ORDER K. Sreedharan, J. 1. Petitioners challenge the order passed by the Court below condoning the delay in filing the complaint. 2. The short facts that are germane for decision of this revision petition are as follows: First respondent herein was the plaintiff in O. S.360/80 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Thiruvalla. Petitioners were defendants therein. On 15-2-1982 the petitioners filed an affidavit in court containing certain defamatory statements relating to the plaintiff, first respondent herein. That suit happened to be dismissed on 12-2-1988. The first respondent then filed a complaint on 7-3-1988 against the petitioners for offence u/s 500 IPC. Along with the complaint the first respondent filed C.M.P. 1225/88 for extension of the period of limitation. The learned Magistrate issued notice to the petitioners herein. After hearing the parties by the order impugned in this revision petition the learned Magistrate took the complaint to file by condoning the delay. 3. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the delay has not been properly explained and that the court below was not justified in taking the view that it is necessary to take cognizance of the complaint even after the expiry of the period of limitation in the interest of justice. 4. The offence u/s. 500 IPC is punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. The period of limitation for such offence is three years. The affidavit containing the defamatory statements was filed before the civil court on 15-2-1982. So the prosecution should have been launched on or before 15-2-1985, 5. According to first respondent, the affidavit which contained defamatory statement was to be dealt with by the Civil Court. While the Civil Court was proceeding with the case ho took it that it will not be proper on his part to agitate the matter before a criminal court as it would be sub judice. On this belief, it is contended, he waited till the disposal of the suit on 12-2-1988. When the suit was dismissed, he filed the complaint on 7-3-1988. Therefore, It is argued that there was proper explanation for the delay and that it was necessary to condone the same in the interest of justice. 6. On this belief, it is contended, he waited till the disposal of the suit on 12-2-1988. When the suit was dismissed, he filed the complaint on 7-3-1988. Therefore, It is argued that there was proper explanation for the delay and that it was necessary to condone the same in the interest of justice. 6. The affidavit filed by the petitioners before the Civil Court on 15-2-1982 is stated to contain defamatory materials If first respondent had any intention to proceed against the petitioners for the publication of defamatory statements he ought to have initiated action against the petitioners for offence u/s. 500 IPC. That right of the first respondent was not one dependent on the decision of the Civil Court. The Civil Court was not competent to try the offence of defamation if the petitioners had in fact committed the same. Therefore, there was no justifiable reason for the first respondent in keeping quiet. If he wanted to prosecute the petitioners ha should have done it within the period of limitation prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The explanation that he was under the impression that the prosecution will be sub judice is a wrong understanding of the law. Ignorance of law is no ground to have the delay caused in launching the prosecution condoned. The Civil suit was dismissed on 12-2-1988, Even there after he waited till 7-3-1988 for filing the complaint before the criminal court. There is no explanation for that delay either. 7. In the civil suit the first respondent was defeated. There upon he was approached the criminal court to wreak vengeance against the petitioners. No person can be allowed to set the Criminal proceedings in motion for wreaking vengeance against another. 8. The provision of limitation has been enacted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, with the obvious purpose of preventing abuse of process or court by filing belated and state prosecutions. S.468(1) prohibits courts from taking cognizance of offences in respect of which periods of limitation have been prescribed under clause (2) of the Section, after the expiry of such periods of limitation. This confers a valuable right cm the persons sought to be prosecuted. The object of this prohibition is to prevent patties from resorting to dilatory tactics and to shut out belated claims. This confers a valuable right cm the persons sought to be prosecuted. The object of this prohibition is to prevent patties from resorting to dilatory tactics and to shut out belated claims. Such salutary purpose should not be allowed to be circumvented by taking recourse to the magic words of "interest of justice" unless there is compelling and justifiable reason. This power must be exercised only in suitable cases where the court is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained or it is in the interest of justice. The court being the guardian of rights of persons, has an obligation to protect them from vindictive and vexatious time barred prosecutions. Valuable vested right of a person should not be easily brushed aside or whittled down by indiscriminate exercise of the power of discretion. Discretion should be exercised judicially and objectively. 9. In the instant case, It is evident that the first respondent, when got worsted in the civil court wanted to weak vengeance against the petitioners by prosecuting them in the criminal case. When this ulterior purpose is clearly manifested in this proceedings the court below should not have allowed the first respondent's prayer to take the complaint into file. The first respondent has failed to give any tenable explanation for the delay. The contention that he could approach the criminal court only after the decision in the civil suit, it clearly devoid of any substance. The delay subsequent to the decision in the civil suit has not been attempted to be explained either. In such a situation the court below was clearly in error in condoning the delay by taking refuge under the words "in the interest of justice". 10. In view of what has been staled above, I have no hesitation in holding that the court below acted without jurisdiction in condoning the delay caused in filing the complains. The result, therefore is the Criminal Revision Petition is allowed and the entire proceedings taken by the learned Magistrate in pursuance to the order in C.M.P. 1125/88 are quashed.