J. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are serving as Assistant Teachers in Municipal Girls High School Amreli have by this petition challenged the appointment of respondent No. 5 Shri P. K. Rupala as Principal of the said Girls High School on several grounds the main ground being that Shri Rupala being a male could not have been appointed as Principal of the Girls High School in view of the proviso to Regulation 20 of the Gujarat Secondary Regulations 1974 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Regulations) framed by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Sec. 54 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE petitioners have alleged that they along with others applied for the post in question but ultimately two females and respondent No. 5 were a selected but as the two females refused to accept the appointment Shri P. K. Rupala has been appointed as Principal 8s per the say of the respondents. The petitioners are alleged that respondent No. 5 could not have been appointed as Principal of the said School in view of the Regulation 20 (1) of the Regulation. They have also alleged that proper record has not been maintained about the interviews and that the selection of Shri Rupala in illegal also on merits. The respondents have filed affidavit-in-reply stating therein that the appointment of Shri Rupala as Principal is made because no suitable female candidate was available. It is their contention that the appointment of a male was permissible under clause 59. 1 of the Grant-in-aid Code. It is also their contention that the proviso to Regulation 20 (1) is directory and not mandatory in nature. It is also their contention that the proviso to Regulation 20 (1) also offends Arts. 14 15 and 16 of the Constitution and therefore it cannot be given effect to. It is also the contention of the respondents that the petitioners have alternative remedy by way of approaching the Tribunal under Sec. 38 of the Act and therefore also this petition is not maintainable. 14 15 and 16 of the Constitution and therefore it cannot be given effect to. It is also the contention of the respondents that the petitioners have alternative remedy by way of approaching the Tribunal under Sec. 38 of the Act and therefore also this petition is not maintainable. ( 3 ) HAVING gone through the affidavits produced on record and having heard the learned Advocates for the parties I am inclined to take the view that the present petition is maintainable because the question at issue cannot be decided by the Tribunal. I am also further of the view the appointment of Shri P. K. Rupala is contrary to the proviso to Regulation 20 (1) of the Regulations and therefore it is required to be quashed. As I am inclined to quash the appointment of Shri Rupala above ground I do not propose to go into the factual aspects with regard to the selection of Shri Rupala. ( 4 ) THE Grant-in-aid Code was approved by the State Government in the year 1964 Clause 59. 1 of the Grant-in-aid Code was amended in the year 1971 providing for appointment of a male candidate if a suitable female candidate was not available. The said relevant provision of clause 59. 1 of the Grant-in-aid Code reads as follows:"the management shall appoint a lady as Head of the School in cases of Girls Secondary Schools. If the management does not get a competent lady as Head of the School the management shall make the appointment of a male Head with the prior approval of the D. E. Ahmedabad. "the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 came into force with effect from 28-9-1973 i. e. after the above provision was made in the Grant-in-aid Code. Section 38 of the said Act provides for reference to the Tribunal established under the Act certain disputes. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 38 of the said Act says that where there is any dispute or difference between the manager of a registered private Secondary School and any person in service of such school as Headmaster a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff which is connected with the conditions of service of such person the manager or as the case may be the person may make an appplication to the Tribunal for the decision of the dispute. In the present case there is no dispute between the petitioners and the School Management with regard to the conditions of service of the petitioners. The dispute is with regard to the appointment of respondent No. 5 as Principal of the School in question. Section 38 (1) therefore on the face of it cannot be pressed into service. The Tribunal will thus have no jurisdiction to decide the question which is required to be decided in this petition. The objection raised by the respondent based on Sec. 38 of the Act therefore is required to be rejected. ( 5 ) SECTION 53 of the Act empowers the Board i. e. the Gujarat Secondary Education Board established under Sec. 3 of the Act to make Regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. Section 54 of the Act empowers the Government to male First Regulations and the said Regulations are to continue in force until new Regulations are duly made and sanctioned under Sec 53 of the Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 54 of the Act the State Government has framed the Regulations. The Regulations are framed in 1974 i. e. after the amendment was made in clause 59. 