Judgment S. H. S. Abidi, J. 1. The petitioners have come to this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order, dated 5-2-1982 by which the learned S. D. J. M, Kodarma, has taken cognizance of the offence under section 22-A of the Minimum Wages Act in Case No. G.25/82. 2. On 29-12-1981 Ram Chandra Choudhary. Labour Inspector filed a complaint before the learned S. D. J. M. on the prescribed form under the Act saying that on 11-11-1981 at about 12.45 noon he inspected M/s. Gawan Mica Mining Co. Ltd. , omchach, and found that the registers were not maintained in accordance with the provisions as contained in Sec.18 of the act by not mentioning fines deductions and employees payments ; the details of which have been given in the complaint in column 8, It is further stated therein that after the inspection, letter No.3631 dated 25-) 1-1981 was issued to remove the irregularities found during inspection, but the accused did not produce the registers nor filed any show cause by the said date nor sent any information in this behalf thus the accused have violated the provisions of Sec.18 of minimum Wages Act, 1948 read with rules 21 (4), 25 (2) and 26 (2) of the Rules, 1951 framed thereunder. 3. The learned S. O. J. M. on getting the report passed the impugned order dated 5-2-1982 taking cognizance of the offence under Sec.22-A of the said Act, against which the petitioners have come to this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that in this case the petitioners are the partners and so they are not liable for the offence. Partners are Directors and that they are not in charge of the company for the conduct of the business of the Company, specially, when other officers of the company are there to look after and so in the absence of any allegation in the complaint of their being connected in any manner the prosecution is not maintainable and the learned Magistrate has erred in taking cognizance of the said offence against the petitioners. It was further argued that in the absence of any such specific allegation against the petitioners, they are entitled to get benefit of the observations of the supreme Court made in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohatgi, AIR 1983 SC 67 , at p.70 (para 14): "so far as the Directors are concerned, there is not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. In these circumstances, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of the high Court that no case against he Directors (accused Nos.4 to 7)has been made out e\-facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed. " 5. To these contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners learned counsel for the State replied that the complaint has been Sled by the Labour inspector in a prescribed form in which columns have been filled up and the petitioners have been shown as Directors of the company and partners and that all have been made against the petitioners in that capacity. Though no specific allegations have been made that they are in charge of the business of the company as provided under Sec.22-C (1) of the Act, but under Sec.22-C (2), which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offense has been committed with the consent or in connivance or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence. So the petitioners are also libale for which evidence will be led and that is why in the beginning the averments have been made which will be proved at the trial, and that the petitioners could not take benefit of the observation ; made by their lordships of the Supreme Court quoted above. 6. So the petitioners are also libale for which evidence will be led and that is why in the beginning the averments have been made which will be proved at the trial, and that the petitioners could not take benefit of the observation ; made by their lordships of the Supreme Court quoted above. 6. For considering the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties a perusal of Sec.22-C of the Act shows that if person committing an offence under this Act is Company, every person, who at the time of the offence committed, was in charge or responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company shall also be proceeded against and punished accordingly, unless accused proves that the offence has been committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Besides these provisions under Sec.22-C (1)there is also sub-section (2) of the said Section which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)when an offence under this Act is committed by the company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or in connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded accordingly. Explanation (b) to this section mentions that the director in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm. 7. In the case of Delhi Municipal Corporation V/s. Ram Kishan Rohatgi (supra) the prosecution of the accused was for contravention of Sec.7/16 under the provision of the Food Adulteration Act, wherein paragraph 5 of the complaint has been referred to which has mentioned the directors as in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Their lordships of the Supreme Court made observations, quoted above, that as there was not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show apart from the presumption by the complainant that there is any act committed by the directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. 8. Their lordships of the Supreme Court made observations, quoted above, that as there was not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show apart from the presumption by the complainant that there is any act committed by the directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. 8. In the case of Municipal Corporation Delhi V/s. Purushottam Das jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1983 SC 158 wherein also violation of provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was complained of, their Lordships referred to the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Ram Kishan Rohatgi (supra) and also the paragraph 5 of the complaint of Jhunjhunwalas case, which had given details of the roles played by the respondents and the extent of their liability to the effect that Ram Kishan Bajaj was said to be the Chairman, R. P. Neyatia, Managing Director and respondents 7 to 11 were held to be in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business at the time of commission of the office. Where is in the earlies case the complainant had merely drawn presumption without, any averment. As there were averments about the active role played by the respondents and extent of their liability, then the complaint could not be said to be vague and that what would be the offence against the respondents is not a matter to be considered at this stage, as that would have to be proved at the trial. Their Lordships further observed that at the time of quashing the proceeding only the allegation set forth in the complaint has to be seen and nothing further and if a prima-facie case for summoning the accused was made out, then that was sufficient for taking cognizance of the offence against the accused. It was also observed that further details would be given in the shape of evidence when the trial proceeds and in view of the clear allegations in the complaint the High Court should not have quashed the proceedings against the accused. 