 1977. She has been crippled for life because of such torture. 36. It is contended by the writ petitioner in paragraph 5 of the writ petition that on the basis of certain contemporaneous documents and records it would appear that the said allegations are patently absurd and inherently improbable, in particular the following materials have been referred to. 36A. The seizure list of which the xerox copy has been annexed at page 135 of the writ petition shows that on 18th July, 1974 between 10 hours to 11.45 hours the residence of Smt. Archana Guha was searched by the Police and several documents were recovered. It has been stated in paragraph 5(b) of the writ petition that the said seizure list was signed by Sm. Archana Guha the respondent No. 5 and by Latika Guha and Gouri Chatterjee as also by the Investigating Officer. It was also alleged that the said seizure list was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sealdah on 19th July, 1974 as would be apparent from the Court's seal and signature appearing thereon bearing that date. A report submitted by the officer concerned to the learned Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sealdah has been annexed to the writ petition at page 137. The said report is in respect of the said search. It appears that by the said report the officer concerned was praying for permission of the learned Magistrate to keep the seized documents in the Police custody for the purpose of investigation. The said report is in respect of the said search. It appears that by the said report the officer concerned was praying for permission of the learned Magistrate to keep the seized documents in the Police custody for the purpose of investigation. The last sentence of the said report reads : "Original Seizure list is attached herewith". There is also a seal of the Court of the learned Magistrate and the seal of the Commissioner of Police. 37. The said seizure list is stated to have been signed by the complainant Sm. Archana Guha and also by Mrs. Latika Guha and Mrs. Gouri Chatterjee. The petitioner's case is that this seizure list completely falsifies the case made out by the complainant that about 1.30 hours on July 18, 1974 her house was raided and she was taken by the police to Cossipore Police Station. It is contended that this fact also falsifies the allegation that on 18th July, 1974 at about 10 a.m. she was being subjected to torture at Lalbazar. 38. From the order sheets of the learned Magistrate which have been annexed to the writ petition it appears that Smt. Archana Guha, the respondent No. 5 was duly produced before the learned Magistrate in connection with the cases in which she had figured as an accused and that at no point of time after her arrest on 18th July, 1974 till the filing of the complaint she alleged before any Magistrate that she had been tortured by the police. On a perusal of the said order sheets of the learned Magistrate it would appear that she was produced before the learned Magistrate in connection with the Ultadnaga Police Station Case No. 108 dated 31st May, 1974 and on the prayer of the Investigation Officer she was sent to police custody till 2nd August, 1974 and by an order of the learned Magistrate she was directed to be sent to jail custody. She was again produced on 23rd August, 1974 and was sent to jail custody. On 20th September, 1974 a bail petition was moved on behalf of the respondent No. 5 obviously by a lawyer which was rejected by the learned Magistrate. On 30th September, 1974 on the report of the Investigation Officer, the complainant was discharged from the case. She was again produced on 23rd August, 1974 and was sent to jail custody. On 20th September, 1974 a bail petition was moved on behalf of the respondent No. 5 obviously by a lawyer which was rejected by the learned Magistrate. On 30th September, 1974 on the report of the Investigation Officer, the complainant was discharged from the case. In connection with the Tollygunge Police Station Cases No. 951/73 the complainant was produced before the learned Magistrate on 2nd August, 1974 and was remanded to police custody till 8th August, 1974. On 8th August, 1974 she was again produced before the learned Magistrate and was granted bail. On 30th September, 1974 she was discharged from the case. It does not appear from the said order sheet that any complaint was made to the learned Magistrate that she had been tortured. 39. In this connection reference may be made to s. 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is set out below:–– "Examination of arrested person by medical practitioner at the request of the arrested person––When a person who is arrested, whether on a charge or otherwise, alleged, at the time when he is produced before a magistrate or at any time during the period of his detention in custody that the examination of his body will afford evidence which will disprove the commission by him of any offence or which will establish the commission by any other person of any offence against his body, the Magistrate shall, if requested by the arrested person so to do direct the examination of the body of such person by a registered medical practitioner unless the Magistrate considers that the request is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice." 40. Thus the right has been given to the accused person when he is produced before a magistrate or at any time when he is under custody, to have his body medically examined with a view to enabling him to establish that the offence with which he is charged was not committed by him or that he was subjected to physical injury. 