BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE essential facts of the case are as follows": a stage carriage permit was held by one k. G. Jagannath, Proprietor of S. N. Motor service, Doddaballapura, to operate on the route between Chikkaballapura and Tumkur. On the portion of the route between Chikkaballapur and Doddaballapur, one more permit was granted to the said permit holder covering identical route between Chikkaballapur and Doddaballapur and both the permits were renewed from time to time. The said permit holder filed an application for renewal of the permit which was valid only up to 31. 3. 1985 and the second respondent heard and disposed of the application under subject No. 395/84-85 by order dated 8. 3. 1985 overruling the objections raised by the 3rd respondent and granted the renewal of the stage carriage permit in favour of K. G. Jagannath. The said order is at Annexure -A. Aggrieved by the order granting renewal, an appeal was preferred in Appeal No. 339/1985 before the first respondent by the 3rd respondent which is the Karnataka State road Transport Corporation, Bangalore -27. The appeal was partly allowed and the appellate Authority passed an order on 22. 12. 1986 vide Annexure -B curtailing the portion of the route from Chikkaballapur to muddenahalli Cross and Gadambachanahalli cross to Doddaballapura. ( 2 ) THE petitioner in this Writ Petition is the transferee of the permit from K. G. Jagannath who is the transferor. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to some other facts of the case. Whereas the transferor had applied for renewal of the stage carriage permit on 1-12-1984, renewal of the permit was granted on 8. 3. 1985. The petitioner made an application before the competent authority for transfer of the permit from K. G. Jagannath in favour of the petitioner by the application dated 27. 6. 1987. The transfer was granted on 31. 7. 1987. Later on, a notice was issued to the petitioner (transferee) vide annexure-C dated 21. 1. 1988 which reads as follows :"the learned Presiding Officer, KSTAT has allowed the Appeal No. 339/1985 filed by KSRTC against the orders of RTA in sub No. 395/84-85 dated 8. 3. 1985 and curtailed the overlapping portion of the notified route viz. , Chikkaballapur to muddenahalli Cross 4 Kms. Gudambachalli Cross to Doddaballapur 4 Kms. in respect of permit P. St. P. 31/58-59 valid upto 31. 3. 3. 1985 and curtailed the overlapping portion of the notified route viz. , Chikkaballapur to muddenahalli Cross 4 Kms. Gudambachalli Cross to Doddaballapur 4 Kms. in respect of permit P. St. P. 31/58-59 valid upto 31. 3. 1988 relating Chikkaballapur to tumkur. Hence you are hereby directed to produce part 'b' endorse curtailment, or to produce stay if any obtained in the hon'ble Court of Karnataka against orders of KSTAT within 3 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Sd/- secretary, RTA, Bangalore". ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED by the notice-Annexure-C, the petitioner has approached this Court challenging the validity and correctness of the order passed by the KSTAT on 22. 12. 1986 vide, Annexure -B. ( 4 ) THE point for consideration is whether the Writ Petition is barred by laches and whether respondent-Tribunal was right in holding that there is overlapping on the notified route. ( 5 ) WHEN this case came up for preliminary hearing, by consent of the learned counsel for both the parties, it was heard and disposed of on merits. ( 6 ) THE main contention of the petitioner is that when his application for transfer of permit was made on 27. 6. 1987 and sub- sequently, when the application was allowed on 31. 7. 1987 no endorsement in the permit was made in regard to the alleged curtailment of the route. Further, the petitioner, after securing the transfer of the permit in his favour in accordance with law, continued to operate the service without curtailment of the route until he received the notice from the first respondent at Annexure-C dated 21. 1. 1988, calling upon him to produce the permit for the purpose of endorsing the curtailment and informing the petitioner that the - Appellate Authority in Appeal No. 339/1985 dated 22. 12. 1986 had passed an order curtailing the overlapping portion of the route via Chikkaballapur to muddenahalli Cross 4 Kms and Gudambachalli cross to Doddaballapur 4 Kms in respect of the permit transferred to the petitioner. Significantly enough, the authority issued a notice vide Annexure-C directing the petitioner to produce an order of stay from this Court within three days from the date of receipt of the notice, staying the operation of the order passed by the KSTAT in Appeal no. 339/1985 and in the alternative, to produce the permit for endorsing curtailment. Significantly enough, the authority issued a notice vide Annexure-C directing the petitioner to produce an order of stay from this Court within three days from the date of receipt of the notice, staying the operation of the order passed by the KSTAT in Appeal no. 339/1985 and in the alternative, to produce the permit for endorsing curtailment. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, who is the transferee of the original permit holder, he had absolutely no knowledge of what had transpired in Appeal No. 339/1985 before the kstat and least of all any knowledge of the order passed by the KSTAT on 22. 