JUDGMENT - RATNAPARKHI M.S., J.:---The finding recorded by the Civil Judge, Ramtek on 20th April, 1988 in Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1985 holding that the plaintiff is not estopped from presenting Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1985 in spite of the withdrawal of the Regular Civil Suit No. 52 of 1985 is a subject-matter of challenge in this revision. 2. The controversy in the present litigation covers a very narrow compass. Before proceeding to the legal aspect, the factual position has to be seen. The plaintiff Vishrantibai Lavet was a tenant in respect of the suit premises and the defendant Dayaram was the landlord. The plaintiff was running her dispensary in the suit premises. The plaintiff instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 52 of 1985 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ramtek against the defendant Dayaram. The suit was for injunction. It was the contention of the plaintiff in that suit that though she was in possession of the suit tenements and was running her dispensary therein, the defendant broke open the lock of her dispensary and was threatening her possession. The cause of action for this suit, according to her, arose on 22-3-1985 when the defendant broke open her lock of the suit premises and thereafter from time to time when the defendant threatened the plaintiff's possession over the suit premises. On these allegations the permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit premises was sought. This suit was filed on 28-3-1985. 3. On 17-9-1985 the plaintiff filed an application in the said suit for withdrawal. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this application are very significant. It runs : "2. That on 22-3-1985 the defendant forcibly by breaking open the lock took the possession of the suit premises and since that time the defendants is in possession of the suit block. 3. That the plaintiff now wants to file another suit for possession of the suit block under Specific Relief Act." Though this application for withdrawal of the suit was filed on 17-9-1985, the orders were passed by the Court only on 1-10-1985 and the order runs as follows : "The plaintiff has filed the application for permission to withdraw the suit which is not objected by the defendant. I, therefore, allow the applicant to withdraw the suit unconditionally for the ends of justice. I, therefore, allow the applicant to withdraw the suit unconditionally for the ends of justice. Cost to be paid by plaintiff of the suit." 4. Before this order came to be passed, the plaintiff filed a fresh suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1985 (giving rise to this revision). This suit was filed on 19-9-1985 for possession and general damages. Paragraphs 4 of the plaint reads as follows : "4. That on 22-3-1985 when the plaintiff was in her house at Kamptee, the defendant, behind the back of the plaintiff, high-handedly and forcibly took possession of the suit block by breaking open the lock of the plaintiff. All the goods of the plaintiff made a report to the police on the same day. The police later on seized some of the goods and the remaining goods were in the suit house." Paragraph 5 runs : "5. The plaintiff, therefore, claims a decree for possession of the suit property. The plaintiff also claims a decree for return of the goods or its price as shown in the schedule filed herewith." Paragraph 8 runs as follows : "8. The cause of action arose at Kanhan within the jurisdiction of this Court on 22-3-1985 when the defendant forcibly took possession of the house alongwith the goods of the plaintiff which were inside the house. The suit is within the limitation and within the jurisdiction of this Court. The plaintiff is filing this suit based on her prior possession. The suit is filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act." 5. The allegations in both these plaints thus have no doubt that on 22-3-1985 the defendant broke open the lock of the house, removed the articles, took possession of the house and continues to be in possession of the same. The previous suit came to be instituted on 28-3-1985 when the plaintiff came to enter into the Court the factual position on which she based her claim was that she was not in possession, that she had a right to remain in possession and the defendant was in possession. The plaint makes out this position clear without ambiguity. These positions are pointedly stated because the point for determination in the present revision is the bar under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. The plaint makes out this position clear without ambiguity. These positions are pointedly stated because the point for determination in the present revision is the bar under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Before we proceed to the real controversy, it will be proper to reproduce Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reads as follows : "2(1). Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted." It is on the background of this legal position that we have to examine this controversy. The plaintiff came to the Court on 28-3-1985 on the allegations that her possession was threatened by the defendant on 22-3-1985. As a matter of fact, it has become crystal clear by now that the plaintiff misrepresented herself, the Court and the opposite party by making these allegations, because when she applied for withdrawal of the suit, she specifically stated therein that on 22-3-1985 itself the defendant broke open the lock; that he took possession of the premises and continues to be in possession of the same. The same factual position is reiterated in the subsequent suit, which I have reproduced in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. It is thus clear beyond any doubt that on 28-3-1985 when the plaintiff came to the Court, the factual position was that she was out of possession and the defendant was in possession. In the circumstances, the reliefs available to the plaintiff were (1) possession, (2) compensation by way of damages and (3) injunction as a consequential relief, if at all necessary and advisable. In the circumstances, the reliefs available to the plaintiff were (1) possession, (2) compensation by way of damages and (3) injunction as a consequential relief, if at all necessary and advisable. At least the first two reliefs were definitely available to the plaintiff and she could straightway come to this Court with these two reliefs, because she was illegally dispossessed by the defendant on 22nd March, 1985 itself. The plaintiff claimed in Regular Civil Suit No. 52 of 1985 neither the relief of possession nor the relief of compensation. On the other hand, she claimed a fictitious relief of injunction knowing full well that she was not in possession and she could not claim the injunction. The plaintiff applied for temporary injunction in that case, but that application was also rejected. These positions crystallised the whole situation that on 28-3-1985 the plaintiffs had available in law two reliefs (1) possession of the suit property and (2) compensation for wrongful act of the defendant. According to the plaintiff the cause of action for both these reliefs accrued on 22-3-1985, but neither of these reliefs was claimed in Regular Civil Suit No. 52 of 1985. It is only in Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1985 instituted on 19-9-1985 that the plaintiff claimed these two reliefs. On the background of this factual crystallised position, we are now left to scrutinise the scheme of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 2 lays down that where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. In the present case there is no question of relinquishment. The plaintiff has however admittedly omitted to claim possession though that relief was available to her even on 28-3-1985 in the previous suit. Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 2 also would apply with equal force because the plaintiff who was entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same caused of action could sue for all or any of such reliefs, but she omitted (without the permission of the Court) to sue for all such reliefs and the consequence thereof is that she cannot be allowed afterwards to sue for the reliefs so omitted. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Somalwar, the learned Advocate for the respondent, strenuously urged before me that the reliefs claimed in Regular Civil Suit Nos. 52 of 1985 and 168 of 1985 do not spring from the same cause of action. This argument has to be viewed on the background of the misstatement and misrepresentation made by the plaintiff in the previous suit that she was in possession of the property. The admitted position which prevailed on 28-3-1985 when she came before the Court was that she was not in possession. The possession was taken by the defendant and her belongings in the house were also retained by the defendant. What is relevant in the present case is what reliefs the plaintiff was entitled to claim, what she has actually claimed and if she has omitted to claim any relief, whether she can claim this relief in the subsequent suit, particularly when the previous suit was withdrawn unconditionally. According to Mr. Somalwar, two suits do not spring from the same cause of action and therefore, the bar under Rule 2(2) of Order 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not operate. 9. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the ratio laid down in (Rangasami Goundan v. K.R. Rangai Goundar)1, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 545. The facts of this case are quite different than the facts in the present case that we are called upon to consider. In the reported ruling an usufructuary mortgagee instituted a suit for recovery of the debt under the mortgage. That suit was opposed on the ground that the suit for recovery of consideration was not maintainable. Only the suit for possession was maintainable. This defence came to be accepted and the suit came to be dismissed. The mortgagee-plaintiff then instituted a fresh suit for possession of the mortgaged property. In the subsequent suit the defendant mortgagor raised a plea that the suit was barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Only the suit for possession was maintainable. This defence came to be accepted and the suit came to be dismissed. The mortgagee-plaintiff then instituted a fresh suit for possession of the mortgaged property. In the subsequent suit the defendant mortgagor raised a plea that the suit was barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Madras High Court observed : "Now looking at the plain wording of Order 2, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) seems to us that the proper construction to be placed on that sub-rule is that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action must sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if under an instrument under which he claims he can only sue for one or two or more alternative reliefs, then bar under Order 2, Rule 2 does not apply. It is not the mere existence of more than one relief only that brings the bar under Order 2, Rule 2 into operation. If he is entitled to more than one cumulative reliefs but, sues for only some of those reliefs and does not choose to sue for the remaining reliefs, then his right to sue for the latter reliefs is barred under Order 2, Rule 2. If on the other hand he is entitled to only one relief out of several alternative reliefs and he sued for one of them, his remedy to sue for the other alternative reliefs is not barred, for he cannot be said to have been entitled to more than one relief." These observations as they stand, help the petitioner in the present petition more than the respondent. What was apparent in the reported ruling is that when the plaintiff went before the Court in the first suit there was only one relief available to him. In the case before us even accepting the factual position, as stated by the plaintiff in her plaint, more than one reliefs were available to her on 28-3-1985 including the possession, damages and so on, but one of these reliefs were claimed. Only the relief of injunction was claimed. Other reliefs were omitted. The case thus surreptitiously comes within the mischief of four corners of sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Only the relief of injunction was claimed. Other reliefs were omitted. The case thus surreptitiously comes within the mischief of four corners of sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. Reliance was also placed on (Sumerchand Hukumchand v. Hukumchand Mathuradas)2, A.I.R. 1965 Mad. 177. A point of bar under Order 2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code came to be raised in that appeal, but the High Court has observed that this point was not at all necessary for the plaintiff on that controversy. It, however, made some observations in the nature of obiter dicta and those observations read as follows : "We would, however, like to observe that the learned trial Judge seems to have overlooked altogether the fact that on the allegations made in the former suit the relief of specific performance could not be claimed by the plaintiff. The plaintiffs could not doubt base their suit on two mutually exclusive grounds, but they were not legally bound to do so. A suit for specific performance and a suit for return of earnest money are based on different causes of action. The provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 govern reliefs arising out of the same cause of action and not different causes of action arising out of the same transaction." It appears that this case was instituted prior to the amendment in Specific Relief Act. The law that stands now is quite different. But apart from this, there is a difference, as far as the factual aspects are concerned. In that case the plaintiff could claim only one relief and no other relief could be claimed and therefore, there could not be any bar under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. My attention was also invited to the ratio laid down in (Sidramappa v. Rajashetty)3, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1059. The facts of that case were altogether different. The old litigation was pending before the Court and the plaintiff applied to the Court for bringing him on record in place of the deceased judgment-debtor. That application was rejected by the Executive Court. The plaintiff, therefore instituted a suit for declaration that he has a legal right to be brought on record in place of the deceased in the execution proceedings. Subsequently he brought another suit for possession of the property on the basis of title. That application was rejected by the Executive Court. The plaintiff, therefore instituted a suit for declaration that he has a legal right to be brought on record in place of the deceased in the execution proceedings. Subsequently he brought another suit for possession of the property on the basis of title. A defence was raised in the subsequently instituted suit that the suit was barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. In that case it was observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment as under : "The requirement of Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure is that every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action. 'Cause of action' means the 'cause of action for which the suit was brought.' It cannot be said that the cause of action on which the present suit was brought is the same as that in the previous suit. Cause of action is a cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief than that to which he limits his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings." It is true that the Supreme Court ultimately held that the causes of action of the previous suit and the subsequent suit were quite different and thus there was no bar. But the observations of the Supreme Court reproduced above, would throw sufficient light on the scope of the bar. If the cause of action gives the occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit, then in the present case the averments in paragraph 4 of the plaint cannot be lost sight of, where he has stated that on 22-3-1985 itself she had lost the possession, that the defendant came in possession