41. It is evidence from the order sheets of the learned Magistrate that no such complaint was ever made by the respondent no. 41. It is evidence from the order sheets of the learned Magistrate that no such complaint was ever made by the respondent no. 5 when she was produced before the learned Magistrate and not even when she was represented by a lawyer who had moved the prayer for bail on her behalf. If she had been really subjected to such torture as the burning of her sole, elbows and finger nails it was expected that there would have been visible marks of injury on her person. So also alleged torture as described so vividly in the petition of complaint could not have been inflicted without producing some external injuries on her person. It is surprising that she did not make any complaint to the Magistrate, not even when she was produced before the Magistrate in the presence of her elder brother and her lawyer. Her allegation that she was not produced before the learned Magistrate on 19th July, 1974 and on 2nd August, 1974 is also to be disbelieved in view of the order sheet of the learned Magistrate which records that she was produced before the Court. 42. The petitioner is also justified in contending that an arrested person who had been subjected to such torture as alleged in the petition of complaint even if she could not for some reason inform the learned Magistrate about such torture by the police, it is highly improbable that she would wait till 20th August, 1977 i.e. for more than 33 years to make her complaint. In the meantime she was in jail custody since 13th August, 1974 as stated by her in the petition of complaint. She was admitted to SSKM Hospital on 12th December, 1975 where she stayed till 24th January, 1976 and was again admitted in the Medical College Hospital, Calcutta on 9th February, 1976 where she stayed till 17th November, 1976. She was released on parole on 17th November, 1976 and was released from MISA detention since 3rd May, 1977. It is well known that a person in the jail custody is not within the clutches of the police and under the Jail Code a prisoner has sufficient opportunity to move the Court for redressal of his or her grievance. She moved the High Court while in jail custody for a writ of Habeas Corpus against her detention under MISA. It is well known that a person in the jail custody is not within the clutches of the police and under the Jail Code a prisoner has sufficient opportunity to move the Court for redressal of his or her grievance. She moved the High Court while in jail custody for a writ of Habeas Corpus against her detention under MISA. She had obviously been produced before the Advisory Board, in connection with MISA. But it does not appear that anywhere she had made any complaint as to torture by the Police while in the Police custody. It appears from the judgment of the Division Bench referred to above that the Division Bench observed as follows:–– "Our attention was drawn to the hospital records and in particular the document No. 10 which shows that Smt. Archana Guha told the Doctor that the underwent torture when she was in the Presidency Jail. The said document, which is the hospital sheet of Smt. Archana Guha also shows that she was admitted into the hospital on 9.2.76 at about 7.45 p.m. and still then there was no complaint………" 43. If she had really made any such allegation before the Doctor in the hospital that she underwent torture when she had been in the Presidency Jail it would certainly be inconsistent with her case that she was tortured by a police officer while in police custody in Lalbazar as sought to be made out in the petition of complaint. 44. From the documents annexed to the writ petition it also appears, more particularly from the hospital record that Smt. Archana Guha was suspected to be suffering from bartholin becess or bartholin cyst which was detected towards the end of 1975 and for which she had to undergo an operation. Whether the weakness of the lower limbs as complained of in the petition of complaint was the result of the alleged assault in July, 1974 or it was the aftereffect of the said disorder and of the said operation, is a matter which cannot be decided one way or the other in this jurisdiction. But from the documents annexed to the writ petition and from the averments made therein it would appear that she has now recovered and has not become crippled for the rest of her life as apprehended in the petition of complaint. But from the documents annexed to the writ petition and from the averments made therein it would appear that she has now recovered and has not become crippled for the rest of her life as apprehended in the petition of complaint. It is also stated that she is now a married woman having a Danish Citizen and settled in Denmark. 