12. 1986. It is emphasised by the petitioner that he came to know of the order of KSTAT only when he received the notice vide Annexure -C dated 21. 1. 1988. It is in these circumstances, that the petitioner filed the present Writ petition on 3. 2. 1988 questioning the legality and correctness of the order passed by the kstat on 22. 5. 1986. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the transfer of permit carries with it all the rights which the transferor would have enjoyed had he retained the permit for the purpose of operation of the service. The contention of the petitioner is also that even if the petitioner did not acquire ownership of the vehicle to be operated under the permit, the mere transfer of the permit itself would confer upon him "the right to sue". In other words, the petitioner contended that a permit is nothing but property as could be understood under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. According to the petitioner, just as the transferor as owner would be invested with the right to sue by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the constitution, if he was aggrieved by the order of the kstat, the petitioner is equally entitled to invoke the Writ Jurisdiction since the impugned order has a direct consequence on his right to operate the services under the permit which he had acquired from the transferor. ( 9 ) THE other contention of the petitioner is that since he, for the first time, came to know of the impugned order when he was served with Annexure-C dated 21. 1. 1988 by the concerned authority, it cannot be said that the Writ Petition is barred by laches. ( 9 ) THE other contention of the petitioner is that since he, for the first time, came to know of the impugned order when he was served with Annexure-C dated 21. 1. 1988 by the concerned authority, it cannot be said that the Writ Petition is barred by laches. He also maintained that there is sufficient justification for the delay in approaching the court and that, on merits, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because there is no basis for a specific finding of fact on the question whether there is overlapping of the notified route as alleged by the KSRTC or whether there is only inter-section. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that, without assigning reasons and without factual basis whatever, the KSTAT had given a finding that there is overlapping of the notified route. ( 11 ) ON the other hand, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the KSRTC that the grant of permit which is made under Section 47 r/w Section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') dealing with curtailment of route is only a ministerial act. It was strongly contended by the learned Counsel that mere endorsement of the permit being only a ministerial act, the petitioner does not acquire any cause of action from it and that the real cause of action accrued only on 22. 12. 1986 when the appeal in Appeal No. 339/1985 was heard and allowed in part curtailing certain portions on the notified route by the KSTAT. According to the learned Counsel, if at all the Writ petition were to be filed,it should have been filed within a reasonable time from 22. 12. 1986 and that, at this distance of time, this Court ought not to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was ako contended by the learned Counsel that since the original permit holder had already exhausted the statutory remedy by way of appeal provided under the Act, there was nothing left for the petitioner to pursue the matter before this Court particularly since the transfer of permit had taken place on 31. 7. 1987 subsequent to the disposal of the said appeal. 7. 1987 subsequent to the disposal of the said appeal. It was also contended by the learned Counsel that the transferee does not acquire more right than what the transferor himself had after exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal under the Act. ( 12 ) IT is also necessary to state that the appeal No. 339/1985 was preferred before the KSTAT by the KSRTC challenging the renewal of the permit in favour of the original permit holder. At the time of hearing of the appeal and passing of the order on 22. 12. 1986, though the original permit holder had been duly served with notice, he did not appear before the KSTAT and, therefore, the order was passed in the absence of the original permit holder. ( 13 ) IT would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 68f (2) (c) (iii) of the act which reads as follows :68f. Issue of permits to State transport undertakings : (1) xx xx (2) For the purpose of giving effect to the approved scheme in respect of a notified area of a notified route the State transport Authority or, as the case may be, the Regional Transport Authority concerned may, by order : (a) xx xx (b) xx xx (c) modify the terms of any existing permits so as to - (1) xx xx (ii) xx xx (iii) curtail the area of route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area of notified route". This provision provides for the curtailment of the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route. In order to give effect to the approved scheme of nationalization of routes in relation to a