H. W. Long fellow. This is the rule of life and this is the rule of Law. Justice tempered with mercy. That is what Judge Chaudhary did. Strange, the Trustees of a charitable trust, the petitioners, find fault in this. 2. The petitioners filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court being Suit No. 617 of 1985 as against the defendants for a declaration that they are trespassers and for possession and for the mesne profits etc. The plaintiffs are the trustees of a charitable Trust which owns a chawl the rooms in which are to be used by the poor men and woman of Lohana caste, at the monthly subscription of Re. 1/-. One Kamlaben was occupying room No. 26, the suit premises, in the said chawl. She died on November 9, 1984. It is the plaintiff's case that Kamlaben was staying alone in the said premises and, therefore, on her death the plaintiffs thought that they could put a lock on the said premises. As against this, it is the case of the defendants that they were residing in the said room at the time of the death of the said Kamlaben. Defendant No. 1 has her husband staying in room No. 28 of the same chawl. But she says that her relations with her husband have been strained since about 1976 and, therefore, she could not stay with her husband. She went to her native place, Morvi, in Gujarat State, where she was residing with her parents till about 1980. She came to Bombay with her mother, defendant No. 2, and since then she has been residing in the said room. 3. It is the case of the defendants that on November 9, 1984 after the funeral they had gone to the ground floor to have bath and by the time they came up they found that there was a lock on the door of the suit premises. They requested plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 to have the lock removed. They went to the Police Station but none could help them. Therefore, they were advised to remove the lock on December 12, 1984. When they occupied the said room, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants broke open the lock of the premises and that is how the suit was filed some time in 1985 on the basis that the defendants are trespassers. Therefore, they were advised to remove the lock on December 12, 1984. When they occupied the said room, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants broke open the lock of the premises and that is how the suit was filed some time in 1985 on the basis that the defendants are trespassers. After the filing of the suit, the plaintiffs took out a notice of motion for appointment of Court Receiver as Receiver of the said room. The learned Judge appointed Court Receiver as the Receiver. However, the learned Judge gave direction that the defendants be not removed from the premises and be allowed to continue as the agents of the Court Receiver. It is not necessary for me to go into various other details. However, it is on record that eventually the defendants entered into an agreement with the Court Receiver and the defendants were directed to pay monthly royalty of Rs. 100/-. 4. It is an admitted position that the chawl is an old chawl of about 70-80 years or more, and the same required heavy repairs. In fact the trustees had informed the occupants of the chawl as far back as in the year 1978 that the chawl is in a dilapidated condition and that the occupants were running a risk in continuing to live in the said premises and they were all warned in that behalf. We do not know as to why the trustees were not in a position to have the chawl repaired and make the same habitable. 5. After the defendants were appointed as agents of the Court Receiver, the defendants informed the Receiver by their Advocates' letter dated March 27, 1987 that the said premises was in a very dilapidated condition and they had shown photographs of the room to the Court Receiver's representative and that the said representative had also visited the room and had reported regarding the condition of the said room. They pointed out to the Court Receiver that the room required heavy repairs and it was dangerous to reside in the said room, and such repairs, be carried out at the cost of the plaintiffs. They also requested the Court Receiver to carry out the repairs and if necessary a meeting be called in that behalf. They pointed out to the Court Receiver that the room required heavy repairs and it was dangerous to reside in the said room, and such repairs, be carried out at the cost of the plaintiffs. They also requested the Court Receiver to carry out the repairs and if necessary a meeting be called in that behalf. There is an earlier report dated June 16, 1986 which shows that the kitchen portion of the suit premises was in a dilapidated condition, and the window above mori was in worn out condition and its iron bars were broken. The report also shows that the flooring in the kitchen was also broken and one could see the ground floor room below the suit room through the said flooring and the wooden refters holding coba of the first floor suit premises were also decayed. Yet, the trustees objected to any repairs being carried out and they informed the defendants' attorneys that their demand for such repairs would be "luxury", and