9. Thus following the above observations of their Lordships it is clear that in respect of the offence committed under the provisions of the Prevention of food Adulteration Act is not only vicarious liability and presumption should be there, but there should be specific mention about the active role of the person accused of. 10. 9. Thus following the above observations of their Lordships it is clear that in respect of the offence committed under the provisions of the Prevention of food Adulteration Act is not only vicarious liability and presumption should be there, but there should be specific mention about the active role of the person accused of. 10. Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act provides for nomination of person to be in charge of responsible to the company for the conduct of the business and if there is no such nomination, then any person, who at the time of commission of the offence was in charge of or responsible to the company for the conduct of the business, can be proceeded against. Under sub-section (2) any company may by order in writing authorise any director or manager to exercise any such powers and that such authorisation or nomination may be noticed to the local authority along with the written consent of the officer, director or manager and if such manager, director or secretary commits any offence after this nomination (authorisation) he would be liable for the offence complained of, Sec.17 further provides that if there is no such nomination or authorisation then it any director, manager or secretary of other officers can also be proceeded against in case he has committed the offence. Thus there is no presumption clause or deeming clause. That is why in the case of Ram Kishan Rohatgi (supra) their Lordships of the supreme Court considering the offence in the complaint observed that besides the presumption there had been no whisper of any act being committed by the directors and so they could not be vicariously liable and in the second case when there was active role mentioned specifically, their Lordships upheld the order of taking cognizance. So vicarious liability on the basis of presumption was not accepted. But it was held that when something has been said in the petition of complaint then it becomes a matter of evidence to be considered at the trial stage. 11. So vicarious liability on the basis of presumption was not accepted. But it was held that when something has been said in the petition of complaint then it becomes a matter of evidence to be considered at the trial stage. 11. In an earlier decision of Satya Narain Musadi and others V/s. State of bihar ( AIR 1980 SC 506 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding that the report under Sec.173 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also required to be accompanied as provided under sub-section (5) of the said Section by all the documents and statements mentioned thereunder, observed at page 509 (para 10) as follows : " The report as envisaged by Sec.173 (2) has to be accompanied as required by sub-section (5) by all the documents and statements of the witnesses therein mentioned. One cannot divorce the details which the report must contain as requied by sub-section, (2) from its accompaniments which are required to be submitted under subsection (5 ). The whole of it is submitted as a report to the Court. But even if a narrow construction is adopted that the police report can only be what is prescribed in Sec.173 (2) there would be sufficient compliance if what is required to be mentioned by the statute has been set down in the report. To say that all the details of the offence must be set out in the report under section 173 (2)submitted by the police officer would be expecting him to do something more than what the Parliament has expecred bam to set out therein. If the report with sufficient particularityand clarity specifies the contravention of the law which is the alleged offence, it would be sufficient compliance with Sec.11. The details which would be necessary to be proved to bring home the guilt to the accused would emerge at a later stage, when after notice to the accused a charge is framed against him and further in the course of the trial. They would all be matters of evidence and Sec.11 does not require the report to be or to contain the evidence in support of the charge, its function being merely to afford a basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case (see Bhagwati saran V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1961) 3 SCR 563 at p.577 ). They would all be matters of evidence and Sec.11 does not require the report to be or to contain the evidence in support of the charge, its function being merely to afford a basis for enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the case (see Bhagwati saran V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1961) 3 SCR 563 at p.577 ). " Thus, according to these observations in the report under Sec.173 (2) though accompanied by documents and evidence, it is not required to set put details of the offence. But if the report under Sec.173 (2) accompanied with the documents or evidence collected, specifies the contravention of the law, in that case, then it will be sufficient compliance and the details would be necessary to -bring home the guilt of the accused at a later stage when after notice to the accused a charge is framed against him and further in course of the trial evidence would come. The view that the further evidence is to come at the stage of trial has also been mentioned by the Supreme Court in the case of municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Purushottam Das Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1983 SC 158 . 