45. The aforesaid facts and circumstances amply demonstrate the case of Sm. Archana Guha, the respondent No. 5 suffers from serious infirmities and appears to be vulnerable to an attack on the ground of improbability and absurdity. In a criminal case the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt and the prosecution is required to prove the case beyond any reasonable doubt. If the trial is allowed to continue the documents which are now annexed to the writ petition will be brought on record without any difficulty as most of them are public documents and not disputed documents. In the face of the said documents whatever oral evidence may be adduced by the prosecution witnesses it may be difficult for the prosecution to succeed in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. While it is not open to the High Court at this stage to embark upon an enquiry into the relative merits and demerits of the prosecution case and of the defence case or to make an assessment of evidence, taking a broad over all view of the aforesaid materials and taking into consideration the infirmities in the prosecution as pointed cut above, it seems extremely doubtful as to whether the case will at all result in a conviction. Even if the prosecution is able to make out a case on the basis of probability that will not be sufficient to sustain a conviction as there would still remain various areas of doubt of which the benefit must go to the accused. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that the chances of an ultimate conviction are rather bleak. 46. The next contention is that the continuance of the proceedings pending for more than 10 years relating to an alleged incident which allegedly took place more than 13 years ago is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that the chances of an ultimate conviction are rather bleak. 46. The next contention is that the continuance of the proceedings pending for more than 10 years relating to an alleged incident which allegedly took place more than 13 years ago is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. This speedy trial is one of the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution and if on the facts and circumstances of this case the proceeding is allowed to continue which is still pending at the initial stage will amount to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. This contention has to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances already narrated earlier and in the light of the decisions cited from the Bar. 47. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC 597 the Supreme Court explained and gave a new meaning to the contents of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was held that the "law" within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India must be a law which fulfills the requirements of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution. In other words, the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness and must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna reported in AIR 1979 SC 1360 , the Supreme Court held : "That no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as a reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, there be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21." 48. The same view reiterated in Kadra Pehadiya v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1981 SC 939 . 49. In S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Limited reported in AIR 1986 SC 289 the Supreme Court was considering a case which went from the Calcutta High Court. In this case the accused was acquitted by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The High Court after setting aside that order gave an order for retrial. 49. In S. Guin v. Grindlays Bank Limited reported in AIR 1986 SC 289 the Supreme Court was considering a case which went from the Calcutta High Court. In this case the accused was acquitted by the Metropolitan Magistrate. The High Court after setting aside that order gave an order for retrial. In paragraph 3 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed : "After going through the Judgment of the Magistrate and of the High Court we feel that whatever might have been the error committed by the Magistrate, in the circumstances of the case, it was not just and proper for the High Court to have remanded the case for fresh trial when the order of acquittal had been passed nearly 6 years before the judgment of the High Court. The pendency of the criminal appeal for 6 years before the High Court is itself a regrettable feature of this case. In addition to it, the order directing retrial has resulted in serious prejudice to the appellants. A fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse of judicial process." 50. In Rakesh Saxena v. State through CBI reported in AIR 1987 SC 740 , by a short judgment with Supreme Court quashed the charges in a criminal case on the twin considerations of delay and doubtfulness of an ultimate conviction. The Supreme Court observed as follows:–– "We have carefully considered the various aspects of the case and we are of the view that having regard to the nature of the dispute and the fact that the offence, if any, are alleged to have been committed more than 6 years ago and the appellant was merely a trader at the lowest rung of the hierarchy in the foreign Exchange Division of the Bank and not a highly placed officer and the trial is bound to occupy the time of the Court of first instances for not less than 2 or 3 years in view of the complicated nature of the case and even then, it is extremely doubtful whether it will be at all result in conviction, no useful purpose will be served by allowing the prosecutions to continue." 