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1988 DIGILAW 288 (MAD)

D. Periasamy v. Mary Mohan Prasad

1988-07-28

RATNAVEL PANDIAN, SATHIADEV

body1988
Judgment Sathiadev, J. This writ appeal is preferred by one D.Periasami, a third party-appellant against the order of the learned Judge of this Court in W.P.No. 3087 of 1988, dated 21.4.1988, impleading the writ petitioner as first respondent and respondents 1 to 3 in the writ petition as respondents 2 to 4 herein. The writ petition was filed for issue of a writ of Mandamus to direct respondents 2 to 4 herein to hand over the key in respect of the premises No.8-A, Jain Hind Nagar, Ernavur, Manali High Road, Madras - 57, to the first respondent herein forthwith, in due compliance with the order of the Sub-Collector, Saidapet, dated 12.2.1988 issued at the instructions of the Collector of Madras. 2. In supporting affidavit, it was claimed by writ petitioner as follows: The petition property belongs to first respondent and that one A.D. Periasami Nadar, the third party appellant herein was entrusted with the task of constructing the building. He had since raised an untrue claim that the property belongs to him; and that there were exchanges of legal notices between them and thereafter she took possession of the building. Applications have been made by her to Municipality and Revenue authorities for assessment purposes and to Electricity Board to get electricity supply to the premises. Because appellant was giving trouble with the connivance of anti-social elements she had lodged a complaint on 6.3.1987 with the third respondent, who took up the complaint and registered a case against appellant in Cr.No.72 of 1987 under Secs.147, 148 and 452, etc. Indian Penal Code. One day, he entered the building and caused injuries to herself and her husband, and they were treated in Stanley Medical Hospital. At present, she is living in her mother’s house. There was an enquiry under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. against her, and it was found to be a civil dispute, and in spite of it, the key of the premises is illegally retained by the third respondent. In spite of the order of the Sub-Collector, the third respondent had not handed over the key of the premises, and therefore, she had filed the writ petition. 3. The writ petition was filed on 23.3.1988 and allowed on 21.4.1988. There is nothing to indicate in the order that the respondents 2 to 4 were represented in the writ petition by any counsel. 3. The writ petition was filed on 23.3.1988 and allowed on 21.4.1988. There is nothing to indicate in the order that the respondents 2 to 4 were represented in the writ petition by any counsel. The original bundle in the writ petition nowhere discloses that it had been admitted. Learned counsel for the first respondent would state that, when the writ petition came up for admission, he was asked to serve notice on the Government, and in turn, on 24.3.1988, he had served a letter on the. Government Pleader, stating that the writ petition is posted to next week and he has to get instructions. Government Pleader states that even though letter from first respondent’s counsel dated 24.3.1988 had been received in the office, there is no record to show that the impleaded respondents had been ever informed about the filing of the writ petition. Even on the day when the writ petition was allowed, Government Pleader had not been heard. The order nowhere states that the Government Pleader had participated in the proceedings. It is in these circumstances, Periasami had preferred this appeal claiming that even on the facts as pleaded in the affidavit, it is quite obvious that he was a necessary and proper party in the writ petition, and having not been impleaded, it ought to have been dismissed on that sole ground apart from other points taken by him on merits. Hence, leave was granted to him to file the writ appeal. 4. Mr.R.Nadanasabapathi, learned counsel for the appellant, points out that in the lawyer’s notice dated 18.1.1987 sent by first respondent, she had referred to an oral agreement between herself and the appellant about the construction of the building and that she had agreed to pay the costs of the materials supplied by appellant on instalment basis after completion of the entire building because she was getting a meagre monthly salary. It was then claimed that taking advantage of her absence, during day time, he had put up a compound wall, mosaic flooring, gate etc., and also put his initial in the gate. When she asked for possession in the first week of January, 1987, he having refused, she had come forward to issue the notice dated 18.1.1987. A notice under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. was sent on 17.3.1987 to both the parties by Revenue Divisional Officer, Saidapet, for an enquiry on 5.3.1987. When she asked for possession in the first week of January, 1987, he having refused, she had come forward to issue the notice dated 18.1.1987. A notice under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. was sent on 17.3.1987 to both the parties by Revenue Divisional Officer, Saidapet, for an enquiry on 5.3.1987. On 6.4.1987 she had stated in the letter addressed to the said Revenue Divisional Officer - ‘For your kind information I do not have any kind of dispute with T.Periasami. Moreover I do not know who is Mr.T.Periasami". She then claimed that she is the owner of the property and is residing therein with her family. By order dated 27.7.1987, Sec.145, Crl.P.C., proceeding was dropped by holding that it was a civil dispute, because the aspects of possession and title are involved, and which will have to be decided by a civil Court. Therefore, she filed O.S.No. 1548 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Ponneri, for injunction against appellant, and pending its disposal, I.A.No. 2255 of 1987 was filed to restrain appellant from interfering with her peaceful possession. A counter affidavit was filed by him narrating several facts and claiming that the property belongs to appellant by relying upon the sale deed dated 23.4.1957 executed by one T.Ganapathi in favour of the appellant’s father Durairaj Nadar, and about their having been plotted out and Town Planning permission obtained on 1.4.1975, etc. Inspite of all these, on 14.3.1988, when she had sworn to the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, she has deliberately suppressed the pendency of O.S.No. 1548 of 1987 and wantonly avoided impleading the appellant as a respondent, even though his name had been mentioned in para 2 of the affidavit. 