JUDGMENT - SHAH P.S., J.:---The University of Pune has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the order dated February 24, 1984, passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune, rejecting its application for permitting them to file its objections to the Award passed by the arbitrators in favour of the respondents as also against the order rejecting its application for condonation of delay in filing the objections. 2. The facts in so far as they are material are as under: The petitioner is the University of Pune established under the Poona University Act. The respondents are building contractors to whom the petitioner had entrusted the contract of constructing teachers' quarters within the University Campus. On a dispute in respect of the respondents' claim towards the said contract between the petitioner and respondents having arisen, the dispute was referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each of the two parties as per the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. After the reference, the arbitrators passed their Award on September 26, 1983. Under the said Award the petitioner was made liable to pay to the respondents a sum of Rs. 2,57,793.72, over and above the amount paid by the petitioner to the respondents during the period of contract. Notices were issued by the arbitrators about their having passed the Award. Apart from the intimation no copy of the Award was furnished to the petitioner. However, on the application of the respondents, the arbitrators handed over to them the original Award and also filed a copy thereof in the Court on October 3, 1984. Thereafter, on October 26, 1983, the petitioner was served with a notice asking it to appear in the Court on December 9, 1983, for submitting its say in respect of the Arbitration Award and also to show cause as to why a decree should not be passed pursuant to the same. Before the date of appearance fixed in the said notice, on November 29, 1983, the petitioner filed an application in the Court for obtaining a certified copy of the Award which copy was furnished to the petitioner on December 27, 1983. Before the date of appearance fixed in the said notice, on November 29, 1983, the petitioner filed an application in the Court for obtaining a certified copy of the Award which copy was furnished to the petitioner on December 27, 1983. It is the case of the petitioner that even before November 29, 1983, Miss Sarbani Sen, Junior Advocate of Shri P. Narayan, Advocate, appearing for the petitioner was sent by him to the Court for obtaining a copy of the Award, but then she was told by the Court-clerk to come on December 9, 1983, which was the returnable date fixed in the matter. It is further the case of the petitioner that when Miss Sen informed her Senior about it he again sent her with an application for obtaining the certified copy, but at that time the Court clerk told her that the copy of the Award had been filed in the Court and it was not permissible to furnish a copy of a copy. However, as mentioned above, on November 29, 1983, a regular application for obtaining a certified copy of the Award was filed on behalf of the petitioner and the copy was received by it on December 27, 1983. In the meantime, on November 24, 1983, the respondents filed an application for passing a decree in terms of the Award. On December 9, 1983, which was the returnable date, the petitioner applied for time, which application was granted and the matter was adjourned to December 20, 1983. On that date the respondents produced the original Award in a sealed envelope in the Court. On that date on the application of the petitioner further time was granted by the Court till January 13, 1984, for filing its objections. As mentioned above, the petitioner received the copy of the Award through Court on December 27, 1983, and on the date fixed i.e. on January 13, 1984, the petitioner filed its objections to the Award along with an application for condonation of delay. This application for condonation of delay was opposed by the respondents on various grounds. As mentioned above, the petitioner received the copy of the Award through Court on December 27, 1983, and on the date fixed i.e. on January 13, 1984, the petitioner filed its objections to the Award along with an application for condonation of delay. This application for condonation of delay was opposed by the respondents on various grounds. It was inter alia contended by them that the petitioner ought to have filed its objections to the Award within the prescribed period of thirty days from the date of the receipt of the notice issued by the Court i.e. on or before November 25, 1983, and the application having been filed beyond that date is barred by limitation. It was further contended by the respondents that even the application for a certified copy of the Award had not been filed within the prescribed period of limitation and this being so, there is no question of excluding the period required for obtaining copy of the Award while computing the period of limitation. In any event, therefore, making of an application for a certified copy after the expiry of the period of limitation cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. It was contended that the notice of the filing of the Award was served by the Court on the petitioner on October 26, 1983, and that being the starting point of limitation, the objections are time barred and no case for condonation of delay has been made out. The respondents denied the case of the petitioner about Miss Sen, Advocate, having attempted to obtain copy of the Award as alleged. 3. The trial Court held that the petitioner had not filed the objections to the Award within the prescribed period of limitation viz. 30 days from the date of service of notice of filing of the Award. The trial Court also held that the petitioner had failed to make out sufficient grounds to condone the delay in filing the objections. In this view of the matter, the trial Court rejected the petitioner's application for taking the objections on record and consequently passed a decree in terms of the Award made by the arbitrators. