ORDER 1. Heard, reply to opposed (sic-opposing) admission and the prayer for ad interim writ has come and with an application filed today by Respondents No. 1 and 2 to which are annexed two documents as Annexures-R-8 and R-9, to support the stand taken by them in the reply. Indeed, preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the petition is taken and reliance is placed in the reply on the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, for short, I. D. Act, submitting that the provisions thereof have been duly complied with. 2. Although Shri Shrivastava made strenuous efforts to statisfy us that the preliminary objection need not be considered and that the same shall not prevail, but we are unable to accept that submission. Still, we are of the view that the prayer he has made at the end of his argument deserves consideration. Indeed, Shri Shrivastava submitted authorities galore of the Summit Court to establish the position himself that the impugned order against each of the Petitioners removing them from services attracts Industrial Dispute Act and that the same is not sustainable in law. See-Santosh Gupta AIR 1980 SC 1219 ., Management of Karnataka Slate Road Transport Corporation AIR 1983 SC 1320 ., that being the position we do not think if it is at all necessary for us to consider his other submission that we interfere ourselves in this matter, on the writ side. Still, few words we may add here to say that upon hearing counsel and upon perusing the records we are satisfied that it is not a case of total want of jurisdiction of Respondents No. 1 and 2 duly established on facts so that we would be justified in exercising our extraordinary jurisdiction on the writ side when equally efficacious remedy is available under the I. D. Act., to which both parties agree. In that view of the matter counsel's reliance on a Bench decision of the Court in the case of Biharilal v. State of M. P. 1983 JLJ 757 . is most imappropriate and misconceived Indeed, we are also of the view that the decision of the Apex Court in Rattanlal's AIR 1987 SC 478 . case would not avail the Petitioners. 3. is most imappropriate and misconceived Indeed, we are also of the view that the decision of the Apex Court in Rattanlal's AIR 1987 SC 478 . case would not avail the Petitioners. 3. On facts, suffice it to say that it is not a case of the Petitioners even claiming themselves, far less establishing, that their appointments were duly made under Section 30 of the M. P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam for short, Adhiniyam. Indeed, it is their own case stated in the petition that they had been "shown as temporary and daily wages employees". This Court has definitely taken the view that if an employee is appointed under Section 30 on a post, he can only be displaced form that post in the manner contemplated under the law. But that holding is not applicable, on facts, to this case. 4. The question, in such circumstances, to be decided would be of compliance or otherwise of the provisions of Section 25 (2) (00) of the I. D. Act and other relevant provisions of that Act and the factual inquiry in that regard can be appropriately made by the Labour Court; and not by this Court on the writ side. The result would have been different if the Petitioners would not have admitted themselves in the petition that they were not accepted as appointees under Section 30 of the Adhiniyam though they were such persons. What has come on record in the form of Annexures R-8 and R-9 today has rather buttressed the stand taken by the Respondents in the preliminary objection to establish the position that the Petitioner were not persons who could claim the benefit of Section 30 of the Adhiniyam and of this Court's holding in regard thereto. 5. Whatever that may be, we are still of the view that because of concurrence of the parties in this matter as to Labour Court's jurisdiction, it is an appropriate case in which the State, Government ought to act under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of I. D. Act. That a reference not only may be, but 'shall' be, made thereunder by the State Government if any of the parties concedes to the position that a reference envisaged thereunder is warranted and the requirements thereof are satisfied. That a reference not only may be, but 'shall' be, made thereunder by the State Government if any of the parties concedes to the position that a reference envisaged thereunder is warranted and the requirements thereof are satisfied. In the instant case, the Mandi Samiti having accepted the position itself in the reply and having taken the stand that the provisions of I. D. Act apply, 'dispute' between the parties, if any, is triable by the Labour Court and a reference is preeminently warranted of the said 'dispute'. 6. True, this Bench in the case of State of M. P. v. Ramprakash M. P. No. 521 of 1988 decided on 7-10-1988. following the decision of their Lordships of the Summit Court in Dhari Gram Panthayat 1987 III SVLR (L) 186. has confirmed in that case the order passed by the Labour Court on the writ side without disposing of contention of the Petitioner therein of applicability of the I. D. Act. But that is not the position here. Indeed, the position is just reverse here in that the Labour Court has not at all been approached and it has not rendered and decision. Therefore, reliance of counsel on that decision also would not avail the Petitioners. 7. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that, on the writ side, it is not possible for us to interfere in this matter. However, we also hold that the Petitioners are entitled to raise a 'dispute' in respect of the impugned order by which they have been removed from the service and that 'dispute' has to be referred by the State Government under Section 10 (2) of I. D. Act. If the question of limitation arises at any stage that has to be decided in favour of the Petitioners because of the pendency of the instant petition. We direct accordingly Respondent No. 1, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Lashkar, to made appropriate application under Section 10(2) of the I. D. Act and Petitioners, if so advised, may join the Samiti in the prayer, by filing separate applications for that purpose. When that is done it will be regarded as an appropriate case for a reference to be made by the State Government under Section 10 (sic) However, steps by parties must be taken within two weeks. When that is done it will be regarded as an appropriate case for a reference to be made by the State Government under Section 10 (sic) However, steps by parties must be taken within two weeks. At the level of the State Government the requirement would be for reference to be made within one month of the receipt of the applications. 8. With the above observations and direction the petition is disposed of.