1 of the Grant-in-aid Code making provision for appointment of a male candidate as a Principal of a Girls School if a female candidate was not available. Regulation 42 of the Regulations framed the State Government in the year 1974 says that the Regulations shall prevail over the provisions of the Grant-in-aid Code. ( 6 ) THE discussion made above will go to show that even though there was a provision made in the Grant-in-aid Code in the year 1911 for making an appointment of a male candidate as a Principal of a Girls High School when a suitable female candidate was not available the State Government while framing the Regulations provided for appointment of only a female candidate as a Principal of a Girls School. The State Government did not at the time of framing the Regulations make provision similar to the one made in the Grant-in-aid Code. The State Government thus did not intend to make a provision similar to the provision made in the Grant-in-aid Code in clause 59. 1. The State Government has further provided in the Regulations that the Regulations shall prevail over the Grant-in-aid Code. The State Government thus did not intend to make a provision similar to the provision made in the Grant-in-aid Code in clause 59. 1. The State Government has further provided in the Regulations that the Regulations shall prevail over the Grant-in-aid Code. When there is thus a conflict between the Regulations and the Grant-in-aid Code the provisions of the Regulations are to prevail. The Regulations ate framed by virtue of the powers conferred on the State Government by Sec. 54 of the Act and therefore the Regulations have the force of law. The Grant-in-aid Code has no force of law. But apart from this when a specific provision has been made in the Regulations framed in 1974 making a clear departure from the provision contained in clause 59. 1 of the Grant-in-aid Code. It is clear that the State Government while framing the Regulations did not intend that a male candidate may be appointed to the post of a Principal of a Girls High School when a suitable female was not available. ( 7 ) THE petitioners have contended that the respondents have not followed proper procedure at the time of the interviews and in making the selection and therefore also the selection of respondent No. 5 is vitiated. Specific allegations have been made in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioners on 23-2-1987. No reply has been filed challenging the allegations made In the affidavit-in-rejoinder with regard selection of respondent No. 5 on merits Mr. N. D Nanavati learned Advocate appearing for the respondents stated at the time of arguments that he will call for the record from the respondents to satisfy the Court that on merits the selection of Mr. Rupala was justified and that no suitable female candidate was available. Inspite of several adjournments such record has not been produced. In view of this we can infer that the respondents. Rupala was justified and that no suitable female candidate was available. Inspite of several adjournments such record has not been produced. In view of this we can infer that the respondents. are not in a position to support even on facts that a suitable female candidate was not available and that Shri Rupala was properly selected On this ground also the petitioners are entitled to succeed in challenging the appointment of respondent No. 5 but I do not propose to give a definite finding on this point because I am inclined to say that even if a suitable female candidate was not available the respondents were not entitled to appoint respondent No. 5 as Principal of the Girls High School in view of the clear provisions contained in the proviso to Regulation 20 (1) I would however like to mention here that even if the respondents are entitled to appoint a male candidate as Principal of a Girls High School in view of the provisions contained in clause 591 of the Grant-in-aid Code the a also they have not only to satisfy that Shri Rupala was properly selected but they have also to satisfy that no other female candidate was found suitable for the post. Simply because Shri Rupala may be a better candidate as compared to other female candidates who have not been selected the selection of Shri Rupala cannot be justified even taking into consideration clause 591 of the Grant-in-aid Code. The respondents should have produced the necessary records to show that the other female candidates who were not selected were not found suitable. They have not discharged that burden by producing the relevant record. In view of this adverse inference can be drawn against the respondents as stated a little earlier. ( 8 ) IT is contended by the respondents that the proviso to Regutation 20 (1) offends against Arts. 14 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Article 14 says that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India while Art. 15 provides that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion race caste sex place of birth or any of them. Article 14 says that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India while Art. 15 provides that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion race caste sex place of birth or any of them. But the said Art. 15 also provides that