Y. B. SURYAVANSHI, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Gopal Prasad Chourasia is challenging the orders dt. 13-02-1985, passed by First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Chhindwara holding that the "revision" filed against the order passed by the First Civil Judge, Class I, Chhindwara, in Insolvency Case No. 6/55 is not maintainable. (ii) The Insolvency Court in the orders dt. 13-08-1984, while dealing with the objection of the petitioner whether this petitioner has a right of pre-emption and accordingly whether he is a person aggrieved by the act of the Receiver (respondent 1 - then Guru Prasad Shrivastava, Advocate - now substituted by his L. R. Shri Prabanna Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate) inter alia, held that the order challenged by the petitioner Gopal Prasad Chourasia could be decided on the basis of the documents filed by him and no oral evidence is necessary to decide that matter. (iii) The learned Addl. Judge in the order dt. 13-02-1985 held, that the orders passed by the Court of Insolvency are appealable under S. 75 and therefore, no revision lies. In the alternative it was also held that in the interlocutory order passed by the Civil Judge, he was of the view that in the light of documentary evidence, oral evidence is not necessary, and moreover, u/s. 68, Insolvency Act, such Court cannot be compelled to take oral evidence or additional evidence and for this reason also, the revision is not maintainable. That seems to be the import of the impugned orders challenged in this petition. ( 2 ) THE petitioner filed the impugned order dt. 13-02-85 by Additional District Judge but did not file copies of other order sheets, including the impugned orders passed by the Civil Judge dt. 13-08-1984. However, other documents have been filed in the returns separately filed on behalf of respondent 1 (Receiver), respondent 2 Sakibali Khan (purchaser), and respondent 3 Shri J. Saran (accused of having colluded with the Receiver in the insolvency proceedings.) On a perusal of the petition, the abovesaid returns and copies of documents filed, more particularly by the respondents, the following relevant circumstances emerge. (I) The Insolvency Case No. 6/55 is still pending in the Insolvency Court of Civil Judge, Class I, Chhindwara in respect of the insolvent late Jugnu Bai. (I) The Insolvency Case No. 6/55 is still pending in the Insolvency Court of Civil Judge, Class I, Chhindwara in respect of the insolvent late Jugnu Bai. Shri Guru Prasad Shrivastava (original respondent No. 1) was appointed as Receiver of the property. The petitioner, Gopal Prasad Chourasia is a tenant of the part of the house, and it seems according to the return, which gives more details, he was inducted as such sometime in August or Sept. 1968 on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/ -. (II) Since no rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner in view of Annexure-2-R/6, the present petitioner Gopal Prasad Chourasia seems to have filed an application addressed to the Receiver dt. 26-08-1968 in the Court of Civil Judge, Class I, Chhindwara stating that he agrees to take the house, on monthly rent on terms and conditions which include that the monthly rent would be Rs. 40/- with an agreement to let it off for 10 years; that he shall pay municipal taxes from the date of agreement; that he will undertake repair which would be done through some person of the Receiver and at the time of vacating the building, he will be reimbursed in cash; in case that is not done, he will be entitled to remove the materials from the building; that there shall be an advance deposit of Rs. 320/-, being eight months' rent, and in case the landlord did not receive rents by 10th of any month, he will adjust it from the advance deposit; that in case he failed to pay rent after getting the whole amount of advance adjusted, he could be ejected even before the expiry of ten years. (III) It further seems from Annexure-2-R/2 that Sakibali Khan (respondent No. 2-purchaser) filed an application stating details of certain parcels of land sold by the receiver, which sales have been confirmed by the Court; that the applicant wants to purchase the land situated on the left side of the land referred in para 1 at the same rate of Rs. 4/- per sq. ft. and has offered Rs. 28,000/- for that land measuring 7200 sq. ft. ; that, he further wants to purchase land measuring 15,394 sq. ft. which is adjacent to the above land but divided by a road, which has a dilapidated superstructure. 4/- per sq. ft. and has offered Rs. 28,000/- for that land measuring 7200 sq. ft. ; that, he further wants to purchase land measuring 15,394 sq. ft. which is adjacent to the above land but divided by a road, which has a dilapidated superstructure. The case was fixed on 18-01-1983 and on the same date the Receiver submitted his reply (Annexure-2/r/4) stating that the contents of the application are correct; that the land in question has been divided in small plots and a substantial portion of it has to be left for road and to be kept unsold; that the occupants of the superstructure standing on some portion of land referred to in paras 4 and 5 of the application are the tenants of the receiver, and the sweeper tenants, namely, Ghansu and others have encroached on a portion out of the land delineated and suits for ejectments have been filed against them, though they have falsely claimed ownership through oral gifts alleged to have been made by the deceased insolvent Mst. Jugnu