that they would not agree to the same. They further pointed out by a letter dated March 30, 1987 that if the defendant finds the premises unworthy, she was most welcome to remove herself from the said room instead of burdening the trust any further. Strange it sounds as it comes from the trustees of a trust, the object of which is to accommodate poor Lohana people on a rental of Re. 1/- per month in their premises. But the matter does not stop there. The Court Receiver, for reasons best known to him, did not even think it necessary to call for a meeting and to make a report. Having regard to the fact that he was in charge of the suit room and that the premises required urgent repairs to make it habitable, particularly when he was collecting a royalty of Rs. 100/- per month, the Court Receiver had a duty of, at least, making a report to the Court concerned and to seek directions. But the Court Receiver thought otherwise. He straight away wrote back to the defendant saying that he did not have funds and, therefore, he was unable to consider their request for repairs. In these circumstances, the defendants thought that there was no choice but to repair the premises themselves. They, therefore, started repairing the premises for the purpose of making it habitable. He straight away wrote back to the defendant saying that he did not have funds and, therefore, he was unable to consider their request for repairs. In these circumstances, the defendants thought that there was no choice but to repair the premises themselves. They, therefore, started repairing the premises for the purpose of making it habitable. This was sufficient ruse for the trustee to rush to the court and to seek an order from the Bombay City Civil Court which they did, when they took out a notice of motion bearing No. 6348 of 1987. The learned judge before whom the plaintiffs moved the said motion thought that the defendants have committed a grave crime and, therefore, he thought that the best thing would be keep the premises sealed. Against this order, the defendants moved the High Court and the learned Judge found no fault in the order at that stage. He took into account that these defendants had gained entry earlier forcibly by breaking open the lock and had started carrying out the repairs without obtaining the permission of the Court Receiver. This, of course, was at the ad interim stage. 6. Since the premises was kept locked and the defendants were virtually without any shelter, they were advised to take out a separate motion on their own, which they did on or about January 11, 1988 being Notice of motion No. 166 of 1988. In that motion, they prayed that their action in carrying out the repairs on their own to be condoned and they be permitted, at their own cost, to reconstruct the premises and the mori and that the Court Receiver be directed to remove the seal and the lock which has been put on the premises. After filing of the affidavits on either side, both the motions were kept on board on April 25, 1988, but, the matter reached for hearing on the next day i.e., April 26, 1988. The learned judge by his order (dated April 26, 1988) dismissed the plaintiffs notice of motion, but, subject to various terms and conditions which are all found in the said order. It is against this order, the plaintiffs have filed the present revision application. 7. The learned judge by his order (dated April 26, 1988) dismissed the plaintiffs notice of motion, but, subject to various terms and conditions which are all found in the said order. It is against this order, the plaintiffs have filed the present revision application. 7. If one goes through the order as also considers all the facts and circumstances of the case, there is neither any question of jurisdiction, nor is there any question of error of law or illegality on the part of the learned judge. Therefore, for the mere asking, this revision application should be dismissed, in limine. 8. However, Mr. Rahimtoola, appearing for the petitioners/plaintiffs, made several grievances. He made a grievance that the plaintiffs have not been heard in these notices of motion. He submitted that the order has been passed by not observing the principles of natural justice. He submitted that the principles of natural justice are as much applicable to the courts as to any other quasi judicial bodies. His submission is that on April 25, 1988 the matter did not reach and it was not possible for him to attend the matter on April 26, 1988. He further submitted that on April 26, 1988 he had sent a word to the Court that he was busy in High Court and, therefore, was not in a position to attend to the matter in the Bombay City Civil Court. Needless, to say that this application was technically not maintainable, if one has regard for the provisions of order 17, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil procedure. Yet, the learned judge was kind enough to keep the matter back till the afternoon session. The order shows that as he was dictating the order round about 4.05 pm., even at that time Mr. Rahimtoola had not come to the Court, which shows that the learned judge did accommodate Mr. Rahimtoola as much as he could. No Advocate can say that he has the right to have the matter kept back, till he chooses to walk in at his own sweet will. It is the grace of the Court that keeps the matter back, and the Bar can only be, but grateful, for the same. It is unfortunate that despite this accommodation shown by the Court, Mr. Rahimtoola made a grievance to this Court repeatedly for which there is no justification whatsoever. 