ORDER Srinivasam, J. 1. These two revision petitions arise out of the same order passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry, granting an amendment of the Judgment and decree dated 25-3-1987 made in M.O.P.No. 20 of 1987. C.R.P.No. 1237 of 1988 is filed by the husband while C.R.P.812 of 1988 is filed by the wife. 2. The parties hereto filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry on 18-11-1986. That petition was filed by them under the provisions of the French Code Civil. When the Court returned the petition pointing out that the application would not be maintainable under the French Code Civil and the proper remedy of the parties would to file a petition before the proper forum, under the Special Marriage Act, it was represented with an endorsement that the Code Civil would be applicable and that the counsel would like to argue the matter before the Court. The Office was requested to post the matter in open Court for arguments. That endorsement was made on 18-2-1987. The matter was called in open Court on 3-3-1987. After hearing Counsel, the Court directed the office to number the O.P. leaving open the point of jurisdiction for enquiry by the trial Court. 3. Even on 18-11-1986, when the petition was presented in Court, both the husband and wife were examined by the Court. The husband spoke in support of the contents of the petition and asserted that they could not live together and they had decided to get separated once for all. The same version was given by the wife. She had also stated that there was no possibility of reunion between the spouses. The parties were again examined on 23-3-1987. On 25-3-1987, an order was passed by the Court granting divorce as prayed for by the parties. With regard to the custody of children, the matter was left open to be agitated in separate proceedings. Similarly, with regard to the wife's claim for jewels and personal properties, that was left open to be agitated in separate proceedings. The question of jurisdiction was not argued by the parties. 4. The husband filed I.A.No. 3119 of 1987 under Sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amending the judgment and decree dated 25-3-1987 by incorporating the relief that the petitioners have no past and future maintenance against each other. The question of jurisdiction was not argued by the parties. 4. The husband filed I.A.No. 3119 of 1987 under Sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amending the judgment and decree dated 25-3-1987 by incorporating the relief that the petitioners have no past and future maintenance against each other. This application was based upon the averments made in the petition originally filed on 18-11-1986. In paragraph 4 of the said petition, it was stated that each petitioner had decided to go in his or her own way without depending on another either physically or monetarily in any way. In the prayer paragraph, it was stated that each petitioners was not entitled to claim past and future maintenance against the other. In the application for amendment, the husband had brought to the notice of the Court that while passing the decree for divorce, no relief was granted with regard to past and future maintenance even though it had been agreed by the parties that there be no claim with reference to past and future maintenance in the original petition itself, and that it was only an omission due to oversight. Therefore, the Court should rectify the mistake by amending the judgment and decree. 5. That application was opposed by the wife. In her counter statement, she had stated thus: Though it was mentioned in that petition that the petitioner and the respondent are not entitled for past and future maintenance against the other, yet the court after due enquiry with this respondent second petitioner found out that she is not willing to such a remedy and as such has not granted the above relief in the decree. Therefore the claim that the past of future maintenance against each other has been omitted by oversight is not bona fide. The wife proceeded to mention about a petition filed by her Under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore and the order passed on 28-1-1985 directing the husband to pay to the wife maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300 per mensem and Rs. 150 per mensem to each of the two children. 6. The wife proceeded to mention about a petition filed by her Under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore and the order passed on 28-1-1985 directing the husband to pay to the wife maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300 per mensem and Rs. 150 per mensem to each of the two children. 6. A reply statement was filed by the husband in which he denied the averments contained in the counter statement filed by the wife and he had denied the averment that the Magistrate's Court at Bangalore passed an order for maintenance after due enquiry. It was further stated that the order passed by the Magistrate was an ex parts one. 7. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry who heard the application for amendment, took the view that the prayer in the petition to waive past maintenance before the filing of the O.P. would amount to defeating the order passed by the Magistrate of the Bangalore Court and it would be against the public policy to nullify the past order of the Court. However, with regard to future maintenance, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the parties could agree to waive the same and the petition should be ordered to that extent. Consequently, he allowed the application for amendment and directed the judgment and decree to be amended so as to include a relief to the effect that the petitioners have no claim for future maintenance against each other. The actual clause in the decree after the amendment reads thus: That the petitioners have no claim for future maintenance against each other from the date of filing of O.P. on 18-11-1986. 