Bai; that it appears that civil suit for arrears of rent and ejectment shall have to be filed against another tenant Shri Gopal Pd. Chourasia (present petitioner); the result of the suit will be binding on the purchaser; that mortgage money carrying interest is to be paid to the official liquidator of the decree-holder Laxmi Bank (Pvt.) Ltd. , Bombay in liquidation, and therefore permission to execute the sale deeds of the lands at the cost of the applicant (Sakibali Khan) be accorded for the benefit of the estate. On 18-01-83 the Insolvency Court after considering the purchaser's application (Annexure-2/r-2) and Receivers reply (Annexure-2/r/4) held that he is satisfied that the sale is for the benefit of estate and Receiver was ordered to execute sale deed vide Annexure-2/r/5. On 18-01-83 the Insolvency Court after considering the purchaser's application (Annexure-2/r-2) and Receivers reply (Annexure-2/r/4) held that he is satisfied that the sale is for the benefit of estate and Receiver was ordered to execute sale deed vide Annexure-2/r/5. ( 3 ) (A) In this background, the petitioner's case is that he was intending to purchase the property sold by the Receiver to respondent 2 Sakibali Khan; that the receiver without intimating any person much less the petitioner privately entered into an agreement with respondent 3 Shri J. Saran, Advocate, who is on friendly terms with the receiver and executed a sale deed in favour of Sakibali Khan, though, in fact, the real purchaser was Shri Saran and as soon as the proceedings come to an end respondent 2 will execute a sale deed in favour of respondent 3; that the petitioner raised an objection against execution of the sale deed, which is pending for decision before the Civil Judge; that along with the objection the applicant has filed several documents and also supported his claim by affidavit that he also made an application for permission to lead oral evidence which has been rejected by the Civil Judge; that against that order he preferred a Civil Revision in the High Court under S. 115 of the Civil P. C. , which was transferred to the Court of District Judge for decision in view of the amendments in S. 115 C. P. C. ; that the District Judge has rejected the revision petition in motion hearing; that there is no other remedy except to file this petition. (B) Amongst the grounds, it is stated that both the Courts below have passed orders contrary to law and facts on record; that the objections raised by the petitioner could not be decided without taking oral evidence; that the Courts below failed to see that the facts of collusion, as alleged, and the actual market price could not be proved except by oral evidence; that the learned Addl. District Judge erred in holding that the order of the Civil Judge, which is of interlocutory nature, refusing to lead oral evidence, is appealable or revisable under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act (hereinafter called P. I. Act); that against such orders only a revision lies u/s. 115 C. P. C. and the learned Addl. District Judge erred in holding that the order of the Civil Judge, which is of interlocutory nature, refusing to lead oral evidence, is appealable or revisable under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act (hereinafter called P. I. Act); that against such orders only a revision lies u/s. 115 C. P. C. and the learned Addl. District Judge was wrong in rejecting the same as not maintainable; that the question of limitation is also a matter of evidence and cannot be decided by mere arguments; that the orders of the Courts below are without jurisdiction; that the question of law is whether a revision u/s. 115 C. P. C. or an appeal under the provisions of P. I. Act lies in this case; and therefore, the record be called for to quash the orders passed by the Courts below and pass suitable orders and directions; that in case it is found that an appeal lies u/s. 75 of P. I. Act, : then it may kindly be treated as such. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the return filed by respondent No. 1 (Receiver) he never agreed to sell the disputed property creating an alleged right of pre-emption at the time of creation of tenancy or before or after the induction of the petitioner as a tenant; that the agreed terms regarding the tenancy are silent about right of pre-emption and the petitioner has no other capacity except that of a tenant and therefore he is a total stranger and has no locus standi to challenge or question the rights of the receiver before the Insolvency Court; that respondent 2 purchaser had applied vide application (Annexure-2-R/2) to the Insolvency Court for purchasing the disputed property; that the proposal was reasonable and was beneficial to the estate and therefore he agreed to the proposal vide his reply, dt. 18-01-1983 (Annexure-2-R/4); that earlier he had sold the adjacent open plot at the proposed price to another purchaser; that a portion of the disputed land was falsely claimed by the tenants, namely, Ghansu and others on the basis of alleged oral gifts by the deceased insolvent and the matter is under litigation; that the petitioner was a habitual defaulter and litigation with him was inevitable; neither any creditor nor the legal representative of the insolvent objected to the proposed sale and the Court accorded sanction to the Receiver to execute sale deed in favour of respondent 2 vide order dt. 18-01-1983 (Annexure-2-R/5) and he accordingly executed sale deeds; that on 17-03-1983, the petitioner with ulterior motive