notified area, or notified route, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may order curtailment of the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route. Whether such a curtailment of the area has to be decided in the context of factual ascertainment of overlapping and the existence of the notified route is the question. The renewal of permit is governed by the provisions of Section 58 of the Act. Whether such a curtailment of the area has to be decided in the context of factual ascertainment of overlapping and the existence of the notified route is the question. The renewal of permit is governed by the provisions of Section 58 of the Act. ( 14 ) SECTION 2 (20) of the Act reads as follows :-" 'permit' means the document issued by the Commission or a State or Regional transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage, or stage carriage, or authorizing the owner as a private carrier or public carrier to use such vehicle". According to this section, permit is defined as a document issued by the Commissioner or a State or Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of the Transport vehicle as a contract carriage or stage carriage or authorising the owner as a private carrier or public carrier to use such vehicle. ( 15 ) AN analysis of this definition indicates that the permit is firstly a document issued by the competent authority under the act and it is issued in respect of a transport vehicle and such a vehicle may be a stage carriage or contract carriage or a private carrier or a public carrier. What the permit creates is the "right to user" of the vehicle concerned. In this case, the transfer of permit has resulted in transfer of the right to the use of the stage carriage vehicle by the transferee. It is not unreasonable to hold that all the rights which the transferor enjoys in respect of the permit when he retains it will be automatically transferred to the transferee so long as the transfer of permit is in accordance with law. That the transfer of the permit has been carried out in accordance with law cannot be disputed even assuming that the transfer is subjected to the order passed by the KSTAT curtailing certain portions of the route in question. The original permit holder who is no other than the transferor is invested with the right to sue whenever his right to operate the services is affected without lawful justification. So is the right of the transferee also. The right to sue and the right to user of the vehicle are co-extensive with one another. The original permit holder who is no other than the transferor is invested with the right to sue whenever his right to operate the services is affected without lawful justification. So is the right of the transferee also. The right to sue and the right to user of the vehicle are co-extensive with one another. Even assuming that the endorsement of curtailment is only a ministerial act, it is only the actual endorsement in the permit that could disclose the fact of curtailment to the transferee and, until such endorsement is made, it is not possible to impute knowledge of the curtailment to the petitioner. The cause of action arises only from the date of the knowledge of the curtailment and, in this case, it cannot be before the date on which Annexure-C had been served on the petitioner. In other words, it could not be earlier to 21. 1. 1988 which is the date of Annexure-C. It is difficult to accept the contention that the time begins to run from the date of the order of the KSTAT which is 22. 12. 1986, particularly because, the transferee was neither a party to the appeal nor is it shown that he had either constructive or actual knowledge of the curtailment prior to 21. 1. 1988. Even the wordings of Annexure-C would go to show that the authority issuing annexure-C presumed that the petitioner was not at all aware of what had transpired in appeal No. 339/1985 and, therefore, it gave two alternatives to the petitioner. The alterna- lives are contained in Annexure-C and they are self explanatory. ( 16 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion, that the delay in approaching this Court is on account of Circumstances which prevented the knowledge of the impugned order to the petitioner and that the limitation commenced on the actual date of knowledge of Annexure-C. Hence there is no laches, ( 17 ) AS regards the question whether the kstat had gone into the merits while deciding that there is overlapping on certain portions of the notified route, suffice it to say that the KSTAT had not applied its mind and had not collected materials in order to infer overlapping. In short, the finding on the question of overlapping which is a question of fact, is not supported by any material on record and unfounded. In short, the finding on the question of overlapping which is a question of fact, is not supported by any material on record and unfounded. ( 18 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, rule is issued and made absolute. The impugned order vide Annexure-B and the impugned notice vide Annexure-C are quashed. The case is remitted back to the kstat for disposal afresh in accordance with law after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the concerned parties. Parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .