JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal, it arises out of a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from putting up a signboard on the roof of a certain shop. The two courts below have taken the view that by putting the signboard there is possibility of the building, which is in the tenancy of the defendant, being damaged. 2. The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is that of a landlord and tenant. The plaintiff had let out the shop in dispute to the defendant for running a bakery therein. Admittedly the roof of the shop in dispute is of tin which is 30 to 40 years old. It is not in dispute that the measurement of the signboard is 15' x 8'. Earlier the defendants had put up a signboard of M/s. Frontier Jewellers on the roof of the shop under his tenancy. Some damage was caused to the roof by putting of that signboard. Later on the defendant put up a signboard of Doon Fan Traders, the size of which has already been mentioned. 3. The argument before the lower appellate court on behalf of the defendant was that by putting up the signboard of either of the traders over the roof of the shop under his tenancy, the defendant earns some money and this is also a business and, therefore the plaintiff landlord cannot interfere with the business activities of the defendant by getting an order of injunction form a court of law. The lower appellate court has held that the putting up of the signboard in question has nothing to do with the bakery business in the shop in dispute. Obviously the signboard does not relate to the business of the appellant. The finding that earlier the defendant damaged the roof and the plaintiff had to incur a substantial amount for repairing the same is finding of fact. The finding that there is a strong possibility of the roof being again damaged by the defendant if he is permitted to put up a signboard of Doon Fan Traders is essentially a finding of fact. Nothing has been shown to me to indicate that the finding stands vitiated on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Nothing has been shown to me to indicate that the finding stands vitiated on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The last submission made is that the lower appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction in giving a direction that the defendant could not carry on any other business in the shop in dispute except the bakery business. This argument appears to be correct. The scope of the suit was confined to the relief of preventing the defendant from putting up the signboard on the tin roof over the shop in dispute. It was neither the plaintiff's case nor could it be that the defendant could not carry on any other business in the shop in question except the bakery business even though no injury either to the house of the plaintiff or to the building let out to the defendant was expected to be caused. Therefore, while maintaining the orders of the trial court and the lower appellate court that the defendant should be restraining from putting up the signboard on the roof of the shop in dispute, the direction that the defendant appellant should not do any business other than the bakery business is dissolved. However, it is made clear that the landlord will always have the right to object to the appellant carrying on any activity in the shop in dispute which, according to the landlord, is inconsistent with the purpose for which the shop was let out. The landlord shall also be entitled to object to any activity of the appellant which, according to him (the landlord), will cause damage to the building let out. 5. This appeal succeeds in part. The decree of the lower appellate court is maintained with the modifications aforementioned. 6. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.