JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J.—This is a revision petition under Para 35 (1) of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Courts Order"). It is not in dispute that the revision petition is to be heard and decided under clause (a) of the said para which confers the power and jurisdiction upon this Court to call for the record of any case which has been decided by a subordinate civil court and in which no appeal lies, if such court appears to have : (a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity. 2. The petitioner is original defendant No. 1, the first respondent is original plaintiff and respondents No. 2 and 3 are original proforma defendants No. 2 and 3. The suit out of which the revision petition arises was filed by the first respondent alleging substantially that be was the owner in possession of Khasra No. 35, which is situate just below Khasra No. 39 owned arid possessed by the petitioner, that both these pieces or parcels of agricultural land (hereinafter called fields") are Dhaniawal and were irrigated with the water of Sameyee Kuhal and that his field used to be irrigated with such water after it overflowed from the field of the petitioner. According to the first respondent, the petitioner was previously arising paddy crop in the field but, of late, he had started raising maize crop with the result that the overflow of Kuhal water from his field into his own field (the first respondents field) had ceased and in that manner the irrigation facility had been discontinued. The relief claimed by the first respondent was in the form of a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the petitioner from preventing him (the first respondent) from irrigating his field with the water of Sameyee Kuhal overflowing as aforesaid and in the form of a mandatory injunction directing the petitioner to let the water of Sameyee Kuhal overflow from his field into the field of the first respondent. 3. 3. The suit was resisted by the petitioner mainly on the ground that the first respondents field was never irrigated with the water of Sameyee Kuhal as alleged, that is, by overflow of the water of that Kuhal from the field of the petitioner. Besides, other pleas such as bar of limitation, want of necessary parties etc. were also taken-up by way of defence. 4. The trial Court found that the field of the petitioner and that of the first respondent were situate as alleged in the plaint. It was held, however, that it was not proved that the field of the first respondent was irrigated in the manner alleged, that is, by overflow of the water of Sameyee Kuhal from the field of the petitioner. It was also found that under such circumstances there was no foundation whatever for the allegation that the irrigation facility through overflow- was discontinued as alleged. The trial Court further found that the suit was barred by limitation. The plea of non-joinder of necessary parties was, however, rejected. In light of the findings aforesaid, the suit was dismissed. 5. It is pertinent to mention at this stage that an argument was advanced before the trial Court on behalf of the first respondent that he was entitled to claim the alleged irrigation facility on the basis of customary easement or customary right. The submission was rejected on the ground that the material on record was not sufficient to establish that Sameyee Kuhal existed since times immemorial and that the first respondent enjoyed the irrigation facility through the field of the petitioner for the requisite period or since a long time. The further finding was that there was neither any allegation in the plaint nor any evidence has been led by the first respondent to establish the existence of a local custom which conferred upon him the right to claim the irrigation facility in the manner alleged. 6. The first respondent carried the matter in appeal to the District Court which was heard and decided by the learned Additional District Judge. 6. The first respondent carried the matter in appeal to the District Court which was heard and decided by the learned Additional District Judge. The appellate Court found that although, in the present case, there was no specific plea as to the existence of a local custom prevalent in the area entitling the owner of an agricultural land situate at a lower height to irrigate his land by means of water overflowing from another agricultural land situate at a higher level above such land, it was evident that the parties went to trial with full knowledge that the first respondents claim was based on the existence of such local custom and evidence was also adduced by the parties on such basis. Under such circumstances, there was no impediment in the way of considering the claim of the first respondent from that angle. A reference was made next to the entries in the record of rights pertaining to both the fields for the years 1966-67 and also to the Khasra Girdawari for Khasra No. 35 for the period from 4-4-1967 to 44Q-1P70 and Khasra No. 39 for the period from 4-10-1967 to 17-4-1971.Those revenue records were relied upon for reaching the conclusion that both the fields were Dbaniawal and that they were being irrigated with the water of Satneyee Kuhal. It was also found that maize crop was for the first time shown to have been cultivated in the field of the petitioner (Khasra No. 39) in Kharif 1969. Oral evidence led by the parties was also held to be pointing in the direction that the field of the first respondent was being irrigated by the water of Sameyee Kuhal which overflowed from the field of the petitioner. The appellate Court then proceeded to observe as follows: "The above evidence examined on behalf of the plaintiff has not been considered by the trial Court on the sole ground that there was no pleadings by the plaintiff so as to cover this evidence especially when according to the trial Court it was not pleaded by the plaintiff since when he was getting this water for