8. Thus, both the parties are aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge as it is partly against both of them. Learned Counsel for the husband contends that the reading of the learned Judge with regard to the past maintenance is clearly erroneous as there is no question of waiver of the past maintenance being against public policy as it would have the effect of defeating the order of the Magistrate of the Bangalore Court. Learned Counsel for the husband contends that the reading of the learned Judge with regard to the past maintenance is clearly erroneous as there is no question of waiver of the past maintenance being against public policy as it would have the effect of defeating the order of the Magistrate of the Bangalore Court. Learned Counsel submits that it is always open to the parties to agree to give up the claims against each other and just because the wife had obtained an order for maintenance from a Magistrate, it does not mean that she cannot give up that claim for maintenance. It would only mean that she had given up the right to execute the order of the Magistrate in so far as she is concerned. It is in no way against public policy. 9. Learned Counsel for the wife contends that the Court below was wrong in treating the matter as one falling under Sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Court had actually decided at the time of the original judgment that the clause relating to the maintenance should not be included in the decree. In the first instance, learned Counsel took the same stand as found in the counter statement filed by the wife in the application for amendment and contended that the original order was deliberate in not including any relief with regard to past and future maintenance. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the wife that the proceedings having been filed under the French Code Civil, there should have been a draft agreement between the parties with regard to the consequences of divorce and such draft agreement should be considered by the Court at the time of passing orders on the divorce petition and there should be a ratification of the agreement by the Court, if the Court accepted the same. Learned Counsel draws my attention to Articles 230 and 232 of French Code Civil. Article 230 reads as follows: In case of joint petition the reasons for divorce need not be stated; they have to submit for the approval of the Judge only a draft agreement between them regarding the consequences of divorce. Such petition may be presented either by the respective counsels of the spouses of by their common counsel. Article 230 reads as follows: In case of joint petition the reasons for divorce need not be stated; they have to submit for the approval of the Judge only a draft agreement between them regarding the consequences of divorce. Such petition may be presented either by the respective counsels of the spouses of by their common counsel. The Divorce by mutual consent, cannot be filed, during the first six months of marriage. Article 232 reads as follows: The Judge on being convinced that the spouses are really determined and have given their consent freely for divorce orders divorce. He ratifies by the same order the agreement regulating the consequences of divorce: Provided that the Judge may refuse to pronounce divorce and ratify the agreement, if in his opinion the agreement fails to adequately protect the interests of one of the spouses or that of their children. 10. It is argued by learned Counsel for the wife that the parties had not admittedly filed any draft agreement in this case with regard to the consequences of the divorce and there was no occasion for the Court to consider such draft agreement as contemplated by Article 232. In the absence of a draft agreement, the parties cannot insist upon an order granting any relief relating to maintenance. Hence according to learned Counsel, the Court below was wrong in amending the decree passed by it originally. 11. The next submission of learned Counsel for the wife is that the Order of the Court below after amendment has the effect of setting aside the Order passed by the learned Magistrate of the Bangalore Court and it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry. According to learned Counsel, such an order is null and void as it is without jurisdiction. 12. Taking up the contentions raised by learned Counsel for the wife, it is no doubt true that the Code Civil refers to a draft agreement between the parties with regard to consequences of divorce and a consideration of the same at the time of passing orders on the petition for divorce. But it is only a procedural rule and any violation thereof will not vitiate the validity of the order passed by the Court which is based on consent of parties. But it is only a procedural rule and any violation thereof will not vitiate the validity of the order passed by the Court which is based on consent of parties. In the present case, I have already pointed out that the petition for divorce contained a specific reference to agreement between the parties that they have given up the claim of maintenance both past and future between each other. The petition has been signed by both the parties and their respective counsel. On the date of the filing of the petition, both the wife and the husband were examined by the Court. In the deposition of the wife, she had stated categorically that she had agreed for divorce by mutual consent as per the petition filed on that date. This shows that the averments contained in the petition were fully accepted by the wife. She had also stated further that she had given her consent out of free will and not under threat or inducement. There is no whisper by the wife in her deposition that she has not come to an agreement with the husband on the question of maintenance. In the deposition given on 23-3-1987 also, there is no mention by the wife with regard to the agreement on maintenance. 