JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Tenants are the Petitioners against the appellate order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in a proceeding-arising out of an application filed u/s 5 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act. 2. Opposite party No. 1 landlord filed an application before the House Rent Controller invoking his jurisdiction u/s 5 of the Orissa House' Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act') for fixation of fair rent in respect of the house in question. The Controller by his order dated l0-3-1980 fixed the fair rent at Rs. 80/- per month as against the previous rent of Rs. 40/- Being aggrieved by the said order the tenants preferred an appeal before the appellate authority which was registered as house Rent Control Appeal No. 6 of 1980. by the impugned order the appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the tenants but allowed a cross-appeal filed by the landlord and enhanced the rent to Rs. 100/-. The tenant Petitioners then filed an application for review purporting it to be one under Order 47, Rule 1. CPC stating therein that the tenants had no notice of any cross-appeal having been filed by the landlord and therefore, disposal of the cross-appeal without notice must be held to be void. That application having been rejected by the appellate authority by order dated 23-7-1981 the Petitioners have approached this Court. 3. Mr. P. K Misra, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners raises two contentions in assailing the order of the appellate authority enhancing the fair rent: (i) The provisions of Order 41. Rule 22, CPC not having been made applicable, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to entertain,a cross-appeal and dispose of the same and therefore, the impugned order enhancing the rent on the basis of cross-appeal filed by the landlord is without jurisdiction and void and (ii) Even assuming that a cross-appeal would be maintainable but no notice of the same having been served on the tenant the impugned order is not sustainable and there has been errore of procedure on the face of it and on that ground the order of the appellate authority is liable to be interfered with. 4. So far as the first question is concerned no direct authority has been placed before, us either by the learned Counsel appearing for the tenants-Petitioners or by the landlord opposite party No. 1.,Mr. 4. So far as the first question is concerned no direct authority has been placed before, us either by the learned Counsel appearing for the tenants-Petitioners or by the landlord opposite party No. 1.,Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner however, places reliance on the decision of this Court wherein it is held that the appellate authority has no power of remand within the meaning of Order 41, Rule 23, Code of Civil Procedure, and contends that the said principle should also apply in case of cross-appeal within the meaning of Order 41, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure. Section 12 of the Act provides that an enquiry under the Act shall be of a summary nature and shall so far as practicable be held in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 21 of the Act enables the State. Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act and Sub-section (2) (a) provides that the State Government may make rules to provide for the procedure to be followed by the Controllers and appellate authorities in the performance of their functions under the Act Rule 10 of the Orissa House Rent Control Rules (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') provides for the procedure to be followed in disposing of an appeal. .A combined reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Rules therefore, indicates that though the enquiry has to beheld in accordance with the provisions contained in the CPC as far as practicable but in terms the specific provisions of the CPC including. Order 41, Rule 22 with which we are concerned in the present case have not been made applicable. The net effect, therefore, would be that a proceeding under the Act is a civil proceeding and it is a civil right which is being adjudicated under the fact consequently if the procedure provided for In the special statute is not specific in respect of a particular matter, then, the ordinary procedure provided for in the CPC has to be applied. In other words if any specific provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder either expressly or even impliedly prohibits application of it particular provision of the CPC then he said provision cannot be held to be applicable. In other words if any specific provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder either expressly or even impliedly prohibits application of it particular provision of the CPC then he said provision cannot be held to be applicable. Otherwise, the provisions of the CPC must be held to be applicable if there is no bar either express or implied in the statute or the rules made thereunder. 5. No doubt, in the case of Sarathi Charan Adhikari v. Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Cuttack and Ors.,it has been held by this Court that the provision contained in Order 41, Rule 17 (1) has no application to a house rent Control proceeding, but the said conclusion, is based on a reading of Section 13 (2) of the Act which has been held to be inconsistent with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 17 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has been clearly held in the aforesaid decision after analysing Sections 12 (1) and 13 of the Act and considering the true meaning of the expression "so far as practicable" used in Section 12 (1) of the Act, that Order 41 would- not be applicable to appeals under the Act if there is inconsistency or repugnancy. It has been further held that in other words, if there is a specific provision in the Act to decide the appeal in a particular manner and there is a contrary provision in Order 41, then the provisions of the Act would prevail and to the extent of inconsistency the provisions of Order 4l would not apply. After considering the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the learned Judges held: ...In other words, it would not be practicable to apply Order 41. Rule 17 (1) to the hearing of an appeal under the Act. In another later decision of this Court in the case of Sarathi Charan Adhikari Vs. Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) and Others. it was held by this Court: ...from a conspectus of the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above we come to the conclusion that the appellate authority under the Orissa house Rent Control Act, 1967 has jurisdiction only to make such further enquiries as it thinks fit and decide the appeal but has no power to remand the case to the Controller for a fresh decision. But in our opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid two decisions is not to the effect that any provision contained in Order 41, CPC has been hold to be inapplicable to an appeal under the Orissa House Rent Control Act.. On the other band, in the case of Smt. Debmani @ Devmani Atha v. Smt. Sarala Ben Mulji Bhinda 59 (985) C.L.T. 83 a learned Single Judge considering the scope of Section 12 (1) of the Act held that it gave wide scope to the application of the provisions of the CPC unless clearly it would defeat the legislative intention. In' the 'said case, Order 9, Rule 13, Code .of Civil Procedure, was held to be applicable to an enquiry under the Orissa House Rent Control Act. In the case of S. Ziaullah and Ors. v. Srimati Kiranbala Devi and Ors. 1975 (1) C.W.I. 447 it has been held by this Court that Order 8, Rule 5, CPC can be invoked to construe the written statement in the absence of specific denial there being no inconsistency between it and the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. . In the case of Srimati Dei alias Dad and Anr. v. Bidyadhar Pradhan and Ors. 37 (1971) C. L.T. 466, this Court has held that Order 41, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, would apply to a proceeding under the House Rent Control Act. In the case of Baini Ram and Anr. v. Jainti Parshad and Anr. 1932 (1) R.C.J. 331 a learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court held that Order 41, Rule 22 Code of Civil Procedure, would apply to a proceeding under the Rent Control Act, and the Respondent would have the fight of upholding the decree or order on any ground decided against him. In the premises as aforesaid after applying our mind to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder we do not find any prohibition under the Act and the Rules for entertaining across-appeal by the appellate authority within the meaning of Order 41, Rule 22, CPC and in view of the wide powers conferred on the authorities, as provide a u/s 12 (1) of the Act, we hold that a cross-appeal filed by the Respondent within the ambit of Order 41. Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, is maintainable before the appellate authority under the Orissa House Rent Control Act. Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, is maintainable before the appellate authority under the Orissa House Rent Control Act. The first, contention of Mr, Misra is, therefore, rejected being devoid of any substance. 6. Coming now to the second submission, it depends on the fact whether in fact, the Petitioners had any notice of the cross-appeal tiled by the landlord-opposite party No. 1. The order of the appellate authority dated 23-7-1981 on the application filed by the Petitioners for review indicates that the appeal and the cross-appeal were heard simultaneously in presence of the advocates appearing for both parties on 4-12-1980. The counsel for the Petitioners bad never made any grievance while the original appeal bad been heard on the ground tbat he had no notice of the cross-appeal. The appellate authority himself, considering the aforesaid state of affairs held that it was not open to the Appellants (the present Petitioner to say that they had no knowledge about the cross-appeal. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of the appellate authority, we are not in a position to accept the submission of Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the Petitioners or their counsel had no notice of the cross-appeal. We do not find any error of law apparent on the fact of the order on this score so as to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The second contention of Mr. Misra, therefore, fails. 7. In the result he do not find any merits in this application which is therefore, dismissed, but in the circumstances, without any order as to costs. V. Gopalaawamy, J. 8. I agree Final Result : Dismissed