JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---All that this petition reflects upon is the frantic desperate bid of the petitioner to delay and protract the litigation and to bring the contesting respondents to the end of their wits. 2. It is the suit filed by the respondent who is admittedly the owner of the suit land, for injunction restraining the present petitioner (hereafter, the defendant) that he himself was in possession of the suit land as the plaintiff's tenant. He came out with this pleading invited an issue from the Civil Court that he was a tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the suit land, got the issue referred to the Tenancy Court, contested the consequent proceeding before the Tahsildar, dragged and drove the owner/plaintiff to the Dy. Collector in appeal, then to the Revenue Tribunal in revision, back to the Tahsildar, on remand once again to the Dy. Collector in appeal. The Dy. Collector examined the entire evidence with noticeably unusual carefulness and found that the petitioner was never in possession of the suit land as tenant at all but was in possession of the same, for some time by way of security and for repayment of Rs. 6000/- lent to the plaintiff, by the defendant's mother for enabling him, the plaintiff to redeem the mortgage on the suit land. The Dy. Collector, thus, recorded a finding that the defendant was not a tenant of the suit land. The petitioner/defendant dragged the respondent/plaintiff to the Revenue Tribunal in revision (second journey, this). Even the Revision Tribunal examined, the evidence once again, that too with unusual keenness and found that the defendant's possession, whenever he was in possession, was never that of a tenant but for and by way of security repayment of the amount of Rs. 6000/- loaned by the petitioner's mother to the plaintiff. The finding of the Dy. Collector that the petitioner was not a tenant is thus confirmed by the Tribunal. The present petition is the defendant's somersault to contend that the reference to the Tenancy Court invited by himself was without jurisdiction. As will be presently pointed out fresh inning and perpetuation of litigation is all that he wants. I have to consider whether this Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 227 should be allowed to be thus abused. 3. The facts are very simple. As will be presently pointed out fresh inning and perpetuation of litigation is all that he wants. I have to consider whether this Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 227 should be allowed to be thus abused. 3. The facts are very simple. The land Gut No. 102 (Survey No. 435/2) admeasuring 65 Acres, situate at village Dubere, admittedly belongs to the present Respondent (who will be referred to hereafter as the "plaintiff"). Admittedly the land was mortgaged by the plaintiff to one Marwadi. He had no monies to repay the mortgage. The plaintiff and the defendant are admittedly near relations, belonging almost to the same family. On 23-01-19761 a sum of Rs. 6000/- was advanced by the defendant's mother to the plaintiff and he executed in her favour a document styled as' Thev Pavti' (Deposit Receipt). But it is almost a matter of admission by now that the plaintiff was not such a wealthy affluent person that the mother of the defendant would have any reason to keep any monies as deposit with him. The deposit receipt shows that the monies have been deposited with the plaintiff without interest. As will be presently pointed out, the defendant's own mother stepped into the witness-box and has stated that no interest was to be paid by the plaintiff for the amount of Rs. 6000/- taken by him from her, but that the income (usufruct) of the suit land was to be taken by her son, the defendant, as a consideration for the mortgage. Obviously this means that according to the defendant's own mother, the income from the suit land was to be regarded as interest for the deposit of Rs. 6000/-. 4. Now we come to the strange entries made in the Record of Rights. We find that right from the year 1964 onwards till the year 1974 the Talathi has gone on making pencil entries in favour of the present defendant and at some point of time, on the sly as it were, the pencil entries are converted into ink entries, meaning thereby that they were confirmed by the relevant officers of the Revenue Department. However, it is a finding of both the Deputy Collector as well as the Revenue Tribunal that nobody knows as to how the pencil entries came to be confirmed and converted into ink entries. The entry shows that the defendant was a tenant. However, it is a finding of both the Deputy Collector as well as the Revenue Tribunal that nobody knows as to how the pencil entries came to be confirmed and converted into ink entries. The entry shows that the defendant was a tenant. The entries were all along the pencil entries. This means that the notice of those entries was never given to the plaintiff, who is the admitted owner of the land and what is significant is that no notice is evidently given by any of the officers to the plaintiff even at the time when the question of confirmation of the entries arose. The entries came to be confirmed by converting them into ink entries, evidently, in a clandestine manner. As will be presently pointed out, this is the concurrent finding recorded by both the Deputy Collector as well as the Revenue Tribunal and this finding is based on very good evidence of no less a person than the Talathi himself. 