ORDER 1. These three writ petitions arise out of the order dated 16-8-1982 passed by respondent 2. the Prescribed Authority appointed tinder the Payment of Wages Act (City Magistrate, Kanpur) (hereinafter referred to as the Prescribed Authority) issuing a direction to the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs. 26838.70 being the amount of wages due with effect from 17-1-69 to 13-7-76 and the compensation amounting to Rs. 26838.40 being one time of the amount so deducted total Rs. 53677.40 to each of respondent I and the judgement and order dated 16-12-83 passed by Sri D.C. Srivastava, 11 Additional District Judge, Kanpur, dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 16-8-1982. 2. Ambika Prasad, respondent I in Writ Petition No. 5183 of 1984, Putti Lal, respondent I in Writ Petition 5184 of 1984 and Prabhu Dayal, respondent I in Writ Petition 5185 of 1984 had filed application under S. 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act before the respondent 2 who by a common judgement and order dated 16-8-82 had issued the above directions for wages and compensation as contemplated under S. 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act in respect of all of them who are now arrayed as respondent 1 in each of the writ petitions. 3. Similarly, respondent 3 the 11 Addl. District Judge by a common judgement and order had dismissed the appeals preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 16-8-82 passed by respondent 3. 4. As common questions of fact and law are involved in these three writ petitions and in view of one judgement and order dated 16- 8-82 passed by the Prescribed Authority and the judgement and order dated 16-12-85 passed by the appellate court while disposing of the three appeals, they are being disposed of together by this judgment. 5. Encompassing the dispute the facts are that Ambika Prasad. Putti Lal and Prabhu Dayal, respondent I in the above writ petitions were employed as gangmen in the Northern Railway. By an order dated 17-1-69 their services were terminated. Aggrieved against this order of termination all of them filed a suit (Suit No. 51 of 1969 Prabhu Dayal and 2 others v. Union of India) in the Court of Munsif, Allahabad. The petitioner (defendant, Union of India) contested the suit and after trial the learned Munsif. By an order dated 17-1-69 their services were terminated. Aggrieved against this order of termination all of them filed a suit (Suit No. 51 of 1969 Prabhu Dayal and 2 others v. Union of India) in the Court of Munsif, Allahabad. The petitioner (defendant, Union of India) contested the suit and after trial the learned Munsif. Allahabad, decreed the suit holding that the termination of their services was illegal and they continued to be in service with all the benefits accrued. The petitioner, Union of India, then preferred an appeal against the judgement and decree dated 25-7-72 passed by the learned Munsif. Allahabad, to the Court of District Judge which was registered as Civil Appeal 351 of 1972, Union of India v. Prabhu Dayal and others. This appeal failed and was dismissed vide judgement and order dated 13-2-76. Consequent to the dismissal of the appeal the employee respondents were reinstated on 14-7-76 in service but wages with effect from 17-1-69 to 13-7-76 were not paid in spite of repeated requests and demands. Several reminders on 4-12-76.8-12- 76 and 3-1-77 were sent by employee respondents to the petitioner but to no avail and ultimately the employees respondents filed an application under S. 15(2) of the Act before the Prescribed Authority at Allahabad on 14-12-1977. However, the Prescribed Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act at Allahabad held vide order dated 15-6-78 that the application was not maintainable at Allahabad for want of territorial jurisdiction. The employee respondents after obtaining the copy of the aforesaid order filed applications before the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act at Kanpur on 3-7-78. This application under S. 15(2) of the Act was allowed vide judgement and order dated 16-8-82 and the appeal preferred against that judgement and order was dismissed on 16-12- 83. Hence, these three writ petitions by the petitioner. 6. The case of the petitioner in brief is that the application under S. 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act was barred by time as the period of limitation for filing the application would he reckoned with from the date of the judgement and order in the suit and not when the appeal was decided by the first appellate Court in regard to the termination of the services of the respondents. Further the view of respondent 3 as regards the order passed by respondent 2 in regard to period of limitation was not challenged earlier, it could not he challenged in appeal is erroneous. It has further been alleged that the respondents had not claimed salary or wages in the civil suit and as such their claim was barred under O. II, R. 2. Civil Procedure Code. Lastly the amount not being paid to the employee respondents would not he deemed to be a deduction but would he deemed to be delayed payment. Besides above it has been contended that the wages were not paid as a bona fide dispute was pending as regards the payment to the employee respondents. In any case the employee respondents were entitled to claim only Rs. 25, as compensation for the delayed payment of the wages. but were not entitled to he awarded any compensation for the deduction of the above. 7. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the employee respondents. The case of the employee respondents is akin to each other. The allegations contained in the writ petition are categorically repudiated. It has been submitted that the application filed under S. 15 of Payment of Wages Act was not barred by time, similarly it has also been contended that the wages could not he claimed in the suit in view of the provisions of Section 22 of the Act for which necessary action was taken by the employees respondents after the suit was decreed and the appeal filed pursuant to such decree was dismissed. Moreover, the petitioner had not challenged the order of the Prescribed Authority. respondent 2, holding the application within time. Further as the amount was illegally deducted hence it was within the competence of the respondent 2 to award compensation for such deduction. 8. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed denving, the allegations in the counter affidavit and reiterating the allegations of the writ petition. 9. Counsel for the parties Sri Lal Ji Sinha for the petitioners and Sri Radhey Shyam for the employees respondents have been heard. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent Sri Radhey Shyam has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition and the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain or dispose it of inter alia on the ground that with the coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent Sri Radhey Shyam has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition and the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain or dispose it of inter alia on the ground that with the coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act. 19115 the petition is not cognizable by the High Court and shall stand transferred to that Tribunal. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the provisions of Payment of Wages Act do not stand ousted by the provisions made under the Administrative Tribunals Act. 1985 as amended. 11. To appreciate the rival contention it would be necessary to advert to certain provisions of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act as well as that of Payment of Wages Act. Section 28 of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act deals with exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 13(1 of the Constitution of India. It provides as under : "S. 28. On and from the date from which any jurisdiction. powers and authority becomes exercisable tinder this Act by a 'Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post, no Court except - (a) the Supreme Court: or . (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. or any other corresponding law for the time being in force. shall have or he entitled to exercise any jurisdiction. powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters." Section 29 of the Central Administrative Tribunals Act provides for the transfer of the Pending cases. It lays down inter alia that every suit or other proceedings pending before any Court or authority, immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal, shall stand transferred on the date to such Tribunal. However, an appeal pending before the High Court is excluded from the purview of this provision from the transfer. 12. The scheme and salient features of the Payment of Wages Act highlight the object for its enactment. The object of the Payment of Wages Act is-to ensure payment of wages to the employee. Adjudication by the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act is contemplated as regards the earned wages due to the employee. 12. The scheme and salient features of the Payment of Wages Act highlight the object for its enactment. The object of the Payment of Wages Act is-to ensure payment of wages to the employee. Adjudication by the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act is contemplated as regards the earned wages due to the employee. It has, thus to be seen in view of the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act whether the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act would he deemed to be a Court or not. Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act ensures payment of wages and for compensation in view of any delayed payment or deductions. The authority is thus empowered to adjudicate whether any wages are due to the employee. In the case of H.C. D. Mather v. E.I. Railway, AIR 1950 All 80 (FB), it has been held that the authority invested with the jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act is not a Court, though undoubtedly it has power to decide questions. This view finds support in a Full Bench case in Gh. Rasool v. Ch. Mohd. Wani, 1980 Lab IC 835 (J and K) where it was held that the authority under the Payment of Wages Act was not it Court and not amenable to the re visional jurisdiction of the High Court. Certain provisions of Civil Procedure Code were en-grained fora limited purpose but it nowhere qualified the authority with the power of civil Court. In the case of The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, 1976 SCC (Lab) 70 : (1975 Lab IC 1651) it was held while crystallising the jurisdiction of the civil court as under: .......... The handicap leads only to this conclusion that for adjudication of an industrial dispute in connection with a right or obligation under the general or common law and not created under the Act, the remedy is not exclusive. It is alternative. But surely for the enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Act the remedy provided uno flat in it is the exclusive remedy_ ......... (Para 14) ".....the civil court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. It is alternative. But surely for the enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Act the remedy provided uno flat in it is the exclusive remedy_ ......... (Para 14) ".....the civil court will have no jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if it concerned enforcement of certain right or liability created only under the Act. In that event civil court will have no jurisdiction even to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatened injury on account of the alleged breach of contract is one which is recognised by and enforceable under the Act alone." ".....The principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus: (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under t he Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created tinder the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either S. 