12. There are four Full Bench decisions of this Court which also deserve consideration, as they have also been referred. In the Full Bench decision of ram Kripal Prasad V/s. State of Bihar, 1958 PLJR 271 ; 1985 BLJ 422 (FB)arising out of violation of the provision of Employees Provident Fund and miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, where in the complaint it was mentioned that the firm was an establishment out of definition of the Act and consequently statutory provisions were applicable as that has been allotted code number administratively labelled in each establishment and that the accused were in charge of the said establishment and responsible for the conduct of the business. The full Bench has observed that it will be a hypertechnical argument if the complained did not expressly plead that the petitioners establishment employed 20 or more persons as the firm was an establishment within the meaning of the act. The full Bench has observed that it will be a hypertechnical argument if the complained did not expressly plead that the petitioners establishment employed 20 or more persons as the firm was an establishment within the meaning of the act. It is relevant to quote paragraph Nos.26 and 37 of this case : "before adverting in some detail to the aforesaid provisions one must keep in mind the broader perspective that the administration of criminal law is more a matter of substance than of form and should not be allowed to be pettifogged by hair-splitting technicalities. What has to be largely seen herein is whether on reading the complaint as a whole the same would with relative clarity disclose facts which would constitute an effence under its prescribed definition. The petition of complaint is to be looked at in its totality and not each paragraph thereof as if it were in a watertight compartment. It is now well settled beyond cavil that a complaint or a first information report in a criminal case is not to be an encyclopadia of all the facts. " "37. . . . . . it is held that a petition of complaint for offence under section 14 of the Act need not in terms plead each and every minuscule relevant fact nor the precise number of employees of the prosecuted establisment. In any event, the failure to do so does not vitiate the proceedings on such technical ground alone. " in the next Full Bench decision of Mahmud Ali V/s. State of Bihar, 1986 PLJR 123 : 1986 BL. T 194 (FB) wherein violation of provisions of the Water (Prevention of Control and Pollution) Act, 1974 was complained of, Sec.17 of the said act has been considered. The Full Bench observed at page 128 (in paras 7, 8 and 9) as follows : "7. Thus viewed, Sec.47 (1) and the proviso thereto would lay down that once the offence is either alleged or established against the company and the added factum of being in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business is existent against a person, he becomes liable, therefore, without more, vicariously. The burden is then laid upon him to establish and prove a total absence of knowledge about the commission of the crime or a diligent prevention thereof. " "8. The burden is then laid upon him to establish and prove a total absence of knowledge about the commission of the crime or a diligent prevention thereof. " "8. Analysed as above, Sec.47 (1) spells out a deeming fiction of vicarious liabilty and a rule of evidence laying the burden of proof on persons in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. " 9. Once it is held as above, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner falls in its place and stands conclusively repelled. It is settled beyond cavil that rules of evidence and deeming fictions are not to be expressly spelt out and pleaded. They are matters which are for consideration and application in the course of the trial. To require that the complaint itself must plead a rule of evidence or in terms, spell out a deeming fiction provided by the statute therein is an argument bordering on hypertechnicality. One must always keep in mind the broader perspective that the administration of criminal law is more a matter of substance than of form and should not be allowed to be obscured by pettifogging technicality. This aspect seems to be well covered, if not wholly concluded by the recent Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ram Kripai prasad and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, 1985 PLJR 271 : 1986 BLJ 422 (FB ). Referring to Sec.47 (2) of the Water (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1974, which is just like the Sec.10 (2) of the B. C. Act and Sec.42 (2) of the weights and Measures Act, the Full Bench observed in paras 13, 14, 15 and 15/a as under: "adverting now to question No. (ii), it may perhaps be noticed at the very outset that what has been held would broadly apply mutatis mutandis in sub-section (2) of Sec.47 of the Act as well. Significantly it begins with a non-obstante clause and this, perhaps, would have effect independently and notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sub-section (1 ). In a way it overrides the said provision and is somewhat wider in its application. Significantly it begins with a non-obstante clause and this, perhaps, would have effect independently and notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sub-section (1 ). In a way it overrides the said provision and is somewhat wider in its application. Unlike sub-section (1) which foists vicarious liability only on persons in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, this sub-section imposes a somewhat similar liability on a larger Class of Directors, Managers, Secretaries or even other officer of the company. In a way this sub-section is envisaged to widen the aet of vicarious liability and to bring within its sweep not only the primal officials of the company but even other officers thereof if the commission of the offence by the company can be established to have been done with the consent, connivance or neglect on their part. Thus, the role and scope of sub-section (2)is somewhat different from that of sub-section (1), the former being applicable only to persons directly in charge of and responsible to the company and the latter having a wider application though in a given situation. They might slightly overlap. Equally the strigency of vicarious liability in the two sub-sections is variable.14. When closely viewed, sub-section (2) is clearly indicative of the fact that it is both a rule of evidence and yet again a deeming fiction for vicarious culpability. Perhaps the one crucial aspect herein is the use of the word proved in the earlier part of the sub-section. It comes into play only at the stage of the availability of adequate proof that the offence has been committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of the principal or other officers of the company. The usual and the normal rule of criminal law is that the charge must be brought home directly to the offender. However, subsection (2) lightenes the burden by providing that even if it is proved that the principal officers were guilty of consent, connivance or neglience with regard to the offence committed by the company, they would be within the net of culpability. This is effectuated by an express deeming fiction that if any of the aforesaid ingredients is established then the officials concerned will be held