JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---A right to life is more precious than a right to trade or to carry on one's business and in case of conflict between the two, the former must prevail over the latter. The petitioners in this writ petition challenge the order of the Commissioner of Police dated 22-7-1988 issued under section 33(1)(b) and (c) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (for short "the Act") regulating the entry of all kinds of heavy vehicles in the Nagpur city during certain hours. We had called upon the State to file its submissions. According to the written submissions filed on behalf of the State the necessity for issuing the impugned order arose looking to the growing incidence of accidents in the Nagpur city, the victims particularly being the school going children. A chart is given in para 8 of the written submissions giving the number of accidents which took place in Nagpur City by local trucks as well as outside trucks from 1985 onwards. A comparative chart is also given in para 8 to show that the growing incidence of accidents in the Nagpur city is curbed and is reduced after the impugned order regulating the traffic hours of the outside trucks was issued by the respondent No. 1. 2. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order issued under section 33(1)(b), and (c) amounts to an unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and, therefore, the said order is not saved by Article 19(6) which permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions upon the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) in the interest of general public. The other contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that sections 33(1)(b) (c) are ultra vires of the Constitution because no guidelines are laid down under Clauses (b) and (c) of section 33(a) of the Act for the exercise of the power conferred there under upon the Commissioner. The above contentions are controverted on behalf of the respondents by the learned Government Pleader appearing for them. 3. The above contentions are controverted on behalf of the respondents by the learned Government Pleader appearing for them. 3. In support of his submission that the impugned order issued by the Commissioner of Police constitutes an unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) and in fact totally prohibits the exercise of such fundamental rights by them the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following decisions : (1) (Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh)1, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118. (2) (State of Madras v. V. G. Rao)2, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196. (3) (Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer another)3, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 373. (4) (C.S.S. Motor Service v. Madras State)4, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 279. (5) (Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P.)5, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728. (6) (In re Venugopal and others)6, A.I.R. 1954 Madras 981 (Note A). (7) (S.D. Shetty v. K.D. Billimoria)7, A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 346 and. (8) (State of Madras v. Murary Co.)8, A.I.R. 1965 Madras 301. On the other hand to show that the restriction imposed under the impugned order of the Commissioner of Police constitutee a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution, the learned Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the decision in the case of (Tirath Ram v. Registering Authority, J. K.)9, A.I.R. J K 141. 4. In appreciating the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners it is necessary to see that the law under Article 19(6) of the Constitution Is by now well settled and it has been held by the Supreme Court that in imposing a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19(6) it is open to the State in appropriate cases even to prohibit the exercise of fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. In particular such a total prohibition has been upheld in the case of noxious or dangerous trades. See (Narendra Kumar v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 430, paras 8 to 14. It may, however, be seen in the instant case that by the impugned order of the Commissioner of Police there is no total prohibition upon the plying of the outside trucks through the Nagpur city. See (Narendra Kumar v. Union of India)10, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 430, paras 8 to 14. It may, however, be seen in the instant case that by the impugned order of the Commissioner of Police there is no total prohibition upon the plying of the outside trucks through the Nagpur city. A perusal of the said order would show that after 6 p.m. in the evening to 6 a.m. in the morning there is no restriction at all in plying the trucks through the city. Even from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. the prohibition is restricted to the period from 6 a.m. to 8 a.m., from 10 a.m. to 12 noon and from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. so that during the rest of the day time the outside trucks can ply through the city. On a bare perusal of the impugned order, therefore, we cannot accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners there is total prohibition for plying the trucks through the Nagpur city under the impugned order. 5. The next question to be seen, in whether the restriction placed upon the plying of the outside trucks through the Nagpur city is a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public within the meaning of Article 19(6) or not. As already pointed out above the reason given for regulating the heavy vehicular traffic of the out side trucks through the city is due to increase in the incidence of accidents in the city and in particular due to the accidents in which small school-going children have succumbed to such accidents. The hours during which the traffic is sought to be regulated under the impugned order of the Commissioner of Police are the hours when the traffic is at its peak in the city of school going students, office-going persons and others. 6. It is in the light of these facts that we have to consider whether the restriction placed upon the plying of the trucks through the Nagpur city is a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public within the meaning of Article 19(6) or not. It cannot be gainsaid that each person who is the user of the roads in the city whether he is a pedestrain or whether he is an owner of a heavy vehicle has a right to use the road. It cannot be gainsaid that each person who is the user of the roads in the city whether he is a pedestrain or whether he is an owner of a heavy vehicle has a right to use the road. The rights or the interests of such persons have to be and have been harmonised and regulated by the Commissioner of Police for which the power is conferred upon him under section 33(1)(b) (c) of the Act. A perusal of section 33(1)(b) of the Act would show that in order to serve the above purpose the power thereunder can be exercised to prevent danger obstruction and inconvenience to the public. 7. It is clear from the written submissions that the above purpose is kept in mind in issuing the impugned order. Thus looking to the interests of the pedestrains who use the roads in the Nagpur city and taking into consideration the question of their inconvenience and the danger to their lives that a restriction has been imposed upon the outside trucks under the impugned order by the Commissioner. Such a restriction can by no stretch of imagination be said to be an unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is clearly a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public imposed under the said impugned order. The above order, therefore, cannot be challenged on the ground that it imposes an unreasonable restriction upon the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on trade and business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 8. The next question to be considered is whether section 33(1)(b) (c) of the Act is ultra vires of the Constitution. Although the said ground is vague in the sense that it has various shades, viz. the ground can be that it is bad for excessive delegation, or that arbitrary and discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 or that it imposes an unreasonable restrictions abridging the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitutions, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has urged before us that the said provision is ultra vires because it abridges the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution because for the exercise of power under section 33(1)(b) (c) no guide-lines are laid down. However, whatever may be the ground, the substratum of the submission that there are no guide-lines for the exercise of power under section 43(1)(b) (c) of the Act itself cannot be sustained. 9. In the first place it must be seen that the power to issue orders under section 33(1) is conferred upon a high authority like the Commissioner of Police which is itself a guarantee that the power conferred will not be abused. Further, it may be seen that in various cases of the Supreme Court it has been held that although the provision in question may not itself contain the guide-lines, such guide-lines can be found out from the preamble and the scheme of the Act as can be gathered from other provisions of the Act. In the instant case although enough guidance can be gathered from the scheme of the Act it is not necessary to do so because Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 33 of the Act which is impugned before us itself provides a guide-line for the exercise of the power thereunder. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has admitted that the impugned order is in fact not one under Clause (c) of section 33(1) of the Act and hence it is not necessary for us to consider the validity of the said clause. Turning to Clause (b) of section 33 (1) of the Act, it may be seen that the order thereunder can be issued to prevent danger, obstruction or inconvenience to the public which are sufficient guide-lines for the exercise of the power conferred thereunder looking to the object of the said enactment. The above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners has, therefore, no merit and has to be rejected. 10. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed. -----