JUDGMENT R.P. SINGH, J. 1. THIS civil revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act has been filed against the judgment and decree, dated 7-7-1987 passed by the VIII Addl. District Judge, Kanpur Nagar whereby the opposite parties' suit for ejectment of the applicant from the house in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits has been decreed. 2. THE facts of the case, briefly, are that the opposite parties landladies filed the aforesaid suit against the applicant on the allegation that the applicant who was a tenant of the house in suit on a monthly rent of Rs. 260/- is in arrears of rent from July, 1985 to December, 1985 which has not been paid inspite of notice of demand, dated 3-1-1986 and consequently he was a defaulter in payment of rent and was liable to be evicted on the ground. It was also asserted in the suit that the tenancy of the applicant has been terminated by serving upon him a notice in this behalf as contemplated by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. THE suit was contested by the applicant on the ground that he was not a defaulter in payment of rent and that the tenancy of the applicant has not been terminated by serving upon him a valid notice as contemplated by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was further asserted that the applicant tendered rent which was, however, not accepted by the opposite parties without any valid cause and hence he deposited the same under section 30 of the U. P. Act no. XIII of 1972. It was further asserted by the applicant that since he had made necessary deposits as contemplated by section 20 (4) of the Act, he was entitled to the benefit of the section which relieved him against the liability for eviction from the accommodation in dispute. THE Addl. XIII of 1972. It was further asserted by the applicant that since he had made necessary deposits as contemplated by section 20 (4) of the Act, he was entitled to the benefit of the section which relieved him against the liability for eviction from the accommodation in dispute. THE Addl. District Judge, however, on appraisal of the evidence on record, held that the applicant was in arrears of rent for more than four months and that since the applicant had already constructed a building at Transport Nagar in the same city, which is fit to be used as a residential building and hence in view of the proviso to section 20 (4) of the Act, he was not entitled to the benefit of section 20 (4) and decreed the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent, vide his judgment, dated 7-7-1987 which order is in challenge in the present revision. The main controversy in the present case is, therefore, whether the case of the applicant is covered by the proviso of section 20 (4) of the Act which reads as follows: Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. 3. THE learned counsel for the applicant contended that no plea in this behalf was raised by the opposite parties landladies in the plaint and hence the Addi. District Judge committed an error in denying the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act to the applicant on the basis of the proviso thereto. It may be noted that it is the applicant who was claiming the benefit under section 20 (4) of the Act and hence it was for him to establish that the proviso thereto was not applicable. When the suit was filed by the opposite parties, they could not envisage that the applicant will claim the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act. Since the applicant claimed the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act, the burden was on the applicant to establish that he was entitled to the said benefit. When the suit was filed by the opposite parties, they could not envisage that the applicant will claim the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act. Since the applicant claimed the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act, the burden was on the applicant to establish that he was entitled to the said benefit. THE applicant could get the benefit only if he had not only complied with the requirements of section 20 (4) but also succeeded in establishing that his case was not covered by the proviso thereto. In this case, an issue was also framed specifically on this point as to whether the applicant was entitled to the benefit of section 20 (4). THE court below on the basis of the evidence produced before it by the parties held that the applicant was not entitled to the benefit of section 20 (4) of the Act inasmuch as the applicant had constructed a house in Transport Nagar which could be used as his residential house. 4. THE question as to what is the 'residential premises' came up for interpretation in the case of Busching Sehmitz Private Ltd. v. P. T. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569 , where Krishna Aiyer, J., observed as follows: "Engineering skills and architectural designing have advanced for enough to make multi-purpose edifices and by minor adaptations, make a building serve a residential, commercial or other use. THE art of building is no longer rigid and the character of a house is not an 'either or'. It can be both, as needs demand. It is so common to see a rich home turned into a business house, a dormitory into a factory. Many small-scale industries are run in former living quarters. To petrify engineering concepts is to betray the law's purpose. Whatever is suitable or adaptable for residential uses even by making some charges, can be designated 'residential premises'. And once it is 'residential' in the liberal sense, Section 14-A stands attracted Dictionary meaning, common-sense understanding and architectural engineering concur in the correctness of this construction.................................................................................... A building which reasonably accommodates a residential use is a residential accommodation nothing less, nothing else. THE circumstances of the landlord are not altogether out of place in reaching a right judgment. And once it is 'residential' in the liberal sense, Section 14-A stands attracted Dictionary meaning, common-sense understanding and architectural engineering concur in the correctness of this construction.................................................................................... A building which reasonably accommodates a residential use is a residential accommodation nothing less, nothing else. THE circumstances of the landlord are not altogether out of place in reaching a right judgment. THE 'purpose test' will enable officers who own houses to defeat the government by pleading that they do not own 'residential premises', because the lease is for commercial use built though it was and suitable though, it is for residence. Similarly the 'possibility test' may make nonsense of the provision." In view of the observations noted above, we will now examine whether the applicant is not covered by the proviso to section 20 (4). The fact that the applicant has constructed a building in Transport Nagar in the year 1974 is admitted. What has to be examined is if the building so constructed was a residential building as claimed by the opposite parties or that it was a commercial building as claimed by the applicant. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that Transport Nagar is essentially a commercial locality and in his statement before the Addl. District Judge, in paragraph 4' of his cross-examination, the applicant has clearly stated that the building in Transport Nagar was constructed by him in the year 1974 which is a two storeyed building i. e., ground floor, first floor and second floor. On the ground floor, there are two shops, balcony and a godown. On the first floor, according to the own statement of the applicant, there are two flats. In one flat, there are four rooms and in the other flat, there are three rooms and there is a covered Verandah in front of them. There are also two latrines and bath room. On the second floor, there are two rooms It has also come in evidence that there is a store and kitchen also on the first floor. In view of this statement of the applicant himself that there are two flats on the first floor and one flat comprises of four rooms while the other flat comprises of three rooms along with bath room, latrine and kitchen, it is clear that first and second floor of the building are residential building equipped with all facilities for residence of families. The Addl. The Addl. District Judge has relied on this statement of the applicant himself in arriving at a finding that the first and second floor of the building are residential in nature and hence in view of the proviso to section 20 (4) of the Act, the applicant is not entitled to the benefit of the said section. 5. THE learned counsel for the applicant contended that the said finding recorded by the learned Addl. District Judge is not in accordance with law and hence it can be interfered with in revision by this Court. THE question about the ambit of the powers under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act has been considered by the Supreme Court in various cases. In the case of Hari Shanker v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chaudhary, AIR 1963 SC 698 it was observed that the phrase "according to law" refers to the decisions as a whole and is not be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the over all decision, which must be according to law which it would not be if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. It was further observed that it is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumount, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom. 223, where the learned Chief Justice dealing with Sec. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act observed: "THE object of Sec. 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. THE section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference, but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order has no jurisdiction or in which the court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being beard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party had not a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere. But in my opinion, the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who beard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at." "Dealing with the scope of interpretation of Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, the Supreme Court in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohammad Mirasaheb Kadri, AIR 1987 SC 1782 said that it is in the same language as in Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. THE Supreme Court observed: "We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the Courts below because it considers it to be a better view. THE fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. Judged by that standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction." 6. IN Hansraj v. Puran Lal, 1981 ALJ 35 this Court held that under section 25, the High Court has limited jurisdiction to find whether the judgment given by the J.S.C.C. is in accordance with law. Where the J.S.C.C. after considering the evidence comes to a finding that the defendant was a defaulter of rent, it being a finding of fact the High Court cannot reappraise evidence and arrive at a finding different from that of the Court below. IN the case of Hari Shanker (supra) the Supreme Court laid down that the decision if given according to law would not be interfered with except on certain error of law. The same view was followed in M. A. Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas, AIR 1969 SC 1344 . A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Laxmi Kishore v. H. P. Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 held that while exercising revisional power under section 25, the court does not possess jurisdiction to determine issue of fact itself by entering into the evidence and assessing it. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Laxmi Kishore v. H. P. Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 held that while exercising revisional power under section 25, the court does not possess jurisdiction to determine issue of fact itself by entering into the evidence and assessing it. It was further held that the revisional court has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact. This view was followed in the case of Mool Narain Mehrotra v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1987 (2) ARC 411. 7. IN view of what has been stated above, since the findings has been recorded by the learned Addl. District Judge on appraisal of the evidence on 'record, who, in arriving at that finding, has relied on the own statement of the applicant that there are two flats on the first-floor-one containing four rooms and the other containing three rooms along with bath room, latrine and kitchen and then there are two rooms on the second floor with open roof, the finding that the accommodations on the first and second floors are residential building cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its powers under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the finding arrived at being in accordance with law. 8. THE learned counsel for the applicant then contended that the Addl. District Judge has not properly appreciated the sanctioned plan and the Income-tax Valuer's report which could show that the building was commercial building and not residential building. THE sanctioned plan cannot show anything more than the accommodation described by the applicant himself in his statement which has been referred to earlier. THE number of rooms etc., has already been described even by the applicant and there is no dispute about the accommodation available on the ground floor, first floor and second floor of the building THE Income-tax Valuer's report is not accompanied by any affidavit of the Valuer. Moreover, the Valuer's report would not change the nature of the building but may be relevant factor while determining the rent of the building if the report is accompanied by the affidavit of the Valuer. Moreover, the Valuer's report would not change the nature of the building but may be relevant factor while determining the rent of the building if the report is accompanied by the affidavit of the Valuer. However, in the present case, the report is not accompanied by any affidavit of the Valuer and hence there are no merits in the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that the case should be remanded to the Addl. District Judge for a decision afresh after considering the Valuer's report. Since the own statement of the applicant has been relied on in arriving at a finding that the first and second floors of the accommodation are residential building and it is admitted that there are two flats on the first floor along with bath room, kitchen and latrine and further there are two rooms also on the second floor with open roof, it is clear that the finding has been arrived at by the Addl. District Judge regarding the residential nature of the building in accordance with law and no case is made out for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional power under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. In the result of the discussion above, there are no merits in this revision which is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, parties shall bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.