B. KARIYAPPA v. LAND TRIBUNAL, BHADRAVATHI — 1988 DIGILAW 314 (KAR)

SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) IN these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners have sought for a declaration that the endorsement dated 3rd March 1988 bearing No. B. S. Application 67/88 issued by the Circle inspector of Police, Bhadravathi (Annexure-C) is illegal and without jurisdiction. ( 2 ) BY the aforesaid impugned endorsement, the Circle Inspector, Bhadravathi has directed the petitioners not to enter upon the land bearing S. No. 91 measuring 2 acres 34 guntas of Koppa Village as the Land tribunal has recorded a finding in favour of resptondent -3 while rejecting the application filed in Form No. 7 by the petitioners and his possession is also supported by the entries in record of Rights. The endorsement is as follows : ( 3 ) IT is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the order dated 15-9-1987 passed by the land Tribunal, Bhadravathi in No. KLR. MA 2582/74-5, 255/71-5 and INA. 32/83-84 (Annexure-B) rejecting the application filed by the petitioners in Form No. 7 is challenged in the appeal before the Land reforms Appellate Authority and the appeal is still pending; that it is not open to the circle Inspector of Police or any Police officer to exercise the power of a Civil Court or of a Land Reforms Appellate Authority to issue an order of injunction restraining the petitioners from entering into the land in question as such it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the endorsement issued is without jurisdiction. ( 4 ) ON the contrary, Sri M. P. Eswarappa, learned counsel for rcspondent-3 the landholder of the land in question contends that the Land Tribunal has recorded a categorical finding in the order Anncxure -B that the petitioners have not cultivated the land in question as tenants and has accordingly rejected their application; that it is respondent -3 being the landholder who has been in possession of the land in question and cultivating the same, therefore, the entry of the petitioner on the land in question amounts to criminal trespass, therefore the circle Inspector of Police is justified in issuing an order restraining the petitioners from entering upon the land in question in order to prevent commission of offence; that Section 149 cr. P. C. empowers the Circle Inspector of Police to issue an order in the nature of injunction to prevent commission of an offence. P. C. empowers the Circle Inspector of Police to issue an order in the nature of injunction to prevent commission of an offence. ( 5 ) THE stand taken by the learned High court Government Pleader on behalf of the circle Inspector of Police is that the endorsement cannot be read as preventing the petitioners from entering the land in question but it is a notice warning them not to give rise to any such situation which would lead to breach of peace and have the dispute between the parties settled peacefully through a court of law. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid contentions the point that arises for consideration is, whether the impugned endorsement dated 3rd March 1988 issued by the Circle Inspector of police, Bhadravathi, is within his jurisdiction. ( 7 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioners have filed applications in Form No. 7 claiming occupancy rights in the land in question. The 3rd respondent disputes the claim made by them. The Tribunal on holding an enquiry, has rejected the applications filed by the petitioners by the order dated 15-9-1987 (Annexure - B ). Being aggrieved by the order of the Land Tribunal, the petitioners have preferred appeals before the Land reforms Appellate Authority, Shimoga and those appeals are pending. The Land reforms Appellate Authority, Shimoga, has also refused to stay the order of the Land tribunal on the ground that as the Land tribunal has rejected the applications filed by the petitioners, there is nothing to be stayed. ( 8 ) THE contention of Sri Eswarappa, learned Counsel for respondent -3 is that in the light of the finding recorded by the Land tribunal it becomes the duty of the police to enforce it, that if the petitioners try to violate the order of the Land Tribunal by attempting to enter upon the land in question, such an attempt would be contrary to the finding recorded by the Land Tribunal and as such it amounts to criminal trespass; therefore under Section 149 Cr. P. C. a Police Officer is entitled to prevent the commission of the offence. Hence the impugned order is issued only to prevent commission of criminal trespass. "it appears to me that it is not possible to accept the contention. P. C. a Police Officer is entitled to prevent the commission of the offence. Hence the impugned order is issued only to prevent commission of criminal trespass. "it appears to me that it is not possible to accept the contention. Both, the petitioners and respondent-3 claim to be in possession of the land in question as tenants and as land owner respectively. This dispute has not yet been finally decided. The finding recorded by the Tribunal rejecting the application of the petitioners on holding that they have not cultivated the land in question as tenants as claimed by them, has not become final as the appeals are preferred by the petitioners. That being so, in assertion of their civil right, if