Judgment :- 1. The C.M.A. was allowed by this Court and the judgment of the District Judge in A. S.343 of 1981 remanding the case to the trial Court was set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court were confirmed. 2. Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of her right to use the plaint B schedule pathway as the only access to plaint A schedule property and also for the removal of the wall constructed in the plaint B schedule pathway to prevent her ingress and egress to her property. Relief for mandatory injunction was also sought for in the suit. The trial Court decreed the suit and held that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and mandatory injunction. 3. This Court held that the District Judge was not justified in remanding the case in view of the specific stand of defendants 3 and 4 in the case. The third defendant (Kerala State Housing Board) admitted in the written statement that the roads inside the colony were surrendered to the Corporation of Trivandrum in order to provide street light, drainage, water connections etc. at the letter's expense. Third defendant further stated that only in case the roads were surrendered to the Corporation the above facilities would be provided by the Corporation at its cost and it is the duty of the Corporation to maintain the road. Fourth defendant (Corporation of Trivandrum) made the assurance that it will conduct proper enquiry and take action against the persons responsible for the unauthorised construction. Corporation claimed that it is vested with statutory powers to demolish the unauthorised construction and asserted that it will not hesitate to take necessary action. dw.1 admitted in evidence that the road was surrendered to the Corporation. 4. Petitioner contends that even if the road was surrendered to the 4th defendant by the 3rd defendant it would not amount to any vesting in the Corporation and therefore the order of remand by the Court below did not warrant interference. As the existence of plaint B schedule pathway cannot be denied and as both the 3rd and 4th defendants admitted that the said pathway surrendered to the 4th defendant this Court in the judgment under review held that it is difficult to accept the contention of defendants 1 and 2 that the said pathway can only be used by the inmates of the housing colony. Hence this Court held that there was no necessity to remand the case as done by the lower appellate Court. 5. In the review petition the main contention is that this Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case finally as has been done. 0.41 R.23 of the C.P.C. enables the appellate Court to remand a case to the lower Court. The appellate Court by remanding the case can direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded. O.43 R.1(u) makes the order under R.23 of O.41 CPC. remanding a case appealable provided that an appeal would lie from the decree of the appellate Court. S.107 CPC. prescribes the powers of the appellate Court. An appellate Court has the power to determine a case finally, to remand a case, to frame issues and refer them for trial and to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. There is nothing in 0.43 R.1 (u) which provides for an appeal from an order under 0.41 R.23 remanding a case confining the power of the appellate Court to setting aside the order of remand and precluding it from determining the case finally if on its findings, that can be done. When an appeal is heard against order of remand the appellate Court can definitely set aside the order of remand and come to its own conclusions. There is no merit in the contention that the powers of the appellate Court can be exercised only to ascertain whether the remand is proper or not. The appellate Court can definitely consider the propriety of the remand and in case it is found as a result of such determination that the suit itself can be finally disposed of, it is really not necessary to remand the case to the lower appellate Court to enter Findings on other issues. As the appellate Court has all the powers under S.107 CPC. to determine a case finally it does not stand to reason to hold that its powers against an order of remand by the lower appellate Court are circumscribed by the consideration of the correctness or impropriety of the remand order only. The contention in the review petition that this Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case finally is devoid of any merit. Madhavan Pillai v. Ebrahim (1964 KLT. 313) is a direct authority on the point. 6. The contention in the review petition that this Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case finally is devoid of any merit. Madhavan Pillai v. Ebrahim (1964 KLT. 313) is a direct authority on the point. 6. Other points urged in the review petitions are all in the nature of attacks on the findings in the judgment. Such a course is available only by filing an appeal. Review of the judgment provided under 0.47 Rule i means judicial examination of the case in certain specified and prescribed circumstances. Rehearing of parent proceedings as if it is an appeal cannot be allowed when a review petition is heard. Grounds on which review can be urged are: discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Review can also be made on any other sufficient reason. The review is not a routine procedure. The petitioner must definitely establish material error manifest on the face of the earlier order resulting in miscarriage of justice. The grounds which can be urged in a petition for review are really different from the grounds which can be urged in appeal. Reappraisal of evidence is not permissible when review petition is heard. As specific power is conferred on the Court by the provisions of the Code it has no inherent power to allow a review petition. To succeed in a review petition the petitioner must affirmatively establish sufficient grounds to invoke 0.47 Role 1 CPC. Under the guise of a review petition the entire matter once decided cannot be re-heard, and decided afresh. It is well settled by a long line of decisions that a party is not entitled to seek a review of judgment merely for the purpose of re-hearing and fresh decision of the case. In N. I. Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980-45 STC 212) the Supreme Court held as follows: "The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. In N. I. Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980-45 STC 212) the Supreme Court held as follows: "The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original bearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility;" 7. Contention of the petitioner is that this Court has not considered the crucial aspect whether the road in question has vested with the Corporation or not and the failure to consider the same necessitates the review of the judgment. In the judgment under review the admissions in the written statements of the 3rd and 4th defendants that the road was surrendered to the Corporation was taken note of. Defendants 3 and 4 are definitely entitled to state with regard to the nature of the pathway more than defendants 1 and 2 who are only the inhabitants in the colony. Defendants 3 and 4 did not advance any argument at the time of bearing of the appeal, This Court relied on the admissions of defendants 3 and 4 to grant decree in favour of the plaintiff. Whether there was really any vesting of the road in the Corporation or not cannot be belatedly urged in the review petition. If aggrieved the only course open to the party is to file appeal before the proper court, and not by recourse to review. There is no glaring omission or patent mistake justifying the review of the judgment. The petitioner could not establish that any grave error has crept in the earlier judgment. In Chandmall Chopra v. State of West Bengal (AIR. 1986 Calcutta 111) the Calcutta High Court held: "Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Trial Court." 8. That would be the province of a Court of Appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Trial Court." 8. in a Civil proceeding an application for review can be entertained only on the grounds mentioned in 0.47 R.1 of the Code. When there is right of appeal and the party can obtain relief from the Court of appeal, ordinarily it is not open to the Court which passed the decree to set aside it unless it is permissible under 0.47 R.1. As the review petition can be allowed only on the grounds of discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record, or for any other sufficient reason and as the petitioner could not satisfy that the petition would come under any of the above requirements bis desire to have the matter re-heard under the guise of review can never be allowed. There is no merit in the review petition and hence the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.