51. On the basis of the earlier Supreme Court decisions a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in The State v. Maksudan Singh reported in AIR 1986 Patna 38 held as follows : "Once the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 has been violated, then the accused is entitled to unconditional release and the charges leveled against him would fall to the ground. The right of speedy and public trial does not arise or depend on the conviction and sentence of the accused… An accused person on the ground of inordinate delay should claim the right long before the conclusion of the trial and before the stage of holding him guilty or otherwise arises." 52. Another Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1986 Patna 324 reiterated the same view and even sought to prescribe an outer limit of 7 years of delay which will be sufficient to quash the proceeding as any further continuation thereof would violate the Constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case admittedly the proceeding has been pending since 20th August, 1977. It is also an admitted position that the prosecution relates to an alleged incident of July, 1974. 53. It has been contended by Mr. A. P. Chatterjee appearing for Sm. Archana Guha, the respondent no. 5 that the writ petitioner himself is responsible for a substantial part of this delay as he had from time to time taken recourse to various proceedings in the High Court and in the Supreme Court which had resulted in stay of the proceedings. It is necessary first of all to find out as to what extent the writ petitioner is responsible for the delay that has already taken place in the instant case. Admittedly when the order of commitment was made by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, the petitioner moved the High Court for quashing the commitment order and in that connection there was a Criminal Revision Case No. 449 of 1979 for which the proceeding in the trial court was directed to be stayed. 54. This Criminal revisional case which was commenced on 22nd January, 1979 was disposed of by the Division Bench on 13th May, 1980. 54. This Criminal revisional case which was commenced on 22nd January, 1979 was disposed of by the Division Bench on 13th May, 1980. From the judgment and order of the Division Bench it would appear that the impugned commitment order was set aside by the High Court. As such, it cannot be said that the proceeding was not a tenable one or that the writ petitioner was not justified in moving the High Court against the said order of commitment the consideration of speedy trial cannot compel an accused to submit to an order which is not tenable in law and to that extent the accused is certainly entitled to move before the superior court against the order by which he is aggrieved. 55. It appears that the writ petitioner again came to the High Court challenging the appearance of Mr. A. P. Chattterjee as the lawyer for the prosecution and obtained a Rule and an order of stay which was disposed of on 29th November, 1983. In this process no hearing could take place between 8th November, 1981 and 29th November, 1983 i.e. for 2 years 21 days. Again the writ petitioner moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court and obtained an order of stay in connection with the Special Leave Petition and that order of stay was in force between 11th September, 1984 and 19th November, 1985 i.e. one year 2 months 8 days. 56. It is necessary to take into consideration at this stage while considering the question of delay that the time taken by a court to dispose of an application should not be attributed to the litigant. Because of the pressure on the Court's business, quite often the Court is unable to take up a matter which is otherwise ready for hearing for a long time. For instance, when the criminal revisional application was moved by the petitioner on 22nd January, 1979 the fact that it was disposed of by the Division Bench on 13th May, 1980 and not earlier is due to a reason with which the litigant is not directly concerned unless by seeking several adjournments the litigant has delayed the hearing. This delay is due to the Courts' pressure of business and procedural reasons and for this delay it will not be fair to make any party responsible. This delay is due to the Courts' pressure of business and procedural reasons and for this delay it will not be fair to make any party responsible. It has not been alleged that the writ petitioner had taken several adjournments in the High Court to cause delay in the disposal of matter in the High Court. As such, even if he is held responsible for having interrupted the hearing by moving the High Court the writ petitioner cannot be held to be solely responsible. But even assuming that the writ petitioner is to be held responsible for the period during which the matter was pending before the superior courts be should not be denied the benefit of a speedy trial only because he had to seek the redressal of his grievances in the superior Court but failed to obtain the relief sought by him. 57. It would thus appear that if in deciding whether there has been no undue delay in this case, the time taken by the accused in respect of a proceeding which ended against him is at all to be excluded, these two periods viz. 