filed an objection alleging misconduct of the receiver, right of pre-emption and collusion with the remaining respondents, and the Receiver requested the Court first to decide the right of the petitioner to make the above allegations on the ground that he has no locus standi as he is a total stranger; that on 20-07-1983, the petitioner filed an application for permission to lead oral evidence to establish his locus standi and the case was fixed for arguments on the question whether oral evidence is required for deciding locus standi and the Insolvancy Court finally passed the impugned orders on 13-08-1984 (Annexure-2-R/2); that no oral evidence is required for the preliminary question; that the petitioner with ulterior motive has suppressed facts that the Insolvency Court has actually decided that no oral evidence is required for deciding the preliminary objection about locus standi; the question of locus standi is yet to be decided and if it is decided in favour of the petitioner, then he would be free to lead oral and documentary evidence to substantiate his alleged claim; that accordingly the petitioner had deliberately concealed the facts to misguide this Court; that he has chosen a wrong forum, and he should have filed a civil suit to enforce his alleged right of pre-emption; that he has no locus standi to question the acts of the Receiver (respondent 1) particularly when the disputed property has been sold with the permission of the Court. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the return filed by respondent 2 Sakibali Khan Purchaser, the petitioner is neither a creditor nor a person aggrieved within the ambit of S. 68 of the Act; that he has deliberately suppressed the impugned orders dt. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the return filed by respondent 2 Sakibali Khan Purchaser, the petitioner is neither a creditor nor a person aggrieved within the ambit of S. 68 of the Act; that he has deliberately suppressed the impugned orders dt. 13-08-84 by the Insolvency Court which has merely decided the petitioner's application to adduce evidence to establish locus standi for raising such objection questioning the sale by respondent 1 to respondent 2; that no evidence is necessary to prove the locus standi: that the petitioner has simply filed copy of the orders passed by the Addl. District Judge creating impression that he has not been permitted to lead evidence on the merits of his objections but the position is clear from the order-sheet (Annexure-2/r-1) as also the written arguments; that in the last para of the orders by the Insolvency Court (Annexure-2/r/2) the Court found that the petitioner's oral evidence on point of locus standi or limitation is unnecessary since in the written arguments also, the objector/petitioner has admitted that in support of his objection he has filed documents and affidavits; that the allegations of collusion is denied and the sale was in the interest of the estate for which the Court hasgranted permission vide orders dt. 18-01-83 (Annexure-2/r/5) and the property was sold by separate registered sale deeds in favour of respondent 2; that according to the petitioner, the Receiver had agreed orally to a right of pre-emption on the occasion when tenancy was agreed upon but the terms of tenancy reduced in writing dt. 26-8-68 (Annexure-2/r/6) are silent and there is not even a whisper about any such terms relating to preemption; that even otherwise, it appears not reasonable that the Receiver would agree for such pre-emption and had it been so, it would have been reduced in writing; that in absence of any document in writing, the claim based on alleged right of pre-emption is only a device to delay the disposal of the eviction suit filed against the petitioner by the purchaser; that in any event, the petitioner cannot enforce the right of pre-emption in the insolvency Court; his remedy is by way of an independent suit and those proceedings are misconceived. ( 6 ) IN the return by respondent 3, it is stated that he is not concerned in any way with the subject-matter of the petition, but the allegation about collusion and benami sale are denied; that the sale deed has been executed by the Receiver in favour of Sakibali Khan who is the real purchaser; that the petitioner made wanton and defematory allegations against this respondent who is a senior practising advocate of long standing; that, a criminal case No. 521/83 has been filed against the petitioner which is pending in the Court of J. M. F. C. Chhindwara for defence evidence. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Issrani and learned counsel Shri Kale for the respondents, heard. They respectively canvassed arguments relating to the above referred contentions in the petition and the Returns. It is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (for short called the Act ). (i) Section 4 is as follows : -"4. Power of court to decide all questions arising in insolvency. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizence of the court or which the court may deem expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand, the debtor and the debtor's eatate and,on the other hand all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under any of them. (3) Where the court does not deem it expedient or necessary to decide any question of the nature referred to in sub-sec. (1) but has reason to believe that the debtor has a saleable interest in any property, the Court may without further inquiry sell such interest in such manner and subject to such conditions as it may think fit. " (ii) Section 68 :-"68. (1) but has reason to believe that the debtor has a saleable interest in any property, the Court may without further inquiry sell such interest in such manner and subject to such conditions as it may think fit. " (ii) Section 68 :-"68. Appeal to Court against Receiver.