5. In the year 1976, the instant suit came to be filed by the plaintiff for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession of the suit land. According to him, the land was initially given by him in possession of the defendant as a kind of a mortgage transaction, meaning thereby by way of security for the amount of Rs. 6000/- taken by him as loan from him. According to him, he got back the possession from the defendant, but that the defendant has started interferring with his possession and that was the reason why the suit for injunction was filed by him. In reply to this suit, the defendant filed his Written Statement and contended that the defendant was a tenant in respect of the suit land and that it was he who was in possession of the suit land on the date of the suit as a tenant. What this means is that the defendant did not remain content with the pleading of his possession simpliciter of the suit land. He has tried to justify his possession by contending that he was the tenant of the suit land. The provisions of the Tenancy Act leave no room for doubt that the landlord cannot take possession from the tenant or cannot interfere with the possession of the tenant. He has tried to justify his possession by contending that he was the tenant of the suit land. The provisions of the Tenancy Act leave no room for doubt that the landlord cannot take possession from the tenant or cannot interfere with the possession of the tenant. The question whether the defendant was in possession on the basis of the title of a tenant or whether he was in possession simpliciter without the basis of any tenancy was therefore quite a crucial fact in issue in that suit. Two issues indispensably arose in the suit:- (a) whether the defendant was a tenant in respect of the suit land; and (b) whether he was in possession of the suit land as a tenant. If he was in possession as a tenant, the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, whether it was a suit for injunction or possession. If, on the other, hand, he was in possession not as a tenant but in some other capacity, the Court would be required to go into a further question whether the suit by the plaintiff for injunction was maintainable in the absence of his possession. If in such a suit, the Court found that the plaintiff was not in possession, it would not necessarily mean that the suit would be dismissed straightaway. If the Court was satisfied that the defendant had no justification for being in possession, the Court would certainly accede to the request that any prudent plaintiff would make for converting the instant suit for injunction into a suit for possession by requisite amendment of the plaint. Such a suit would be a suit on title against trespasser. The point is that the question as to whether the defendant was in possession with some justification or not was very much germane in the suit. 6. At least so far as this suit is concerned, two issues inevitably arose:- (a) whether the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff; and (b) whether as such tenant, he was in possession of the suit land or not. The 1st question could not be decided by the Civil Court. The Court therefore framed an issue relating to the defendant's claim in respect of the tenancy rights regarding the land. The issue was invited by the defendant himself. The 1st question could not be decided by the Civil Court. The Court therefore framed an issue relating to the defendant's claim in respect of the tenancy rights regarding the land. The issue was invited by the defendant himself. The Court referred the issue to the Tenancy Court under section 85-A of the Tenancy Act. The defendant submitted to that order. Not only that; he contested the proceeding in the tenancy Court. There was a decision of the Tahsildar in the first instance and Appeal was filed by one of the parties to the Deputy Collector. Further, the matter was taken to the Revenue Tribunal in revision. It was remanded by the Revenue Tribunal to the Tahsildar. All this rigmarole was something which was of the defendant's own making. He himself sent the plaintiff from pillar to post. When the Tahsildar was required to decide the issue of the defendant's tenancy for the second time, he held that the defendant was a tenant of the suit land. As is found by both the Courts below, he did so without, in any way, applying his mind to the real evidence on record. In the evidence, the defendant's own mother had stepped into the witness-box and had stated that she had lent Rs. 6000/- to the plaintiff and the suit land was kept with her son, the defendant, as a security for the repayment of that amount. The defendant's plea of tenancy of the suit land was, thus, exploded by his own mother, who had admittedly advanced the amount to the plaintiff. No doubt she further contended that the amount of Rs. 6000/- was not repaid by the plaintiff to the defendant. But the nature of the transaction was something which stood fully exposed by her evidence, showing that it was not a tenancy transaction, but was a transaction, of security. The Talathi was also examined in the proceeding and he made clean breast of the fact that not only in the year 1964-65 but right till the year 1974 all the entries of defendant's tenancy in respect of the suit land were pencil entries. Now from the very nature of things, this is impossible. At the most the 1st year's entry would be a pencil entry; it will be converted into ink entry when the tenancy is confirmed upon inquiry in the next year. Now from the very nature of things, this is impossible. At the most the 1st year's entry would be a pencil entry; it will be converted into ink entry when the tenancy is confirmed upon inquiry in the next year. In the inquiry, notices would be required to be issued to the