guilty of that offence and be punished accordingly. This is effectuated by an express deeming fiction that if any of the aforesaid ingredients is established then the officials concerned will be held guilty of that offence and be punished accordingly. Sub-section (2)may truly come into play during the course of the trial and even at its conclusion when it is proved that the offence has been committed witb the consent, connivance or neglect of the companys principal officials. Thus, the stringent rule in sub-section (2) in a way provides a second line of defence for the prosecution. Even where the case set up is that the offence has been directly, willfully or deliberately committed by the company and its officials but the same cannot be established to the hilt, this sub-section provides that such officer would still be guilty if the relatively lower culpability of even consent or mere connivance or neglect is laid at his door. This is probably and patently due to the difficulties or proving a charge beyond reasonable doubt in cases of vicarious liability for offences committed by legal and artificial persons as compared to natural persons. It bears repetition that this sub-section (2) is a rule of evidence for apportioning guilt when consent, connivance or neglect is proved by its principal officer and a deeming fiction of guilt for vicarious liability to the crimes committed by the company itself. Now once it is held as above, it is well settled that a rule of evidence or a deeming fiction of the law are not to be pleaded as such. No principle warrants that either in a complaint or in a first information report the literal words of the statute must be incorporated or what is even important is that the rule of evidence with regard to burden of proof and a deeming fiction of guilt should be quoted at the foundational stage. Therefore, to require that the complaint or the first information report must inflexibly plead consent connivance or negligence of the officers at the threshold stage is, to my mind, patently fallacious. Seen broadly, the deeming fiction is primarily one of evidence and proof and not of the literal formalities of pleading, which are foreign to the criminal law. Indeed, it must be noticed that in a particular case the prosecution charge may be one of direct, deliberate and wilful commission of the offence by the company and its official. Seen broadly, the deeming fiction is primarily one of evidence and proof and not of the literal formalities of pleading, which are foreign to the criminal law. Indeed, it must be noticed that in a particular case the prosecution charge may be one of direct, deliberate and wilful commission of the offence by the company and its official. In such a situation, to require that they should plead at the outset that it was only by way of connivance or neglect would be an absurdity and, indeed, destructive or contrary to the case set up. Again, as has been noticed above, sub-section (2)applies independently and notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1 ). Therefore, to require that the pleading of consent connivance or neglect must be incorporated even with regard to the guilt under sub-section (1), which is absolutely pertaining to the person in charge of and responsible to the company, is in a way rather more fallacious (para-15 ). To conclude on this aspect, the answer to question No. (ii) is rendered in the negative. It is held that Sec.47 (2) does not mandate the incorporation of the allegation that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance or was attributable to the neglect on the pan of the Chairman, Director or General Manager of the Company in the complaint itself. (15/a). In the tbird Full Bench decision of Badri Prasad Gupta and others V/s. State of bihar and another ( 1986 PLJR 246 : 1986 BLJ 484 (FB) the offence complained was under the provisions of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 regarding partnership of the- firm M/s. Vaishali Picture. The objection raised was that m/s. Vaishali Pictures had not been made accused in the complaint and that the complaint does not expressly allege that the petitioners were responsible for or in charge of the business on that date and they either exercised ultimate control over the affairs and were immediate charge of the general management and control thereof and so necessary averments incorporated in terms of Sec.2 (5)of the Act, ought to have been made in the complaint. The cognizance had been taken under Sec.34 of the said Act. The cognizance had been taken under Sec.34 of the said Act. The Full Bench juxtaposing the section 35 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Acts an Sec.10 of the e. C. Act said that under Sec.35 the Directors, Patners Managers or secretaries, the ipso facto liable for the contravention of the provisions of the Act by the Company or the partnership and throws the burden upon them to prove that they had no knowledge and if so they had exercised positive diligence to prevent the offence. Hence Sec.35 imposes more strigent vicarious liability than section 10 of the E. C. Act. The Full Bench observed at page 249 in para 8 as follows : ". . . It is manifest that the provisions of these statutes indicate that they incorporate the stringent principle of strict vicarious criminal liability of persons who are responsible to the company for the conduct of its business or its responsible officers like the director, partner, manager or secretary. Now strict vicarious criminal liability is some what of an exception to the general rule of direct personal culpability and is a modern development through statutory provisions. That there can be such vicarious criminal liability by legislative mandate is no longer in dispute. Indeed, in modern conditions it is an inevitable necessity. Nevertheless steeped as we are in the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence that mens pea must be an ingredient of an offence and both the act and intent mast concur to constitute a crime, it needs some effort to accept whole-heatedly the legislative mandate of vicarious criminality even in the absence of either of the aforesaid ingredients. as regards the proof for offences under section 35 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act t he Full Bench observed that Sec.35 spells out both deeming fiction of vicarious liability and a rule of evidence laying the burden of proof on the directors, partners, managers or secretaries of the company or partners firm committing the contravention The Full Bench dealing with Sec.2 (5)of the Act while considering the definition of employer observed that a person owns or exercises ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment and includes a manager, agent or any person of immediately authority of general management or control of such establishment, held : "now it is settled beyond cavil that it is not necessay to plead the language of the statute itself. When a clause of the enactment describes the person who could be prosecuted, it does not require that each and every attribute of his office or power must in terms be stated in the complaint itself. " (para-15)The Full Bench further, considering the definition of complaint under Sec.2 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown had committed an offence, but it does not include the police report, observed : "it is significant that a complaint may even be made orally and it primarily means allegations against a preson for having committed offence. One must always keep in mind the perspective that the administration of criminal law is more a matter of substance than of form and should not be allowed to be obscured by pettifogging technality. This aspect seems to be well covered by two recent full Bench judgments of this Court in Ram Kripal Prasad and two others V/s. The State of Bihar and two others ( 1985 PLJR 271 : 1985 BLJ 422 ). The Full Bench after referring to the observations in the said two decisions of ram Kripal Prasad and Mahmud Ali (supra) observed at page 253 (para 17) as under: ". . It is held that Sec.35 of the Act does not inflexibly require the pleading that the Director, partner, Manager or Secretary either exercised ultimate control over the affairs of the company or the partnership firm, or was in immediate charge of the general management or control thereof, in all complaints against them, for offences in contravention of the said Act. " 13. In the Full Bench of Badri Prasad Gupta S. S. Hasan, J. though a greed with the ultimate result of the application and the decision on the points 1 and 3 arrived at by the Chief Justice S. Sandhawalia, but expressed his view on the point No.2 that even where a person is prosecuted vicariously pro-designate, indictment must contain facts relating to the occurrance and the accused, which the prosecution will have to prove at the trial. It is true that Sec.351 of the Bihar shops and Establishment Act, 1983 is wider in its amplitude than Sec.10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the person noted in Sec.35 of the act can be arraigned as accused even if they are not incharge of and responsible to the affairs of a Company, yet the materials will have to be brought in the indictment which will indicate that the accused persons actually held the posts which have brought them within the purview of Sec.35 of the Act on the date when occurrence took place. Merely stating that they were holding certain posts would not be enough. The Supreme Court in the two of cited decisions, that is, municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Purushotam Das Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1983 SC 158 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Ram Kishan Rohatgi and others ( AIR 1983 SC 67 ) lends substance to my views. " Hasan, J. after quoting in extenso paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the decision of Jhunjhunwala (supra) observed: in my view, this decision clearly emphasises the necessity of indictment containing facts that would justify the prosecution of an accused. Similarly, in Rohtagls case (supra) the prosecution of the directors was quashed in the absence of sufficient evidence in the indictment leaving the Court to take steps under Sec.319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if sufficient evidence was found, though it was mentioned in the complaint that they were incharge of and responsible to the affairs of the company. It was, however, thought desirable to refrain from quashing the case against the general Manager because of the very nature of his duties inferred from designation which justified his prosecution. " (para 24 ). 14. In the fourth Full Bench decision in Madan Mohan Upadhaya and others V/s. The State of Bihar, 1986 PLJR 537 : 1987 BLJ 1 (SC)in which violation of provisions of section 10 of the E. C. Act was complained of it was obsesved that Sec.10 (1) spelled out a deeming fiction of vicarious liability and also a rule of evidence laying the burden of proof on the persons in-charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business. Further the full Bench referring to the earlier decision of the Full Bench decisions of Ram kripal Prasad and Mahmud Ali (supra) reiterated that it was settled beyond cavil that the rule of evidence and deeming fictions not to be expressly spelt out and pleaded as they are matters which are for consideration and application in the course of the trial and it will be hypertechnicality to expect in the complaint pleading of the rule of evidence, as the administration of criminal law is more a matter of substance than a form, as is not to be allowed to be pettifogged by obscured technicality. After referring to paragraph number (i) of the complaint (annexure-3 in that case itself) where it was mentioned that the accused 1 to 4 were partners and were interested in the loss and profit of the business of cement and the aforesaid business was under the direct control and supervision of the accused the Full Bench observed that all the petitioners were deeply interested in the loss and profit of the business which was under their control and so it cannot be said that a person not in direct control and strictly supervising business are not in charge thereof and are not responsible to the firm for the cement. 15. As regards sub-section (2) of Sec.10 of the Act it was observed that this sub-section starts with non-obstante clause and it will have effect independently of and notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1) which foist the vicarious liability on the persons incharge of or responsible to the company for the conduct of the business. This sub-section imposes a similar liability on a larger class of Directors, managers, secretaries or even other officers of the company. Thus it widens the net of vicarious liability. So not only primal officers arened but even others also connected with the company at the time of commission of the offence with their consent connivance or neglect. 16. This sub-section imposes a similar liability on a larger class of Directors, managers, secretaries or even other officers of the company. Thus it widens the net of vicarious liability. So not only primal officers arened but even others also connected with the company at the time of commission of the offence with their consent connivance or neglect. 