irrigation of his field. At the cost of repetition it may again be referred here that the plaintiffs case is basically based to get water for his field from the field of the deft, which, according to him and his evidence is based on the local custom as has been deposed by the witnesses. There is no doubt that the witnesses have not used specific words but the fact remains that they are unanimous that the aforesaid arrangement of irrigation was followed in that village and the plaintiff was receiving water on the basis of that arrangement for a sufficient long period which period has been described to be more than 20 years. In this view of the matter the trial Courts conclusion to reject this evidence appears to be most unreasonable and untenable in the eyes of law." The final conclusion was recorded by the appellate Court in the following words: “I think the evidence, as discussed above and the circumstances present in this case establish that it was on the basis of the local custom prevalent in the area that the plaintiff had been receiving water for his field as an overflow and from the drain from the field situated at a higher level. These circumstances in itself reflect that it was a matter of right and not as a matter of courtesy that the plaintiff has been receiving water. It is not essential that the witnesses have to use the word "RIGHT" but a right enjoined by the parties has to be inferred from the circumstances legally established in the case. The present case is of that very nature where the plaintiff has been successful in establishing his customary right to receive water from the field of the deft, as has been pleaded, by him." In view of the findings recorded as aforesaid, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court were set-aside and the suit of the respondent for permanent prohibitory injunction was decreed as prayed. Be it stated that the trial Courts finding on the issue of limitation was also reversed and the suit was found to have been instituted within the time prescribed by law. 7. This revision petition is directed against the decree aforesaid and it has to be heard and decided under the provisions aforementioned. 8. Be it stated that the trial Courts finding on the issue of limitation was also reversed and the suit was found to have been instituted within the time prescribed by law. 7. This revision petition is directed against the decree aforesaid and it has to be heard and decided under the provisions aforementioned. 8. Now, it is settled law that a custom, in order to have the force of law, must be ancient, certain, reasonable, continual, peaceable, consistent, legal, moral and not opposed to public policy. So far as custom as a rule of law applicable to a particular or defined locality, that is, local custom, is concerned, it must be shown also that it is compulsory in the sense that it is a customary right vested in the inhabitants of a particular locality and that it is not optional to every person to follow it or not. It is also well established that in the matter of custom a party has to plead in specific terms as to what is the custom that he is relying on and he must prove the custom pleaded by him. He cannot be permitted to prove a custom cot pleaded by him. The reason for this rule is obvious. Anybody who puts forward a custom must prove by satisfactory evidence the existence of the custom pleaded, its continuity and the consistency with which it was observed. A party against whom a custom is pleaded must have notice as to what case he has to meet. The opposite party, apart from rebutting the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, may be able to prove that the custom in question was not invariably followed. He cannot get ready with that evidence without knowing the nature of the custom relied upon by the plaintiff (sec : Kochan Kani Kunjuraman Kani etc. v. Mathevan Kani Sankaran Kani and others etc., AIR 1971 SC 1398. The validity of the impugned decision requires examination against the aforesaid legal background. 9. The impugned decision proceeds on the footing that the first respondent was entitled to the relief claimed since it was established that there was local custom prevalent in the area that a field situate at a lower level could be irrigated with water overflowing from another field situate at a higher level. 9. The impugned decision proceeds on the footing that the first respondent was entitled to the relief claimed since it was established that there was local custom prevalent in the area that a field situate at a lower level could be irrigated with water overflowing from another field situate at a higher level. In terms it was found that the first respondent was entitled to the decree since he had successfully established his right on the basis of the local custom as aforesaid prevalent in the area. 1 he question which, therefore, requires consideration is whether, in the first instance, the existence of such a local custom could have been relied upon since it was not pleaded and, in the next place, whether the existence of such a custom, if any, was proved by satisfactory evidence. 10. So far as the question of pleadings is concerned, the trial Court found that it was nowhere alleged in the plaint that the first respondent had a customary right based on a local custom and, on that basis, inter alia, the relief sought on that ground was denied. I he appellate Court found also that there was no specific plea as to the existence of any local custom, it was held, however, that the absence of a specific plea was not a bar to the grant of relief since the parties had gone to trial with full knowledge that the first respondent was basing his claim on such custom and evidence on that point was also led by the parties. 