2 years 21 days and 1 year 2 months 8 days making a total of 3 years 2 months 29 days or about 3 years 3 months should only be excluded. Since the case has been pending for about 10 years 8 months, even if the period of 3 years 3 month, is excluded, there would still remain a delay of 7 years 5 months. For this delay the writ petitioner cannot be held responsible. This delay must have been occasioned partly due to the absence of the complainant who admittedly lives abroad and it appears from the writ petition that having married a foreigner she is now settled in Denmark and this is not disputed. Another part of the delay must have been caused due to the procedural reasons including the absence of the trial Magistrate, long adjournments and various other reasons for which the case cannot be disposed of expeditiously by the Court. 58. In this context it should not be lost sight of that even if the case is allowed to continue it will take quite a few years more to reach the final stage. As yet the charge has not been framed and as yet the complainant is being examined in chief before charge. 58. In this context it should not be lost sight of that even if the case is allowed to continue it will take quite a few years more to reach the final stage. As yet the charge has not been framed and as yet the complainant is being examined in chief before charge. Under the procedure to be followed for the trial of warrant case as directed by the Barooah and Mitra, JJ, the Trial Court will proceed according to the provisions of ss. 244 to 247 of the Code. This means that first the evidence of the prosecution will be taken then the Magistrate will consider whether the accused can be discharged or not and if the accused is not to be discharged the Magistrate will frame a charge. After framing of such charge the accused will cross-examine the prosecution witnesses already examined. There may be further witnesses for the prosecution who may be examined and cross-examined. Then the stage will come for examination of the accused persons under s. 313 of the said Code. After that, the accused may adduce his evidence in defence if he chooses to do so. Thereafter, the arguments of the two sides will be heard and after that there will be judgment of the Magistrate. It is also possible that the accused may genuinely feel aggrieved by the charge framed by the Magistrate and may be advised to move the superior Court against the charge. The accused may also be compelled to move the superior Court under any procedural illegality or irregularity in course of the trial. These possibilities cannot be overlooked. The accused being entitled in law to come to the superior Court for any bona fide grievance during the progress of the trial may do so and it is not possible to restrict his rights in that behalf. Thus it is most uncertain as to how long a trial will continue and there cannot be any doubt that it will continue for an additional 3/4 years. It is well known that in the Courts of the learned Magistrates the dates are fixed according to the diary of the Magistrate concerned which is usually congested and the interval between one date and another is usually more than a mouth. So a long time is expected to be taken. 59. It is well known that in the Courts of the learned Magistrates the dates are fixed according to the diary of the Magistrate concerned which is usually congested and the interval between one date and another is usually more than a mouth. So a long time is expected to be taken. 59. While the decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court will not permit any criminal proceeding to remain pending for more than 7 years which has been suggested as the outer limit of the Constitutional requirement of speedy trial it would appear that the Supreme Court in quashing the criminal case which are pending for a long time on the ground of delay has also to take into consideration another factor viz. possibility of ultimate conviction. In judging this possibility, the Supreme Court did not follow any rigid principle but has taken an over all view of the matter in the light of the materials placed before the Court. It will, therefore, be reasonable to conclude that ordinarily mere passage of time without anything else may not by itself be sufficient to quash a criminal proceeding which is pending for a long time, but the Court should also take into consideration the nature of the allegations, nature of the materials on which prosecution seeks to rely and other relevant factors to come to the conclusion on a prima facie basis as to whether the chance of an ultimate conviction is strong or bleak. Where it would appear upon such consideration that the chance of an ultimate conviction is not quite strong that fact, coupled with factum of actual delay may provide a ground for quashing the proceeding on the salutary principle that for the ends of justice and in order to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court the prosecution which has already been pending for a quite long time and apparently does not have strong chance of resulting any order of conviction should not be permitted to continue any further as it would be unreasonable to do so. 60. Another contention has to disposed of. It is the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the delay in completion of proceedings is mainly attributable to the accused and accordingly the accused cannot ask for quashing of the proceedings on the ground of such delay. 