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Mr. In this view of the matter, the trial Court rejected the petitioner's application for taking the objections on record and consequently passed a decree in terms of the Award made by the arbitrators. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Mr. Bhonsale, the learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner University urged the following contentions : (1) That the trial Court erred both in law and facts in holding that the petitioner's application for taking the objections to the Award on record was barred by limitation; (2) that in any event, the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the objections; (3) that admittedly a copy of the Award was not furnished to the petitioner along with the notice of the Court served on the petitioner and in the absence of the copy being made available to the petitioner, the period of limitation could not commence on October 26, 1983, as held by the trial Court; (4) that the notice served on the petitioner is devoid of even the bare particulars such as the name of the respondents, the names of the arbitrators or any other particulars to indicate that the Award in respect of which the notice was issued by the Court related to the dispute between the petitioner and the respondents. Even the names of the arbitrators are absent; (5) that the mere intimation of an Award having been filed in the Court is no intimation in the eye of law and the limitation cannot commence on October 26, 1983, as held by the trial Court; (6) that the case of the petitioner about Miss Sen, Advocate, having approached the Court clerk twice for a copy of the Award should be accepted, particularly having regard to the fact that the petitioner's Advocate Shri Narayan at whose instance Miss Sen had approached the Court clerk for a copy of the Award has filed a detailed affidavit in that regard in this Court; (7) that in the facts of this case the earliest date on which the limitation commenced is December 9, 1983, which is the returnable date mentioned in the Court notice served on the petitioner; (8) that in any event, the bar of limitation cannot apply having regard to the fat that the trial Court had granted the petitioner's application for time to file objections and accordingly the objections were filed on January 13, 1984; (9) that taking into consideration the period required for obtaining the certified copy, there was no delay in filing the objections; (10) and lastly he submitted that if regard be had to all the facts of this case, the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay, if any, in filing the objections. 5. On the other hand Mr. Akolkar, the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner was served with a notice of the filing of the Award on October 26, 1983, and it was the duty of the petitioner to either file the objections to the Award within 30 days from the said date or apply for a certified copy of the Award within the said prescribed period of limitation, so as to claim exclusion of time as per the provisions of section 12(4) of the Limitation Act. He submitted that it is impermissible for a party to claim exclusion of the period required for obtaining the certified copy of the Award unless such an application is made within the period of limitation i.e. prior to November 26, 1983 in this case. He submitted that it is impermissible for a party to claim exclusion of the period required for obtaining the certified copy of the Award unless such an application is made within the period of limitation i.e. prior to November 26, 1983 in this case. He submitted that the petitioner's case about Miss Sen, Advocate, having contacted the Court clerk for a copy cannot be believed and contended that this story is set up only with a view to explain the lapse on the part of the petitioner in not making the application for a certified copy. He submitted that the notice served on the petitioner was in conformity with the form prescribed under the High Court Rules and, therefore, no fault can be found with the notice by contending that it should have contained more particulars. He also submitted that the Act does not prescribe for a copy of the Award being furnished along with the notice and in the absence of such a provision either in the Act or the Rules, the petitioner cannot claim exclusion of time on that count. Lastly, it was submitted that the Act does not prescribe for a copy of the Award being furnished along with the notice and in the absence of such a provision either in the Act or Rules, the petitioner cannot claim exclusion of time on that count provisions of the Arbitration Act incorporate a self contained Code as regards the remedies available to the parties and the remedy of the petitioner in this case was to file an appeal as provided in sub-section (6) of section 39 of the Arbitration Act and not a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was also submitted that in any event, the trial Court's order is based on appreciation of evidence and circumstances of the case and this Court should not interfere in exercise of the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, though this Court may find that the order is erroneous and merely because a different view on the facts of this case is possible. 6. In order to appreciate the arguments it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act as well as the Limitation Act. 6. In order to appreciate the arguments it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act as well as the Limitation Act. Sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Arbitration Act inter alia provides that when the arbitrators or umpire have made their Award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. Sub-section (2) of section 14 of the said Act deals with filing of the Award in Court and notice to be given by the Court to the parties of the filing of the Award. Sub-section (2) of section 14 runs thus: "(2) The Arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and Award and of the costs and charges of filing the Award, cause the Award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the Award. 