- If the insolvent or any of the creditors or any other person is aggrieved by any act or decision of the receiver, he may apply to the Court, and the Court may confirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of; and make such order as it thinks fit : provided that no application under this section shall be entertained after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of theact or decision complained of. " (iii) Section 75 : -"75. Appeals. (1) The debtor, any creditor, the Receiver or any other person aggrieved by a decision come to or an order made in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction by a Court subordinate to a District Court may appeal to the District Court, and the order of the District Court upon such appeal shall be final : provided that the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made in any appeal decided by the District Court was according to law, may call for the same and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit : provided, further, that any such person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court on appeal from a decision of a subordinate court under S. 4 may appeal to the High Court on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (2) Any such person aggrieved by any such decision or order of a District Court as is specified in Schedule I. come to or made otherwise than in appeal from an order made by a subordinate court, may appeal to the High Court. (3) Any such person aggrieved by any other order made by a District Court otherwise than in appeal from an order made by a subordinate court may appeal to the High Court by leave of the District Court or of the High Court. (4) The period of limitation for appeals to the District Court and to the High Court under this section shall be thirty days and ninety days respectively. (4) The period of limitation for appeals to the District Court and to the High Court under this section shall be thirty days and ninety days respectively. " ( 8 ) SECTION 4 confers very vide powers on the insolvency Court to decide any question which it may deem expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property. Section 4 does not intend to affect the specific provisions contained in the other portions of the Act but intends to only provide for other matters arising out of insolvency not specifically provided for elsewhere in the Act. The jurisdiction under the section is purely discretionary and whether in any particular case the insolvency court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction would depend upon the facts of each case. There may be questions of title raised which the Court may not deem it expedient or necessary to determine and may in its discretion leave it to be determined by an ordinary civil court and not in the summary way provided under the Act. Where the other provisions of the Act authorise the determination of any question raised, the power given u/s. 4 cannot be invoked in view of the. opening words of the section "subject to the. provisions of this Act" (Referred : Extracts from the Provincial Insolvency Act by Sanjiva Row 4th Edn. Notes 10 and 11 on S. 4 ). (b) In Hansraj v. Ratanchand, AIR 1967 SC 1780 B and H were two brothers. B was adjudicated insolvent and Receiver was appointed. He filed an objection that certain properties belonged to him and was exclusively in his possession. The objection-petition was time barred being beyond 21 days. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the scheme of the Act provided in Ss. 3, 4 and 5 and other sections, considered. the scope and ambit of Section 68 and S. 4 and observed :"it appears to us, on a plain reading of the sections mentioned above and in particular, Ss. 4 and 68, that there can be no doubt that a person (like the appellant before us) complaining of the receiver taking possession of or attaching property in which the insolvent has no interest must apply for relief within 21 days of the wrongful act of the receiver. 4 and 68, that there can be no doubt that a person (like the appellant before us) complaining of the receiver taking possession of or attaching property in which the insolvent has no interest must apply for relief within 21 days of the wrongful act of the receiver. He cannot be heard to say that his application is not under S. 68 but under S. 4 and thus seek to avoid the short period of limitation prescribed under S. 68. Moreover, sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of S. 4 both start with the phrase" subject to the provisions of this Act" and even if it was possible to construe that S. 4 envisaged the making of an application for relief, such application would be subject to S. 68 of the Act. " (Para 7)"a person complaining of the act of the receiver may either apply under S. 68 or proceed under the ordinary law of the land. Section 4 does not prescribe any application for any relief under that section. This section does not lay down whatprocedure or what steps should be taken by any person who is aggrieved by any order of the Insolvency Court or of any act of omission or commission of the receiver. Its object is to define the limits of jurisdiction of the Courts