13. The averments contained in the petition for divorce are sufficient to constitute an agreement between the parties with regard to the consequences of divorce. That itself is a draft agreement as contemplated by Article 230. In my view, it is not necessary to have the draft agreement on a separate paper other than the petition for divorce filed before the Court. Once the petition is filed by both the parties that itself will constitute an agreement between the parties on the terms contained therein. With regard to the agreement between the parties on the consequences of divorce, there is no ambiguity in the language of the petition, in that, the husband and wife have agreed that there shall be no claim for maintenance either past or future as against each other. The fact remains that the Court passed an order on 25-3-1987 without making any reference to the consequences of the divorce as contemplated by the Code as that aspect was not considered by the Court at that time. The fact remains that the Court passed an order on 25-3-1987 without making any reference to the consequences of the divorce as contemplated by the Code as that aspect was not considered by the Court at that time. The attention of the Court was not drawn to this part of the petition and appropriate orders were not passed at that time. Hence there is a clear case of omission on that aspect by the Court. That was sought to be rectified by the petition for amendment under Sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court below was well within its jurisdiction to amend the order passed by it earlier by including a clause relating to the relief of maintenance. Hence the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the wife based on Articles 230 and 232 of the French Code Civil is rejected. 14. The second contention urged by learned Counsel for the wife that the application under Sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable is also rejected on the above reasoning. 15. The third contention that the Order of the Court below will be in effect setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate of the Bangalore Court is untenable, I have already extracted the relevant clause in the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge in the O.P., after the amendment petition was allowed. That clause only reflects the agreement between the parties which is incorporated in the decree. Based on this order, it may be open to the husband to apply to the Court of the Magistrate at Bangalore for setting aside the order passed by him already. This Order by itself does not have the effect of setting aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, I hold that the order passed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry is well within his jurisdiction. 16. Even assuming that the procedure prescribed by Articles 230 and 232 not having been followed, the Order of the Court below is vitiated or that the Court below had no jurisdiction to pass such an order, it is not necessary that I should interfere with the same Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as, in my view, justice has been rendered in this case. It has been laid down in Chennichi alias parikkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar (1970) 1 M.L.J. 234 that Under Section 115, C.P.C. it is not necessary for the High Court to interfere with the Orders of the Court below, even if the Court below had no jurisdiction. The learned Judge has observed in that case as follows: The exercise of the revisional powers of the High Court Under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, is purely discretionary. The High Court will not take a technical view and necessarily interfere in every case, where an order is wrong and even improper, if such interference will produce hardship or injustice. The revisional jurisdiction of the Court is intended to secure and sub-serve and ends of justice and not to deny or defect it. If interference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to a party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, even if the order is found to be one without jurisdiction. The said decision of Justice M.M. Ismail has been approved by a Divisional Bench of this Court to which I was a party in S.M. Kuba v. P.P. Vaithyanatltan 1988 T.N.L.J. 1, wherein it has been observed thus: We are also inclined to accept the contention of the respondent that the discretionary jurisdiction Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be exercised where the order of the Court Subordinate renders justice to the parties on the facts of the case. In this case, I am of the opinion that the Court below has rendered justice in accepting the agreement between the parties which was not challenged before it. Hence the revision petition filed by the wife deserves to be dismissed. 17. Turning to the revision filed by the husband, even though the learned Judge is wrong in taking the view that the prayer to waive past maintenance would defeat the order made by the learned Magistrate of the Bangalore Court, I am not inclined to interfere with the same as her again, I am of the view that justice has been done. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander too. 18. I understand from the parties that a sum of Rs. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander too. 18. I understand from the parties that a sum of Rs. 3,000 will be the only amount due by way of maintenance to the wife between 28-1-1986, (he date of the order of the Magistrate and 18-11-1986, the date of filing of the petition for divorce before the Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry. In my opinion, interests of justice require that the husband should pay that amount to the wife. Hence the revision petition filed by the husband also deserves to be dismissed. 19. In the result, both the revision petitions are dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.