nothing contained in the said Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children The provision with regard to appointment only of a female candidate as Principal of a Girls High School has been made not for giving any privilege to a female candidate for being appointed as a Principal but it is made with a view to protect the girl students. The provision has been made keeping in view the fact that only girls are studying in a Girls School. In view of this it cannot be said that the proviso of offends against Art. 14 or Art. 15. So far as Art. 15 is concerned it has to be read along with Art. 15 and not in isolation. Hence the challenge to the proviso of Regulation 20 toes not appear to have any substance. ( 9 ) A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in the case of B. R. Acharya and Another v. State of Gujarat 1988 (1) GLR 33 . In that case it was contended that the Rules framed by the Government for recruitment to posts of Lady Superintendents of Shelter Homes and Reception Centers wherein only women are given shelter reserving the said posts for only women were void and unconstitutional. This Court held that there was wisdom in the Government policy and that the said provision did not offend against Art. 15 of the Constitution. This decision is a clear answer to the contention of the respondents so far as the challenge to the Regulation as unconstitutional is concerned. ( 10 ) MR. This Court held that there was wisdom in the Government policy and that the said provision did not offend against Art. 15 of the Constitution. This decision is a clear answer to the contention of the respondents so far as the challenge to the Regulation as unconstitutional is concerned. ( 10 ) MR. Nanavati drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Punjab Beverages v. Suresh Chand AIR 1978 SC 995 The Supreme Court has laid down therein that it is well-settled rule of construction that no one section of a statute should be read in isolation but it should be construed with reference to the context and other provisions of the statutes so as as far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. I fail to understand how this decision of the Supreme Court is of any assistance in the present case because there is no other provision in the Regulations which is required to be read while construing the proviso to Regulation 20 (1 ). There is also no other provision in the Gujarat Secondary Education Act which might be required to be read while interpreting the proviso to Regulation 20 No provision in this regard is made either in the Regulations or in the Act which might throw any light on the interpretation of the proviso to Regulation 20 (1 ). There is nothing either in the Act or in the Regulations which might show that the proviso to Regulation 20 (1) is directory and not mandatory. We cannot read the Grant-in-aid Code while interpreting the proviso to Regulation 20 (1) firstly because the Regulations have been framed after the relevant provision in the Grant in-aid Code was made and secondly because the Regulations themselves provide that the Regulations shall prevail over the provisions in the Grant-in-aid Code and lastly because the Regulations have the force of law as they are framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 54 of the Act while the Grant-in-aid Code have no such statutory force. ( 11 ) MR. ( 11 ) MR. Nanavati then has also referred to another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Smt. Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain and Others AIR 1978 SC 1351 in support of his submission that because the consequence of breach of the proviso to Regulation 20 is not provided anywhere the proviso should be taken as directory and not mandatory. He also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya AIR 1961 SC 751 in support of the said submission I have carefully gone through both these judgments and I am not inclined to agree with Mr. Nanavati that these decisions lay down that if no consequences for a breach are provided then a particular provision of statute should always be taken as directory and not mandatory. So far as the decision in the case of Smt. Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain (supra) is concerned the Supreme Court was dealing with the proviso to Sec. 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The said proviso provide that it shall not be lawful for the respective parties to marry again unless at the date of such marriage at least one year has elapsed from the date of the decree in the Court of the first instance. The said proviso has not provided that the marriage shall be void. The Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether such a marriage was void or not. After discussing this aspect at paras 10 and 11 the Supreme Court took the view that such a marriage was not void but was merely invalid not affecting the core of marriage and that the parties will be subject to a binding tie of wedlock flowing from the marriage. Mr. Nanavati relied upon the following observations made at para 10 of the Supreme Court decision in support of his submission that when consequences for a breach are not provided then that particular provision should be regarded as directory and not mandatory:"but whenever 2 statute prohibits a certain thing being