the petitioneis claim to be in possession of the land in question which is consistent to the claim made by them in form No. 7 it cannot be held that they are committing an offence amounting to criminal trespass. Further, the Circle Inspector of police or any police officer cannot attempt to exercise the jurisdiction of a Civil Court or any other competent authority. In the instant case, the Land Reforms Appellate Authority, which is seized of the matter, is competent to decide as to who has been in possession of the land in question. If pending decision by the Land Reforms Appellent Authority, there is any Controversy between the parties to the appeal as to possession, they have to seek appropriate interim order from the land Reforms Appellate Authority. The only course open to the Circle Inspector of police in the instant case, if he is of the opinion that the acts of the parties in connection with the land in question are likely to lead to breach of peace, is to take recourse to Section 107 Cr. P. C. Section 149 Cr. P. C. does not and cannot be interpreted to empower the Police Officer to issue an order of injunction under the guise of preventing commission of offence so as to interfere with the civil rights of the parties. Section 149 Cr. P. C. is out of place in a case like this where the assertion of the petitioners, that they are in possession of the land in question cannot be termed as amounting to commission ot offence much less a cognizable offence. Section 149 Cr. P. C. is out of place in a case like this where the assertion of the petitioners, that they are in possession of the land in question cannot be termed as amounting to commission ot offence much less a cognizable offence. If the contitution is accepted, no party will be in a position is claim that his nossession of an immovable property and bonafide assert his possession and have the right adjudicated in a civil court-an authority competent to decide the claim. "learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a decision in Ibrahim sheriff, v. Sub-inspector Of Police, Periyapatna [ (1978) 2 Kar. L. J. 437]. In that case, it has been held that a Police Officer either under the provisions of Cr. P. C. of I. P. C. or any other law has no power to restrain a person in possession of the lands from enjoyment of the same. Sri Eswarappa submits that, that was a case in which the order was passed against a person who was in possession of an agricultural land preventing him from entering upon the land and this Court held that the order passed by the Police Officer was without jurisdiction. Therefore it is submitted that it follows from that decision that a police officer can issue an appropriate order in favour of a person to protect his possession of the land restraining the persons who try to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the land by the person who is in possession of it. No such proposition is laid down in the aforesaid decision. It is also not possible to hold that any such a proposition of law is deducible from that decision. The decision has no bearing on the present case, in as much as in the present case, the police officer has issued an order protecting the alleged possession of respondent-3. Whether for protecting possession of a person in possession or preventing a person who according tc the police officer tries to interfere with the possession of another person of an immovable property, the police officer has ho jurisdiction or power to interfere with the claims of either of the parties by preventing one of the parties to enter tht land. Whether for protecting possession of a person in possession or preventing a person who according tc the police officer tries to interfere with the possession of another person of an immovable property, the police officer has ho jurisdiction or power to interfere with the claims of either of the parties by preventing one of the parties to enter tht land. The only course open to him in such a situation, if he is convinced that the activities of the parties are likely to lead to breach of peace, is to take recourse to Section 107 of the Cr. P. C. if the parties have already approached competent authority or a court in respect of such properly for adjudication of their rival claims. If not it is open to him to make a report to the jurisdictional Magistrate to initiate a proceeding under Section 145 of the cr. P. C. In this regard, it is relevant to notice a decision of this Court in Malkappa v padmanna (AIR 1959 MYSORE 122 ). That was a case in which the parties had approached the civil court for adjudication of their rival claims to the suit property. In spite of that, the Magistrate initiated a proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr. P. C. The Court held as follows :"it seems to me that it is a misapprehension to consider this question from the point of view of the existence or otherwise of a jurisdiction in a Magistrate. Section 145 should not be understood as merely conferring a particular jurisdiction on a criminal court to deal with a civil matter. It embodies or enjoins upon the magistrate a certain duty and that duty is to see that parties who have a civil dispute do not take the law into their own hands and commit breach of peace. The duty is to see that the parties actually go to a civil court and not fight about the land. If the