60. Another contention has to disposed of. It is the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the delay in completion of proceedings is mainly attributable to the accused and accordingly the accused cannot ask for quashing of the proceedings on the ground of such delay. It is only when the delay is not attributable to the accused and the delay is caused by the prosecution, the accused may legitimately pray that the proceedings should not be allowed to continue which would cause unnecessary harassment and prejudice. Mr. Chatterjee has also set out the statistics from the order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate to emphasize that the delay in this case is mainly attributable to the accused. In my view, this approach is wholly erroneous. An accused, aggrieved by any order at any stage of the proceeding can move the higher court for redress of his grievance, if any. If he does so and obtains any interim order of stay, can it be said that the delay, because of the stay, is attributable to the accused? If the contention of Mr. Chatterjee is accepted, the delay will be attributable to the Court. The stay which was granted by the Division Bench of this Court was on contest and such stay would not have been granted had there been no case. As indicated earlier, the Division Bench quashed the proceedings challenged. The Supreme Court also granted stay in the Special Leave Petition by the accused. It is not the case of the complainant that by taking adjournments after adjournments the accused delayed the hearing of the case either before this Court or the Supreme Court. He has taken recourse to the remedy provided under the law. In such case it is immaterial whether it is the accused or the complainant who moved this Court and obtained the stay of further proceedings. The fact remains that 14 years have already passed from the date of alleged occurrence and more than 10 years have rolled on after the complaint was made by the complainant. In my view, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and the Patna High Court will apply to the facts of the case irrespective of the fact whether a part of the delay is attributable to the interim order of stay passed by the Courts. In my view, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and the Patna High Court will apply to the facts of the case irrespective of the fact whether a part of the delay is attributable to the interim order of stay passed by the Courts. Speed is no doubt highly desirable where the issue relates to torture of a woman in police custody. But expedition should not be achieved at the cost of the legal rights of an accused. In my view, delay in this case would cause considerable practical difficulties and may even constitute a hidden form of arbitrariness. 61. In the premises, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing the prosecution to continue, more particularly, when the complaint was itself a stale complaint relating to the incidents alleged to have been occurred some 3 years prior to the making of the complaint and the more important fact that the proceeding has already continued for more than 10 years without there being any substantial progress as a result of which the case is still pending at its initial stage in which the complainant is being examined-in-chief before the framing of charge. 62. The writ petitioner has also urged that he cannot get a fair trial in any Court in West Bengal in view of the hostile publicity in the press and propaganda including the demonstration, distribution of leaflets etc. against him. In support of this contention several documents have been annexed to the writ petition. It was pointed out by Mr. A. P. Chatterjee that on an application under Article 227 of the Constitution made by Ajkal Publication Ltd., Monoranjan Mallick, J. has already given certain directions in the matter of press reporting in connection with the said proceeding. Mr. Chatterjee's contention is that after such direction of the High Court, the writ petitioner should not have any grievance in the matter. On behalf of the writ petitioner it was contended that even after the said order of the High Court adverse publicity in the Press have been going on unabated. It was also pointed out that the order of Mr. Justice Mallick relates only to the reporting of the judicial proceeding and cannot prevent the press from publishing articles and stories, nor can the said order prevent any one from distributing leaflets and holding demonstration. Mr. It was also pointed out that the order of Mr. Justice Mallick relates only to the reporting of the judicial proceeding and cannot prevent the press from publishing articles and stories, nor can the said order prevent any one from distributing leaflets and holding demonstration. Mr. Chatterjee contended that in that event there may be proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act for interference with the course of justice. 