done thereby making it unlawful without providing for consequences of the breach it is not legitimate to say that such a thing when done is void because that would be tantamount to saying that every unlawful Act is void"it is difficult to agree with Mr. Nanavati that these observations support his submission. Nanavati that these observations support his submission. On the contrary the Supreme Court has in the said paragraph observed as follows:" A submission that the proviso is directory or at any rate not mandatory and decision bearing on the point need not detain us because the interdict of law is that it shall not be lawful for a certain party to do a certain thing which would mean that if that act is done it would be unlawful"the Supreme Court therefore did not go into the question whether the provision was mandatory or directory. In facts the Supreme Court was not concerned with that aspect but the Supreme Court was only concerned with the question whether such a marriage would be unlawful or void. It also appears that the Supreme Court gave the decision in that case because the Supreme Court was considering the Marriage Law. The Supreme Court has observed at para 10 as under:"as pointed out earlier it would be all the more inadvisable]e in the field of Marriage Law Consequences of treating a marriage void are so serious and far reaching and are likely to affect innocent persons such as children born during the period anterior to the date of the decree annulling the marriage that it has always been considered not safe to treat a marriage void unless the law so enacts or the inference of the marriage being treated void is either inescapable or irresistible. This decision of the Supreme Court therefore does not support the contention canvassed by Mr. Nanavati that because no consequences for breach of Regulation 20 are provided the proviso to Regulation 20 should be taken as directory and not mandatory. ( 12 ) SO far as the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya (supra) is concerned the Supreme Court was considering the penal provisions of U. P. Police Regulations. The Supreme Court has not stated therein that is non-compliance with a particular provision is of is not visited with some penalty then the provision should be taken as directory though the Supreme Court has observed that that is one of the factors to be considered. The relevant discussion in this regard is found at paras 29 and 30 of the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has observed at para 29 as follows:"the relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus. The relevant discussion in this regard is found at paras 29 and 30 of the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has observed at para 29 as follows:"the relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus. When a statute uses the word shall prima facie it is mandatory but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature the Court may consider inter alia. the nature and the design of the statute and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided the circumstances namely that the statute provides for a contingency of non-compliance with the provisions the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom. and above all whether the object or the legislation will be defeated or futhered. In that case also no penalty was provided for non-compliance with Rule 1 of para 486 of the U. P. Police Regulations and even then the Supreme Court held that the provisions were mandatory and not directory. That was in the light of the discussion made at para 29 of the judgment. As observed by the Supreme Court at para 29 for ascertaining the real intention of the Government which has framed the Regulations we have to consider the nature and the design of the statute the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other and whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered. "if we apply the test applied by the Supreme Court at para 29 of the judgment it is clear that the object of the Regulations will be defeated if the interpretation sought to be put by Mr. Nanavati is accepted. Such an interpretation as canvassed by Mr. Nanavati that the proviso to Regulation 20 should be taken as directory cannot therefore be accepted. Nanavati is accepted. Such an interpretation as canvassed by Mr. Nanavati that the proviso to Regulation 20 should be taken as directory cannot therefore be accepted. ( 13 ) THE contention of the petitioner that the two selected females who refused to accept the appointment were only dummy candidates appears to have some substance because those two lady candidates applied for the post and were interviewed and selected but thereafter for the reasons which do not seem to be quite convincing refused to accept the appointment. One Shailbala D. Bhatt refused to accept the appointment stating therein that she was refusing to accept the appointment for certain reasons but the reasons have not been disclosed therein. She has thus not disclosed any reasons for refusing to accept the appointment. The other candidate Smt. P. C. Pandya has refused to accept the appointment stating therein that she was not in a position to accept the post on account of family circumstances. These are also very vague reasons. It is also not possible to believe that