JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal by United India Insurance Company is directed against the interim award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge) Bharatpur, dated 26th May, 1987. 2. Smt. Premvati died in an accident by Jonga Jeep No. RSA 5983 on 3rd November, 1986. Shri Sampat Singh, husband of Premvati filed a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against Smt. Shringar Devi, owner, Shri Chano driver and United Insurance Company insurer of jeep No. RSA 5983. Smt. Premvati at the time of accident was pregnant having a seven months child in her womb. Shri Sampat Singh also filed a separate petition under section 92-A of the Act. The learned Tribunal passed an interim award for an amount of Rs. 30,000 on account of death of Smt. Premvati as well as the death of unborn child of seven months. The appellant Insurance Company has challenged the above order of the Tribunal to the concept of awarding Rs. 15,000 for the death of unborn child of Smt. Premvati. 3. It was contended by learned Counsel for the appellant that the unborn child cannot be considered as "person" for the purpose of awarding compensation under section 92-A of the Act. It was submitted that the compensation is awarded on account of dependency and loss suffered by the claimant due to the death of a person in that accident. In the instant case no question of any dependency can arise on account of the death of the unborn child. 4. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondents contended that a liberal and wider meaning should be given to the word "person" and the claimant is entitled to compensation for the death of unborn child also. It was also contended that the unborn child was seven months old and as such had sufficient development for separate existence from her mother and according to the medical science a child of seven months could have been born alive. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for both the parties and have gone through the scheme of the Act. I shall also deal with the cases cited at the bar during the course of arguments. Section 92-A of the Act was inserted by Act 47 of 1982 with effect from 1st October, 1982. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for both the parties and have gone through the scheme of the Act. I shall also deal with the cases cited at the bar during the course of arguments. Section 92-A of the Act was inserted by Act 47 of 1982 with effect from 1st October, 1982. The compensation of a fixed sum of Rs. 15,000 is allowed under this provision in respect of the death of any person and the claimant is not required to plead and establish that the death was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. Thus, the liability to pay compensation under the above provisions based on the principles of no fault. A compensation of fixed sum of Rs. 7,500 is provided under the above provision in respect of permanent disablement of any person. The claims for compensation in respect of the accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of Motor Vehicles of damages, to any property of a third party so arising, or both are filed under section 110-A of the Act. Thus, there should be the death of a person in order to claim compensation under the above provisions of the Act. Apart from the death of a person, the claim for compensation is determined for the benefits which the claimant would have received from the person who died in the accident. The compensation is also determined for the loss of love and affection, loss of consortium, mental agony, pain etc. in given set of circumstances. In the present case, there is no dispute with regard to the interim compensation awarded under section 92-A of the Act for the death of Smt. Premvati. It is also not argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant as to what compensation would be ultimately determined at the time of final award on account of the death of Smt. Premvati carrying a pregnancy of 7 months of child. The only controversy to be determined at this stage is as to whether an unborn child of seven months can be considered as a separate person for awarding interim compensation of Rs. 15,000 under section 92-A of the Act. The only controversy to be determined at this stage is as to whether an unborn child of seven months can be considered as a separate person for awarding interim compensation of Rs. 15,000 under section 92-A of the Act. I am clearly of the view that unless a child is born alive, it cannot be considered a separate person for the purpose of awarding interim compensation under section 92-A of the Act. In the contention of learned counsel for the respondents is taken to be correct and taken to its logical conclusion a pregnant woman having two or four persons and having died in an accident, would result into the death of two or four persons more as unborn children. This can neither be the intention of the Legislature nor appeals to commonsense. The word "person" has not been defined in the Act. Unless a child is born, no question of any dependency or benefit or mental agony to the claimant can arise from such person. 5. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that an unborn child can be regarded as a living entity with a life of its own. It is contended that the word "person" is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, in two ways, firstly, it is defined as "an individual human being" or "a man, woman or child" and secondly, as "the living body of a human being". Reliance is placed on Jabbar and others v. State, AIR 1966 All 590 . In the above Allahabad case the question for consideration was whether the offence committed by the appellant Jabbar falls within the purview of section 304-A, I. P. C. or not. While dealing with the above question it was held that the term person has not been defined in a technical or narrow sense in the Indian Penal Code. Section 11, I. P. C. defines it in the same way as the term "person" has been defined in section 3 (42) of the Central General Clauses Act. The definition of section 11, I. P. C., is : "the word Person includes any company or association or body of persons whether incorporated or not". It was held as under : "I do not think that it can be denied that an unborn child in advanced stages of pregnancy has a being or life of its own and that it has a body. It was held as under : "I do not think that it can be denied that an unborn child in advanced stages of pregnancy has a being or life of its own and that it has a body. It may be that its life and body are not independent of the mothers existence so that the unborn child cannot be said to have a separate existence. The word "person" has not been defined in such a way as to involve a separate existence of the living creature spoken of as "a person". As there is no such technical definition, I prefer to adopt the ordinary meaning of the term "person" as including a "child" whether born or unborn. Even if the child is unborn and within the womb of the mother, it is capable of being spoken of as "a person" if its body is developed sufficiently to make it possible to call it a "child". The post-mortem report shows that the child had developed sufficiently to have an identity of its own as a child. That would in my opinion be enough to satisfy the definition of the term "person as used in section 304-A, I. P. C.". 6. In my view the above observations have been made in the context of the provisions of section 304-A, I. P. C., and the said principle cannot be applied in the v. awarding compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. That apart in the above Allahabad case the post-mortem report had also shown that the child had developed sufficiently to have an identity of its own as a child. In Bharat Abhyudoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshar Singh, AIR 1938 Cal 745 , it has been held that in order to decide whether in a particular instance the word "person" includes an artificial person or a Corporation or a Company, regard must be had to the setting in which the word "person" is placed, to the circumstances in which it stands. The scope and meaning of the word depends essentially on the connection and circumstances in which it is used. 7. Learned Tribunal has placed reliance on a decision of the Orissa High Court in Minati Das v. Laxmidhar Mohanty and others, 1976 ACJ 512 . The scope and meaning of the word depends essentially on the connection and circumstances in which it is used. 7. Learned Tribunal has placed reliance on a decision of the Orissa High Court in Minati Das v. Laxmidhar Mohanty and others, 1976 ACJ 512 . In the above case, the appellant had claimed compensation on account of the injury sustained by her in a motor accident which caused her abortion after seven days of the accident. The appellant was allowed compensation on account of such abortion in the accident. The above case is not at all relevant nor gives any assistance to the respondents in deciding the controversy raised in the present cases before me. In the case before the Orissa High Court, the appellant had not died in the accident and she herself was claiming compensation on account of the abortion having taken place in the accident. Learned Counsel for the respondents also submitted that under the Hindu Law also a son, who was in his mothers womb at the time of partition is entitled to a share though born after partition, as if he was in existence at the time of partition. The above principle of Hindu Law has no relevancy at all with the question raised before me. 8. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part, the order of the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (District Judge) Bharatpur, dated 26th May, 1987 is set-aside to the extent of awarding Rs. 15,000 for the death of an unborn child of Smt. Premvati. The remaining part of the award by which Rs. 15,000 have been awarded for the death of Premvati herself is maintained. There would be no order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******