1 here was no doubt, observed the appellate Court, that the witnesses had not used specific words but the fact remained that they were unanimous that the arrangement for irrigation as alleged was followed in the village and that the first respondent was receiving water on the basis of that arrangement for a sufficiently long period. On the basis of this reasoning, the trial courts conclusion was found to be "most unreasonable and untenable in the eyes of law”. 11. Now, the material averments contained in the plaint have been set-out in the earlier portion of this judgment. On the basis of this reasoning, the trial courts conclusion was found to be "most unreasonable and untenable in the eyes of law”. 11. Now, the material averments contained in the plaint have been set-out in the earlier portion of this judgment. I here is not a whisper, much less a plea and a specific plea, that the first respondent was claiming the right on the oasis of local custom With respect, therefore, the trial Court was right and the appellate Court was in error in permitting the first respondent to rely on the so-called local custom without pleading the same in specific terms in the plaint. Having regard to the well settled legal position referred to earlier, such a course of action is not permissible and even if some evidence bearing upon the alleged local custom was let in, the same could not have been validly taken into consideration. Besides, what is more relevant and significant is that there is no precise evidence to prove the alleged local custom, Mo specific evidence has been led to show the existence of the local custom, if any, its continuity and the consistency with which it was observed and the length of time for which it was being followed. The existence of the relevant entries in the revenue records, including the record of rights, would not establish local custom in the sense the said expression is understood in legal parlance. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the impugned decision, insofar as it proceeds to grant relief to the first respondent on the basis of local custom, is wholly unsustainable. 12. The next question is whether the decision discloses a jurisdictional error so as to enable this Court to interfere in the exercise of revisional powers conferred by Para 35 (1) (a) of the Courts Order. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the precise question is whether in granting the relief the appellate Court acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity. 13. It cannot be gainsaid that the revisional jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision has to be exercised in accordance with the limits therein prescribed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the precise question is whether in granting the relief the appellate Court acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity. 13. It cannot be gainsaid that the revisional jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision has to be exercised in accordance with the limits therein prescribed. While exercising such jurisdiction, it is not competent to this Court to correct errors of fact, however gross they may be, or even errors of law, unless such errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute its if. An erroneous decision on a question of law reached by the subordinate court, which has no relation to the jurisdiction of that court, cannot be corrected by exercising these powers. The words "illegality" and "with material irregularity", which are generally used in the context of revisional powers, do not cover either errors of fact or of law ; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached The errors contemplated by these words relate to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision and not to errors either of fact or of law after the formalities which the law prescribed have been duly complied with both in letter and spirit. The errors contemplated may relate to either some breach of a provision of law or to a breach of procedure affecting the ultimate decision (see : Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kisen Chamria and others, AIR 1953 SC 23 ; Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others v. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others, AIR 1966 SC 153 and Mis. D. L. F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Samp Singh and others, AIR 1971 SC 2324. 14. Does the present case meet with the test of "material irregularity" as explained and elaborated above? Is it shown that the appellate Court has committed a breach of procedure which has affected its ultimate decision? These questions must be answered before the impugned decision can be interfered with. 15. To permit a party to raise a plea of local custom without it having been specifically pleaded and to grant relief to him on such basis touches upon the manner in which the final decision is reached. It is a material defect in the procedure affecting the ultimate decision. But this is not all. 15. To permit a party to raise a plea of local custom without it having been specifically pleaded and to grant relief to him on such basis touches upon the manner in which the final decision is reached. It is a material defect in the procedure affecting the ultimate decision. But this is not all. Any decision reached as to the existence of local custom in the absence of precise evidence on all the material aspects and ingredients or by misreading the evidence, is an error in the manner of arriving at the decision and touches the jurisdiction to decide the case. Not to apply mind to the evidence with a view to ascertaining whether custom as understood in law is established is not to comply with the procedure which the law prescribes for a fair and proper trial in which custom is the source of relief. The present case thus clearly discloses a jurisdictional error conferring power on this Court to set aside the decision in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition succeeds and it is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the suit instituted by the first respondent is dismissed with costs throughout. Revision allowed. -