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1988 DIGILAW 290 (SC)

K. K. Muthukutty Vaidhyan v. Special Deputy Commissioner

1988-04-06

M.M.DUTT, RANGANATH MISRA

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(1) NOTICE was given that the matter would be; finally disposed of today. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we direct special leave to begranted. (2) THE two appellants applied to the Deputy; Commissioner concerned in Bangalore under the provisions of Karnataka Land Revenue Act for permission to convert certain separate areas of their agricultural lands into non-agricultural use. The applications were rejected but the appellate tribunal granted the applications by reversing the rejection by the Deputy Commissioner. When the matter came; up before the High court and by interim maridamus, the authority was called upon to grant necessary certificate, the High court was moved by the respondents for quashing the appellate order. The Single Judge declined to interfere and directed implementation of the Tribunals order. The division bench at the instance of the respondents entertained appeals but byorder dated 9/03/1987, dismissed the Writ Appeal Nos. 1938 and 1939 of 1986. The copy of the judgment which is made available in the paper book shows two dates for the appellate order, one being 9/03/1987 and the other being the 2 5/03/1987. On looking into the judgment we find that paragraphs 1 to 8 were dictated on the 9th March, and rest of the judgment beginning from paragraph 9 till the end appears to have been dictated on the 25/03/1987. As the contentsofparagraphs9,10 and 11 wouldshow the judgment of 9/03/1987 though dictated in the open court had not been signed on account of delay in transcription and the court chose to continue the same proceeding on, the basis of the information gathered by it white disposing of some other similar matters. The net result of the Division benchs decision was to reverse what had been dictated on 9/03/1987, and to allow the appeals of the respondents by the order dated 25/03/1987. (3) ADEQUATE care and attention have not I apparently been bestowed while deliveiring the judgment. This impression has been formed on account of the fact that the judgment has paragraphs 8,9,10 and 11 twice over. This has happend obviously on account of the fact that instead of signing the Judgment on 9/03/1987, or having it separately shown without Signing, the two decisions pronounced on two different dates have been clubbed together and a confusion has been created. This has happend obviously on account of the fact that instead of signing the Judgment on 9/03/1987, or having it separately shown without Signing, the two decisions pronounced on two different dates have been clubbed together and a confusion has been created. It took us some time to find out whether the judgment of the 9/03/1987, ended and from where the judgment of the subsequent date commenced. (4) THIS court had occasion sometime back to deal with a case of this type to some extent in VINOD KUMAR SINGH VS. BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY ( 1988 (1) SCC 80 ) where in open Court a judgment had been pronounced by dictation to the shorthand writer and the court chose not to sign it and the matter was relisted and disposed of by delivering a contrary judgment in the peculiar facts of that case we allowed the first judgment to prevail and indicated as to how and under what situations ignoring of a judgment dictated in open court should be permitted. This obviously has to be a very rare event as we then indicated. We never thought that we would come across within a short period another instance of the same type. We sincerely hope and trust that the High Courts would not exercise jurisdiction in the way it has been done here as such a practice is likely to shake the confidence of the litigants in the judicial process. (5) WE find that the respondent had not placed any documents or new material inthe appeals before the Division bench. If material available in any other case was intended to be utilised by the High court, full opportunity should have been given to the parties to meet the same. Before us the learned counsel for the appellants wanted to rely upon some documents which would support their stand that the High court was not right on merit. We have not considered it appropriate to go into the merit of the matter because in our opinion that would not be appropriate on the other hand. The appeal should go back to the High court where the questions can be looked into.