JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---The petitioners, a registered body, are conducting the Assumpta Convent High School at Sazzora. This School is recognized by the S.S.C. Board of Goa, Daman and Diu. The School conducts classes right from K.G. to S.S.C. It is private aided School and receives aid from the Government. It is also the case of the petitioner that it is a minority institution within the meaning of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. The respondent No. 4 was appointed as assistant teacher on probation on 16th July, 1984. His services came to be terminated vide Order dated 11th May, 1987. Being aggrieved by the said Order of termination the said respondent filed an appeal before the first respondent the Administrative Tribunal under section 22(1)(e) of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). A preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner society about the maintainability of the appeal itself. The Tribunal by its Order dated 10th July, 1987, over-ruled the said preliminary objection and held that it had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal. It is this Order dated 10th July, 1987, passed by the Tribunal which is challenged in the present writ petition. 2. Mr. D'Costa, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, contended before us that if section 11 and section 22(e) of the Act are read with Rule 83 and Rule 97 of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Rules, 1986, it is quite clear that no appeal lies against an order of discharge passed by the management under Rule 83 of the Rules. The termination of services of a probationer is not covered by section 11(2) of the Act and therefore, the appeal itself was not maintainable. The Tribunal has misconstrued the various provisions of the Act and the Rules and has therefore, committed an error apparent on the face of the record. 3. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. The Tribunal has misconstrued the various provisions of the Act and the Rules and has therefore, committed an error apparent on the face of the record. 3. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. The relevant portion of section 11 of the Act reads as under :--- "Section 11(2).:--- Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed, terminated except with the prior approval of the Director." As per sub-section (5) of the said section, sub-section (2) shall have effect as if for the words "except with the prior approval of the Director" occurring therein, the words "except after an inquiry in accordance with the procedure specified in the said rule" have been substituted in its application, to an aided minority School. Then comes section 22 which provides for appeals against the various orders. Sub-section (1)(e) of the said section in terms lays down that an appeal shall lie to the Tribunal from the orders dismissing, removing from service any employee or reducing him in rank under sub-section (2) of section 11. The term "employee" is defined by sub-section (9) of section 2 to mean a teacher and includes every other employee working in a recognized school. The Order against which the appeal is filed is an order of termination or removal and therefore, an appeal lies under section 22 against the said Order. 4. However, it is contended by Mr. D'Costa that the provisions of section 11 as well as section 22 will have to be read subject to the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 83 deals with the probationers and Rule 97 provides a procedure for imposing major penalty. The appeal is provided only against the major penalties and not against an Order of termination or discharge simpliciter, passed under Rule 83 of the Rules. Rule 83 deals with the probationers and Rule 97 provides a procedure for imposing major penalty. The appeal is provided only against the major penalties and not against an Order of termination or discharge simpliciter, passed under Rule 83 of the Rules. The relevant portion of Rule 83 namely sub-rule (1) reads as under :--- "R. 83(1) : Every employee shall on initial appointment be on probation for a period of 2 years which may be extended by the appointing authority by another year and the services of an employee may be terminated with one month's notice without holding any enquiry during the period of probation if the work and the conduct of the employee, during the said period is not, in the opinion of the appointing authority, satisfactory." Therefore, in substance it is the contention of the learned Counsel that section 22 is controlled by Rule 83 of the Rules and in case of termination of services of a teacher who was on probation, no appeal will lie. As already observed, it is not possible for us to accept this contention. The Act read with the rules is a complete Code in itself. The expression used in section 22(e), namely "dismissing, removing from service" is of wider amplitude. It takes in its import all the cases of dismissal as well as a termination of service. Termination of services of a probationer is also a removal from service. It is well-settled that the relationship of master and servant is created by a bilateral act. Contract of service is continuing in nature and the obligation under the said contract is terminable by following certain defined modes. It is equally well-settled that mere use of polite language instead of peremptory one will not after the fact. The words dismissal, termination or removal as used in sections 11 and 22 are the key words. Termination or removal embraces not merely an act of termination or removal by the employer, but the fact of termination, however produced. The word used in section 11(2) is "terminated", whereas in section 22(1 (e) words used are "removing from service" and then reference is made to section 11(2). Thus, it is clear, that though different expressions are used the meaning is one and the same. 5. The word used in section 11(2) is "terminated", whereas in section 22(1 (e) words used are "removing from service" and then reference is made to section 11(2). Thus, it is clear, that though different expressions are used the meaning is one and the same. 5. Explanation to Rule 83 lays down that the work will be said to be unsatisfactory only when written memos are served on the employee pointing out the defects and acts of misbehaviour and reasonable opportunities are given to the employee to explain and improve and these deficiencies and shortcomings should be reflected in the confidential report. If the work and conduct of an employee during the period of probation is satisfactory he is entitled to be confirmed, after expiry of probationary period unless it is extended. Proviso to Rule 83(2) lays down that an untrained teacher shall not be retained in service for a period of more than five years which can be extended by further two years. Thus, these provisions confer certain rights upon an employee. These rights will have no meaning if no remedy is provided for its enforcement. The protection granted to the probationer will lose its efficacy and will become illusory. It is nowhere laid down either in the Act or Rules including Rule 83, that no appeal will lie against the order of termination or removal passed under Rule 83. Such an inference cannot be drawn even by necessary implication. 6. The Act has been enacted for the protection of the employees and teachers from the termination of services by the unscrupulous management. If the construction suggested by the petitioner is accepted, the very object and the purpose of the enactment will be frustrated. In this context the observations of the Supreme Court in (Miss A. Sundarambai v. Government of Goa, Daman Diu others)1, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1700 are quite pertinent. This is what the Supreme Court has observed in para 11 of the said judgment :--- "We may at this stage observe that teachers as a class cannot be denied the benefits of social justice. We are aware of the several methods adopted by unscrupulous managements to exploit them by imposing on them unjust conditions of service. This is what the Supreme Court has observed in para 11 of the said judgment :--- "We may at this stage observe that teachers as a class cannot be denied the benefits of social justice. We are aware of the several methods adopted by unscrupulous managements to exploit them by imposing on them unjust conditions of service. In order to do justice to them it is necessary to provide for an appropriate machinery so that teachers may secure what is rightly due to them." In our view that is what has precisely been done by providing an appeal under section 22 of the Act. We do not find any compelling reason even in the Rules to give a narrow construction to section 22(e) of the Act. On the other hand, the said section takes in its import all types of termination of services. It is broadly worded and therefore, it must take in its import even the termination of services of a probationer. In this view of the matter, we do not find any substance in this writ petition. 7. The rule is discharged with costs. Since the matter is pending long the Administrative Tribunal is directed to hear and decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible. 8. At this stage the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner orally prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave refused. Rule discharged. -----