and he continued to be in possession. If this is a cause of action then the relief which she could legitimately claim before the Court was the relief for possession and if at all, relief for damages. Thus on 28-3-1985 when she instituted a suit before the Court (Regular Civil Suit No. 52 of 1985), the relief of possession and damages was already available to her and none of these reliefs was claimed. Thus on 28-3-1985 when she instituted a suit before the Court (Regular Civil Suit No. 52 of 1985), the relief of possession and damages was already available to her and none of these reliefs was claimed. The case squarely falls within the mischief of sub-clause (3) of Rule 2 of Order 2 and it can legitimately be said with all certainty that more then one relief was available to the plaintiff, but she omitted to claim these reliefs and, therefore, this omission does not entitle her to claim this relief in the subsequent suit. 12. Mr. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, invited my attention to the ratio laid down in (State of Madhya Pradesh v. State of Maharashtra)4, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1466 and in particular invited my attention to the observations in paragraph 25 of the judgment. These observations are: "The plaintiff will be barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure only when he omits to sue for or relinquishes the claim in a suit with knowledge that he has a right to sue for that relief. It will not be correct to say that while the decision of the Judicial Committee in Lall's case (supra) was holding the field the plaintiff could be said to make a claim for arrears of salary. On the contrary, it will be correct to say that he knew that he was not entitled to make such a claim. If at the date of the former suit the plaintiff is not aware of the right on which he insists in the latter suit the plaintiff cannot be said to be disentitled to the relief in the latter suit. The reason is that at the date of the former suit the plaintiff is not aware of the right on which he insists in the subsequent suit. A right which the litigant does not know that he possesses or a right which is not in existence at the time of the first suit can hardly be regarded as a "portion of his claim" within the meaning of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 13. It is surprising as to how this case was relied upon. Any how the ratio can be appreciated in the circumstances. The observations in the earlier part of paragraph 25 lay down a law that the courts are bound to follow. It is surprising as to how this case was relied upon. Any how the ratio can be appreciated in the circumstances. The observations in the earlier part of paragraph 25 lay down a law that the courts are bound to follow. The factual position in that suit was quite different inasmuch as the plaintiff was not aware of his rights under law when he instituted the first suit. This is not the position prevailing in the present case, apart from the admissions of the plaintiff in most ambiguous terms that she was not in possession of the property and the defendant was in possession of the property. This makes the whole difference. This legitimately leads the Court to believe that on the day she came to the Court with the suit the relief of possession was certainly available to her. She having not claimed that relief and having omitted to claim that relief, cannot now claim that relief in the subsequent suit as the bar of Order 2, Rule 2(3) is very much there. 14. The learned Judge of the trial Court has not properly appreciated this controversy. In fact, though a ratio laid down in (Dr. V.D. Angal v. State of Maharashtra)5, A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 304 summing up the real position was brought to his notice, the Court held that when the Civil Suit No. 52 of 1985 was brought the plaintiff had only one remedy available and that was only for injunction. The factual position which was brought before that Court even in the previous suit in the application for withdrawal and also the factual position which was brought before the Court in the subsequent suit in paragraph 4 of the plaint has been completely ignored. In my opinion, therefore, the reasoning adopted by the learned Judge of the trial Court has been full of errors inherent on the face of the record. I find myself unable to agree with the learned Judge that the subsequently filed suit i.e. Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1985 does not come within the mischief of Order 2, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Disagreeing with the learned trial Judge, I hold that the Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1985 is barred under Order 2, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. The revision deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. Disagreeing with the learned trial Judge, I hold that the Regular Civil Suit No. 168 of 1985 is barred under Order 2, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. The revision deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The finding recorded by the trial Court on 20-4-1988 that the plaintiff is not estopped from filing the present suit in spite of the bar under Order 2, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is hereby set aside and it is held that the suit is barred. Rule is made absolute, in terms above. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Revision allowed. -----