63. While it is true that prejudicing fair trial is a serious matter and will certainly lead to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India but that cannot be a ground for quashing a criminal proceeding. The writ petitioner may avail of his remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or under the Constitution by seeking transfer of the case from West Bengal to any other State. The writ petitioner may also proceed against the persons responsible for such adverse publicity by initiating proceeding in the nature of contempt. But the only relevant aspect of this matter is that such proceeding either for transfer or for contempt may lead to further delay in the disposal of the case. Whether the case will ultimately be transferred or not cannot be anticipated at this stage. But the very proceeding for transfer may itself be a source of further delay and that is what matters in the context of the aforesaid discussion. 64. Taking an overall view of the matter and particularly having regard to the delay that has already taken place and is further likely to take place if the proceeding is allowed to continue, coupled with the inherent infirmities in the prosecution case which make the chance of an ultimate conviction rather bleak, conclusion is irresistible that the proceeding if allowed to continue any further, it will lead to violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and, as such, the proceeding should be quashed. 65. Before I part with this case, I have to make some observations regarding the publication may in certain papers and journals on the merits of the case. These publications are meant to prejudice the mind of the Court against the accused. From the copies of the publications annexed to the writ petition it appears that demonstration was also staged by Association for Protection of Democratic Rights outside Bankshall Court for speedy trial. These publications are meant to prejudice the mind of the Court against the accused. From the copies of the publications annexed to the writ petition it appears that demonstration was also staged by Association for Protection of Democratic Rights outside Bankshall Court for speedy trial. Leaflet was issued demanding suspension of the petitioner for "inhuman torture on Sm. Archana Guha by the petitioner, a notorious police officer". It further appears that the learned Counsel for the complainant also made certain comments and remarks on the merits of the case pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. No Court can permit a trial by newspapers. Unfortunately, those publications have proceeded on the assumption of correctness of the case made out by the complainant, which ought not to have been done. An accused is also entitled to protection of law. I may only refer to the following observation of Lord Reading, L.C.J. in R. v. Empire News Ltd. (1920) Times 20th January : "The Courts should not permit the investigation of murder to be taken out of the hands of the proper authorities and to be carried on by newspapers. The liberty of the individual, even when he was suspected of crime and indeed even more so when he was charged with crime, must be protected, and it was the function of that Court to prevent the publication of articles, which were likely to cause prejudice." 66. I may also refer to the observation of Lord Chief Justice Goddard in "Daily Mirror" case. In that case one Haigh was charged with the murder of a rich and elderly widow and was about to be tried for offence of murder. The "Daily Mirror" of London gave the history of the prisoner with lucid and horrifying details of a number of other murders said to have been committed by him according to the newspaper. There Lord Chief Justice Goddard observed as follows : "There never has been a case approaching such gravity as this. It is of a scandalous and wicked character……..no more was known than that he was charged with murder. There Lord Chief Justice Goddard observed as follows : "There never has been a case approaching such gravity as this. It is of a scandalous and wicked character……..no more was known than that he was charged with murder. On March 4, three editions of the "Daily Mirror" contained articles and photographs and headings in the largest possible type, of a character which this Court can only describe s a disgrace to English journalism, as violating every principles of justice and fair-play which it has generally been the pride of this country to extend to the worst of criminals." 67. It may also be placed on record that a group of persons allegedly belonging to the Association for Protection Democratic Rights came to my Chamber and demanded that the judgment in this case be delivered without any delay. In their approach and request there was a veiled threat. But an attitude of calm dignity has to be maintained by the Court. I may usefully refer to the following observation made by the learned Judge in Ram Narain v. J. O. Gyanpur reported in 1965 (2) Cr. L. J. 268. There the learned Judge observed : "These and many other incidents in Courts show that judges remain unmoved by small incidents and ignore lapses of language and decorum by litigants…… This is as it should be, for the judicial process, like the great caravan in the Persian proverb, proceeds and passed on without taking notice of occasional barking here and there." 68. I cannot also trouble myself with this occasional barking. 69. For the reasons aforesaid, this application succeeds. The Rule is made absolute. The impugned proceedings are quashed. Let appropriate Writs be issued. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute; impugned proceedings quashed.