Kabjedar, viz., the present plaintiff, and it would be only after hearing him that the entries would be confirmed and once they were confirmed they would continue to be entries in ink until there is a change of legal relationship of the parties. Now in this case nobody knows as to how the pencil entries continued from 1964 to 1974 and, what is more important as to how and what point of time they came to be converted into ink entries showing their confirmation. The whole thing is extremely suspicious. The entries appear to be on the face of them bogus. The parties are near relations. Notice of the entries were never received by the plaintiff. His own mother admits that the translation was not of tenancy at all, but that was the transaction of the security. Further, it is an admitted fact that this suit land was mortgaged by the plaintiff with one Marwadi and that he wanted the amount from the defendant and his mother for the purpose of repayment of that loan. It is inconceivable that he would give the land on lease to the defendant, the tenant, by borrowing monies for repayment to the creditor, Marwadi. From the very nature of the things, this is impossible, because under the Tenancy Act a tenant becomes entitled to purchase the land, almost for a song, in the very next year of tenancy. Leasing land to any tenant after the Tiller's Day is making a veritable gift to him, and it is inconceivable that the owner would redeem the land from mortgage and then lease it to a tenant. This is the precise conclusion that was arrived at by the Deputy Collector after scanning examining the entire evidence and this conclusion is confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal by going through the entire evidence all over again and this conclusion is sought to be challenged before me on the ground that the reference itself was incompetent. 7. This is the precise conclusion that was arrived at by the Deputy Collector after scanning examining the entire evidence and this conclusion is confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal by going through the entire evidence all over again and this conclusion is sought to be challenged before me on the ground that the reference itself was incompetent. 7. Reliance is sought to be placed on the Judgement of a learned Single Judge of this Court (M.N. Chandurkar, Actg, C.J.) in (Maruti Sambha Surve v. Parshuram Krishna Koratkar and another)1, 1983, Maharashtra Law Journal, page 958. The facts of that case are somewhat similar to the facts of this case. As stated in the judgement, it was a suit for injunction simplicitor filed by a person, who claimed to be the owner of the same against the person who claimed to be the tenant of the land. An issue was framed under section 85-A of the Tenancy Act and it was referred to the Tenancy Court. It appears that the Revenue Tribunal ultimately held that the defendant in that case was not a tenant of the suit land, as has been held in the instant case by the Revenue Tribunal. In the Writ Petition against the judgement of the Tribunal contention was urged that the reference itself was incompetent because in a suit for injunction simplicitor the question of the defendant's tenancy was not relevant at all and that the only relevant question was one of possession of the party. This contention appears to have been accepted by the learned Judge. While doing so, he has observed as follows in Para 4 of his judgement :- "4. At the very outset, it has to be made clear that Civil Courts seem to be following a practice of referring the issue of tenancy to the Tahsildar straightaway without ascertaining whether the decision of that issue is material for the decision of the suit. Section 85-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 permits only such issue to be referred as is involved in the suit. Section 85-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 permits only such issue to be referred as is involved in the suit. When section 85-A refers to an issue being involved in the suit, it obviously means that the issue is relevant for the decision of the suit." Thus, according to the learned Judge, the issue of tenancy was an otiose issue in that case and that the only issue relevant was the issue of possession which had nothing to do with any of the provisions of the Tenancy Act. A plea was urged in that case that the plaintiff would be entitled to amend the plaint and ask for possession on title and in such a case the question whether the defendant was a tenant or not would be very much material. In reply to this plea, the answer given by this Court was as follows:- "In such a case, it may be that the plaintiff might like to amend the plaint but till such amendment is prayed for and granted, the question as to whether the suit for possession can be decreed against the defendant who claims to be a tenant cannot arise." Taking this view, the learned Singal Judge has held that the reference itself was incompetent and that, hence, the decision that the defendant was not a tenant was of no consequence. The Writ Petition was allowed and the Civil Court was directed to deal with the suit without the help of the finding of the tenancy Court that the defendant was not a tenant of the suit land. 8. Mr. Patankar has rightly relied upon this judgment. But, in my opinion, the judgment is, in the first place, distinguishable. Secondly, a question does arise in this case as to whether this Court can exercise its equity jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution for extending its hand of help to dishonest litigant, the falsehood of whose plea has been fully exposed. There also arise a question