7. The italics portion is important for our purpose since the period of limitation for filing objections depends on the compliance thereof. The period of limitation for filing the Award in Court as well as for an application for setting aside the Award is prescribed under Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Clause (a) of Article 119 provides for the filing in Court of an Award. The period prescribed is 30 days and the starting point of limitation is the date of service of the notice of the making of the Award. We are concerned with Clause (b) of Article 119 which provides a limitation of 30 days for setting aside an Award or getting an Award remitted for reconsideration. The starting point of limitation as provided in this Article is the date of service of the notice of the filing of the Award. Thus, it is obvious that the limitation does not commence unless the notice of the filing of the Award in Court is served on the party who wants to get the Award set aside or remitted for reconsideration. 8. Thus, it is obvious that the limitation does not commence unless the notice of the filing of the Award in Court is served on the party who wants to get the Award set aside or remitted for reconsideration. 8. The question as to the interpretation of section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in a recent decision in (Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunag and Company Pvt. Ltd.)1, Civil Appeal No. 2746 of 1988, decided on August 4, 1988, reported in Judgments Today, 1988(3) S.C. 482. In paragraph 6 of the judgment it is observed:- "In order to be effective both for the purpose of obtaining the judgment in terms of the Award and for setting aside the Award, the Award must be filed in the Court. Thee must be service of notice of intimation or communication of the filing of the said Award by the Court to the parties. If all these factors are established or are present, the mode of service of the notice would be irrelevant. If the substance is clear, the form of the notice is irrelevant but the notice of the Award having been filed in the Court, is necessary. The filing in the Court is necessary and the limitation thereof by the Registry of the Court to the parties concerned, is essential. Beyond this there is no statutory requirement of any technical nature under section 14(2) of the Act." 9. In the aforesaid decision the Court referred to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in (Nilkantha Shidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Sommana Ningashetti and others)2, 1962(2) S.C.R. 551 where the Court held that the communication by the Court to the parties concerned or their Counsel, of the information that an Award has been filed was sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. In that case the Court held that the notice need not necessarily mean 'communication in writing' and construing the expression 'give notice' in sub-section (2) of section 14, the Court held that it simply means giving intimation of the filing of the Award and that it does not necessarily mean 'in writing'. 10. In that case the Court held that the notice need not necessarily mean 'communication in writing' and construing the expression 'give notice' in sub-section (2) of section 14, the Court held that it simply means giving intimation of the filing of the Award and that it does not necessarily mean 'in writing'. 10. The requirements of the service of notice of the filing of the Award in short are that there must be a) filing of the Award in the proper Court; b) service of the notice by the Court or its office to the parties concerned and c) such notice need not necessarily mean in writing. However, the fact that the parties have notice of the filing of the Award is not enough. The notice must be served by the Court. It is upon the date of service of such notice that the period of limitation begins and under Clause (b) of Article 119 of the Act, the limitation expires on the expiry of 30 days of the service of that notice for an application for setting aside the Award. The importance of the matter is that the service of the notice by the Court, though it is not the method or form of the service, that is important or relevant. 11. From the above discussion it would appear that it is not the form of notice which is material, but it is the substance that matters. In other words, the communication may be made by the Court in any form, but it must be such as to give a proper idea to the party on whom the notice is served that the Award relating to the dispute between the parties has been filed by the Arbitrators in the Court. It cannot be said that mere mention of the filing of an Award or some unidentifiable Award in the notice will be enough compliance of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. In the present case the notice issued by the Court mentions the name of the plaintiff. The name of the defendant has been kept blank. The notice starts with the sentence "has made application to this Court that......" Nothing is said as to who has made the application. In the present case the notice issued by the Court mentions the name of the plaintiff. The name of the defendant has been kept blank. The notice starts with the sentence "has made application to this Court that......" Nothing is said as to who has made the application. After this sentence the notice runs thus : ^^yokn fuokM?kkoj vkiys Eg.k.ks ns.;klkBh o R;kizek.ks dkVkZus gqdweukek dk d:u u;s- You are hereby warned to appear in this Court in person or by a person duly instructed on the 9th day of December, 1983 at 11 O'Clock in the afternoon, to show cause against the application failing wherein, the said application will be heard and determined ex parte. Also take notice that in default of your filing an address for service on or before the date mentioned you are liable to have your defence struck out." 12. The notice does not refer to any particular