9. Mr. It is the grace of the Court that keeps the matter back, and the Bar can only be, but grateful, for the same. It is unfortunate that despite this accommodation shown by the Court, Mr. Rahimtoola made a grievance to this Court repeatedly for which there is no justification whatsoever. 9. Mr. Rahimtoola pointed out that if he were present, he would have pointed out several facts in their proper perspective. His junior one Miss Advani, was present in the Court, but she was not aware of all the facts of the case. It is true that Mr. Rahimtoola has not been hearded in the matter, but, it is because he was not present in Court. But, it does not mean that the learned judge has not complied with the principles of natural justice. It is the Court that has passed a judicial order, and the opportunity to appear was never denied. The learned judge has taken into account all relevant facts as set out on either side. He has considered the case of the petitioners. If that is so, there can be no grievance of the type advanced by Mr. Rahimtoola. He submitted that on earlier occasion the matter had been adjourned to suit the convenience of the advocates on the other side. He, therefore, submitted that the learned judge ought to have adjourned the matter to suit his convenience. To adjourn or not to adjourn is the sole concern of the Judge. If the matter is not adjourned, it cannot be assailed unless it had resulted in manifest injustice. In the present case, if at all any one had suffered on account of each day's delay, it was the respondents and not the petitioners. 10. Ordinarily, I would have rejected this revision application for the mere asking, for the simple reason that once the Court Receiver is appointed, the property is in the custody of the Court and if an agent of the Receiver commits a breach of the agreement or the terms and conditions of occupation, the Court can always condone the same. It is always in the discretion of the Court, where a discretion is properly exercised, no higher Court can interfere with such exercise of discretion. However, since Mr. It is always in the discretion of the Court, where a discretion is properly exercised, no higher Court can interfere with such exercise of discretion. However, since Mr. Rahimtoola made a grievance that he has not been heard in the matter, I gave him full opportunity to make such submissions as he wants, and after hearing him I found no fault in the order of the learned Judge. 11. Mr. Rahimtoola in particular pointed out that the defendants have another premises, viz. the premises belonging to the husband of defendant No.1, being room No. 28. It is on record that the husband and wife are not on good terms. It is on record that because of the husband assaulting defendant No. 1, she had to go to the Police Station. These are not imaginary grievances. Even after sealing of the premises, defendant No. 1 tried to stay with her husband, but, it was not possible, and, therefore, in these circumstances she had no choice but to come back to Court and request the Court to remove the seal of the premises. 12. Mr. Rahimtoola pointed out that earlier the defendants had broken he lock and entered into the premises. That is of no consequence. That allegation has no bearing on the present notice of motion. That is an issue which will be tried in the suit. Despite this allegation, the Court found it proper that the defendants should be allowed to remain in the premises as the agents of the Court Receiver. The only crime which the defendants committed was that they tried to help themselves when others would not show any consideration for them. 13. Mr. Rahimtoola pointed out that the terms and the conditions as prescribed by the Court Receiver did not contemplate for any repairs of the premises, by the Court Receiver. That is of no consequence. When a Court takes a residential premises in its custody and if a person is allowed to reside therein as an agent to the Receiver, the least that is expected is that the premises should be habitable. There was nothing wrong if they called upon the Court Receiver to repair. If, therefore, the premises required repairs and the Receiver was not having sufficient funds, the Court Receiver could have called a meeting to consider this. The Court Receiver could have made a report to the learned judge. There was nothing wrong if they called upon the Court Receiver to repair. If, therefore, the premises required repairs and the Receiver was not having sufficient funds, the Court Receiver could have called a meeting to consider this. The Court Receiver could have made a report to the learned judge. The Court Receiver could have considered ways and means how to set right such a situation. He did nothing of the kind and apparently was influenced by the petitioners/plaintiffs and failed in his duty. 14. Mr. Rahimtoola then pointed out that the learned judge, when he ordered sealing of the premises, the defendants had come to the High Court and the learned judge did not set aside the said order and the premises continued to be kept sealed. This again is of no consequence. This is at an ad-interim stage. In fact, the learned judge took this fact also into account and ultimately decided that in the interest of justice he should have the seal of the premises removed. 