exercising powers in insolvency. It is not correct to say that a person aggrieved by an act of the receiver has the choice of making an application under S. 4 or under S. 68. Section 4 comes into operation whenever any question of the nature mentioned therein is sought to be canvassed before a Court exercising insolvency jurisdiction. Such questions may arise because of act or decisions of the receiver complained of. A question as to whether an insolvent has any interest in the property attached by the receiver would fall within the purview of S. 4, but the application for the adjudication of such a question when the receiver acts otherwise than under the order of a Court would be covered by S. 68 and as such the period of limitation of twenty-one days would be attracted to any such application. "the above decision refers to Bhairo Prasad's case also, AIR 1919 All 274 wherein it was observed, that stranger to the insolvency is not bound to go to the Insolvency Court at all. "the above decision refers to Bhairo Prasad's case also, AIR 1919 All 274 wherein it was observed, that stranger to the insolvency is not bound to go to the Insolvency Court at all. He has the ordinary right, which every individual has to seek redress in the ordinary civil courts, but if he pleases and complains against the acts of the receiver, the limitation ' would apply. (c) In State Bank of India, Ambala City v. Brij Mohan Lal, AIR 1971 Punj and Hry 358 the pledgee Bank took action against receiver taking possession of insolvent customer's articles. It was held that the action was under S. 68 and not u/s. 4. Hence, the proceedings had to be taken within 21 days. It was further held that question of limitation being a mixed one of law and facts should not be canvassed for the first time in appeal unless all facts needed are present on record. The expression "of any nature whatsoever" would ordinarily cover adjudication of those questions which arise in insolvency and not outside insolvency. In other words, it covers questions such as disputes between debtors, State and the claimants one or of all his creditors or other questions of priority or title. ( 9 ) IN the instant case, the impugned orders passed by the learned A. D. J. clearly state that the objection is raised u/s. 68 and the petitioner had filed an application u/s. 5 Limitation Act. Instead of repeating the contentions in the Returns and Annexure referred, it is apparent that the purchaser made an application, the receiver filed a reply and after considering the contents of both those applications, the insolvency court, not only accorded sanction to the receiver vide Annexure-2/r/5 dated 18-1-83 but looking to the applications and the order, it is a speaking order with a finding that the Court was satisfied that the plots were involving litigation and the sales would be for the benefit of the estate of the insolvent. The receiver was further directed to execute the sale-deed. It was also recorded that receiver's remuneration would not be on basis of the sale prices. (ii) Thus, there is force in the contention by the learned counsel Shri Kale that as envisaged u/s. 68, the impugned sale cannot be called an act or decision of the receiver. The receiver was further directed to execute the sale-deed. It was also recorded that receiver's remuneration would not be on basis of the sale prices. (ii) Thus, there is force in the contention by the learned counsel Shri Kale that as envisaged u/s. 68, the impugned sale cannot be called an act or decision of the receiver. The further contention is that the petitioner is neither insolvent nor a creditor but is a total stranger to the insolvency proceedings and, therefore, he has no locus standi. Section 68 envisages 3 categories viz. insolvent, any of the creditors or any other person aggrieved. Though cl. (a) of S. 59 empowers the receiver to sell property, in the instant case, the sale was not only with the approval but with a direction of the insolvency court. But then the grievance of the petitioner, in the instant case is that there was collusion of the receiver with respondent 3 and the applications were moved under collusion and the court was misled. It seems from para 7 of the impugned orders of the Insolvency Court (Annexure-2/r/2) that the court, realising that the sale was under orders of the Court, he deemed it improper to take any evidence because that related to the propriety of his own orders. But then whether the Court was misled by the receiver and purchaser on these applications due to collusion is a different matter. This, however, is a secondary aspect. The fundamental and primary aspect is whether the petitioner could be said to be a person aggrieved by the alleged act of the receiver who allegedly entered into an oral agreement with the petitioner which is in the nature of pre-emption. Petitioner could be a person aggrieved only to the limited extent viz. that his right of pre-emption had been adversely affected. ( 10 ) (A) The expression "aggrieved person" means a person who has got a legal grievance " i. e. a person is wrongfully deprived of anything to which he is legally entitled and not merely a person who has suffered some sort of disappointment (Refer Law of Insolvency Mulla-Third Edn. that his right of pre-emption had been adversely affected. ( 10 ) (A) The expression "aggrieved person" means a person who has got a legal grievance " i. e. a person is wrongfully deprived of anything to which he is legally entitled and not merely a person who has suffered some sort of