5. It is thus quite obvious that, when there was a dispute relating to possession of property and also ownership between appellant and first respondent, and when proceedings having been initiated in a civil Court and also in Sec.145, Crl.P.C. proceedings she had knowingly avoided impleading the appellant, who is necessary and proper party to the writ petition. 6. Mr.Sundaram, learned counsel for the first respondent, would state that as the writ petition is filed based on the order of the Sub-Collector, dated 12.2.1988 which makes no reference to the appellant, and when she is asking for the key for her premises, there is no need to implead the. 6. Mr.Sundaram, learned counsel for the first respondent, would state that as the writ petition is filed based on the order of the Sub-Collector, dated 12.2.1988 which makes no reference to the appellant, and when she is asking for the key for her premises, there is no need to implead the. appellant as a respondent in the writ petition. 7. From what has narrated above, it cannot but be held that there is a wanton, deliberate, conscious and motivated avoidance to implead the appellant who is the necessary and proper party to the writ petition. Once a reference is made in the affidavit about the appellant having put forth a claim of ownership to the property and exchange of legal notices between them, the Court ought to have called upon the first respondent either to implead the appellant as a respondent or dismiss the writ petition for having failed to implead him. The subject matter of the writ petition was the taking custody of the key of the premises in respect of which there is a dispute over ownership and possession, and the name of the person who is claiming such rights having been mentioned, the writ petition could not have been allowed in the manner done. 8. Yet another point is that, the order of the Sub Collector relied upon was not an order passed under any provisions of any enactment. The dispute between the parties is being agitated in a civil suit and earlier to it, there was Sec.145, Crl.P.C. proceedings which had been dropped directing the parties to resolve their dispute in a civil Court, and under those circumstances, there was no lawful authority for the Sub-Collector to send the communication dated 12.2.1988 as per Collector’s instructions. Here again, as per the appellant, the Collector, could not have instructed the Sub-Collector to send such a communication. The source of power exercised by him is untraceable by the Government Pleader. Hence, based on such an order, the writ petition ought not to have been allowed. 9. One more vital point taken is that without the writ petition being admitted, it could not have been allowed. The original records were called and they do not anywhere disclose that the writ petition had been admitted. Hence, based on such an order, the writ petition ought not to have been allowed. 9. One more vital point taken is that without the writ petition being admitted, it could not have been allowed. The original records were called and they do not anywhere disclose that the writ petition had been admitted. In the docket sheet, it is noted that on 25.3.1988 learned counsel for the writ petitioner had appeared, and there was a direction to call the writ petitioner on 30.3.1988. Government Pleader states that the letter relied upon by the first respondent’s counsel had been received in his office, but the authorities concerned having not been initiated. No doubt, the Government Pleader can be asked to take notice on behalf of public authorities, but he must have been heard before allowing the writ petition. The order does not state that inspite of notice served on the Government Pleader, there is no response though more than one opportunity had been given. Before a writ petition is allowed, it is necessary to take the precautions of finding out as to who are all the necessary parties, who would be affected by the order of Court, and whether they have been duly served and if any attempt made then whether it had been effectively and properly carried out. Since the Government Pleader had neither contacted the respondents or received instructions from them consequent to any other mode of service effected on them or on their own coming to know about the pendency of the writ petition, they had not participated in the hearing of the writ petition when it was allowed. It is needless to state that, under the circumstances as pointed out above, the writ petition ought not have been allowed. 10. In Director of Handlooms and Textiles v. Venkatesan, (1988)1 L.W. 605 , the practice of allowing writ petition in admission stage without notice to respondents had been deprecated. No doubt, there was an attempt in this matter to serve upon the Government Pleader by private notice, but he had not been heard at all when it was allowed. 11. 10. In Director of Handlooms and Textiles v. Venkatesan, (1988)1 L.W. 605 , the practice of allowing writ petition in admission stage without notice to respondents had been deprecated. No doubt, there was an attempt in this matter to serve upon the Government Pleader by private notice, but he had not been heard at all when it was allowed. 11. Therefore, when the appellant had been highly prejudiced for more than one reason stated above and the key of the premises having been handed over to first respondent based on such an order, respondents 2 to 4 are hereby directed to take back the key from first respondent within one week from today, and deposit it with the District Munsif Court, Ponneri, in O.S.No. 548 of 1987. It is for that Court to take a decision as to who would be entitled to the key of the premises. 12. Hence, the writ appeal is allowed with costs payable by first respondent resulting in the writ petition being dismissed. Counsel’s fee Rs.500.