15. Mr. Rahimtoola also submitted that there was no apology on the part of the defendants when they took out the notice of motion. He submitted that such an apology came at a very late stage and it was purely an after-thought. In my view, the learned judge has accepted the apology. That is sufficient. Whether the apology was tendered earlier or later is of no consequence. It is always on advise. Here, the defendant No. 2 is an old lady of 84 years and defendant No. 1 again is a lady with no support from her husband and if they are in distress, in such circumstances, whether they should have apologised or not, is always done on advise. 16. Mr. Rahimtoola pointed out that the defendants have tried to assert that they have a right to repair. If one is in the premises and the roof is leaking or if the flooring is broken and if he can see through the floor, and if there is danger to life and limbs, he need not have to wait for an order of the Court to attend to the same. By and large he can help himself in such matters provided there is no serious breach of any law as such. Despite reasonable requests, the Court Receiver does not have the courtesy to call a meeting. By and large he can help himself in such matters provided there is no serious breach of any law as such. Despite reasonable requests, the Court Receiver does not have the courtesy to call a meeting. In fact, whether the Court Receiver could have repaired the premises or not, certainly, he could not have denied the respondents the elementary right to have the premises made habitable. 17. The learned Judge took every aspect into account. He gave detailed reasons for his order. He came to the conclusion that there was a lapse on the part of the respondents. He posed the question correctly: "What is, therefore, to be considered is whether this lapse of the defendant is sufficient to deprive them of the right of occupation as agents of Receiver or whether they can be relieved from the rigour thereof ?". He rightly held that it was not such a lapse as to dishouse them while the suit is pending. He imposed various conditions for reoccupation. Left to myself, I would not have imposed even half the conditions as the learned Judge did. But the defendants at the moment make no grievance and I do not want to interfere with the order. He did justice to the parties while balancing the interest of both the parties. The basis of any revision application is injustice and not a mere exercise of discretion properly or improperly. In the result, I pass the following order : Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Mr. Thakkar, at this stage submits that with regard to repairs, a permission from the Bombay Municipal Corporation may be necessary. I make it clear that it is for the Architect appointed by the Court Receiver to decide whether any such permission is necessary or not. If the Architect opines that no such permission is required, there is no question of applying for permission and the repair work shall be taken up forthwith. However, if such permission is required, for any item or items, Court Receiver or the Architect to get the permission without any delay. In the meanwhile, repairs for other items for which no such permission is required, shall be carried out forthwith. However, if such permission is required, for any item or items, Court Receiver or the Architect to get the permission without any delay. In the meanwhile, repairs for other items for which no such permission is required, shall be carried out forthwith. If there is any question of any no objection from the landlord for the purpose of obtaining permission from the Municipal Corporation, I make it clear that there is no question of obtaining such a permission from the plaintiffs, inasmuch as it is the Court Receiver who is in charge of the property and he shall give such a No Objection Certificate for the purpose of repair work. Stay is vacated forthwith. Seal put on the premises be removed forthwith. I further direct that the order relating to payment of royalty charges as granted by the learned judge shall not be operative with effect from May 1, 1988 till August 31, 1988. The Royalty shall commence as from the date the defendants are put back into possession pursuant to this order. Court Receiver to act on a true copy of this order certified by the defendants' Advocate as true copy. At this stage Mr. Thakkar appearing for the petitioners applies for stay of the operation of my order. The application made by Mr. Thakkar stands rejected as there is no justification whatsoever for such an application. I may add at this stage that it does not speak well of a Charitable Trust to insist upon an application of this kind. Order accordingly. -----