Award, but merely refers to an Award. The notice read as a whole is blissfully vague about any particulars of the Award in question. Even the name of the other party i.e. the respondent is not mentioned nor is there any reference to the impugned Award passed by the Arbitrators in the present case. The most glaring aspect of this notice is the absence of the name of the defendant. It is left to the petitioner to guess as to who must be the defendant. In the absence of this basic fact, coupled with the other infirmities mentioned above, it is not possible to hold that by the aforesaid notice served on the petitioner on October 26, 1983, an intimation of the filing of the Award in question has been given to the petitioner. If that be so, it would follow that the limitation cannot in the facts of this case commence on October 26, 1983, as contended by the respondent. Now, it is the case of the petitioner that Miss Sen, Advocate, had approached the Court clerk for a copy twice before a regular application for a certified copy was filed on November, 29 1983. In this connection Mr. Narayan, Advocate, who had appeared for the petitioner in the trial Court has filed his affidavit in this Court. I see no reason to discard the say of Mr. Narayan, Advocate. In this connection Mr. Narayan, Advocate, who had appeared for the petitioner in the trial Court has filed his affidavit in this Court. I see no reason to discard the say of Mr. Narayan, Advocate. It is not likely that the Advocate would file a false affidavit just to support the petitioner. If his evidence is accepted, then it cannot be disputed that the petitioner has made out a case for condonation of delay, even assuming that the notice served by the Court registry on the petitioner on October 26, 1983, is proper and legal and the limitation can be said to commence on that date. If as urged by Mr. Akolkar that the petitioner's case about Miss Sen, Advocate, having approached the Court clerk twice for a copy at the instance of her senior Mr. Narayan is rejected as an afterthought, then in that case there is nothing to attribute any knowledge to the petitioner about the Award in question being filed in Court till the date fixed for appearance by the Court or the date on which the petitioner filed an application for a certified copy. As observed by me above, the notice served on the petitioner in this case is not in compliance with the provisions of section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act and on the basis of this notice the petitioner cannot be fastened with the knowledge that the Award with which we are concerned has been filed in the Court. 13. Mr. Akolkar submitted that the notice issued by the Court registry to the petitioner about the filing of the Award is in accordance with the Form No. VI prescribed in the Rules framed by the High Court. In the first place the notice issued to the petitioner is not even in conformity with Form No. VI which requires that the date of the passing of the Award by the arbitrators must also be mentioned. The form further provides for the intimation that the Court will proceed to pass judgment according to the Award, unless an application is duly made under section 15, 16 or 30, as the case may be, of the Arbitration act, 1940. There is no such mention in the notice served on the petitioner. The form is more or less prescribed by way of guidance and cannot take the place of law. There is no such mention in the notice served on the petitioner. The form is more or less prescribed by way of guidance and cannot take the place of law. The requirement is the service of notice by the Court registry on the parties that the Award has been filed in the Court. The details as may be necessary in each case have to be filled in, in the notice sent as per the prescribed Form No. VI. The intention is to communicate to the party the fact that the particular Award has been filed by the arbitrators. Merely because the form does not specifically provide for mentioning the names of the parties, can it be said that this essential information should not be incorporated in the notice? In my opinion, it is implicit that the notice sent in Form No. VI must mention at least the names of the parties, otherwise it would be impossible for the person served with the notice to know as to in respect of which dispute the Award has been filed in the Court. Merely telling a party that some Award has been filed in the Court conveys nothing. There is no duty cast on the party on whom a vague notice is served to make inquiries on his own. The condition precedent viz. the communication of the filing of the Award by the Court registry must be complied with. It is elementary that the notice must substantially indicate to the party that the Award relating to a particular dispute between individual parties has been filed in the Court. Here there is neither identification of the respondent as a party nor does the notice contain any other information such as names of arbitrators or the date on which they made the Award and so on. The notice served on the petitioner cannot be said to be a notice in the eye flaw nor can it be said that by service of this notice the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 14 are complied with. In the view that I have taken it is clear that the petitioner is entitled to exclude the period for obtaining the certified copy under section 12(4) of the Limitation Act and taking into consideration the time required for obtaining the copy of the Award, the objections are filed in time. In the view that I have taken it is clear that the petitioner is entitled to exclude the period for obtaining the certified copy under section 12(4) of the Limitation Act and taking into consideration the time required for obtaining the copy of the Award, the objections are filed in time. In any event, the vagueness of the notice itself would be a valid ground for condonation of delay even if it is held that the application for certified copy was filed beyond limitation. The petitioner, in my opinion, has shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay, assuming that the petitioner's contention that the objections are filed beyond limitation is accepted. 