disappointment (Refer Law of Insolvency Mulla-Third Edn. Page 635-Note 776; and also Ram Das v. W. G. Rogers AIR 1931 Lah 586 Gurbakash Singh v. Amar Nath AIR 1935 Lah 818, Ram Das v. W. G. Rogers's case (supra) the Insolvency court granted a lease of a hotel to the highest bidder and the former lessee of the hotel appealed against the order granting the lease. It was held that the appellant was not an aggrieved person within the meaning of S. 75 and the appeal was incompetent. (B) According to the learned counsel Shri Kale, the petitioner is only a tenant and the terms and conditions of tenancy as per petitioner's application dt. 26-8-68 (Annexure-2/r/6) are silent and had there been an agreement with the receiver, it would have been mentioned in that document. But there is not a whisper regarding pre-emption in the above said document and Ss. 91 and 92 of Evidence Act are attracted. Moreover, in the written arguments, it was submitted that he has filed all documents and affidavit and, therefore, prayer to lead oral evidence is rejected. Apropos orders passed by the Addl. District Judge in Para 6, he has observed that the lower court had come to the conclusion that in view of the available documentary evidence, it is unnecessary to take oral evidence which means that the lower court is of the view that there is sufficient evidence to dispose of the objections. The Court, in a pending case, can hold whether there is sufficient evidence and circumstances. He further held that fight to lead evidence is a substantial right which has been denied and for which there is an appeal and, therefore, the revision is not maintainable. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, on perusal of the impugned order and in view of the contentions abovesaid, we find that the insolvency Court had passed an interlocutory order, refusing the petitioner's application to lead oral evidence over and above documents and affidavit relied upon by him and this order relates only to the limited question viz. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, on perusal of the impugned order and in view of the contentions abovesaid, we find that the insolvency Court had passed an interlocutory order, refusing the petitioner's application to lead oral evidence over and above documents and affidavit relied upon by him and this order relates only to the limited question viz. " whether he is the person aggrieved" i. e. what has been called "locus standi" in respect of the objections u/s. 68. The insolvency Court ' has still to adjudicate upon that question. Till that decision, an appeal envisaged u/s. 75 (1) ( AIR 1967 SC 1780 ) (supra) para 7 (iii )) which is relevant to the facts of this case, was not competent. It was only an interlocutory order. ( 12 ) TO recall, the petitioner had preferred a revision and not an appeal before the Addl. District Judge against the orders passed by the subordinate Court. According to learned counsel Shri Issrani, it should have been treated as an appeal instead of rejecting it as a revision, which is not maintainable. it was also contended that if relief is claimed under erroneous provision, still it can be granted under relevant provision in view of O. 7 R. 7 (1) (c) Budhulal v. Chhotelal 1976 Jab LJ 797, was also referred. ( 13 ) THE next question for consideration would be whether in view of the expression "decision or order" as used in S. 75 (1) would include the impugned orders which are interlocutory. The Madras High Court in Laksamappa v. Venkata, AIR 1942 Mad 305 has taken the view that though there is the difficulty of stating in sufficiently clear-cut and definite terms what is and what is not an order for the purpose of S. 75, there is no doubt that the recording of a mere finding, albeit in a formal manner, that the court. has jurisdiction to entertain an application cannot be deemed to be an order within the meaning of this section. A decision upon jurisdiction has only the effect of regulating procedure and where it is not sufficient to dispose of the application, hardly stands on a different footing from a ruling as to the admissibility of ' a document tendered or the relevancy of a question put and objected to in the course of the trial. A decision upon jurisdiction has only the effect of regulating procedure and where it is not sufficient to dispose of the application, hardly stands on a different footing from a ruling as to the admissibility of ' a document tendered or the relevancy of a question put and objected to in the course of the trial. Such decisions as to details of procedure and admissibility of evidence may no doubt be regarded as orders in a sense but it cannot be intended that such decisions should by themselves be open to appeal apart from the final decision disposing of the application or matter. The consequence of holding that such decisions are appealable might well be to make them conclusive unless they are displaced in appeals preferred against them by the party who is adversely affected. Nothing would be "more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing (i. e. from every interlocutory order); whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. " Consequently, no appeal lies from the decision of the Insolvency Court that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application to scale down the debt under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. (b) Similarly it has been held in Balmokund v. Kalyandas, AIR 1934 Lah 194 (1) that no appeal lies refusing to frame specific issues. (c) In