parties have already gone there, the Magistrate has no longer any duty to perform. It is also necessary to state that one of the pillars of public peace is the respect for orders of the Civil courts and the proceedings before a Civil Court. If the parties have already gone there, the Magistrate has no longer any duty to perform. It is also necessary to state that one of the pillars of public peace is the respect for orders of the Civil courts and the proceedings before a Civil Court. If the Criminal courts should start parallel proceedings in respect of a matter which is pending before a Civil Court, I have no doubt that it will have the effect of undermining respect for the authority of civil courts with the result that the very objective of Section 145 will be defeated. This is not saying that the Magistrate cannot proceed under Section 107 to bind over parties who, it is apprehended, might commit some offence or commit breach of the peace. Indeed that section is more proper because it is exclusively a matter for a magistrate to deal with, whereas Section 145 impinges upon the authority of civil courts. When therefore, there is a choice between Section 145 and Section 107 before a Magistrate by reason of the pendency of Civil litigation, it seems to me perfectly obvious that he must choose section 107 and not Section 145. "in Smt. Venkatalakshmamma v. Sub inspector of Police, Chikmagalur (I. L. R. 1987 kar. 79) a Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the power of the Police officer to issue an order of injunction has held thus :"the conferment of occupancy rights on respondent-3 even if the order of the tribunal had been confirmed and was even in force as on 11-12-1981 and 25-5-1981 on which days the Tahsiklar and s. I. issued their directions and this court rejected the writ petition of the appellant on 13-11-1981, did not mean that either the Tahsildar or S. I. could usurp the powers of the competent authorities under the Act or a Civil Court to order restitution and then physically dispossess the appellant if she was in possession and deliver possession to respondent 3. On the guise of issuing directions the tahsildar and S. I. could not take the law into their own hands, usurp the powers and functions of the competent authorities and courts, which also could exercise their powers duly complying with law only and not otherwise. On the guise of issuing directions the tahsildar and S. I. could not take the law into their own hands, usurp the powers and functions of the competent authorities and courts, which also could exercise their powers duly complying with law only and not otherwise. We are of the view that this ground that found favour with the learned judge, as pointed out by the Supreme court and this Court in Lallu v. Rao jagdish ( AIR 1968 SC 620 ) and Mis Patil v corporation ILR (1985) Kant. 3700 (AIR 1986 Kant 194), with respect, was clearly unsound and illegal. ""in W. P. 257 of 1979 decided on 3-4-1979 [1980 (1) Kar. L. J. Short Notes Item 49], it has been held by this Court that the sub-Inspector of Police does not possess any power under the Karnataka Land Reforms act to issue an order so as to interfere with the civil rights of the parties. Therefore, the point is answered in the negative. " ( 9 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the writ petitions are allowed. The endorsement dated 3rd March 1988 bearing No. 67/88 (Annexure-C) issued by respondent No. 2- circle Inspector of Police, Bhadravathi circle, Bhadravathi is hereby quashed. ( 10 ) IT is not in dispute that after the impugned order Annexure-C was issued, the 3rd respondent cut and removed the crop standing on the land in question. The question as to whether the petitioners are entitled to reimbursement of the value of the crop cut and removed by the 3rd respondent depends upon the decision of the Land Reforms Appellate authority. Therefore this question is left open to be decided by the Land Reforms appellate Authority on the basis of the Conclusion it arrives at on the claim made by the petitioners in Form No. 7. However it is clarified that if the Land Reforms Appellate authority comes to the conclusion that the petitioners are entitled to be registered as occupants of the land in question, they are entitled to reimbursement of the value of the crop that is cut and removed by respondent no. 3. However Sri Eswarappa learned counsel for respondent No. 3 submits that the Land Reforms Appellate Authority will have no jurisdiction to go into the question of reimbursement. 3. However Sri Eswarappa learned counsel for respondent No. 3 submits that the Land Reforms Appellate Authority will have no jurisdiction to go into the question of reimbursement. It is not possible to accept this submission because it is only a consequential relief to which the petitioners are entitled to if they are held to be entitled to grant of occupancy right. Hence I am of the view that the Land Reforms Appellate authority has jurisdiction to pass consequential order as to reimbursement of the value of the crop cut and removed by the 3rd respondent from the land in question in case the petitioners are held to be entitled to grant of occupancy right. Accordingly consistent with its conclusions, the Land Reforms Appellate authority shall pass the consequential order relating to the value of the crop. --- *** --- .