JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - This is an application by one of the injured against the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 23-4-1986 granting anticipatory bail in exercise of powers u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. It was alleged in the F. I. R. that the informant alongwith the Editor of a local newspaper "The Samaj" was coming in a vehicle after attending a function at Sri Ramachandi College. The road was blocked by placing carts and as soon as the vehicle stopped he injured as well as the co-passenger were indiscriminately attacked as a result of which all of them including the driver of the vehicle sustained injuries. The occurrence took place on 18-3-1986 and on the basis of the F. I. R. a case was registered under: Sections 147/148/149/341/326/307/336, Indian Penal Code, read with Section 5 (3) of the Indian Explosives Act. The opposite parties filed an application in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Puri, which was registered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 285 of 1986 invoking the jurisdiction u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of anticipatory bail. The learned Sessions Judge notwithstanding the gravity of the offence as well as existence of evidence against the opposite parties granted anticipatory bail by order dated 23-4-1986. The main reason which impelled the learned Sessions Judge to invoke his jurisdiction u/s 438 of the Code is that the Public' Prosecutor did not object the grant of anticipatory bail. The learned Sessions Judge has also observed that the offence are not very serious and the evidence is meagre. It is this order of the learned Sessions Judge which is being impugned \in this application. 3. Mr. Palit, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the grounds on which the Sessions Judge granted anticipatory bail invoking his jurisdiction u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are wholly unsustainable and unless the order in question is interfered with, public faith in the administration of justice will be shaken. Mr. Misra. 3. Mr. Palit, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the grounds on which the Sessions Judge granted anticipatory bail invoking his jurisdiction u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are wholly unsustainable and unless the order in question is interfered with, public faith in the administration of justice will be shaken. Mr. Misra. the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties on the other hand contends that the order of the sessions Judge being dated 23-4-1986 and more than two years having elapsed from the date of the said order and there having been no allegation against the opposite parties that they made any attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or they have abused the liberty granted to them in any manner it would not be proper for this Court to cancel the order of bail in Exercise of powers under section. 439 (?) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.. The rival contentions require careful examination particularly in view of the fact that Sessions Judges are exercising power under section. 438 of the Code under circumstances and on grounds which would certainly not entitle them to invoke the said jurisdiction. 4. Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was introduced in Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 which was not there in the earlier Procedure Code. The object obviously was to enable the Court of Sessions and the High Court to direct the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest. The said power is of an extraordinary nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases. The Supreme Court in the case of Balchand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I. R. 1977 S.C. 366 laid down the propositions, regarding grant of anticipatory bail and according to the said decision all the limitations imposed u/s 437' are to be read into Section 438 and in addition, the Petitioner must further make out a special case for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail. In later decisions, the Supreme Court further indicated that the discretion u/s 438 should not be exercised with regard to an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life unless the Court at that very stage is satisfied that such a charge appears to be false or groundless and in the larger interest of the public and the State the discretion u/s 438 should not be exercised .in serious cases like economic offences and offences invoking blatant corruption at the higher rungs of the executive and political power. It was also categorically held in several cases that mere general allegations of mala fides in the petition were inadequate and the Court must be satisfied from the materials before it that the allegations of mala fides are substantial and the accusation appears to be false and groundless, the burden of establishing such mala fides being on the person alleging. Notwithstanding such clear enunciation as some Courts exercised their discretion u/s 438 without the pre-conditions being satisfied, in a recent case of Pokar Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others. the Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between bail and anticipatory hair and held: Relevant considerations governing the Court's decision in granting anticipatory bail u/s 438 are materially different from those when an application for bail by a person who is arrested in the course of investigation as also by a person who is convicted and his appeal is pending before the higher Court and bail is sought during the pendency of the appeal. These situations in which the question of granting or refusing to grant bail would arise, materially and substantially differ from each other and the relevant considerations on which the Courts would exercise its discretion, one way or the other are substantially different from each other: After referring to the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court is Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others Vs. State of Punjab, and considering the accusation against the Respondent, the Supreme Court observed: Before we conclude this judgment, it must be made distinctly clear that some very compelling circumstances must be made out for granting bail to a person accused of committing murder and that too when the investigation is in progress. In fact, the Investigating' Officer did not even attempt to arrest the Appellant though the initial accusation was u/s 307 I.P.C. punishable with imprisonment for life. In fact, the Investigating' Officer did not even attempt to arrest the Appellant though the initial accusation was u/s 307 I.P.C. punishable with imprisonment for life. And as soon as the victim of the assure succumbed to his injuries and an offence u/s 302 was registered, promptly an application for anticipatory bail was made and granted. If such an order is snowed to stand, 'faith of public in administration of justice is likely to be considerably shaken. Therefore, we have no option but to cancel the order granting anticipatory bail. In my considered opinion, the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court applies to the facts of the present case fully. It would also be appropriate to notice a Bench decision of this Court in the Case of Bhagirathi Padhan v. Pachila Rout and Ors. 61 (1986) C.L.T. 9 where ancipatory bail had been given by the Sessions Judge on the concession of the public prosecutor and this Court had quashed .the said order. In the present case the impugned order also indicates that the Sessions Judge granted anticipatory bail invoking his jurisdiction u/s 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the public prosecutor conceded to the same. In my opinion, that can hardly be a germane reason for invoking the jurisdiction u/s 436 of the Code. In view of the serious nature of the allegations and no special circumstances having been, indicated or found the Sessions Judge committed gross error by granting anticipatory bail to the opposite parties and therefore, there is no option but to cancel the order in question. 5. Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties, relying upon a decision of this Court in Bhagirathi Padhan v. Jayalal Sahu and Anr. Cri. Misc. Case No. 516186 of 1987 dispose on 12-3-1987, disposed of on 12th March, 1987 contends that since two years have elapsed in the meantime and there has been on further accusation against the opposite parties, the order in question should not be cancelled. No doubt, in the aforesaid case. I had taken into consideration the fact that there had been no attempt by the accused to interfere with the due administration of justice and there had been no attempt to evade the course of justice or to abuse the liberty granted to the accused and ultimately on account of lapse of some time. No doubt, in the aforesaid case. I had taken into consideration the fact that there had been no attempt by the accused to interfere with the due administration of justice and there had been no attempt to evade the course of justice or to abuse the liberty granted to the accused and ultimately on account of lapse of some time. I had not cancelled the bail that had been granted to the accused persons. But in the very Division Bench case to which I have already referred to supra Bhagirathi Padhan v. Pachila Rout and Ors. 61 (1986) C.L.T. 9 an order passed u/s 438 by the Sessions Judge dated 28-12-1984 was cancelled by this Court on 2-9-1985. Then again, in Pokar Ram's case2 the order granting anticipatory bail dated 30th of September, 1983, was quashed by the Supreme Court on 17-4-1985. In this view of the matter, and in the facts and circumstances of the present case after applying My mind fully to the accusation made against the opposite parties and the circumstances in which the Sessions Judge granted anticipatory bail u/s 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, I would cancel the order granting anticipatory bail without hesitation. But 1 would make it clear that by my setting aside the order granting anticipatory bail, the opposite parties should in no may be prejudiced and in the event they are arrested which must ordinarily follow it is open for them, if they are so advised to move an application for being enlarged on bail and the Court would consider the same on merits wholly uninfluenced by this judgment. 6. This application is accordingly allowed and the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 23-4-1986 granting anticipatory bail to the opposite parties in hereby quashed and set aside and the bonds furnished by them are cancelled. Final Result : Allowed