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." (Para23) .......in relation to principle 2 stated above there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(K) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in S. 2A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. Such a contingency for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in S. 2A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle 3 stated above." (Para 24) 13. There is no dispute that the amount payable to the respondents is not wages. There is also no whisper that the petitioner had withheld or denied the wages for permissible deductions as contemplated under the Payment of Wages Act. 14. In the case of General Manager, N.E. Railway, Gorakhpur Sripat, 1987 All WC 515 : ( 1988 Lab IC 260) a Division Bench after considering various aspects of the case finally held that the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act is not it Court. It is thus clear that S. 28 read with S. 29 would not be attracted so as to impel this Court to transfer the petition to the Tribunal. Further the Payment of Wages Act provides an appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under sub-section 12) of S. 15 or against it direction made under sub-sec. (3) or sub-sec. (4) of that section wit hin 30 days of the date tin which the order or direction was made, before the Court of the District Judge. The petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 16-8-82 of the Authority filed an appeal before the District Judge" This appeal was dismissed by the judgement and order dated 10-12-83. The scheme and object of the Act thus provides for the finality of the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. These proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act culminate with the order passed in appeal. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be filed for lack of jurisdiction or illegality or where the findings arrived at are based on no evidence Air based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence or otherwise perverse. The order of the respondents is being attacked within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be filed for lack of jurisdiction or illegality or where the findings arrived at are based on no evidence Air based upon extraneous or irrelevant evidence or otherwise perverse. The order of the respondents is being attacked within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution has ample jurisdiction to entertain this petition. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very suddenly submitted that the claim of the respondents is hit by 0. 2. R. 2. Civil Procedure Code. The submission stands spurned by the very fact that S. 22 of the Payment of Wages Ac clearly ousts the jurisdiction of the civil court in regard to the payment of wages due to the employee. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has then submitted that the application filed by the petitioner under S. 1512) of Payment of Wages Act was barred by limitation. The submission is wholly ill-merited. The cause of action accrued to the respondent on 25-7-72 when the suit was decreed by the Additional Munsif, Allahabad. The appeal preferred on behalf of the petitioner was dismissed on 13-2-76. The appeal would be deemed to be in continuation of the suit. The matter was sub judice and moreover the petitioner had not reinstated the respondents The respondents could not have knocked the door of Payment of Wages Authorities, as regards their claim for the wages during the pendency of the list in the appellate court. It was only after the dismissal of the appeal that the respondents approached the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act and that too when they were not paid their wages by the petitioner. Even representations sent by tile respondents on various dates i.e. 4-10-70, 8- 12-70 and VI-77 were not heeded to thus compelling the respondents to lay their grievance before the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act. Manifestly the cause of action thus accrued to the respondents to make application under S. 151 2) of the Act for the payment of wages on 3.1-1977. The payment of Wages Authority as well as the appellate Court rightly came to the conclusion that the application was within time. 17. Manifestly the cause of action thus accrued to the respondents to make application under S. 151 2) of the Act for the payment of wages on 3.1-1977. The payment of Wages Authority as well as the appellate Court rightly came to the conclusion that the application was within time. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has then strenuously urged that the respondent 2 was in error in awarding compensation of one time of the wages due. It has been contended that the respondents were entitled to only compensation of Rs. 25. - as provided under the Act. Section (3) of the Act runs as follows : "(3). When any application tinder sub section (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under Section 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard and after such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may. without prejudice to any other penalty to which such- employer or other person is liable under-this Act, direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and (not exceeding twenty-five rupees) in the latter, and even if the amount deducted or the delayed wages are paid before the disposal of the application. direct the payment of such compensation, as the authority may think fit, not exceeding twenty-five rupees." Section 15(3) proviso is as under : -- "Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall he made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to (a) a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or (b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence. to make prompt payment, or (c) the failure of the employed person to apply for-or accept payment." The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was a bona fide dispute pending between the parties. to make prompt payment, or (c) the failure of the employed person to apply for-or accept payment." The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was a bona fide dispute pending between the parties. The submission that a bona fide dispute was pending which prevented the payment of wages to the respondent is wholly fallacious. The proviso to S. 15(3) provides that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if such delay was due to a bona fide error or dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person. Nothing is emerging to show that there was a bona fide dispute pending as regards the amount payable to the employed person (respondent 1). No doubt a lis was pending as regards the competence of the petitioner to terminate the services of the respondent. It cannot be said that there was a bona fide dispute as to the payment of amount due to the employed person. Moreover it is admitted that the payment has not been made. If that be so, how can this plea succeed that it would be a case of delayed wages warranting award of compensation to the extent of Rs. 25/- only. 18. It has now to be seen as to whether the amount not paid to the petitioner would come in the category of deduction enjoining award of compensation not exceeding 10 times the amount deducted or not. Certain facts are admitted and which precisely reveal that the respondents filed suit in the court of Munsif for injunction restraining the petitioner from implementing the notice of termination of service dated 17-1-1969; the suit was decreed by judgement and order dated 25-7-1972; feeling aggrieved the petitioner preferred an appeal against the judgement and order dated 25-7-72 decreeing the suit; the appeal was dismissed - vide judgement and order dated 13-2-1976; the respondents in view of the suit being decreed and the appeal of the petitioner having failed moved for permission to join the duties; hesitantly, they were permitted to join duties on 14-7-76 after a lapse of about 5 months from the date of judgement and order in appeal. The wages for the period from 7-1-69 to 13-7-76 were not paid; even representations dated 4-10-76, 8- 12-76 and 3-1-77 proved of no avail; ultimately compelling the respondents to seek recourse to law for the payment of the wages and compensation. The authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act vide judgement and order dated 16-1-82 directed the petitioner to pay the amount of Rs. 26,838.70 being the wages w.e.f. 17-1-69 to 13-1-76 and one time compensation of Rs. 26,838.70 total:- Rs. 53,677.40 to each of the respondents. All the three respondents were thus entitled to Rs. 53,677.40 which was directed to be paid and the total amount which was thus directed to be paid to the respondents was Rs. 161032.20. Feeling aggrieved against the judgement and order dated 16-8-82 the petitioner preferred an appeal to the District Judge. Kanpur. All the three appeals were decided by the judgement and order dated 16- 12-83. These appeals were dismissed. 19. From the above it is clear that the amount of wages with effect from 17-1-69 to 13-1-76 was not paid. 20. Whether this amount would attract the word "delayed wages" or would he deemed to be a "deduction" has to be examined. It cannot for a pause would be deemed to come to within the category of "delayed wages" as admittedly no amount has been paid. It now thus has to be seen whether withholding or denying the payment would be deduction for the purposes of awarding compensation. The word "deny" as per new Webster's Dictionary of the English Language. Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition thereinafter referred to as the Dictionary) means as under "Deny. To assert the negative of. as a statement or an alleged fact: declare not to he true: to refuse to believe, as a doctrine: reject as false or erroneous: to refuse to believe in the existence of reality of: to refuse to recognise or acknowledge, as a person or thing: disown: disavow: repudiate: to refuse to grant, as a claim or request; to withhold the use of enjoyment or: to refuse access to one visited. as to refrain from the gratification of one's desires: exercise self-denial." The petitioner was all through asserting that the amount is not due. The demand as regards the payment of dues has been persistently negatived by the petitioner. as to refrain from the gratification of one's desires: exercise self-denial." The petitioner was all through asserting that the amount is not due. The demand as regards the payment of dues has been persistently negatived by the petitioner. The petitioner" was all the time declaring that the contention of the respondents for the payment of wages was not true. The petitioner was refusing to believe that the amount is due to the respondents. The petitioner had set-forth the plea that the claim of the respondents was false and erroneous. Such claim was not recognised or acknowledged by the petitioner. The claim was insistently disowned and repudiated by the petitioner. The petitioner had refused to grant the claim of the respondents. 