16. As regards the pleading in the complaint or the first information report about connivance or negligence of the officers at the threshold stage as envisaged under Sec.10 (2) of the E. C. Act the full Bench made observations in various paragraphs i. e. , 19, 20 and 22 of the judgment which are quoted as under : "when closely viewed, sub-section (2) is clearly indicative of the fact that it is both a rule of evidence and yet again a deeming fiction for vicarious culpability. Perhaps, the one aspect herein is the use of the word proved in the earlier part of the sub-section. It comes into play only at the stage of the availability of adequate proof that the offence has been committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of the principal or other officers of the company. The usual and the normal rule of criminal law is that the charge must be brought home directly to the offender without any reasonable double. However, sub-section (2) lightens the burden by providing that even if it is proved that the principal officers were guilty of consent or connivance or negligence with regard to the offence committed by the company or partnership firm, they would be within the net of culpability. This has been effectuated by an express deemiug fiction that if any of the aforesaid ingredients is established, then the officials concerned will be held guilty of that offence and be punished accordingly. Sub-section (2) may truly come into play during the course of the trial and at its conclusion when it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of the companys or the firms principal officers or partners. Thus, the stringent rule in sub-section (2) in a way even provides a second line of defence for the prosecution. Thus, the stringent rule in sub-section (2) in a way even provides a second line of defence for the prosecution. Even where the case set up is that the offence has been directly and wilfully committed by the company or partnership and its officers or partners, but the same cannot be established to the hilt, this sub-section provides that such officer who would still be guilty if the relatively lower culpability of even consent or mere connivance or neglect is laid at his door. This is probably and patently due to the difficulties of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt in cases of vicarious liability for offences committed by the legal and artificial persons as compared to natural persons. It bears repetition that this sub-section is also a rule of evidence for fastening the guilt when consent, connivance or neglect is proved against the persons named therein ; and a deeming fiction of law for vicarious liability for the crimes committed by the company or partnership firm itself. (para-19)Now, once it is held as above, it does not need any elaboration that rule of evidence or deeming fictions of law are not to be pleaded as such. No principle warrants that either in a complaint or in a first information report the literal words of the statute must be incorporated or what is even more important the rule of evidence with regard to the burden of proof and a deeming fiction of guilt should be quoted at the foundational stage. Therefore, to require that the complaint or the first information report must flexibly plead consent, connivance or negligence of the officers at the threshold stage, is, to may mind, patently fallacious Seen broadly, the deeming fiction is primarily one of evidence and proof and not of the literal formalities of pleading, which are foreign to the criminal law. Indeed, it must be noticed that in a particular case the prosecution charge may be one of direct or deliberate or wilful commission of the offence by the company or partnership or its officers or partners. In such a situation, to require that they should plead at the outset that it was only by way of connivance or neglect would be an abserdity or indeed, destructive or contrary to the case set up. Again, as has been noticed above, sub-section (2) applies independently and notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1 ). In such a situation, to require that they should plead at the outset that it was only by way of connivance or neglect would be an abserdity or indeed, destructive or contrary to the case set up. Again, as has been noticed above, sub-section (2) applies independently and notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1 ). Therefore, to require that the pleading of consent, connivance or neglect must be incorporated even in regard to the guilt under sub-section (1), which is absolute pertaining to the person in charge of and responsible to the company, is in a way rather more fallacious. " (para 20)It is held that sub-section (2) of Sec.10 does not, mandate the incorporation of the allegation that the offence as committed with the consent or connivance or was attributable to the neglect on the part of the Director of a company or a partner of a firm in the complaint itself. (para 22 ). " 17. In the case of Drug Inspector Palace Road, Bangalore V/s. Dr. B. K. Krishnaih and another, ( AIR 1981 SC 1164 ) the accused is alleged to have stocked drugs the potentiality of which expired and sold such drugs to the complainant. The complainant then lodged a complaint against the accused for offence under section 18 (a) (iv) of the Act and the rule made thereunder, punishable under section 28 (b) and 28 of the Drugs Act. The learned Magistrate perused the partnership deed which showed that all the partners were responsible and so overruled the contentions and took cognizance against all the accused persons. The High Court considering Sec.34 (1) of the Act held that the complainant had not complained that the accused Nos.2 to 4 (petitioners) were any more incharge of or responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm (accused No.1 ). The Supreme Court held at page 1165 (para 6) as follows : "the only question for consideration for the High Court in this case was whether the accused or any one of them were liable. In para 17 of the complaint petition, the complainant quoted the provisions of the act. In addition he cited the names of the witnesses submitted a list of document including a copy of the partnership deed at item No.13 of the list of documents. In para 17 of the complaint petition, the complainant quoted the provisions of the act. In addition he cited the names of the witnesses submitted a list of document including a copy of the partnership deed at item No.13 of the list of documents. The learned Magistrate perused the partnership deed and prima facie found that the respondents and the deceased accused were liable for the offences and proceeded for trial. The learned High Court committed an error in holding that there was no allegation that the respondents were not responsible for the management and conduct of the firm. The extent of their liability would be established by evidence during trial. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. " 18. Thus following the above pronouncements of the Courts it is made out that where an offence is alleged to have been committed by the company, then its Managing Director from very nature 01 his duty can be inferred to be undoubtedly vicariously libale for the offence. The designation of the Managing directors, Chairman and Secretary to the company is by itself adequately indicate of their primal role given in the company. So far as directors or partners are concerned there should be even some whisper or shred of evidence or anything to show apart from presumption of their being director, that thers is some act committed by them from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. But the fact is that the very factor of partnership is indicative of the fact that the partners are interested in profit and loss of the partnership or company and simply by saying that they are not in charge of or are not in direct control of the affairs of the company or partnership they cannot excape the offence committed by the company or partnership. 19. There are statutory provisions, like Sec.35 of the Bihar Shops and establishments Act, which says that when an offence is contravened by a company or a partnership firm then every director, partner, manager or secretary thereof shall, unless he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention, deem guilty of such contravention. In the face of such provisions the burden of proving that he was not guilty and whatever has been done for without his consent or knowledge and that he had exercised his due diligence to prevent breach of the act lies upon the accused. But there are other provisions like Sec.10 (1) of the E. C. Act, Sec.47 (1) of the Water Pollution Act, Sec.14 of the employees Provident Fund Act and Sec.17 (1) of the Prevention of Food adulteration Act. Under such and the like provisions, if there is any contravention by a company then every person, who at the time of contravention was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed guilty unless he proves the contravention took place without his knowledge or he exercised all due diligence to prevent such breach. So in such situation it is to be shown by the prosecution at the relevant time that these persons were in charge of and were responsible to the affaire of the company so later it is for the accused concerned to show that the contravention took place without his knowledge/consent or that he exercised due diligence to prevent such contravention. Thus not only persons in charge and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business are held but widened net brings in also these persons, besides the in-charge director, partner, manager, secretary or other officers of the firm with whose consent, connivance or negligence the offence complained of had been committed. 20. For an offence a complaint is to be filed. A complaint under Sec.2 (d) of the Cr. P. C. means any allegation made orally or in writing to a magistrate with a view to his taking action under this Code that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence but it does not include police report. In a complaint it is not necessary to quote the language of the statute itself violated by the accused, but simply mention of it is sufficient. Similarly, when the enactment describes the person who can be prosecuted it does not require that each and every attributes of his office or firm must in terms be stated in the complaint itself. In a complaint it is not necessary to quote the language of the statute itself violated by the accused, but simply mention of it is sufficient. Similarly, when the enactment describes the person who can be prosecuted it does not require that each and every attributes of his office or firm must in terms be stated in the complaint itself. It is a settled law that at the foundational stage of the case in the complaint or first information report rule of evidence or deeming fiction of law are not to be pleaded. Prosecution may charge for direct deliberate and wilful commission of the offence by the company and its officers, but it is not required that they should plead at the outset and at the thresh hold, the deeming fiction of vicarious liability or that it was only by way of connivance or negligence. These are matter of evidence and not the literal formalities of pleadings. The administration of criminal law is more a matter of substance than of form and should not be allowed to be obscured by pettifogging technicalities. 21. When in a complaint for an offence by a company and its persons concerned the provisions of the Act have been referred or quoted, the names of the accused have been mentioned with their designations making out their connection and relationship with the company, the gist of the offence has been given to know at the initial stage about the offence and its nature, the names of the witnesses have been mentioned, the documents to be referred and relied on by the prosecution are shown with precision and also details of the like just nature or statements of witnesses are brought to light, then at the stage of taking of cognizance, it cannot be said that the complaint is to be thrown out, on the ground that the evidence has not been brought on the record which resulted in the regation of reasonable opportunity to defend. As observed, such hairsplitting and pettifogging technicalities are not the purpose of law. No matter can be misplaced and every thing is to go in accordance with its place and procedure. As observed, such hairsplitting and pettifogging technicalities are not the purpose of law. No matter can be misplaced and every thing is to go in accordance with its place and procedure. Full details and evidence cannot be executed to be given at the thresh hold when the court is to find out only prima facie case and not such material which could determine, like the final stage of the case, as to whether the allegations are false or correct or that it will end in acquittal or conviction. At the stage of taking cognizance, the magistrate issues summons to the accused who is to appear. Then the prosecutor leads evidence, which is tested by cross-examination also and it is also scrutinised by the court. If passing through such stages and tests the evidence is not upto the standard of belief, then it is open to the court to discharge or acquit the accused. But in grave and serious offence, by adopting the technalities and hair-splitting process, if the complaint is dismissed or even quashed under Sec.482, Cr. P. C. , then it will be negation of justice. Similarly if the complaint does not have any whisper of the material from which the court may find a prima facie case against the accused or that taking the allegation of the complaint to be true without adding or substracting, there is no material against the accused, then such a complaint cannot stand, whether it is in respect of the company, its director or any other person in the hierarchy. The continuation of such prosecution is waste of public time and money and also cases grave injustice to the accused, who cannot be compensated for the losses he suffers on account of frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. Thus in both the cases and situations, the court is to be most vigil and on guard. 