whether the judgement does not require a second look at. 9. The learned Judge's observation in Para 4 of the Judgement are set out above. From that it appears that in that case the issue of tenancy was referred to the Tahsildar by the High Court (sic) Court straightaway without ascertaining whether the decision on that issue was material for the suit or not. 9. The learned Judge's observation in Para 4 of the Judgement are set out above. From that it appears that in that case the issue of tenancy was referred to the Tahsildar by the High Court (sic) Court straightaway without ascertaining whether the decision on that issue was material for the suit or not. From these observations, it is clear that if the issue was material, the ultimate view taken by the learned Judge would have been different. Now, it cannot be said that the position in the instant case is identical. There is nothing to show in this case that the issue of tenancy was raised by the learned Judge blind-folded as it were or that he referred the issue to the tenancy Court in a mechanical manner. The pleadings in the instant case show that the issue was not only natural, but was indispensable. It was not the plaintiff's plea that the defendant was never in possession. The plaintiff had conceded initially that the possession of the land was with the defendant by way of security. It was the defendant who came out with the plea that his initial possession was not by way of security, but by way of tenancy. The question of the nature of the defendant's possession was, therefore, quite relevant in the present case. It is not as if the issue of tenancy is raised mechanically. Without raising the issue, the suit could not proceed at all. In such a case when the issue is framed, it has got to be referred to the tenancy Court and when it is referred to the tenancy Court, the tenancy Court is bound to consider the question. The decision of the tenancy Court is, therefore, a competent decision with a Court of competent jurisdiction. 10. Moreover, now that the issue has been returned to the Civil Court, the Civil Court would no doubt be required to consider whether the plaintiff is in possession or not. If the Court finds that he is not in possession, or even otherwise, it will be open for the plaintiff to move the Court for leave to amend the plaint so as to incorporate the alternative prayer for possession in the plaint. If that is done, the finding recorded by the tenancy Court, after examining the entire evidence carefully, will have most important bearing upon the suit. If that is done, the finding recorded by the tenancy Court, after examining the entire evidence carefully, will have most important bearing upon the suit. If the judgment of this Court in Maruti Sambha's case is to be followed, then there shall be a second inning given to the defendant and a second round of litigation will start. I cannot appreciate as to why such a state of thing should be brought about. I make it clear that so far as the view taken by the learned Judge about the mechanical framing of issued is concerned (vide Para 4 of his Judgment). I am in complete agreement with him. But the point is that if the issue arose, inevitably, it has to be referred to the tenancy Court. 11. Moreover, a question does arise as to whether in the writ petition presenting such gory facts, revealing the utterly dishonest conduct of the petitioner/defendant, this Court should give relief to the petitioner, which relief was going to result in frustration of justice. This Court's writ jurisdiction is not meant for smoothering justice; it is meant for furthering justice. When the Court finds that the defendant's plea is, on the face of it, unjust, unfair dishonest, this Court will Loath to give a hand of help to the petitioner against a genuine party. 12. While making the above analysis, I have not differed from most of the reasoning employed by the learned Judge, because in my opinion, even if the reasoning contained in Para 4 of his Judgment is accepted still the case becomes distinguishable from the present case. But I propose to keep on record my view that lot can be said in favour of the view that the judgment needs having a second look at. In fact if the judgment was not legitimately distinguishable, I would have referred this petition to the Division Bench. Because, in my opinion, it would not be a correct view that in every suit for injunction, the question of possession is the only relevant issue. When in a suit such as the present one the plaintiff claims relief of injunction on the basis of his title and possession, the defendant may take variety of defences. He may question the plaintiff's title as also his possession and may contend that both the title and possession vest in him. When in a suit such as the present one the plaintiff claims relief of injunction on the basis of his title and possession, the defendant may take variety of defences. He may question the plaintiff's title as also his possession and may contend that both the title and possession vest in him. On the other hand, he may not dispute the plaintiff's title, but may contend that he himself is simply in possession and, thus dispute only the possession of the plaintiff. In this case, the issue of possession may, probably, be the only material issue. There may be a 3rd case in which the defendant would not remain satisfied with pleading his own possession but might want the Court to hold that his possession was a lawful possession, such as that of a tenant or a mortgagee. In such a case it would be a somewhat narrow approach to hold that the issue of possession is the only relevant issue in the