Wali Mohammad v. Higan Lal AIR 1936 All 80 one Vazir Ali was adjudicated as an insolvent by the Court of subordinate Judge. The creditor's application was dismissed who preferred appeal in the Court of District Judge during which Vazir Ali died. The District Judge held that the appeal would not abate. Second appeal was preferred by the LRs. A preliminary objection was taken that no second appeal lies and when it was pointed that the High Court had a very extensive power in revision, it was submitted that a revision slip did not lie. Interpreting S. 75 (1) their Lordships observed therein that there is a clear distinction between a decision and an order referred in sub-cl. (1) of S. 75. Their Lordships declined to proceed under the Proviso to S. 75 (1) because the Order was not passed by the District Judge upon an appeal. Interpreting S. 75 (1) their Lordships observed therein that there is a clear distinction between a decision and an order referred in sub-cl. (1) of S. 75. Their Lordships declined to proceed under the Proviso to S. 75 (1) because the Order was not passed by the District Judge upon an appeal. While disagreeing with the Nagpur decision 61 Ind Cas 589, they observed :"in insolvency cases the High Court has power to act under the Civil Procedure Code only subject to the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Where therefore the Insolvency Act specifically provides for appeals and revisions in particular manner any action taken in appeal or revision under the Civil Procedure Code will not be subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act but will be in contravention of those provisions. ' The Provincial Insolvency Act is a (special law), and in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, the Civil Procedure Code cannot limit or otherwise affect the provisions of the Insolvancy Act. ""the word "decision" has an element of finality so far as a particular court is concerned. Hence an interlocutory order of a Court cannot be said to be a decision of the Court. " ( 14 ) IN view of the ratio of decision of the Supreme Court regarding "subject to the provisions of this Act" r/w S. 5, the Nagpur view cannot be said to be good law. ( 15 ) THE upshot of the above discussion is that the Insolvency Court had passed only an interlocutory order which has no finality and no decision about locus standi i. e. on the point whether the petitioner is a person aggrieved has been given. Such interlocutory order does not seem to be an order appealable under Cl. (1) of S. 75, Unless an appeal as provided under Cl. (1) of S. 75, is decided by the District Court, the High Court, under the proviso to the above provision, cannot pass such order as it thinks fit as envisaged in the Proviso. Such interlocutory order does not seem to be an order appealable under Cl. (1) of S. 75, Unless an appeal as provided under Cl. (1) of S. 75, is decided by the District Court, the High Court, under the proviso to the above provision, cannot pass such order as it thinks fit as envisaged in the Proviso. The preliminary question to be decided by the insolvency Court would be "whether the petitioner falls in the category of person aggrieved ?" The High Court's powers of revision under Art. 227 of the Constitution are restricted to interfere in cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law and would be exercised most sparingly in cases where grave injustice would be done. It cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. The power would not be exercised unless there is error of law apparent on the face of the record or an irregularity of procedure unless such affects the jurisdiction or involves breach of principles of natural justice (Refer :- Extracts from Shorter Constitution of India - Basu - Ninth Edn. pages 562 - 563 on Art. 227 ). The issues for consideration framed by the insolvency court in Para 6 of Annexure-2/r/2 mainly are : - (I) Whether the sale on that date was made for a low price with collusion between receiver and the other two respondents? (ii) Whether the petitioner has a right of pre-emption ? (iii) With the Preliminary issue whether the objector/petitioner has a locus standi i. e. he is a person aggrieved to be heard in an application u/s. 68 of the Act. If the decision on the preliminary issue goes in favour of the petitioner, then alone the decision on his application u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act would arise. If he succeeds on that question as well, then the other two issues would arise for consideration. ( 16 ) THE contentions canvassed before us by the learned counsel for the respondents which we are constrained to reproduce may not be construed as any expression of any opinion by this Court on the merits of the preliminary question or on others. ( 17 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this petition under Art. 227 Constitution of India is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. ( 17 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this petition under Art. 227 Constitution of India is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/- The petitioner has suppressed some material facts and in the circumstances of this case, there shall be no refund of the security amount. Before parting with this petition, we further direct that the insolvency proceedings seem to be pending for more than 33 years and the objections of the petitioner shall be decided positively within two months from now and this old matter be also expedited. Petition dismissed. .