no suitable female candidates will be available for a Girls High School in a place like Amreli. ( 14 ) THE contention of the petitioner that respondent No. 5 being the Chief Officer of the Municipality by which the said School was managed should not have been a candidate for the post of Principal of this Girls High School also has much substance. It is surprising that the Chief Officer of a Municipality was selected for the post of Principal of a Girls High School and that too for the post of the Principal of the Girls High School managed by the same Municipality. ( 15 ) THE approval by the D. E. is of no consequence because even the Regulations can now be amended by the Board and not by the Government because Sec. 54 empowers the Government only to make the first Regulations. Any amendment in the Regulations has to be made by the Board and not by the Government. ( 16 ) PETITIONER No. 3 is working as Vice Principal of the School and even then she is not selected. As stated earlier the respondents have not produced any record to show that the petitioners and particularly petitioner No. 3 was found to be unsuitable for the post in question. ( 16 ) PETITIONER No. 3 is working as Vice Principal of the School and even then she is not selected. As stated earlier the respondents have not produced any record to show that the petitioners and particularly petitioner No. 3 was found to be unsuitable for the post in question. It may also be mentioned that the affidavit-in-reply Shows that the others were not selected. The affidavit-in-reply does not say that the other lady candidates were found to be unsuitable for the post in question. It may be that the three candidates including respondent No. 5 may have been found to be more suitable as compared to the other lady candidates but there is nothing on record to show that all other lady candidates were found to be unsuitable for the post in question. ( 17 ) IT was contended that the Regulations are inconsistent with the Act and therefore ultra vires the Act. I do not find any substance in this contention. Section 17 of the Act prescribes power and duties of the Board and one of the duties 13 in prescribe the standards including qualifications for appointment of the staff of a registered school. The power to prescribe qualifications includes the power to provide that Principal of a Girls High School shall be only a female. The said Section also empowers the Board to lay down qualifications methods of selection and conditions of appointment promotion and termination of employment and rules for conduct and discipline of the Headmaster and the teaching and non-teaching staff of registered private secondary schools. This make it amply clear that the Board has all the powers in this regard. The Board was thus competent to provide that Headmaster for a Girls High School shall be only a female. When such powers is given to the Board and when these powers are to be exercised by the Government in the first instance it cannot be said with any stretch of imagination that the Government could not have inserted the proviso to Regulation 20. The contention raised by the respondents in this regard therefore also deserves to be rejected. When such powers is given to the Board and when these powers are to be exercised by the Government in the first instance it cannot be said with any stretch of imagination that the Government could not have inserted the proviso to Regulation 20. The contention raised by the respondents in this regard therefore also deserves to be rejected. ( 18 ) THE discussion made above will go to show that the petition is required to be allowed and the appointment of respondent No. 5 as Principal of respondent No. 4 Girls High School ii required to be set aside as it is in contravention of the proviso to Regulation 20 (1) of the Regulations framed by the Government Directions are also required to be issued restraining respondent No. 5 from holding the post of Principal of respondent No. 4 High School and further directions are also required to be given to the respondents to make a fresh selection for the post in question by inviting applications only from female candidates ( 19 ) THE petition is accordingly allowed and the appointment of respondent No. 5 Shri P. K. Rupala as Principal of respondent No. 4 Municipal Girls High School Amreli is hereby quashed and Shri Rupala is hereby restrained from discharging the duties as Principal of the said Girls High School and the respondent. Municipality is hereby directed to make a fresh selection for the post of Principal of the Girls High School by inviting applications only from female candidates. The respondent. School shall also make arrangement for holding charge of the post of Principal by a lady teacher in the meantime. ( 20 ) RULE is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. . ( 21 ) MR. J. R. Nanavati for Mr. N. D. Nanavati makes an oral request that the operation of the order passed by this Court may be stayed for a period of four weeks from today so as to enable the respondents to file Letters Patent Appeal and obtain appropriate orders from the Appellate Court Mr. Thakkar objects and states that not more than one weeks time may be granted. The operation of the order passed by this Court is stayed for a period of two weeks from today. Rule made absolute. .