14. In the view that I have taken on the facts of this case it is unnecessary for me to consider the contention of Mr. Bhonsale that the bar of limitation will not apply to the instant case in view of the fact that the trial Court had granted the petitioner's application for time to file objections and the objections were filed on the date fixed by the Court i.e. on January 13, 1984. In support of his contention of (Gangaram Chhapolia v. Chief Engineer (Projects), Orissa and others)3, A.I.R. 1983 Orissa 262 where it has been held that the application to file objections could not be said to be beyond time because by granting time to file objections, the Court had impliedly extended the time even without a formal application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. However, it appears that a contrary view has been taken by the Mysore High Court in (Mohammed Esoof v. V.R. Subramanyam and another)4, A.I.R. 1957 Mysore 78. 15. It was submitted by Mr. Akolkar that the Arbitration Act is a self contained and exhaustive code inter alia providing for remedy. The petitioner is not entitled to invoke the powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. He submitted that the petitioner has the remedy of filing an appeal against the impugned orders provided in sub-section (6) of section 39. In this connection reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of the Supreme Court in (Smt. Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector, Jabalpur and others)5, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 479. In para 10 it is observed: "Arbitration Act, 1940, is a self contained and exhaustive code. In this connection reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of the Supreme Court in (Smt. Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector, Jabalpur and others)5, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 479. In para 10 it is observed: "Arbitration Act, 1940, is a self contained and exhaustive code. It provides for filing arbitration agreement to the jurisdiction of Court, appointment and removal of arbitrator by Court, making Award a Rule of Court, remitting or setting aside an Award etc. Where the arbitrator has made an Award it can be questioned under section 33. Section 32 bars a suit on any ground whatsoever for contesting an Award and further provides that no Award shall be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in the Arbitration Act itself. Thus, Arbitration Act, 1940, is a self contained exhaustive code. Relief sought by the appellant by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 could have been obtained by proceeding in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act. In this situation, if the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition, no exception can be taken to it." 16. It is true that the Arbitration Act provides for the remedy of filing an appeal and normally this Court would decline to exercise powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution in such cases. However, in the present case it has been found that the trial Court has totally misguided itself in the application of the legal provisions to the facts of the instant case. The petitioner's grievance that the objections filed by it are not barred by limitation is found to be totally justified. Moreover, the petition has been admitted in the year 1984 almost four years back. Under such circumstances, it would not be proper to reject the petition on the technical ground that the petitioner has the alternative remedy of filing an appeal under sub-section (6) of section 39 of the Arbitration Act. In the peculiar facts of this case, in my opinion, interference under Article 227 of the Constitution would be justified and it would not be proper to throw out the petition on a technical plea that an alternative remedy is open to the petitioner. In the peculiar facts of this case, in my opinion, interference under Article 227 of the Constitution would be justified and it would not be proper to throw out the petition on a technical plea that an alternative remedy is open to the petitioner. Moreover, it is also to be noted that the impugned order is passed in a special suit and the appeal under section 39(6) will lie to this Court and this being so the present writ petition as well can be treated as first appeal. Under the circumstances, in my view, it would be an idle formality to direct the petitioner to file an appeal at this stage. 17. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated February 24, 1984, rejecting the respondents' application for filing the objections for setting aside the Award and passing a decree on the basis of the Award are set aside. The petitioner's application Exh. 16 dated January 13, 1983, is granted and the Special Civil Suit No. 549 of 1983 is restored to file. The trial Court shall consider the objections raised by the petitioner on merits and proceed to decide the case in accordance with law. Having regard to the facts of the case, I direct that the parties to bear their respective costs. Since the matter is pending for a long time, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the same expeditiously and in any event by March 31, 1989. 18. Before parting with the matter it is necessary to observe that the prescribed Form No. VI requires modifications, since I find that the same is defective and does not conform with the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Arbitration Act, so as to convey to the parties a notice of the filing of the Award. The notice must at least mention (a) names and addresses of both the parties and (b) the name/names of the arbitrator/arbitrators/umpire and the date of the making and filing of the Award in Court. It appears that a similar form is prescribed also on the Original Side of the High Court. The Prothonotary and the registrar to put up the proposal for amendment of the form before the learned Chief Justice. Petition allowed. -----