21. The petitioner was equally withholding the enjoyment of the amount by the respondents. The word "withhold" as per the dictionary meaning means as under : ..with hold, (with, in sense of against, and hold) To hold back; to restrain; to keep from action; to keep back: not to grant to forbear; to refrain." Admittedly the petitioner had not paid the amount due to the respondents and was holding it hack. The amount due to the respondents was not granted. The words "deduct" and "deduction" as per the dictionary mean as tinder : "de.duct. To subtract or separate, in numbering, estimating. or calculating: to infer: to take or detract. Deduction; The act of subtracting; that which is deducted. abatement: the method of deducting from premises, conclusion derived from the given premises." From the above reading it is difficult to accede to the submission that if the amount has not been paid to the petitioner, respondent ?) it would not be deemed to be a deduction. No amount was paid. The whole of the amount would thus stand denied or withheld and would come within the category of deduction. It would be deemed to be deduction of the entire sum due to the respondents. The respondent 2 rightly came to the conclusion that the amount has been deducted and awarded compensation one time. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 has also submitted that the plea as is being raised by the petitioner as regards the award of compensation of one time was not urged before the appellate court. A perusal of the judgement and order dated 16-12-83 also clearly shows that this plea was never urged before the appellate court. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 has also submitted that the plea as is being raised by the petitioner as regards the award of compensation of one time was not urged before the appellate court. A perusal of the judgement and order dated 16-12-83 also clearly shows that this plea was never urged before the appellate court. 23. The employee respondents were, however, denied the fruits of the orders passed by the respondents 2 and 3 in view of the operation of the orders dated 16-8-82 and 16-12-83 having been stayed by this Court at the instance of the petitioner. The attitude of the respondents in denying the entire wages (clearly fell within the ambit of word I 'deduction'. Such an attitude deserves to be spurned and it is incomprehensible as to how such an obdurate attitude was taken in view of the decisions of the Courts. The withholding of the payment does not depend on the whims of the petitioner. Withholding the amount for more than a period of a decade and a half by an agency of the .Government like the petitioner has not been based upon good faith and due care. The i petitioner as a measure of reprisal or provoked by the judgements of the civil court and the orders of the Prescribed Authority and that of the appellate court had ceased to act bona fide merely because the respondents resorted to legal action but that by alone cannot impel the petitioner to deny the respondents the fruits of the hazardous litigation which was forced on them. True, it may not be emerging as to what extraneous factor influenced the petitioner denying or withholding the wages to the respondents but it clearly indicates all the lack of bona fides. Social justice is the conscience of our Constitution. The State or its instrumentalities or its agency is a promoter of economic justice. These two are the founding faith which Sustains the constitution. The petitioner is a model employer with a social conscience not an artificial person without soul. The deductions and withholding of payment to respondents is wholly unjust. In the case of Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, (1981) l.SCC 449 : ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) it was held that law and justice must be on talking terms and what matters under our constitutional scheme is not merciless law but humane legality. The deductions and withholding of payment to respondents is wholly unjust. In the case of Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, (1981) l.SCC 449 : ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) it was held that law and justice must be on talking terms and what matters under our constitutional scheme is not merciless law but humane legality. The true strength and stability of our policy is society's credibility in -social justice not perfect legalese. 24. This case does disclose indifference to this fundamental value. Right from the year 1972 when the suit was decreed till 16- 12-83 when the appeal was dismissed, the mighty petitioner made a prestige issue against the respondents employees. It would have been an appropriate case where ten times of the compensation was awarded. However, the authority has awarded only one time. At this stage it is not proposed to enhance the amount of compensation but sympathies are certainly for the respondents who had to bear the agony of such a long drawn litigation where they ultimately stood vindicated. 25. The petitions have no force and deserve to be dismissed. No other plea was urged. 26. In the result the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 1000/- (Rs. one thousand) payable to each of the respondents.