proceeding. The Court will have to frame not only the issue whether the defendant is in possession or not; the Court will also be required to frame the other issue on the question whether the defendant is in possession as tenant or not because the defendant has come out with the other plea of tenancy and has called upon the Court to adjudicate upon that other plea. When the defendant admits the plaintiff's title but denies his possession and claim that he himself is in possession without pleading any justification for such possession on the ground that he is a tenant, no other issue will arise. But when he sets up his own possession with justification for the same such as the plea of tenancy or mortgage, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the kind of possession claimed by him. In such a case, the Court shall have to frame an issue as to whether the defendant is in possession or not and further, whether his possession is of the right and of the kind pleaded by him in the Written Statement or not; in other words, whether he is in possession as a tenant (if he has pleaded tenancy) or not. The issue of defendant's tenancy is bound to arise : the Court will have to frame that issue and will have to adjudicate upon that issue. The issue of defendant's tenancy is bound to arise : the Court will have to frame that issue and will have to adjudicate upon that issue. It is no use saying that if the issue of possession is decided against the plaintiff, the suit will have to be dismissed and hence the other issues would be otiose, because, likewise, if the issue of defendant's alleged tenancy is decided against the plaintiff, his suit will have to be dismissed and the other issue of possession would be otiose. The Courts are required to frame all the issues, arising out of the pleadings simultaneously, at one and the same time; not by instalments. May be that one or some more of the issues are treated as preliminary issues and are tried earlier. It may even be that some preliminary issues are the only issues that are framed and are tried first (most of the times because no evidence is required to be led on the same). But that is a far cry from saying that in every suit for injunction, no other issue except the one of possession is material. In the case such as the present, it is idle contending that the issue of defendant's tenancy does not arise. If it arise, it must be referred to Tenancy Court under section 85-A of the Tenancy Act. A glance at the provisions of said section 85-A would make this clear. The section runs as follows:--- "85-A. (1) If any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act (hereinafter referred to as the "competent authority) the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination. (2) On receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the competent authority shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance wiith the provisions of this Act amd shall communicate its decision to the Civil Court and such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto." It will be worthwhile illustrating this point further. 13. A plaintiff may file a suit against the defendant for possession on title. 13. A plaintiff may file a suit against the defendant for possession on title. In that suit, the defendant may just deny the plaintiff's title without setting up his own title of any kind whatsoever. In such a suit the only issue relevant would be whether the plaintiff has proved his title. But the defendant may (as defendants often do) plead not only the lack of title of the plaintiff, but may justify his own possession on the basis of some kind of title for himself. For example, the defendant may plead title by adverse possession. In such a suit where the defendant has pleaded acquisition of title by adverse possession, the Court shall have to frame an issue whether the plaintiff has proved his title or not. If the plaintiff fails in proving his title, his suit for possession will have to be dismissed. But even if the suit is capable of being disposed of on this solitary issue of the plaintiff's title, still the Court shall have to frame an additional issue whether the defendant has acquired title by adverse possession or not. It would be no answer to the framing of the issue of the defendant's title that the suit is capable of being decided on the basis of the plaintiff's title alone. Often time, the failure of the plaintiff to prove his title non-suits him. But that does not mean that the further issue whether the defendant has acquired title by adverse possession or not is an unnecessary issue. The issues arise out of pleadings. It may be that certain findings on certain issues may obviate the findings on other issues. But that does not mean that the other issues are redundant or something which do not arise out of the pleadings. The above mentioned judgment gives an impression that this is the view taken by the Court, viz. that no issue of the defendant's tenancy should be framed even if the facts in that behalf are pleaded in so many words. If that impression is correct, then the judgment certainly requires a second look at. But as stated above, the above mentioned judgment of this Court in Maruti Sambha's case is capable of being distinguished. Hence, I do not find that any necessity arises for reference of this petition to a larger Bench. 14. If that impression is correct, then the judgment certainly requires a second look at. But as stated above, the above mentioned judgment of this Court in Maruti Sambha's case is capable of being distinguished. Hence, I do not find that any necessity arises for reference of this petition to a larger Bench. 14. There is yet another reason why the petition needs to be dismissed even on the assumption that Maruti Sambha's case is not distinguishable or that the judgment contains correct exposition of law. If there existed any petition which ought not to be entertained by this Court in its writ jurisdiction, it is the present petition. As stated in Para 11 above, by entertaining allowing the writ petition, the petitioner is likely to get a second inning with a view to succeed in protracting the litigation ad infinitum even though it is proved that he has not a title of title to the suit land. If it is held that the only relevant issue is whether the plaintiff is in possession or not and if the injunction is refused to the plaintiff on the ground that he is not in possession, the plaintiff will no doubt be advised and will be allowed to amend his plaint and to ask for the relief of a decree for possession. If such alternative relief for possession is asked for, the prayer will have no defence if the finding recorded by the tenancy Court is held binding, because it is a finding of a Court of competent jurisdiction, nay, of the Court of exclusive jurisdiction as per section 85 and section 85-A of the Tenancy Act. If it is held that the reference was incompetent, the defendant will have a field day. He will go on occupying the land even though he is a trespasser because the same rigmarole will have to be followed by referring the same question to the tenancy Court all over again and the same game will start once again of the trial in the tenancy Court : Appeal, remand, revision application and what not. This Court sitting in its writ jurisdiction should be loath to countenance such obnoxious reprehensible situation. This aspect of the exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction was something to which this Court has not applied its mind while deciding said Maruti Sambha's case. 15. This Court sitting in its writ jurisdiction should be loath to countenance such obnoxious reprehensible situation. This aspect of the exercise of this Court's writ jurisdiction was something to which this Court has not applied its mind while deciding said Maruti Sambha's case. 15. Apart from the fact that this is a settled rule of law relating to the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the latest judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court, page 94 (Mohammad Swalleh and others v. IIIrd Addl District Judge, Meerut and another)2, further fortified my above mentioned view. In that case, an erroneous order was passed by the prescribed authority. In the Appeal filed by the aggrieved party, the District Judge set aside the order. The legal position found by the High Court was that the Appeal did not lie to the District Court and still the High Court refused to interfere because, after all, substantial justice was done. In the Appeal before the Supreme Court, contention was advanced that the District Judge's order was illegal and that, hence, the High Court was bound to interfere in its writ jurisdiction to set aside the order passed by the District Judge. The Supreme Court held that justice had been done and hence, the High Court was justified in not interfering with the order even though the order might smack of one being devoid of any jurisdiction. The present case is even one stronger case. Here the reference was invited by the defendant himself. He went through all the rigmarole and as a last resort he raised this question of jurisdiction for the first time in this Writ Petition and he wants the High Court to interfere with a just order passed and finding recorded by the Courts which are exclusively nominated by the statute to decide the question arising in the suit. 16. The petition, therefore, fails. The Rule earlier issued stands discharged with no order as to costs. The trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit expeditiously and in any event before the end of December 1988. The trial Court is further directed that if it finds that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property, the Court shall give him opportunity to amend the plaint so as to incorporate therein the prayer for possession. The trial Court is further directed that if it finds that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property, the Court shall give him opportunity to amend the plaint so as to incorporate therein the prayer for possession. When the plaint is amended, the defendant would be entitled to file his further or amended Written Statement in the suit. It is further made clear that in that suit the issue of tenancy of the defendant shall be decided only on the basis of the finding recorded by the tenancy Court. Further, if the plaint is required to be amended, the suit would be deemed to have been filed on the date of the suit and not on the date of amendment. 17. Mr. Vaze fairly agreed that he would give the necessary advice to his client to pay a sum of Rs. 6000/- to the defendant be depositing the same in the trial Court without prejudice to his contentions. He agreed that the defendant would be at liberty to withdraw the amount in case he does not want to contest the suit any further. He took instructions from his client, who is present in the Court, and stated that the amount would be deposited in the Court within 4 weeks from today. If the amount is deposited in the Court, the trial Court shall accept the deposit. However, the amount will not be paid to the defendant unless the defence is withdrawn by the defendant. 18. Liberty to the parties to move this Court for removal of difficulties. Rule discharged. ------