22. The continuation of such prosecution is waste of public time and money and also cases grave injustice to the accused, who cannot be compensated for the losses he suffers on account of frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. Thus in both the cases and situations, the court is to be most vigil and on guard. 22. In the case of Smt. Nagawwa V/s. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi (Arr 1976 SC 1947) where their Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed the scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed at page 1951 in para 5 : "thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : (i)where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused ;" further in the case of Sharda Prasad Sinha V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 the Supreme Court observed at page 1755 (para 2): "it is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the chargesheet do not constitute Any offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Sec.482, Cr. P. C. to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. " In the case of Drug Inspector, Bangalore V/s. Dr. B. K. Krishnaiah and another (supra), the Supreme Court has observed at page 1165 (para): "in a quashing proceeding the High Court has to see whether the allegations made in the complaint petition, if proved, make out a prima-facie offence and that the accused has and prima facie committed the offence. " 23. In the case of Khacheru Singh V/s. State of U. P. , AIR 1982 SC 784 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "all that the learned Magistrate has done was to issue a summon to the respondent No.2 Satbir Singh. If eventually offence was made out against Satbir Singh it would be open to him to discharge or acquit him, as the case may be. But it is difficult to appreciate why the order issuing summons should be quashed. If eventually offence was made out against Satbir Singh it would be open to him to discharge or acquit him, as the case may be. But it is difficult to appreciate why the order issuing summons should be quashed. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the Sessions Court and the High Court, restore that of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Meerut, dated February 2, 1979 and the matter to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. " 24. In the case of State of Punjab V/s. Devindra Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 545 where the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act were violated as the vanaspati ghee did not contain sesame oil at all, though sesame oil of 5% weight is required, complaint was filed, but the High Court quashed it under Sec.482, cr. P. C. as the requirements of Sec.11 of the Act and Rule 22-A and also of Sec.20-A were said to be violated. The Supreme Court observed at page 549 (paras 8 and 9): " (8) Before concluding, we should observe that the High Court committed a serious error in these cases in quashing the criminal proceedings in different magistrates courts at a premature stage in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Sec.482, Cr. P. C. These are not the case where it can be said that there is no legal evidence at all in support of the prosecution. It is neither expedient nor possible to arrive at a conclusion at this stage on the guilt or innocence of the accused on the material before the Court. While there is no doubt that the onus proving the case is on the prosecution, it is equally clear that the prosecution should have sufficient opportunity to adduce all available evidence. (9) We are of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the criminal proceedings, the High Court should not have interferred at this interlocutory stage. These were not the case of that exceptional character where continuance of the prosecution would have resulted either in the waste of public time or money or in grave prejudice to the accused concerned- On the other hand the undue interference by the High Court has been responsible for these prosecution in respect of grave economic offences remaining pending for a long time. " 25. " 25. In the case of J. P. Sharma V/s. Vinod Kumar Jain and others, AIR 1986 sc 833 it was observed at page 842 (in para 51 ) "taking all the allegations in the complaint to be true, without adding or substracting anything, at this stage it cannot be said that no prima facie case for trial has been made out. That is the limit of the power to be exercised by the High Court under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court in the instant case has exceeded that jurisdiction, (para 51)We are not concerned with the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint, that would be investigated at the time of the trial. In that view of the matter we are unable to sustain the order under appeal. We make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merit of the charge and the complaint would be investigated in accordance with law and the accused persons would be entitled to prove before the Court that no charge has been made out against them and they should be acquitted of the charges. But at this stage under inherent power of Sec.482 of Code of Criminal ; procedure, in our opinion, in the background and circumstances of this case the Court should not have use the extraordinary power. " (para 52) 26 In Fuil Bench decision of Madan Mohan Upadhya (supra) it was observed by this Court at page 545 (para 25) : "it suffices to mention that it is not the province of the High Court under Sec.482, wben considering the issue of quashing to delve into evidence or attempt to convert itself into a trial court that is the role wholly prescribed tor the magistracy in which I find no adequate reason to intrude. " 27. As in the present case it has been alleged that the accused are partners. " 27. As in the present case it has been alleged that the accused are partners. Thus so they are deeply interested in the profit and loss of the firm and so they are responsible for the affairs of the company and as in clear terms it has not been stated that they are responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm then for this hypertechnicality, this Court will not interfere with the order of the order of issuing process, as the petitioners will get opportunity to appear and show a case of discharge if any which will be considered by the court below. 28. In the result, this application has go no force and is therefore, dismissed. The stay order granted by this Court is vacated. Let the L. C. records be sent to the court below immediately for its early disposal. Application dismissed.